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‘The definitions, or descriptions, that have been applied to money are legion. They 
range from those which carry the implication that it is the root of  all evil to those 
that regard it as manna from heaven. Some have argued that it does not matter, 
others that it matters too much. Money has been described as a political, or 
sociological, phenomenon, as a mechanism, as a mirror, as a religion, as a myth, as a 
means of  communication which reduces complexity and as a distortion which 
increases it, as the curse of  the miser and the elixir of  the spendthrift, as a means to 
all ends and as an end in itself, as barren and as all-powerful, as inert or neutral, and 
as ‘‘the drink which stimulates the economic system to activity,” as the tool of  social 
progress and as an obstacle to it. . . . Such definitions, descriptions, implications, or 
epithets always imply or involve a moral or philosophical issue. This is not generally 
recognized because Cartesian forms of  thought still dominate our thinking’. 
 





















This thesis deals with the complex and epistemic role of  money and its surrounding institutions. It studies 
the relations among money, monetary institutions, the contextualized formation of  macroeconomic 
phenomena, and the emergence of  knowledge. It makes three relevant contributions: first, it explores the 
analytical and methodological implications of  the link between the use of  money and different monetary 
institutions in determining the formation of  knowledge. As such, it emphasizes the emergence of  
different macroeconomic phenomena conditioned on monetary institutions’ distinctive epistemic and 
incentive properties. Second, it presents a new political economy and institutionalist framework within 
macroeconomics to assess different monetary institutions in order to identify their: a) relative robustness 
and b) plausible institutional ‘inevitability’ and entangled political evolution. Third, it sheds light on the 
need for an orderly set of  monetary relations and associated systems of  neutral monetary policy and 
robust rules, necessary for sustaining a social order. In sum, this dissertation delineates a novel 
institutionalist subdiscipline of  macroeconomics that recognizes and deals with emergence, complexity, 
entangled evolution, and the rationale for central banks. 
 
This work is divided into three main sections, comprising six chapters: Part I examines the analytical 
relation between the notion of  organized complexity and macroeconomics, as well as its implications for 
methodology and macroeconomic inquiry. It also explores the epistemic role of  money as an orderly 
system of  social relations, money’s fundamental role in generating epistemic complexity, and how its use 
is indivisible from a macroeconomic complex order. In Parts II and III, the complexity-based research 
agenda is translated into two self-standing yet interrelated research inquiries delving deeper into the 
political economy of  money. They explore the institutional implications of  money and the need for 
robust monetary constitutions. More specifically, Part II examines the institutional evolution of  central 
banks and their alleged ‘institutional rationale.’ It combines a scrutiny of  the theoretical justifications for 
central banks with a historical analysis of  their entangled political evolution. Together these analyses 
reveal that there is no strong institutional rationale for central banks’ apparent inevitability. The 
framework of  robust political economy is extended to monetary theory in Part III, which scrutinizes 
monetary alternatives that could be robust for ‘managing’ money and overcoming knowledge and 
incentive problems in monetary policy. It specifically undertakes institutional comparisons of  diverse 
monetary systems, primarily central banking versus free banking. Finally, the three sections propose a 
heterodox institutional research agenda in macroeconomics to identify robust institutions, contrasted 
















Part I  
 
The Monetary-Institutional Foundations of Complexity and Social 
Knowledge 
 
1. The Challenges of Complexity in Macroeconomics: Toward a Political Economy of 
Money  




The Institutional Rationale and Entangled Evolution of Central Banking  
 
3. The Institutional Rationale of Central Banking Reconsidered 




The Robust Political Economy of Monetary Institutions 
 
5. The Stability Properties of Monetary Constitutions 
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‘There cannot be intrinsically a more insignificant thing, in the economy of 
society, than money . . . It is a machine for doing quickly and commodiously, 
what would be done, though less quickly and commodiously, without it: and 
like many other kinds of machinery, it only exerts a distinct and independent 
influence of its own when it gets out of order’. 




Why are money and monetary institutions so fundamental in coordinating economies based on 
decentralized interactions and freedom of  exchange? How can money, as Mill suggests in the quote above, 
be ‘out of  order’, and what are its effects on coordination and on the overall economy? Do monetary 
institutions, and the way they are designed (their rules, incentive structures, and procedures), have 
substantial influence in the way money can potentially get ‘out of  order’? And finally, do institutions, 
which ‘govern’ the supply (creation) of  money, have any meaningful role in explaining the recurrence of  
crisis and coordination failures?  
 
Or to frame the question differently, are economic crises simply unavoidable and inherent features of  
capitalism—as Marx (1973 [1939]) claimed—or are they really phenomena conditioned to a specific 
monetary institutional context? And ultimately, are money and its institutions—rather than market 
failures and animal spirits—the most important elements in explaining the macroeconomy’s complexity 
and the emergence of  crisis? These are some of  the fundamental questions I will seek to address 
throughout this work, by using a broader conception of  macroeconomics and political economy based 
on the ideas of  organized complexity, emergent knowledge, institutional analysis, and their relationships 
with robust political economy (RPE).1 
 
Specifically, this thesis deals with three pressing challenges related to suitable economic methodologies, 
complex macroeconomic phenomena, and banking institutions. In a simple phrase, it deals with some 
crucial yet neglected problems related to the most suitable methods for macroeconomic analysis, the 
epistemic and complexity-based role of  money in society, and finally, the monetary institutions that affect 
how money operates within such a complex system. These three major and contemporary challenges for 
macroeconomics can be also framed as a series of  important research questions that have been greatly 
neglected by modern macroeconomics, and they will be the core focus in this work. Hence in what follows, 
I will describe what can be gained by paying attention to alternative (non-mainstream) approaches to 
macro, the three major relevant research questions that guide the intellectual endeavor of  this work, 
followed finally by a detailed examination of  the major themes developed throughout this thesis in order 
to address them.  
 
The rest of  this preface will proceed as follows: First, it will propose some fruitful ways forward, 
 
1 RPE provides an analytical framework or approach for doing comparative institutional analysis, in which the institutions to 
be compared are examined to see how in reality they can function in order to overcome social, collaborative, and economic 
dilemmas—even when there are unfavorable conditions about the knowledge, information, and incentives that decision-
makers, within those institutions, face explicitly in them (Leeson and Subrick, 2006; see chapter 6). Institutional robustness 
relates to ‘institutional success’, meaning ‘institutions that enable individuals to achieve productive outcomes in situations 
where temptation to free-ride and shirk are ever present’ (Ostrom, 1990, 15).             
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complementarities, and some plausible relations (theory bridge-building) between contemporary 
macroeconomics and this work, so that mainstream macroeconomists can be more captivated and 
incentivized in gaining insights from alternative and institutionalist approaches to macro. Thus, the first 
part of  this preface seeks to show to mainstream practitioners what can be gained—intellectually—by 
paying attention to alternative and heterodox approaches to money and monetary institutions. The 
second section will describe the three major research questions that will be addressed throughout this 
thesis and that motivate the entire intellectual endeavor of  this work. Second, it will outline the major 
themes explored throughout the six chapters that comprise this thesis, in order to shed light on and 
address those specific research questions.  
 
Third, the preface will provide theoretical justifications and arguments for focusing on money as a crucial 
element of  analysis within the fields of  political economy and macroeconomics. Fourth, it will describe 
in depth the major themes of  complexity, knowledge, and monetary institutions and how they analytically 
relate to the relevant research questions that motivate this work; and then it will give a brief  description 
of  the major contributions of  this dissertation.2 Finally, the preface will conclude by suggesting a novel 
complexity-based approach and institutional research agenda for macroeconomics that is more capable 
of  addressing the key properties of  the macroeconomy as an organized complex system and hence better 
able also to address the relevant research questions related to money and posited in this work.           
 
Fruitful Bridges Between Contemporary Macro and Alternative Approaches 
 
The aforementioned broad challenges for macroeconomics can be translated into a series of  research 
questions that will guide the overall intellectual endeavor of  this work, and that can be of  great interest 
also for mainstream macroeconomists. The more general and encompassing research question therein is 
the fundamental problem concerning why money matters in commercial societies—in other words, what 
the economic and institutional implications are of  the use of  money in commercial societies. Money as 
an institution seems to be extremely important for the correct workings of  commercial and market-based 
societies, yet its fundamental coordinative and epistemological role has not been entirely understood 
(Dyer, 1989; Smithin, 2003). In other words, the social sciences in general, and political economy in 
particular, have long recognized that money is a crucial institution for market-based societies (Marx, 1964; 
Smith, 1981 [1776]); yet paradoxically, we have no compelling and systematic explanations of  the 
fundamental reasons why money is so important (Horwitz, 1992a, 1992b). 
 
This lack of  a consistent and compelling explanation of  why money matters in commercial societies and 
in the macroeconomy at large seems to be one of  the underlying reasons why macroeconomics, as a 
discipline, has largely forgotten about money and its important implications (Laidler, 2004; Smithin, 2000). 
Consequently, this thesis can be interpreted as a broad attempt to provide tentative answers to the above 
fundamental question and hence why they should be, once again, a fundamental focus of  scientific 
attention for both macroeconomics and political economy. Put differently, the six chapters that comprise 
this work are complementary and overlapping attempts to provide answers to the fundamental question 
of  whether money and its surrounding institutions matter in determining (both positive and negative) 
macroeconomic phenomena. 
 
This broad research question about money and its institutional implications for commercial societies can 
be subsequently broken down into three more specific research questions that will be addressed in the 
three major parts of  this work, part I, part II, and part III. Taken together, these three more specific 
 
2 Institutions are conceived throughout this work as ‘the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. They 
are made up of  formal constraints (e.g., rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (e.g., norms of  behavior, conventions, 
self-imposed codes of  conduct), and their enforcement characteristics. Together they define the incentive [and epistemic] 
structure of  societies and specifically economies’ (North, 1994, 360; see also Ostrom, 2005). Alas, it should be acknowledged 
that North’s conception of  institutions is considered by some unclear and has also been criticized recently by other institutional 
economists (Hodgson, 2006); furthermore, there has been recent attempts to provide a more refined discussion on how 
institutions should be defined, see for example Guala’s (2016) recent arguments concerning how institutions should be defined.          
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research questions are complementary attempts at providing different theoretical and institutional 
answers to the more general question about the crucial role of  money and its surrounding institutions in 
commercial societies. Thereafter, the first more specific research question concerns the complexity-based 
and epistemic role of  money. In other words, how does money affect the emergent and complex 
macroeconomic order? Put differently, why does money, as an institution, matter in the emergent 
coordinative process of  the market?  
 
Ever since Hayek’s famous essays on money prices and knowledge (Hayek, 1948 [1937], 1948 [1945]), 
not much work has focused on the fundamental role that money plays in coordinating the scattered 
knowledge in society. Moreover, recent work has focused merely on the rather communicative or almost 
‘linguistic-like’ role of  money in conveying the already-existent tacit knowledge available in society (Horwitz, 
1992b). However, recent explorations in complexity theory and social ontology have suggested that 
interactive social systems, which are based on orderly systems of  relations, generate emergent epistemic 
properties that are irreducible to the already-existent informational properties of  the system (Hodgson, 
2000b; Lawson, 2012; Paniagua, 2018a). Thus these two fundamental ideas about money and organized 
complexity seem to be on conflicting theoretical terms with each other (Lawson, 2016). Thus, a relevant 
challenge for the first part of  this thesis is to find a theoretical way forward, or framework of  analysis, 
through which we can reconcile these ideas about epistemology, money, social ontology, and emergence 
and consequently, to expand further our narrow understanding of  the crucial role of  money in society.        
 
Given the above gaps in monetary research, a fundamental question for social theory in general, and for 
monetary theory in particular, arises: does money truly play a communicative or ‘disseminating’ role in 
society? Or rather, could money potentially play a more relevant role in generating an orderly complex 
system through which the coordinative properties of  the market arise as emergent properties of  such a system 
of  monetary relations? These tensions lead also to a second more specific research question: do money 
and language differ in any meaningful manner as media of  social relations? Alas, modern 
macroeconomics, with its isolated and utility-maximizing representative-agent models, has nothing 
meaningful to say on these fundamental issues related to money, emergence, and organized complexity 
(Kirman, 1992, 2010). Modern macroeconomic approaches have relied too heavily upon reductionist 
assumptions and formalist methods; and consequently, they are unfortunately silent on these relevant and 
pressing issues related to complexity, epistemology, and money (Horwitz, 1992a). Thus, there is no 
wonder why macroeconomists have been so confused and puzzled about the underlying and fundamental 
causes of  the 2008–9 Great Recession (Caballero, 2010; Calvo, 2013; Romer, 2016).  
 
For instance, Calvo has recently commented, ‘Conventional monetary theory obliterates the central role 
played by media of  exchange in the workings and instability of  capitalist economies’; pressing issues 
about the role of  money in economic crises ‘have been ignored in conventional theory . . . This is very 
strange because disregard for these key [monetary] issues has lasted for more than half  a century’ (Calvo, 
2013, 3). These remarks have been further underscored by Caballero (2010), which stated that: 
 
[T]he current core of macroeconomics—by which I mainly mean the so-called dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium approach—has become so mesmerized with its own internal 
logic that it has begun to confuse the precision it has achieved about its own world with 
the precision that it has about the real one. This is dangerous for both methodological and 
policy reasons. On the methodology front, macroeconomic research has been in “fine-
tuning” mode within the local-maximum of the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
world, when we should be in “broad-exploration” mode. We are too far from absolute 
truth to be so specialized and to make the kind of confident quantitative claims that often 
emerge from the core. On the policy front, this confused precision creates the illusion that 
a minor adjustment in the standard policy framework will prevent future crises, and by 
doing so it leaves us overly exposed to the new and unexpected. (Caballero, 2010, 85; see 
also Romer, 2016)  
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Hence current macroeconomic approaches are unable to shed light upon the aforementioned issues 
related to money, emergent properties, and the features of  organized complexity—all features that seem 
to be actually relevant in order to illuminate the fundamental emergent and coordinative role of  money 
in society (Lawson, 2016; see also chapter 1). Ever since the 2008 Great Recession there has been a 
growing dissatisfaction concerning the way in which macroeconomics has been performed. This has been 
even recognized by the most mainstream and prestigious practitioners of  macroeconomics (Romer, 2016). 
 
As Caballero has recognized in the quote above, the fundamental problem with mainstream 
macroeconomics is that contemporary approaches have begun to consider that the only legitimate way 
to shed light on macroeconomic phenomena, is through either neoclassical growth models or stochastic 
general equilibrium approaches. Alas, in such a zealous process concerning the most appropriate methods 
to understand macroeconomic reality, modern practitioners have begun to confound their preferred 
methods with macroeconomic reality itself. Hence mainstream macroeconomics is at the danger of 
confusing ‘the precision it has achieved about its own world with the precision that it has about the real 
one’ (Caballero, 2010, 85). This is problematic for two reasons: first, it has misled mainstream 
practitioners to believe that their preferred approaches are the only plausible and legitimate way to 
understand macroeconomic reality; and second, it has misled them to believe that the world represented 
by those models is in fact the real world, and thus, that no further alternative explorations are required 
to enrich their worldview. I consider that narrow form to engage with scientific explorations utterly 
misguided.   
 
These two effects have significantly impoverished macroeconomics as a discipline, proscribing it to 
engage fruitfully with alternative and non-formalist approaches that could enrich the manner in which 
macroeconomists fully understand money and monetary institutions. As Caballero (2010) suggests, 
mainstream practitioners should be less concerned about ‘fine-tunning’ their own mainstream models —
which allegedly have achieved their maximum total utility (Romer, 2016)—, and thus be more concerned 
with ‘broader explorations’ about how to best understand macroeconomic reality, and finally to rekindle 
macroeconomics as a discipline. Hence, in part, this work is an invitation for mainstream practitioners to 
engage fruitfully with alternative approaches to money and monetary institutions from a social-epistemic 
and emergentist perspective.                                
 
This thesis examines macroeconomic phenomena from an analytical framework different from the 
mainstream modelling approach and based on theories of  complex systems, institutional analysis, and 
social epistemology. Thus, in contrast to conventional approaches based on aggregation and formal 
stochastic general equilibrium models, the approach suggested in this work is one in which 
macroeconomic entities are generated and constituted by both the network of monetary interactions 
established by the agents and also by the adjacent monetary institutions in charge of producing the 
medium of exchange. The non-linear and complex combination of these two elements allows the 
emergence of economic phenomena which are irreducible to the micro parts, yet largely affected by the 
institutions which produce money. The resulting difference in analytical perspectives is substantial: the 
macro level of  society cannot be either represented or attain by processes of  aggregation over the micro 
entities which neglect also the role of  money as a socio-interactive mechanism (Wagner, 2020). To the 
contrary, the micro-macro relation is treated as a complex one of  parts-to-emergent-whole, and this 
nonlinear relation is analyzed via a socio-epistemic and institutionalist scheme of  thought.  
 
Ultimately, from this perspective, the macroeconomy is a complex epistemic network, generated by agents 
interacting through monetary exchanges. However, such an emergent epistemic-monetary system, cannot 
be reducible either to a single “representative” plan, performed by a single “representative agent”, or to 
the aggregation or sum of  the agents’ different plans. Hence my approach suggested here, treats 
macroeconomic theory as a form of  systems theory, or as a theory of  money-using society, which has 
been organized through monetary interactions and money-producing institutions. In other words, the 
main difference between the systems-theoretic or social-theoretical approach suggested here and the 
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mainstream approach to macro is that:      
 
Conventional macro theory presents a national economy as a collection of  such aggregate 
variables as output, employment, investment, and a price level, and seeks to develop 
theoretical relationships among those variables. In contrast, the social-theoretic approach 
to macro or social theory … treats the standard macro variables as having been shaped through 
social institutions, conventions, and processes that in turn are generated through interaction 
among economizing persons. The relation between micro and macro levels of  analysis is a 
relationship between the parts of  something and the entirety of  that thing. … The object 
denoted as macro is thus of  a higher order of  complexity than the object denoted as micro. 
(Wagner, 2020, vii)  
 
Thus, standard macroeconomic approaches, equipped either with neoclassical growth models or 
stochastic general equilibrium models, treat the micro-macro relationship as simply scalable: with macro 
variables represented as being mere aggregations over, or scaled-up versions of, micro variables (Kirman, 
1992, 2010). In consequence, the standard approach to macroeconomics, deemphasizes the unique role 
of  money in producing novel epistemic complexity in society, thus deemphasizing also the role of  
monetary institutions in ultimately generating, and deeply affecting, such a monetary-epistemic order. In 
contrast, the systems-theoretic approach sketched throughout this work, portraits the relationship 
between micro and macro as a complex and non-scalable relationship, that rather entails an ontological 
transformation of  economic phenomena throughout the unique use of  money and institutions. There is 
a complexity and ontological transformation which occurs from the micro level to the macro level of  
society, exclusively throughout the use of  money in society. As I will show in chapters 1 and 2, this 
complexity-based transformation is clarified further by complexity theory and by social epistemology.  
 
From this alternative view, macro phenomena are actually richer and more complex phenomena: the 
emergent products of  monetary-epistemic interactions, and so they entail novel and irreducible societal 
properties. This alternative approach proposed treats macro theory as a form of  systems theory in which 
the behavior of  the entire system has novel properties that are not reducible to, nor explicable by, the 
properties of  individual elements which composed the order. In other words, the approach suggested 
here seeks to expand and enrich the current reductionist and narrow vision concerning what the 
macroeconomic order ultimately consists and how it can be generated. Standard macroeconomists thus 
can gain an entirely different perspective about how the macroeconomic order is ultimately produced, by 
shedding light on the epistemic role of  money and its surrounding institutions. This can enrich the 
manner in which contemporary macro is currently being performed, thus, encouraging also what 
Caballero (2010) has identified as a healthy and valuable “broad-exploration” mode in economic inquiry.       
 
Therefore, these new directions in the political economy of  money could be extremely valuable to 
mainstream macroeconomists by pointing out certain areas of  macroeconomic reality and its causal 
properties that have been disregarded by the standard framework which reduces the macro variables as 
simple aggregations over micro variables. Hence mainstream macroeconomists can gain a more accurate 
picture about the fundamental epistemic role of  money in society and its surrounding institutions, by 
paying attention to macro phenomena through a social-epistemic and institutionalist perspective. 
Ultimately, by paying attention to emergent properties and social epistemology, mainstream 
macroeconomists can also get a more accurate view and a better (non-formal) explanation about why 
money is fundamental in order to sustain an economic order, and how money could also become—
paradoxically—an element of  discoordination and disorder. This novel socio-epistemic and complexity 
vision of  money, posited in this work, thus allows mainstream macroeconomists to grasp why money 
should be interpreted as a kind of  unique “double-edged sword” system of  social relations; finally, 
providing compelling reasons as to why a vital concern for macroeconomists going forward should be a 
thorough comparative institutional analysis of  monetary and banking institutions.     
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Similarly, new monetarists macroeconomists (or Market Monetarists) can also gain considerably from this 
work by reflecting upon a different perspective on topics such as monetary policy rules and 
macroeconomic stabilization. Broadly speaking, market monetarists consider that all that is required in 
order to attain macroeconomic stability is to establish a stable and credible nominal expenditure 
(aggregate demand or MV) rule, that can be maintained by a central bank governed by experts. Thus, a 
nominal expenditure rule (or a form of  nominal anchor related with aggregate demand), is considered 
by market monetarists as a sufficient condition to attain macroeconomic stability. This work, grounded on 
complexity and social epistemology, proposes certain challenges to the Market Monetarist literature and 
to such an aggregated (top-down) way of  perceiving macroeconomic stability, which could fruitfully help 
to develop finer lines of  argument going forward and also help those macroeconomists to clarify their 
specific policy proposals.    
 
In short, the emergentists approach, undertaken throughout this work, suggests two important things for 
the Market Monetarist literature going forward: first, that macroeconomic stability arises indirectly—as an 
emergent phenomenon—through the interactions between monetary institutions, monetary rules under 
non-ideal conditions, and the agents’ interactions performed through money; thus, macroeconomic 
stability can only be attained through dynamic processes from the micro level toward the macro level via 
robust monetary institutions and how they ultimately affect monetary exchanges. This bottom-up and 
institutionally contingent view concerning macroeconomic stability challenges the notion that stability 
could be attain and design merely by imposing a top-down form of  nominal stability from the macro-
level toward the micro-level disassociated from the processes of  exchange. Second, that nominal income 
stability rules (or NGDP rules) should be considered as a subset of  a wider group of  plausible monetary 
institutions that could achieve, in different ways, macroeconomic stability.  
 
Consequently, stable nominal expenditure rules should be scrutinized institutionally, and compare against 
other plausible monetary institutions, in order to understand which ones are relatively more robust and 
batter able to cope with several epistemic and incentive problems inherent in non-ideal monetary policy 
making. To conclude, Market Monetarists, similarly to mainstream macroeconomists in general, can 
therefore gain substantial political economic and institutional insights concerning money, emergent 
macro properties, and the relative robustness of  different institutions; lastly, greatly enriching also their 
technocratic, and rather narrow, view about monetary stability and the macroeconomic reality at large.  
 
Some Neglected Yet Relevant Research Questions for Macroeconomics   
 
Consequently, and in order to build those aforementioned fruitful connections and intellectual bridges 
between mainstream macro and alternative approaches, part I of  this work seeks to shed light on those 
aforementioned research questions about the decisive (complexity-based) role of  money in society by 
exploring two major themes related to organized complexity and emergent properties in macroeconomic 
phenomena. Specifically, these research questions will first be tackled by exploring the crucial analytical 
and methodological challenges that the properties of  organized complexity in general pose to 
macroeconomic analysis in particular, in addition to the potential analytical tensions between the notion 
of  organized complexity and modern macroeconomic approaches. I will argue in chapter 1 that the 
macroeconomy truly resembles, and possesses the core features of, an organized complex system; 
accordingly, political economists need to find alternative methods of  analysis that are more capable of  
dealing with the crucial properties of  complexity (Hodgson, 2000b; Lewis and Wagner, 2017).  
 
Part I of  this work therefore starts in chapter 1 by exploring the methodological relationship (and tensions) 
between organized complexity and macroeconomics by suggesting that conventional macroeconomic 
approaches obliterate all the relevant aspects and core properties that characterize macroeconomic 
phenomena that stem from the use of  money in organized market relationships. Subsequently, by 
borrowing from the aforementioned insights about complexity theory and its methodological relationship 
with macro phenomena, chapter 2 also explores the complexity-based role of  money in the generation 
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of  economic knowledge as an emergent property irreducible to the existent and scattered knowledge 
already present in society. Finally, throughout the exploration of  these themes related to methodology, 
organized complexity, and the emergent role of  money in society, part I as a whole ultimately attempts 
to shed light on the crucial—yet neglected—research question concerning why money matters in 
determining complex macroeconomic phenomena? Interestingly, attempting to shed light on this 
pressing research question will also lead us to recognize that not only does money matter, but money’s 
crucial relevance in society is indivisible also from the surrounding monetary institutions that sustain, affect 
and guide its production (Smithin, 2004).  
 
Given the above recognition, the second relevant research question therefore concerns the monetary 
institutions that can actually produce (and affect) the medium of  exchange. It consequently concerns the 
actual institutional implications of  the crucial use of  money in society. As explained above, money is the 
main subject matter of  this work; however, the use of  money in society is directly related also to the 
banking institutions that broadly affect (and guide) its production. The individuals in society do not 
produce money effortlessly and endogenously (unlike language); and consequently, they have to rely on 
additional (and exogenous) banking institutions for its production (Horwitz, 1992a; Ingham, 2000). 
Particularly relevant among these banking institutions are central banks (Goodhart, 1987; 1988; 2010; 
Smithin, 2004). This creates a two-tiered system in which monetary institutions—such as central banks—
broadly create and guide money’s production. Subsequently individuals can engage in monetary relations 
that create the emergent order discussed throughout part I (Ingham, 2000; Smithin, 2003).  
 
Hence, since individuals do not produce money by themselves effortlessly, the analytical focus of  
attention in this work naturally has to transition toward the relevant monetary institutions engaged in its 
production (Horwitz, 2000; Smithin, 2004). Consequently, the analytical focus of  attention will move 
toward analyzing and scrutinizing the relevant role of  central banks. Specifically, the second research 
question that will be addressed in this thesis is the following: are central banks the only ‘natural’ and 
inherent institutional evolutionary outcome of  monetary and banking systems? Or as Schwartz (1993) 
once rhetorically asked: ‘Are Central Banks [inherently] necessary?’ Put differently, what is the core 
economic rationale for the need for, and potentially ‘natural’ institutional evolution of, central banks?  
 
Consequently, part II will focus on analyzing the most important banking institutions that affect and 
guide money’s production and consequently that determine also—at the institutional or preconstitutional 
level—the emergent, complex macroeconomic order. In part II, the focus therefore will shift toward 
addressing the aforementioned second relevant research question of  this thesis concerning the alleged 
inherent banking role for, and natural evolution of, central banks within the economic order. Particularly 
relevant here will be scrutinizing the theoretical arguments and the historical evidence provided by 
Goodhart (1987; 1988) and other banking scholars (see for example Congdon, 1981 and Giannini, 2011) 
for justifying the inherent need for, and ‘natural’ evolution of, central banks within resilient banking 
systems (see also Paniagua, 2019b).   
 
Accordingly, if  we care about studying money and the emergent macroeconomy at large, then we should 
also study the institutional properties of  central banks and their historical and institutional evolution 
within the monetary system (Goodhart, 2010; Smithin, 2004). If  we consider monetary institutions and 
their (epistemic and incentive) properties as relevant aspects within macroeconomic analysis under a 
complexity-based orientation of  macroeconomics (Colander and Kupers, 2014), then the study of  central 
banks should also become a crucial theoretical and analytical aspect in our attempts to provide a 
complexity-based framework for analyzing macroeconomic phenomena (Smithin, 2003). Unfortunately, 
in the last decades macroeconomists and political economists alike have largely disregarded these relevant 
research questions about the institutional evolution of, and inherent need for, central banks within 
resilient banking systems (Smith, 1990 [1936]; Smithin, 2003, 2004). Thus, the relevant research question 
of  whether central banks are necessary has largely been marginalized in the contemporary banking 
literature (Paniagua, 2019b; Schwartz, 1993; Selgin, 2017).     
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Respectively, pressing institutional research questions about central banks and their alleged inherent 
necessity and ‘natural’ evolution within banking systems have largely been ignored by macroeconomists. 
Indeed, as Vera Smith once noticed:  
 
In the present century centralised banking systems have come to be regarded as the usual 
concomitant, if not one of the conditions of the attainment of an advanced stage of 
economic development. The belief in the desirability of central bank organisation is 
universal. . . . There is, however, a noticeable lack of any systematic examination of the 
bases of the alleged superiority of centralised banking over its alternative. . . . Very little 
attention has been paid in modern economic literature to the consideration of the rationale 
of the particular system of banking that we have succeeded in evolving, in the light of the 
progress that has been made in economic science. (Vera Smith, 1990 [1936], 3–4) 
 
Echoing Vera Smith, and in order to address this neglected research question about central banks, part 
II utilizes Goodhart’s (1988) The Evolution of Central Banks as a theoretical motivation and starting point 
to start addressing this research question about the apparent need for certain monetary institutions and 
their ‘natural’ institutional evolution. Specifically, part II attempts to shed light upon this institutional 
research question by examining both the theoretical arguments and the historical evidence that are 
generally employed in the banking literature in order to sustain the general case for the ‘natural emergence’ 
of, and inherent need for, central banks.  
 
Consequently, part II of  this work starts in chapter 3 by exploring the theoretical arguments and the 
historical evidence used to sustain the case for the ‘natural emergence’ of  central banks as intrinsic and 
monocentric-only solutions to crucial banking challenges. By borrowing from Goodhart’s (1988) The 
Evolution of Central Banks, chapter 3 critically examines Goodhart’s theoretical claims that central banks 
must evolve naturally as the only institutional responses and solutions to collective banking challenges. 
Chapter 3 critically examines the institutional rationale behind the ‘natural’ evolution of central banks. 
Subsequently, chapter 3 and chapter 4 will also review some key historical evidence, arguing that 
Goodhart’s historical generalizations about the ‘natural’ evolution of  central banks are inconsistent with 
developments of  the vast majority of  the earlier proto–central banks in Europe. A particular focus will 
be on the historical and institutional evolution of  the Bank of  England, between the years 1694 and 1890, 
in chapter 4. Finally, throughout the critical examination of  these theoretical arguments and historical 
evidence, part II as a whole ultimately attempts to answer the second research question concerning 
whether central banks evolve naturally and consequently whether central banks are inherently necessary.  
 
The third and final research question addressed in this thesis relates also to monetary institutions and 
central banks, but particularly to diverse nonmonocentric monetary institutions and rules that could 
become institutional alternatives to central banks. In part II, attempts to provide answers to the second 
research question discussed above lead us also to recognize that central banks are not the only 
institutional possibility available for successfully governing collective banking affairs and for also 
providing crucial banking services (Paniagua, 2019b). Indeed, heterogeneous institutional forms of 
nonmonocentric banking orders could be able also to govern crucial banking problems and therefore able to 
‘naturally’ evolve as alternative institutional solutions to banking challenges without necessarily relying 
upon central banks (Selgin, 1993, 1994; Goodspeed, 2016). It will be argued—throughout this 
dissertation—that institutional heterogeneity and nonmonocentric forms of banking are feasible 
institutional possibilities within resilient banking orders.    
 
Hence attempts to elucidate the second research question ultimately lead me to suggest in this work that 
societies do not necessarily carry the burden of being institutionally ‘ensnared’ with central banks and that 
therefore they could potentially look for more robust and resilient monetary institutional alternatives (if 
there are any) to possibly transition toward (Salter, 2014b). This additionally indicates also that a 
comparative institutional analysis of monetary alternatives could potentially be a fruitful way forward for 
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macroeconomic research. This will be the focus of attention in the final part III.   
  
The above insights concerning the lack of a serious institutional and theoretical justification for 
monocentric-only types of banking solutions to pressing monetary challenges suggest that theoretical 
examinations and the intellectual environment within macroeconomics could be ripe for further 
explorations in comparative institutional analysis (Smithin, 2004). More specifically, macroeconomics 
could be ripe for further exploring some novel and unattended research questions related to robust 
political economy, monetary-policy neutrality, and the comparative institutional properties of central 
banks and nonmonocentric alternatives (Salter, 2017a). Accordingly, the institutional findings of part I 
and part II concerning money and central banks reasonably lead to the third and final research question 
of  this thesis: which monetary system is most robust under a comparative institutional analysis? Put 
differently, which monetary arrangement is most robust at ‘managing’ monetary policy and thus at 
overcoming both epistemic and incentive problems present inherently in it?  
 
Aligning with this last research question, the focus of  part III will move toward analyzing and comparing 
different monetary institutional alternatives under the framework of  RPE and institutional analysis 
(Ostrom, 1990; Pennington, 2011, 2017; Salter, 2014b). Specifically, in order to address this third and last 
research question, part III will first develop and later apply a framework for monetary institutional 
analysis and political-economic robustness considerations to assess and compare the institutional 
robustness (and efficacy) of  central banks and alternatives such as NGDP targeting and free banking. 
 
Consequently, part III starts in chapter 5 by proposing a novel RPE framework for engaging in banking 
and comparative institutional analysis within monetary policy. Thereafter, chapter 5 and chapter 6 
propose a novel non-ideal analytical framework for bridging institutional analysis, RPE, and monetary 
theory, in order to realistically (non-ideally) compare and assess different monetary institutions and policy 
rules. Subsequently, both chapters provide applied exercises in comparative institutional analysis between 
central banking and diverse nonmonocentric banking alternatives. Finally, throughout this application of  
this novel non-ideal banking RPE framework, part III ultimately attempts to answer the third and last 
research question of  this dissertation: which monetary arrangement is most robust at conducting 
monetary policy?           
 
Three Overlapping Themes to Address Some Neglected Research Questions           
 
Now that I have reviewed and made explicit the series of  research questions that motivate this work and 
that will be addressed throughout this thesis, I will now explain and outline in more detail the three major 
themes that will enable me to address the aforementioned research questions. This will be followed by a 
brief  explanation concerning the broad aims and scope of  this work. The three major themes related to 
the research questions of  this thesis are the following: First, part I seeks to understand how the 
macroeconomy—based upon the non-Walrasian use of  money—really possesses important properties 
that resemble an organized complex system, and it examines the implications of  those inexorable 
properties for the correct study of  the macroeconomy. Second, this work explores the crucial role and 
functions of  money in generating a complex economic system, and it explores money’s social role in 
generating an orderly system of  exchanges that produces emergent and epistemic social properties not 
present or nonexistent previously (ex ante). Third and finally, this work deals with the functions and 
workings of  different banking and monetary institutions and how their different epistemic and incentive 
properties affect money’s production and exchange. 
  
Hence this thesis deals with the epistemic and socio-relational functions of  money, in generating an 
organized complex system, and its surrounding banking institutions, emphasizing the role that both play 
in the promotion (or erosion) of  an organized and complex macroeconomic order. This work therefore 
offers a much broader and wide-ranging perspective upon money and banking institutions than can be 
usually found in the traditional and formalist macroeconomic and banking literature.   
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Since this work deals largely with the use of  money in society and its implications for organized 
complexity, this thesis logically proceeds by dealing first with some general and highly abstract features 
of  the macroeconomic order as an organized complex system and with its implications (and challenges) 
for the most suitable economic methods to best understand it. This is followed by a more concrete 
analysis of  the epistemic role of  money in society, ultimately culminating with a more applied and specific 
institutional analysis of  the banking institutions that guide and affect money’s production. In simple terms, 
the logical flow of  the main arguments of  this work goes from understanding macroeconomics as a 
complex order, to examining the unique role of  money in generating and sustaining such a complex 
economic order, and finally to focusing more practically upon comparing alternative banking institutions 
that affect money’s circulation within such an order.  
 
As the title of  this work suggests, money is obviously the main theme and the theoretical focus of  this 
entire work; however, as hinted earlier money is intimately related also to—and perhaps even indivisible 
from—both an emergent complex macroeconomic order and the banking institutions that affect its 
production (Horwitz, 2000; Lewis and Wagner, 2017; Smithin, 2000). Consequently, the focus of  this 
work will gradually tend to gravitate toward the relevant banking institutions that affect (and guide) 
money’s production and consequently that broadly determine the emergent complex macroeconomic 
order (Smithin, 2004). Throughout this aforementioned and logical sequence of  themes, it will become 
easier to address, in a coherent and consistent manner, the aforementioned research questions that 
motivate this work.    
        
As hinted above, a large portion of  this work—particularly parts II and III—therefore engages in 
comparative and institutional analysis and goes beyond monetary theory narrowly conceived. Hence it 
incorporates insights from constitutional political economy, socio-economics, complexity theory, banking 
history, and epistemology. The broad aim of  this work is to suggest an alternative research road map and 
a vision for a plausible institutional and constitutional research agenda for macroeconomics. Such an 
institutional research agenda for macro will provide a better understanding of  the emergence of  
macroeconomic phenomena, such as economic crises, always conditioned by the political-economic and 
institutional fragility (or robustness) of  different monetary systems or monetary rules. In so doing, and 
by borrowing also from E. Ostrom’s (1990; 2010) institutional approach, this thesis will often highlight 
and scrutinize the importance of  two sets of  institutional properties, both of  them largely neglected by 
macroeconomists. Specifically, this work focuses on comparing and scrutinizing both the incentive and 
knowledge (epistemic) properties present in any given monetary institution and how they subsequently 
affect the actions undertaken by monetary policy makers (see also Salter, 2014b, 2017).    
 
More specifically, parts II and III will stress also the relevance of  both incentive problems (misalignment 
of  incentives, regulatory capture, and political pressure) and cognitive constraints (epistemic challenges 
and informational limitations) present in the fields of  monetary policy and banking stability. Thus it seeks 
to explore the institutional implications for monetary policy and the macroeconomy at large whenever 
the real institutions of  banking, and the non-ideal agents that are making decisions within them, deviate 
strongly from the standard neoclassical assumptions about aligned incentives and complete benevolence, 
and also from neoclassical assumptions about robust cognitive rationality and availability of  information 
(a large degree of  omniscience or complete information of  the situation). In this important sense, a large 
portion of  this work will attempt to bridge ideas from non-ideal theory in political economy with 
monetary theory and institutional analysis, in order to explore how monetary policy and banking stability 
will likely function and operate under non-ideal monetary institutions and boundedly rational human agents.   
 
Why Money?  
 
There is perhaps no other economic good or system of  social relations that is so important for our social 
orders and prosperity, yet so neglected and misunderstood, as money (Horwitz, 1992a). Political 
economists, at least since Adam Smith and David Hume, have long acknowledged the numerous benefits 
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of  a monetary economy; however, much research remains to be done concerning the crucial epistemic 
and relational roles of  money and the most propitious and robust institutional arrangements for its supply. 
One fundamental yet largely unexplored question relates to the relative roles that banking institutions, 
social relations, and knowledge play in determining and maintaining (or potentially undermining) a 
complex monetary order. Modern macroeconomics has largely analyzed money and the macroeconomy 
at large through mathematical models of  atomistic, utility-maximizing, and representative agents, paying 
little attention (if  any) to exchanges and to the socio-interactive and institutional context within which 
such representative agents act and utilize money (Kirman, 1992).  
 
Paradoxically, modern macroeconomics—through the use of  generalized mathematical abstractions and 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models—has largely neglected two fundamental details 
about economic reality: first, the fact that the macroeconomic order comprises a myriad of  
heterogeneous individuals interacting through the use of  money; and second, the fact that those agents 
are also unable to produce the medium of  exchange by themselves, and thus rely upon larger financial 
and banking institutions that provide their medium of  social relations (Ingham, 2000). Hence there seems 
to be a fundamental and complex relationship between heterogeneous agents, decentralized and 
fragmented monetary social relations, and monetary institutions that seems to be at the core of  any 
organized and beneficial macroeconomic system (Paniagua, 2018a). It is actually such a complex 
relationship—as will be argued in part I—that generates and sustains the entire macroeconomic emergent 
order. However, these fundamental features of  the macroeconomy (money, social relations, emergence, 
and institutions) are currently being ignored by the mainstream economic literature.   
   
In other words, the contemporary and mathematical DSGE models with a single representative agent are 
not helpful in illuminating exactly what constitutes the foundations and basis of  a complex monetary 
order. Both social and banking institutions and the manners in which heterogeneous and decentralized 
individuals cooperate and interact via the use of  money within particular rules have been seriously 
neglected by current macroeconomic approaches. Puzzlingly, the contemporary mathematical literature 
on macroeconomics, money, and banking is not truly relevant to the emergent macroeconomic order and 
for explaining also the institutionally contingent formation of  economic crises (Howitt, 2012; Kirman, 2010). 
This explains also why most macroeconomists have been largely puzzled about the underlying origins 
and institutional causes of  the Great Recession (Buchanan, 2010; Sumner, 2012). This work will seek to 
contribute to filling those research gaps by (a) addressing the aforementioned three relevant, yet neglected, 
research questions concerning money, organized complexity, and banking institutions and (b) by 
extending those aforementioned monetary and banking institutional themes into new areas of  research 
on the intersections between monetary theory, non-ideal political economy, and institutional analysis.               
 
The major motivations of  this work concern the subjects of  money and monetary institutions and their 
recently neglected role in generating economic crisis and in affecting the macroeconomy (Buchanan, 2010; 
Kirman, 2010). I believe that money, as will be shown throughout part I, is the most central, relevant, 
and paradoxically dangerous medium of  social relations of  any human socio-economic order (see also 
Marx, 1973 [1939] and Yeager, 1968). Almost every single exchange, market interaction, or cooperative 
and contractual agreement made in organized (and also informal) markets takes place through the use of  
money (Clower, 1984a, 1984b). Money is therefore ubiquitous in all of  our socio-economic interactions 
and also in our ways of  thinking (Horwitz, 2000; Mitchell, 1937; Yeager, 1968).    
 
Money and money prices, like the language we speak, literally permeate almost all of  our social affairs, 
and thus they affect the way we think and act (Hodgson, 1994; Horwitz, 1992a). Thus, it is not quite an 
exaggeration to say that money ‘touches’ (intermediates), at least indirectly, almost everything we do in 
commercial societies (Clower, 1984a). Hence it is not a surprise that Mitchell (1937), in his study of  
money as a crucial socio-economic institution, stressed the relevance it has in shaping human mentality, 
human cognition, and human nature: ‘The money economy . . . is in fact one of  the most potent 
institutions in our whole culture. In sober truth it stamps its pattern upon wayward human nature, makes 
 17 
us all react in standard ways to the standard stimuli it offers, and affects our very ideals of  what is good, 
beautiful and true’ (Mitchell, 1937, 371).  
 
As Mitchell argued, the emergence and the use of  money in society cannot be reduced to, nor explained 
simply by, the mere fact that it reduces transaction costs and makes trade easier for merchants (Mitchell, 
1937). We need to acknowledge also that ‘the penetration of  money exchange into social life altered the 
very configuration of  rationality, stimulating the peculiarly modern conceptions of  abstraction, 
measurement, quantification and calculative intent’ (Hodgson, 1994, 587; see also Mises, 1981 [1922]). 
Not for nothing also Marx described money as ‘the God among commodities’ (Marx, 1973 [1939], 221). 
Hence for these social and epistemic reasons alone, money should be considered, at least prima facie, a 
crucial matter of  study within macroeconomics in particular and in the social sciences in general. I hope 
that this work can persuade the reader of  the unique relevance of  money and its surrounding institutions 
in largely determining and shaping emergent macroeconomic reality and social rationality. 
 
Yet the reader may still legitimately ask, Why should we be so concerned about money, among the many 
other economic goods and social interactions present in the modern economy? The answer to this 
question—as will be shown in chapters 1 and 2—resides in the fact that money is central in generating 
an orderly system of  social relations that provides the core properties for sustaining an organized 
complex system that we call the macroeconomic order and economic coordination. Money, as will be 
argued in chapter 2, is therefore fundamental and unique for the generation and emergence of  novel 
complex economic and epistemological phenomena that sustain the entire socio-economic order and the 
beneficial coordination of  individuals and production in modern commercial societies (Paniagua, 2018a; 
Simmel. 1978 [1907]).  
 
Indeed, most of  our cooperative endeavors, exchanges, and daily work interactions are performed 
through the medium of  exchange (money). Hence, as Clower succinctly put it, ‘Goods buy money, money 
buys goods—but goods do not buy goods in any organized market’ (Clower, 1984b, 100). Thus, it is not 
a stretch to argue that money ‘touches’ or intermediates (almost) everything we do in the economy and 
in our cooperation processes. Paradoxically, it is also money’s pervasiveness and ubiquity in our daily 
interactions that generates both the benefits and also the potential dangers of  using only money in 
coordinating our exchanges (Yeager, 1968). Consequently, as Mill (1929 [1848], 488) argued, if  money is 
‘out of  order’, potentially all of  our social relations and cooperative endeavors could also potentially be 
‘out of  order’. Money therefore could become a kind of  ‘double-edged sword’ system of  social relations 
if  nonrobust or fragile monetary institutions poorly manage it and supply it.                   
 
Money’s pervasiveness in our social relations, rationality, interactions, and coordinative and cooperative 
capacities is almost as deep, wide, and ingrained as the use of  language itself  (Dodd, 1994; Ingham, 
1996a). Hence it can hardly be treated simply as a ‘veil’ over barter relations or as just another (liquid) 
good among the many present in our economy (Clower, 1984a, 1984b; Dyer, 1989; Ganssman, 1988). In 
addition, it has been argued by many economists from Mill, to Keynes, to Friedman that money and its 
institutions are particularly relevant in generating business fluctuations and economic crises (Friedman, 
1975; Keynes, 1930). Indeed, many economists, such as Mill, Thornton, Marx, Friedman, and others—
all from very different methodological perspectives—have convincingly argued that money and its 
surrounding institutions have played fundamental roles in the manifestation of  economic crises that have 
plagued capitalistic economies (Laidler, 2004). Yet modern macroeconomic theory, based on highly 
abstract, formalist, and reductionist models, seems to be moving ever further away from recognizing 
these fundamental facts and insights about money and complexity known to political economists and 
sociologists for centuries (Horwitz, 1992a; Ingham, 1996a, 1996b; Laidler, 2004, 2011).  
 
Alas, the idea that money and monetary institutions matter has been forgotten in modern macroeconomic 
research over the last thirty years (at the very least), and this in part explains also the revival of  the age-
old institutionless debate about the inherent instability of  the decentralized market economy based on 
 18 
private property and monetary exchanges (Howitt, 2012; Laidler, 2004, 2011; Minsky, 1986; Smithin, 
2004). The idea that both money and monetary institutions are fundamental in generating complex 
economic orders and also in potentially generating economic crises has been paradoxically neglected by 
macroeconomics today in providing explanations of  the Great Recession. This in part explains also why 
public intellectuals have come back to superficially argue about the inherent instabilities of  capitalism, 
without further exploring also the specific institutions through which commercial societies are indeed 
sustained. Arguing that capitalism is inherently unstable doesn’t add much to the more productive and 
practical debate concerning which are the underlying institutions that could make capitalism more robust 
and able also to avoid generating severe economic crises.  
 
Indeed, this theoretical neglect of  money and its institutions has been one of  the most severe intellectual 
gaps in economics over the last fifty years (Calvo, 2013; Horwitz, 2000; Laidler, 2004). It is thus the major 
fact that has motivated me to write this work. This dissertation then is an attempt to argue that money, 
and its institutions, matter a great deal in determining either the beneficial or detrimental emergence of  
macroeconomic outcomes, and it argues that modern macroeconomic models—represented by the new 
neoclassical synthesis and its DSGE models—are not particularly helpful in illuminating what are the key 
aspects of  a monetary order that deals seriously with complex and emergent phenomena (Kirman, 1992, 
2010; Smithin, 2004).  
 
It has long been acknowledged, since Frank Hahn’s (1965) remarks at least, that the fundamental problem 
with the modern Walrasian-equilibrium framework for macroeconomic modeling is that, given its 
assumptions, it leaves no room for either dynamic exchanges performed in disequilibrium (or false, non-
market-clearing) prices or the use of  money as a mechanism to establish those exchange relations (Howitt, 
2012). In other words, it leaves no analytical room for economic phenomena that arise from analyzing 
monetary exchanges in an imperfect dynamic setting (Laidler, 2011). From this it follows logically that 
this Walrasian ‘macro approach’ is unable to illuminate macroeconomic fluctuations and financial crises—
as emergent phenomena—and their deep relationships to money and its surrounding institutions 
(Buchanan, 2010; Lucas, 2004).  
 
However, despite these recognitions and limitations, macroeconomic research is still engaging in ‘business 
as usual’ within the Walrasian paradigm and macroeconomic models based on the postulate of  rapidly 
adjusting and clearing markets and representative agents (Kirman, 1992). These last thirty years of  
modern macroeconomic research can be characterized by neglect of  the obvious fact that what we call 
market economies are actually monetary networks and institutionally embedded economies that do not 
function ‘as if ’ overseen by an omniscient and benevolent auctioneer (Hodgson, 2000a; Lucas, 2004; 
Laidler, 2004). Alas, if  we are indeed going to attempt to ameliorate the problems related to economic 
crises and business cycles, we need to better understand the unique role that money plays in generating—
or potentially undermining—the emergent complex order of  the macroeconomy. If  we keep disregarding 
money and its institutions in our contemporary assumptions, models, and methods of  research, we will 
be unable to improve our fragile macroeconomic state of  affairs. I hope that this work will contribute to 
bringing back the analytical and theoretical relevance of  acknowledging money, complexity, and monetary 
institutions in macroeconomic and banking research to eventually (and hopefully) improve our current 
monetary institutions and the whole macroeconomic order.  
 
If  money and its surrounding institutions can be better understood, perhaps institutional reforms 
concerning money and banking could be implemented to mitigate severe economic recessions. For these 
reasons, further research on money, complexity, and monetary institutions should be encouraged. In other 
words, as Mill (1929 [1848]) suggested, if  an orderly and well-functioning monetary order is the 
foundation for an advanced, cooperative, and wealth-enhancing economy (see also Friedman, 1994), then 
we must examine seriously the underlying banking institutions and their properties that constitute the 
basis of  such a well-functioning and resilient monetary order.     
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Given the above, and in response to the 2008–9 Great Recession, I argue throughout this work that it is 
necessary to return to and to revive the broader tradition of  monetary analysis based on the monetary-
equilibrium framework, and political economy as developed before the rise of  the Arrow-Debreu general-
equilibrium framework in the 1970s (Warburton, 1981; Yeager, 1986). This requires once again 
acknowledging the fundamental—and perhaps obvious—facts that, first, the macroeconomy is actually 
a complex and dynamic ecosystem of  voluntary market exchanges performed indirectly and mediated 
always by money and disequilibrium money prices; and, second, money, as a crucial mechanism of  socio-
economic interactions, is actually never produced by the interacting agents of  the system, but rather only 
by certain specific monetary institutions or ‘legally granted’ banking institutions that possess particular 
incentive mechanisms and informational properties that deeply affect its supply (Ingham, 1996a; Smithin, 
2000, 2003). Exploring the theoretical and institutional implications of  these perhaps-obvious facts will 
be the major task undertaken in this work.   
 
Ultimately, it is only through the use of  money that individuals seek to collaborate and coordinate their 
decentralized activities in markets with other individuals that perhaps they don’t even know and perhaps 
will never even see (Clower, 1984a, 1984b; Hayek, 1973). It is only through the use of  money and money 
prices that individuals in commercial societies can attempt to overcome or bypass what Keynes (1930, 
1936) denominated ‘the dark forces of  time and ignorance’ (see also Hayek, 1967 [1935]). Consequently, 
monetary institutions—which deeply affect money’s production—can severely exacerbate or dissipate 
those ‘dark forces’ that impede and hinder human cooperation and economic development. This work 
argues that the only manner in which we can overcome, or at least ameliorate, those ‘dark forces of  time 
and ignorance’ and the emergence of  economic crises is through a careful study and comparison of  the 
degrees of  political-economic robustness that different monetary institutions possess. In other words, 
this dissertation argues that macroeconomics has to become less formalistic and abstract and more 
political-economic and institutional in its orientation.     
 
Put somewhat metaphorically, Adam Smith’s allegory about the ‘invisible hand’ that unintendedly 
coordinates the market economy has actually very visible monetary fingers and also a monetary-institutional 
brain that moves those fingers. Insofar as the monetary and banking ‘brain’ and its ‘fingers’ fail to function 
properly, so does the entire market economy and the invisible hand that is supposed to coordinate markets 
(Laidler, 2011). Instead, if  the visible ‘monetary fingers’ are working properly, then exchanges are not 
being hampered or distorted, and consequently the ‘invisible hand’ coordinative property of  the market 
economy can arise as an emergent feature of  such an orderly system of  exchanges. In other words, the 
‘monetary fingers’ and the ‘monetary-institutional brain’ of  the entire economy seem to be the causal 
elements that generate the ‘invisible hand’ coordinative function of  the market economy, as a novel, 
emergent, and irreducible property of  the orderly use of  money in society (Lewis, 2015; Paniagua, 2018c).      
 
This Smithian metaphor of  the ‘invisible hand’ and the visible ‘monetary fingers’ might also help us to 
shed light on the Mill quote that opens this preface. Insofar as the ‘monetary fingers’ of  the invisible 
hand move smoothly, Mill argues, the economy will move and coordinate as if led unintendedly by an 
invisible hand. When that occurs, Mill suggests, we barely notice the ubiquitous presence of  money in 
the coordination process of  markets, and consequently the invisible hand is as invisible as possible (Mill, 
1929 [1848]; see also Laidler, 2004, 2011). However, the ‘monetary fingers’ of  the market economy 
become very visible, and money ‘exerts a distinct and independent influence of  its own when it gets out 
of  order’. When that occurs instead, the ‘invisible hand’ (as an emergent property of  the market) ceases 
to function smoothly, and the malfunction of  the ‘monetary fingers’ suddenly becomes very visible 
throughout the real economy and exchanges. Consequently, the visible malfunctioning of  those 
‘monetary fingers’ will impede the ‘invisible hand’ from coordinating exchanges and economic plans 
accordingly, harming the entire economy. It is the recognition of  this Smithian allegory that should make 
us wary of  contemporary macroeconomic models that disregard both money (the fingers) and its 
institutions (the brain) as relevant causal and generating macroeconomic elements.   
 
 20 
New Directions in Complexity, Knowledge, and Monetary Institutions 
 
As suggested throughout this preface and by the title of  this work, this thesis is largely an exercise in 
comparative monetary systems and monetary institutional analysis. However, before engaging in specific 
institutional analyses and comparisons of  monetary alternatives, I outline the crucial epistemic and 
complexity-based reasons why money matters in the coordination of  economic activities and in 
generating macroeconomic phenomena of  interest. If  money were unimportant in an economic order 
or merely a secondary ‘veil’ over the underlying economic system, then it would be unnecessary to explore 
banking institutional alternatives of  how money could be indeed supplied. After all, if  money did not 
matter—for creating or coordinating an orderly economic system or for affecting the emergence of  
economic crises—then perhaps it would be more effective to allocate intellectual efforts to other aspects 
of  the market order to improve our well-being. But if  a comparative institutional analysis of  monetary 
rules and alternatives is deemed a necessary intellectual exercise for promoting sound reforms to our 
fragile macroeconomic state of  affairs (Buchanan, 2010; Salter, 2014b), so that future economic crises 
can be lessened, then it is necessary to first provide plausible arguments to understand why money is 
unique in the economic order and why it is worthy of  further analysis and institutional considerations. 
 
In other words, if  we consider applied monetary institutional analysis and monetary institutional 
comparisons a very important—yet severely neglected—intellectual and research endeavor in 
macroeconomics, as has been suggested throughout this preface, then we must first provide convincing 
arguments as to why both money and its surrounding banking institutions really matter in the formation 
and emergence of  complex macroeconomic orders and epistemic systems in the first place. Consequently, 
this thesis starts first by providing those theoretical and more abstract arguments about the crucial 
complexity-based and epistemic relevance of  money in society and its unique social role in the formation 
of  an orderly system of  social relations that produces novel macroeconomic and epistemic complexity, 
rather than starting directly with a focus on its specific and surrounding banking institutions and their 
applied comparative analysis.     
 
Before this institutional and emergentist transition in macroeconomic research is possible, I must first 
provide convincing arguments as to why the unique medium of  socio-economic relations—which those 
very same monetary institutions produce—should be worthy of  further scrutiny. This thesis therefore 
aims to explore, in a logical sequence (from the most abstract and theoretical to the more concrete and 
applied aspects), three distinct yet highly interrelated and complementary macroeconomic topics that are 
closely related also with addressing the aforementioned three relevant research questions.  
 
These interrelated themes are (a) the role of  money, knowledge, and organized complexity in generating 
the macroeconomic order, (b) the institutional evolution of  central banks, and (c) a comparative 
institutional analysis of  different monetary alternatives. Each of  these three broad macroeconomic and 
monetary topics will be explored in depth in the three sections of  this work, part I, part II, and part III, 
each comprising two chapters. As clarified at the beginning of  this preface, the objective is to develop 
these three interrelated monetary and banking themes in order to address some relevant and severely 
neglected research questions in macroeconomics concerning (a) why money matters in determining 
complex macroeconomic phenomena; (b) whether central banks evolve naturally and, consequently, 
whether central banks are inherently necessary; and finally (c) which monetary arrangement is most 
robust at conducting monetary policy. Given this series of  research questions, the objective is to develop 
the three research themes outlined here, in order to acquire alternative comparative methods and an 
alternative analytical framework of  monetary analysis that will actually enable me to address the three 
research questions, rather than assuming them away as it would be the case using formal methods.                             
 
Given the above series of  research questions that motivate this work, part I first examines the analytical 
and methodological relationship between organized complexity and macroeconomic inquiry, the 
epistemic role of  money as an orderly system of  social relations, and money’s role in generating economic 
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complexity. Parts II and III explore jointly the institutional details and the institutional implications of  the 
use of  money in society and the need for monetary constitutions (and rules) that such a coordinative, but 
contingent, role of  money entails. These last two parts suggest a novel institutional and complexity-based 
research agenda in macroeconomics, for identifying alternative, but robust, institutions juxtaposed with 
the institutionally fragile rationale for and politically entangled evolution of  central banks.  
 
Consequently, concerns regarding the role of  money and complexity explored in part I, combined with 
the analysis of  the evolution of  central banks and the lack of  an institutional rationale for them in banking 
systems, as explored throughout part II, show the need for comparative institutional analysis in monetary 
theory. Such a task is finally undertaken in part III, which scrutinizes nonmonocentric monetary 
alternatives that might be robust for ‘managing’ money and overcoming both knowledge and incentive 
problems present in monetary policy (see also Paniagua, 2019b). The following paragraphs contain a 
detailed synopsis of  the major themes explored in each general part, in order to address and provide 
some answers to the relevant, yet neglected, three above-mentioned research questions. 
 
Specifically, part I of  this thesis, which comprises chapters 1 and 2, explores the theoretical and more 
abstract topics of  this work, broadly concerned with the ideas of  organized complexity and its 
methodological implications for macroeconomic theory, money, knowledge, and coordination. Part I 
provides the starting point and foundational arguments for why, theoretically, money and its surrounding 
institutions are indivisible from, and a critical subject matter in, macroeconomics. Building on recent 
literature on complexity theory and social ontology, it elaborates on the unique epistemological and 
complexity-based role of  money and money prices in the economy, arguing that money is unlike any 
other commodity, good, or even other medium of  social relations such as language. Exploring the themes 
of  complexity, epistemology, and social ontology related to money will help to provide answers to why 
money matters in determining macroeconomic phenomena.    
 
By using arguments from complexity theory, constitutional political economy, social ontology, and 
epistemology, I contend here that money is the most important element in generating both an orderly 
system of  economic relations and also potentially beneficial economic complexity. As an emergent 
property from those monetary relations, this interactive system of  money-based exchanges creates the 
irreducible and emergent economic knowledge that further sustains the process of  wealth-enhancing 
coordination in markets (Paniagua, 2018a). In other words, the primary focus of  part I is to outline 
theoretical arguments demonstrating that the macroeconomy is inherently complex (it possesses the core 
features of  an organized complex system) and thus that it is largely an institutionally conditioned emergent 
property of  organized monetary systems of  relations. This provides strong analytical and methodological 
reasons why it is necessary to shift our intellectual efforts and methods of  analysis away from narrow 
formalisms and reductionisms in macroeconomics and toward monetary institutions, comparative 
institutional analysis, and money in order to better analyze the monetary ‘eco-structure’ (monetary 
constitutions and institutions) and the system of  banking rules under which beneficial economic 
complexity and coordination can indeed emerge (Lewis and Wagner, 2017).    
 
Carrying forward the insights from part I, part II of  this thesis, which comprises chapters 3 and 4, 
investigates the less abstract topics of  this work related to banking and monetary institutions. It focuses 
on monetary institutions, their history, and their evolution; more specifically, it focuses on the institutional 
and economic rationale behind the need for, existence of, and potentially ‘natural’ institutional evolution 
of  central banks. If  we care about studying money and the macroeconomy at large, then the study of  
central banks is a crucial theoretical and practical aspect of  institutional analysis in macroeconomics. If  
we theoretically should care about monetary institutions, as chapter 1 suggests, then it is necessary to 
explore the theories and arguments behind the development of  central banks in order to understand their 
institutional evolution and their potential inherent inevitability within banking systems (Goodhart, 2010; 
Smithin, 2004).   
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In a nutshell, the second topic of  this work moves away from the role of  money and complexity in the 
abstract, as explored in part I, and first explores the more concrete theoretical arguments that claim that 
central banks are the only institutionally rational response to severe banking challenges, and are indeed a 
necessary and only response to them. And second, I explore historical claims and scrutinize evidence that 
suggest that central banks are the natural and inherent institutional evolution of  resilient banking orders. 
These institutional and historical arguments related to the ‘natural’ evolution of  central banks, explored 
throughout part II, will help to provide answers to the second set of  research questions: Do central banks 
evolve naturally? And are central banks inherently necessary?    
 
As argued earlier, the broader scope of  this work is to provide an intellectual framework for engaging in 
institutional analysis of  monetary and banking alternatives so that we can compare different institutions 
and judge them according to some monetary and political economic criterion. However, there seem to 
be strong theoretical and historical institutional and economic arguments in favor of—and showing the 
inherent need, as pertains to banking stability, for—central banks, which might suggest that a comparative 
institutional analysis is an unnecessary intellectual endeavor in monetary theory (Goodhart, 1988). 
Therefore, prior to arguing for the need for institutional comparisons and looking for more radical, and 
perhaps more resilient, alternative monetary systems, I must first scrutinize the aforementioned 
institutional and historical arguments in favor of  central banks in depth before moving forward. This is 
the core focus of, and underlying justification for, part II.  
 
The third and final part of  this work comprises chapters 5 and 6 and explores the last institutional and 
applied topic in the thesis. This final part elaborates further the institutionally oriented themes about 
money, central banks, and the money supply, explored in the previous section, by extending them to other, 
nonmonocentric monetary institutions and comparing them. Given that central banks are not the only, 
necessary, and inherently natural institutional evolutionary outcome of  banking systems—as contended 
in part II—part III expands upon the previous analysis of  central banking, to engage in comparative 
analysis of  more radical alternatives (see also Paniagua, 2019b). Thus part III explores further the 
institutional properties of  central banks briefly delineated in part II and also the idea of  comparative 
monetary analyses, but applied here in particular to the realm of  monetary policy and the production of  
money.  
 
Providing answers to the research questions posited in part II concerning the apparently ‘natural’ 
evolution of, and the institutional and theoretical justifications for, central banking suggests that the 
intellectual field of  inquiry and research in macro is wide open for further explorations in comparative 
institutional analysis between central banks and other, more radical alternatives (Paniagua, 2017). 
Moreover, addressing the second set of  research questions suggests that the exploration of  more radical 
and decentralized institutional and monetary alternatives is actually warranted in macroeconomics if  we 
desire to promote sound reforms to our fragile banking systems. Hence, the general scope in part III 
logically transitions to applying institutional analysis and political-economic robustness considerations 
and a comparative monetary institutional analysis—which were briefly delineated also in chapter 4—to 
the realm of  monetary policy and the money supply. Thus part III aims to provide a novel analytical and 
political-economic-oriented framework for monetary institutional analysis, and provides also an applied 
exercise in comparative institutional analysis of  different monetary and banking alternatives. 
 
In attempting to answer the final research question, part III ultimately offers two major contributions. 
First, it delineates a novel RPE framework for comparative and monetary institutional analysis (Paniagua, 
2016b; see also footnote 1). This novel RPE framework is compatible with and applicable to potentially 
all monetary policy rules and institutional analysis in banking (Salter, 2017a). Particularly, it is here used 
to assess and compare the relative political-economic and institutional robustness of  different monetary 
policy rules and institutional alternatives such as nominal gross domestic product (NGDP) targeting, 
central banking, and free banking. Second, it provides also a subsequent application of  the proposed 
comparative RPE framework of  analysis. I do this to illuminate, under non-ideal conditions, an 
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institutional and RPE analysis comparing central banking and nonmonocentric alternatives in their ability 
to maintain monetary policy that is consistent with monetary equilibrium and monetary stability 
(Paniagua, 2016a). The objective is to compare, under non-ideal conditions, both NGDP targeting and 
free banking against central banking in order to address the final research question: which monetary 
arrangement is most robust at conducting monetary policy?           
 
To summarize, the logical sequence and the argumentative flow of  the major themes explored throughout 
this thesis run as follows: I first argue in part I that money and its surrounding institutions matter in 
unique ways in generating novel macroeconomic complexity and social knowledge. Thus the crux of  the 
matter in emergent macroeconomics, which takes complexity and emergence seriously, is ultimately non-
ideal monetary institutional analysis (Smithin, 2004). Subsequently, in part II, I argue that central banks 
are not inherent and institutionally natural evolutionary outcomes of  banking systems; nor are they 
necessary institutions for a sound and resilient banking order. This consequently opens the field of  
macroeconomic inquiry to more radical and polycentric alternatives (see also Paniagua, 2017, 2019b). 
Only then, in part III, after presenting the (rather replaceable) non-inherent and potentially fragile role of  
central banks as monetary institutions in generating economic complexity, can this work more confidently 
engage in a comparative institutional analysis of  different and more radical alternatives. The thesis thus 
concludes in chapter 6 with some observations regarding the relative institutional robustness of  free 
banking over central banking and the long-term possibilities for institutional and polycentric reforms 
within existent banking systems.    
 
Toward a Novel Political Economy and Institutional Research Agenda for Macroeconomics   
 
The very title of  this thesis—‘Explorations in Political Economy of  Money: Complexity, Knowledge, 
and Monetary Institutions’—suggests that this work borrows different ideas and insights from schools 
of  thought in political economy, philosophy, economics, and political science. I engage in this broad 
intellectual study to explore relevant, yet neglected, aspects of  the complexity-based role of  money in 
society. Such explorations lead me to concentrate on how money relates to complexity, knowledge, and 
its institutions. The six chapters within this dissertation are intended to apply and combine the 
aforementioned ideas in order to delineate potential novel avenues of  research for social scientists 
concerning money and its unique role in commercial societies. Thus this whole work aims at exploring 
how political economy can more broadly contribute to understanding the macroeconomy and how it is 
indivisible from money and its surrounding institutions. The final goal is to argue that macroeconomics is 
ultimately indivisible from explorations about money and its institutions and therefore methodologically 
and analytically indivisible also from political economy and institutional analysis.    
 
Considering a potentially viable and fruitful future for macroeconomics, as hinted earlier in this preface, 
I argue that it is essential to focus on emergence, complexity theory, and monetary institutions and to 
understand the various types of  institutionally contingent emergent macroeconomic phenomena that 
different banking institutions can actually generate under non-ideal conditions of  human nature. Hence 
macroeconomics should move away from the current institutionless ‘macroeconomics in a vacuum’ type 
of  research, as briefly presented in this preface, and embrace instead a different type of  contextualized 
research that focuses on institutional analysis, conditioned emergent properties, and the comparative 
political-economic and institutional properties of  different monetary frameworks and rules under non-
ideal conditions of  the human nature. 
 
Hence throughout this work, I propose a novel political-economy and institutional research agenda of  
money and monetary institutions with broad brushstrokes from social ontology, political economy, 
complexity theory, and monetary theory. All six chapters address overlapping and complementary 
research questions and issues about money and its institutions. Together, as a single body of  work, they 
can be interpreted as an attempt to propose and redefine, analytically and methodologically, what it means 
to practice non-ideal macroeconomics through an emergentist and ‘complexity vision’ (Colander and 
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Kupers, 2014; Smithin, 2004). Hence this thesis is a ‘whole’ intellectual application of  the broad 
‘economic way of  thinking’ in monetary affairs. 3  Accordingly, it illuminates the series of  research 
questions through economic reasoning and basic economic concepts concerning (a) the implications of  
how individuals relate through money, (b) how markets are formed (and determined) by the use of  money, 
and ultimately, (c) how monetary institutions largely shape emergent macro phenomena based upon 
monetary interactions (Buchanan, 1964). 
 
The major intellectual inspirations for the specific, yet rather eclectic, approach of  this work mainly come 
from three broad lines of  literature. The first comes from the intersections between the recent 
developments of  the Bloomington school of  institutional analysis (Ostrom, 1990, 2005, 2010) and the 
RPE framework for comparing and analyzing diverse polycentric systems and institutions (Boettke, 2012; 
Pennington, 2011). Together they provide a unique focus on the role of  local knowledge, institutional 
craftsmanship, learning, and incentives and on how all these elements are severely shaped and affected 
by institutions and rules (Pennington, 2011, 2016; North, 1994).  
 
The second literature considers the intersections between the revival of  the ‘alternative-monetary-
systems literature’ following the recession of  2008–9, particularly, the interest in both the theory of  free 
banking, and the new, complementary interest in NGDP targeting (Beckworth, 2012b; Hetzel, 2009, 2012; 
Salter, 2014b). I combine this macroeconomic literature also with recent postrecession re-elaborations 
of  some old monetarist and monetary-equilibrium theorists’ insights; these are all represented in the 
forms of  modern market-based macroeconomics and market monetarism, mainly advanced in the works 
of  Horwitz (2000), Salter (2017), Sumner (2012), and Yeager (1968, 1986).  
 
The third and final strand of  literature comes from recent explorations in complexity theory, social 
ontology, the sociology of  money, and emergent phenomena and from the methodological challenges 
they pose to and analytical implications they have for both institutional analysis and macroeconomic 
research (Hodgson, 2000b; Ingham, 2000; Lawson, 2016; Lewis, 2015).  
 
To sum up, the series of  research questions and the different and eclectic streams of  literature used 
throughout this work to address them can be coalesced analytically into contributing to the development 
of  what Lewis and Wagner (2017, 1) have termed the ‘New Austrian macro theory’.4 In other words, it is 
a novel attempt to reconceptualize macroeconomics within a broader methodological and non-ideal 
conception, a banking institutional analysis, and a richer political-economic ‘complexity vision’ (Colander 
and Kupers, 2014; Smithin, 2004). Or in the words of  Lewis and Wagner:  
 
By New Austrian macro we mean a style of  theorizing that incorporates the core of  
traditional or Old Austrian macro and pushes the core in new directions by using new 
analytical tools and methods. . . . [it] is a product of  blending some traditional Austrian 
insights and formulations with new analytical formulations that were never part of  the 
Austrian tradition but which can multiply the analytical oomph of  that tradition. (Lewis 
and Wagner, 2017, 1)   
 
Consequently, the three broad intellectual sources of  inspiration aforementioned are constantly relevant 
 
3 The ‘economic way of  thinking’ is, as Buchanan (1964) and Boettke (2012) conceived of  it, a political-economic and 
catallactic inquiry, meaning it focuses on exchanges (collaborative interactions), emergent properties, and the specific 
institutions or rules under which exchanges occur and emergent properties contingently appear. See also footnote 7 in page 26.             
4 Despite of  the epithet given by Lewis and Wagner (2017), I do not consider this work in any way as blindly following or 
narrowly applying a particular school of  thought or dogma in economics. Indeed, I entirely agree with Friedman when he 
commented that ‘there is no Austrian economics—only good economics, and bad economics’ (quoted in Dolan, 1976, 4). 
Within that dichotomy, there are certainly some ‘Austrian’ economists who have contributed to ‘good economics’; 
nevertheless, the entire set of ‘good economics’ is not exhausted solely by them, nor does it belong only to them. While the 
present work borrows heavily from Hayek and his insights on complexity and the different epistemic properties of institutions, 
it also borrows widely from several other schools of thought, such as the Bloomington and monetarist schools.  
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throughout this work, although they play different leading and complementary roles at different times, 
according to the specific subject matter and theme of  each chapter. Hence some streams of  literature, 
ideas, and methods will appear in the forefront of  the analysis at different parts, while some other ideas 
and methods will be in the background of  the analysis in different chapters. Nevertheless, I hope that 
the reader can still get a unified, and hopefully stimulating and challenging, new vision of  

























The Monetary-Institutional Foundations of 




‘The existence of emergent properties can justify a distinctive sub-
discipline of macroeconomics. . . . the possibility of emergence suggests 
there is a distinctive subject-matter for macroeconomics, centering on the 
tasks of identifying and illuminating the social relations, and associated 
systems of rules, that must be in place for social order . . . [to] be possible’.  

















The Challenges of Complexity in Macroeconomics:  




‘Too large a proportion of recent “mathematical” economics are mere 
concoctions, as imprecise as the initial assumptions they rest on, which 
allow the author to lose sight of the complexities and interdependencies 
of the real world in a maze of pretentious and unhelpful symbols’. 




This chapter provides a general overview of, and justifications for, the methodological strategies and 
frameworks employed throughout the six chapters that compose this thesis. It uses the theory of  complex 
phenomena and its unique properties to justify the employed alternative methodological strategies and 
nonformalist approaches. It also explores four crucial properties of  complex phenomena and their 
relations with, and challenges to, modern macroeconomic models and their methodological criteria.5 It 
acknowledges some crucial properties of  complex phenomena and contrasts them with the 
methodological criteria and assumptions currently employed by modern macroeconomic models. 
Ultimately, the chapter provides arguments in favor of  complementing current formalist approaches in 
macro with a nonformalist political-economic and institutional analysis of  money, as provided 
throughout this thesis. Therefore, it provides a general intellectual justification for the methods and 
frameworks employed throughout this work.    
 
I apply the properties of  Weaver’s (1948) notion of  ‘organized complexity’ to the idea of  the 
macroeconomy as a complex dynamic network comprising interacting agents who use money. This allows 
me to present theoretical and conceptual challenges and outline the methodological implications of  
complexity for macroeconomics. I do so in order to guide the intellectual endeavor and nonformalist 
methodological approaches in this work. Here I argue how using the notion of  organized complexity—
a ‘complexity vision’ in economics—and the properties of  emergent phenomena can help us to 
reconceptualize the scope and vision of  macroeconomics. The complexity vision here proposed is the 
one that guides philosophically and methodologically the whole intellectual endeavor of  this work.  
 
The proposed complexity vision serves as an alternative way of  thinking about macro and seeks to 
reframe macroeconomics as the institutional and emergentist study both of  money as a system of  social 
relations and of  the analysis and comparisons of  different macroeconomic emergent properties 
conditioned to alternative monetary institutions. These unconventional research themes are all explored 
throughout the six chapters of  this work. The dominant literature and current formalist methods in 
macroeconomics are unable to represent the macroeconomy as organized complexity and to represent 
its core causal properties (Axtell, 2014). Because of  reductionist and debatable assumptions present 
throughout their methods, they inherently overlook causal features of  complexity and reality.  
 
 
5 A general definition of  a complex system is provided by Simon (1962, 267): ‘Roughly by a complex system I mean one made 
up of  a large number of  parts that interact in a non-simple way. In such systems, the whole is more than the sum of  the parts, 
not in an ultimate metaphysical sense, but in the important pragmatic sense that, given the properties of  the parts and the 
laws of  their interaction, it is not a trivial matter to infer the properties of  the whole.’ Hence ‘the more interconnected parts 
to a system, the more likely it is that the system is best analyzed as a complex system’ (Colander and Kupers, 2014, 46).  
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Thus this first chapter focuses on exploring which sorts of  analytical frameworks and ways of  thinking 
are most suitable to illuminate the macroeconomic reality and its complex properties as they actually 
seem to be, rather than concealing them. In addressing that question, we must recognize that the ‘more 
dynamically and tightly interrelated the parts are, the more likely the complexity frame will be the more 
useful one’ (Colander and Kupers, 2014, 14). Thus this chapter argues that if  we take the ‘complexity 
frame’ seriously, we need to break away from the current methodological and conceptual straitjackets in 
macroeconomics. Simultaneously, we must look for alternative nonformalist ways of  illuminating the 
macroeconomy as a complex system. I argue that this unfortunately involves, methodologically, moving 
away from current formalistic methods and their radical reductionism in favor of  unconventional 
methods such as analytical narratives, historical analysis, and comparative institutional analysis.  
 
Unlike what most formalist assumptions in economics propose, ‘social systems are characterized by dense 
and diverse interconnections [that] have not been easily captured by standard science. . . . Many aspects 
of  social systems are best viewed as inherently complex. . . . This small change in perspective has major 
implications in how we conduct social science’ (Colander and Kupers, 2014, 49). This chapter seeks to 
explore those implications by taking the properties of  organized complexity seriously.6 As I argue, this 
complexity vision in macro inescapably leads to changing the focus toward institutional analysis and the 
potential use of  nonformalist analytic narratives and historical analysis in monetary theory. Such an 
institutional and nonformalist change to macroeconomic research is ultimately a philosophical and 
methodological attempt to bring macroeconomics back to its ‘main line’ classical heritage and to the 
complexity vision and sensibilities of  Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, and other classical economists 
(Boettke, 2012; Colander and Kupers, 2014).   
 
In this chapter, I provide arguments as to why a nonformalist institutional approach to money is a more 
suitable and sensible methodological approach for when we aspire to represent the macroeconomy as a 
complex system. The chapter also addresses three broad themes related to complexity theory and 
macroeconomics and their implications for and challenges to the methods and frameworks employed 
throughout this thesis. First, this chapter explores four crucial properties of  complex phenomena and 
how they conceptually relate to the macroeconomic order. Second, the chapter evaluates the current 
narrow reductionist methodological and formalist criteria along with modern macroeconomics’ 
underlying assumptions employed in models and how they conceptually conflict with the notion of  
complexity. I explore the radical reductionist way macroeconomics is being conducted and how these 
methods and assumptions are inherently incompatible with conceiving of  the macroeconomy as a 
complex system. Third, based on these incompatibilities, I delineate an alternative political-economic 
approach to engage in a different, but complementary, form of  macroeconomic research that embraces 
complexity while bypassing current conceptual and methodological straitjackets that conceal the 
properties of  complexity and of  economic reality.   
 
Combining these three themes puts forth a novel nonformalist approach to macroeconomics that is 
sensitive to institutions (and rules) as well as organized complexity and its causal properties. Moreover, 
this chapter recognizes that such a complexity-driven political-economic approach to money and 
 
6 Weaver’s (1948) distinction between ‘problems of  organized complexity’ and ‘problems of  disorganized complexity’ lies in 
the fact that organized complexity displays a type of  order or regular pattern (structure of  complexity) that arises from orderly 
interactions among the elements comprising the whole. A problem of  ‘disorganized complexity’ instead is ‘a problem in which 
the number of  variables is very large, and one in which each of  the many variables has a behaviour which is individually erratic 
[not purposeful], or perhaps totally unknown’ (Weaver, 1948, 528). Contrarily, a problem of  ‘organized complexity’ shows the 
essential features of  an organization, meaning that the specific arrangement of  the variables generates an order—an 
organizational property that possesses emergent features. Thus they are ‘problems which involve dealing simultaneously with 
a sizable number of  factors which are interrelated into an organic whole’ (Weaver, 1948, 539, emphasis in original). Consequently, 
organized complexity must display a type of  interconnectedness among the elements so that they are ‘all interrelated in a 
complicated, but nevertheless not in helter-skelter, fashion’ (Weaver, 1948, 539). Moreover, organized complexity ‘depends 
not only on the properties of  the individual elements of  which they are composed, and the relative frequency with which they 
occur, but also on the manner in which the individual elements are connected with each other’ (Hayek, 2014 [1975], 365). 
Hence systems of  relations and connections are extremely relevant to generate complexity.   
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institutions is deeply rooted in classical economists’ methods and thinking, or the ‘main line’ approach to 
economics taken by Adam Smith, David Hume, John Stuart Mill, and other classical economists 
(Colander and Kupers, 2014, 70–75). This is also understood in contemporary political-economic 
thinking as ‘Smithian political economy’ or as ‘the economic way of  thinking’ (Boettke, 2012).7 Hence 
the broad Smithian political-economic approach undertaken in this work distances itself  
methodologically both from conventional neoclassical theory and from the contemporary formalist 
methods that misrepresent both the macroeconomy and banking systems.  
 
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 1.1 explores Hayek’s and Weaver’s arguments about statistics’ 
inherent limitations in dealing with complex phenomena. Their arguments are used as an illustrative foil 
to understand the general and underlying reasons why some formal methods fail to grasp the essential 
features of  complexity. They also serve as a conceptual starting point for reconsidering the core 
properties that define complexity. Section 1.2 examines four crucial properties that define both organized 
complexity and the macroeconomic order. Section 1.3 reviews three methodological and conceptual 
criteria and assumptions currently employed in macroeconomics and how they are intrinsically and 
conceptually incompatible with the four reviewed properties of  complexity. Section 1.4 proposes an 
alternative, Smithian framework of  macroeconomic analysis that avoids current radical reductionism, 
methodological incompatibilities, and the shortcomings of  formal models in illuminating complexity and 
the role of  money. Section 1.5 concludes.   
  
1.1 Interconnectedness, Emergence, and the Limitations of  Statistics  
 
In recognizing the complexity vision in economics, Hayek (2014 [1964], 264) argued that, as a method 
of  analysis, statistics is analytically impotent when it comes to dealing with patterns of  complexity within 
social events based on orderly systems of  relations. To Hayek, and also to Weaver, statistics as a method 
is unsuitable to deal with social phenomena that display the essential features of  organized complexity 
(see footnote 6 for a definition). Hayek argued that statistics is unable to illuminate the workings of  
complex ‘more highly organized’ phenomena. The conceptual inability of  statistics to deal with complex 
phenomena is, as Hayek argued, because statistics, through its methods, deliberately ignores the relative 
positions of  the elements within the whole; and further, it disregards the manner in which those elements 
are systematically connected. In Hayek’s words: 
 
[Statistics] deals with the problem of  large numbers essentially by eliminating complexity 
and deliberately treating the individual elements which it counts as if  they were not 
systematically connected. It avoids the problem of  complexity by substituting for the 
information on the individual elements information on the frequency with which their 
different properties occur in classes of  such elements, and it deliberately disregards the fact 
that the relative position of  the different elements in a structure may matter. . . . It proceeds 
on the assumption that information on the numerical frequencies of  the different elements 
 
7 The ‘economic way of  thinking’ is, as Buchanan (1964) and Boettke (2012), among others, conceived of  it, logical and 
nonformalist economic inquiry. Building upon the classical economists, it focuses on exchanges (collaborative interactions), 
emergent properties, and the institutions in which exchanges occur and emergent properties contingently appear. It follows A. 
Smith’s (1981 [1776]) vision to explore the nature and implications of  contextualized exchanges upon society and the crucial 
influence of  rules and institutions upon exchange and interactive relationships. Above all, for Smith, institutions and their 
comparative incentive and epistemic properties matter for explaining social outcomes and emergent economic reality. It is also 
an attempt to change economists’ ‘thought processes, to look at the same phenomena through “another window”. . . I want 
them to concentrate on exchange rather than on choice. . . I should propose that we cease, forthwith, to talk about economics. . . . 
I should recommend that we take up a wholly different term such as catallactics, or symbiotics. . . . [meaning] the study of  the 
association between dissimilar organisms . . . [and] that the association is mutually beneficial to all parties. This conveys . . . 
the idea that should be central to our discipline. It draws attention to a unique sort of  relationship, which involves the 
cooperative association of  individuals. . . . It concentrates on Adam Smith’s “invisible hand,” . . . the position that I advance 
is neutral with respect to ideological or normative content. I am simply proposing . . . that economists concentrate attention 
on the institutions, the relationships, among individuals as they participate in voluntarily organized activity’ (Buchanan, 1964, 
217–222).             
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of  a collective is enough to explain the phenomena and that no information is required on 
the manner in which the elements are related. The statistical method is . . . irrelevant to the 
solution of  problems in which it is the relations between individual elements . . . which 
matters. (Hayek, 2014 [1964], 264–265) 
 
This suggests that statistical analysis and other formalist approaches might have analytical and 
methodological limits preventing them from explaining and representing organized complex phenomena 
mainly because complexity arises exclusively out of  institutionally contingent relationships between 
orderly and systematically connected parts (Hayek, 2014 [1964], 265). Statistics’ methods, assumptions, 
and techniques of  thought assume away generative properties of  complexity that cannot be assumed 
away if  we want to preserve the notion of  organized complexity and comprehend social structures that 
are clearly not reducible to the mere sum of  their component parts or their properties (Colander and 
Kupers, 2014).  
 
In other words, there might be certain methods and frameworks of  analysis—such as statistics, as Hayek 
identified—that by their mere procedures and forms of  thinking negate the existence of  crucial 
properties that generate organized complexity. Hence if  social systems and organizational structures are 
systems that display features of  an organized complexity and thus are systems that are best analyzed as 
complex ones (ibid., 44–49), then using certain narrow methods that exclude or negate the existence of  
core properties that explain complex phenomena might be after all not only a misapplication of  methods, 
but also a severe waste of  intellectual resources that could undermine social scientists’ efforts to 
understand such phenomena.   
 
Statistics thus proceeds under the reductionist assumption that the numerical information about the 
isolated parts, the randomly distributed numerical frequencies of  their properties, and the repetition of  
the classes of  behavior of  the different elements are sufficient to explain organized complex phenomena. 
As Hayek (1952a, chapter 6) identified, statistics replaces and transforms the original underlying 
information about the attributes and positions of  specific individuals and their systematic relationships 
into numeric ‘information on the frequency with which their different properties occur in [unrelated] 
classes of  such elements’ (Hayek, 2014 [1964], 264; see also Ostrom, 1982).  
 
This way of  treating the ‘social data’ shifts the analytical focus away from positions and relations and 
toward the frequencies at which the properties of  parts appear as separate entities or unrelated classes. 
Thus it conceptually alters the underlying information about social relations and the attributes of  specific 
agents into statistical aggregates that convey instead how frequently the separate attributes (devoid of  
context) appear in the whole. These aggregations of  attributes and classes are actually concerned not 
with particular individuals’ attributes and their relations with others in context, but rather ‘with attributes 
of  which we know only that they are possessed by a certain quantitatively determined proportion of  all 
the individuals’ (Hayek, 1952a, 124; see also Ostrom, 1982).  
 
Thus statistical wholes are entirely different in nature and in composition from the complex wholes we 
aim to study in the social sciences that deal with organized complexity (Weaver, 1948). Hence, ‘collectives 
of  statistics’ are ‘emphatically not wholes in the sense in which we describe social structures as wholes’ 
(Hayek, 1952a, 124). Statistical wholes ignore, and at times even radically alter, context and the specific 
properties and relations of  the parts, and hence they fail to convey the manner in which the parts had 
been positioned in the system and orderly connected, even though such connections and contexts are 
actually the generative features of  complexity (Lavoie, 1985; Lawson, 1997, 2012). Consequently, statistics 
as a method is unsuitable to deal with organized complex phenomena because the techniques of  thought, 
the treatment of  the data, and the assumptions it employs actually transform the underlying data about 
the parts, their properties, and their relations, and thus it disregards the properties that generate 
complexity (Weaver, 1948).  
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Beyond these methodological shortcomings of  statistics to deal with organized complexity, Hayek (1952a, 
2014 [1964]) and Weaver (1948) also suggested that complex systems might display additional novel 
emergent properties. These properties could render the analytical and logical relationship between the 
formalistic, statistical, and reductionist methods currently employed in the social sciences and emergent 
complex phenomena problematic at best, or entirely incompatible at worst (Colander and Kupers, 2014, 
121). This is because the social and organized wholes we aim to study in the sciences that deal with 
complexity are largely produced by the 
 
‘emergence’ of  ‘new’ patterns as a result of  the increase in the number of  elements between 
which simple relations exist. [This] means that this larger structure as a whole will possess 
certain general or abstract features which will recur independently of  the particular values 
of  the individual data, so long as the general structure . . . is preserved. Such ‘wholes’, 
defined in terms of  certain general properties of  their structure, will constitute distinctive 
objects of  explanation for a theory. (Hayek, 2014 [1964], 261–262) 
 
Similar remarks regarding emergence have also been made by M. Polanyi (1966) and Mayr (1985) among 
several other scientists (Hodgson, 2000b). They recognized that one of  the crucial characteristics that 
defines organized complex systems concerns emergent and novel properties that arise from specific and 
highly contingent orderly interactions. Moreover, Polanyi acknowledged that, given their emergence and 
novelty, these properties and organizing principles cannot be reduced to and represented by the specific 
laws, intrinsic properties, and narrow principles that originally governed the isolated parts (Polanyi, 1966, 
36). Thus they saw that emergent properties of  complexity cannot be explained merely by the original 
properties of  the parts, by the frequencies at which certain classes of  the parts appear, by any partial 
combination of  the properties or frequencies of  the parts, or by the (linear or simple) sum of  those 
original parts (Hodgson, 2000b). Hence these novel and emergent properties identified, once more render 
statistics—and most of  reductionist methods for that matter—methodologically unsuitable to deal with 
complex phenomena.   
 
These emergentist arguments against the use of  radical reductionism to analyze complex phenomena 
resonate with Hayek’s aforementioned remarks on why statistics are unable to illuminate complex 
phenomena. This is because statistics ultimately attempts to engage in a form of  radical reductionism, or 
rather a type of  severe conceptual simplification (transformation) of  the complex whole. Statistics, by its 
own proceedings and methods of  treating the data, conceptually avoids dealing with the subject matter 
of  complexity, in which it is the position and interconnectedness of  the parts that matter (Colander and 
Kupers, 2014; Hayek, 2014 [1964]; Lawson, 1997). This is clearly an illegitimate reductionist undertaking 
in studying complex phenomena since emergent properties and the characteristics of  complex systems 
‘cannot (not even in theory) be deduced from the most complete knowledge of  the components, taken 
separately or in other partial combinations. In other words, when such systems are assembled from their 
components, new characteristics of  the new whole emerge that could not have been predicted from a 
knowledge of  the components’ (Mayr, 1985, 58, emphasis added). 
 
Put succinctly, this discussion on statistical analysis’s limited analytical and methodological ability to shed 
light on complexity alludes to three important features of  complexity. First, not only do the structures 
of  organized complexity require a large number of  elements, but also they require that those elements 
must establish homogenous, specific, and orderly interactions among them. This means that they require 
establishing purposeful and ‘orderly relations’ among the parts. It is now known that complexity is closely 
related to the scale of  the array and to the number of  elements that compose it (Anderson, 1972). But 
more importantly, Hayek (2014 [1964]) argued that what is ultimately fundamental and causal for 
complexity to arise is the establishment of  orderly and similar relationships among elements; thus it is 
required also that the elements need to be interconnected in the same kinds of  ‘simple and orderly relations’ 
(Weaver, 1948). 
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Second, organized complexity possesses some novel qualities, emergent properties, and new general 
abstract features not present in or engendered outside of  specific institutional and contextual processes 
of  interactions (Buchanan, 1982; Lavoie, 1985; Paniagua, 2018a, 2018c, 2019a). These are moreover 
ontologically different, irreducible to, and largely independent from the intrinsic and original properties 
of  the unrelated individual parts (or even their sum) that originally composed the order (Mayr, 1985). Thus 
the notion of  emergence is a crucial feature of  complex systems and is also conceptually indivisible both 
from the organized and orderly interconnectedness of  the parts and from the specific institutional 
context (or rules) that defines them (Hodgson, 2000b; Lewis, 2015).  
 
Third, emergent properties do not depend largely on the inherent properties of  the individual parts 
composing the whole, nor do emergent properties depend on aggregating the specific properties of  the 
parts. Furthermore, emergent properties are largely independent of  the frequencies at which the original 
properties of  the separate agents that constitute the whole appear (Alchian, 1950; Ostrom, 2005). 
Concerning complex properties, ‘to some extent they do not depend on [and are not contained within] 
the idiosyncratic states of  the elements they are composed of ’ (Axtell, 2014, 23). Instead, they mainly 
depend on both the general structure of  the order and on the system of  rules that defines the interactions 
among a large number of  elements (Alchian, 1950; Axtell, 2014). Emergent features of  complex systems 
largely depend on the institutional structure in which the elements are interacting, rather than on the 
intrinsic and original properties of  the parts (Alchian, 1950; Ostrom 2005). In the following sections, I 
will explore further these features in light of  the recent literature on complexity, emergence, and 
macroeconomics.   
 
1.2 Four Features of  Complexity and the Methodological Procrustean Bed  
 
In this work, using four core features of  complex systems in attempting to reconceptualize 
macroeconomic outcomes as emergent phenomena has important implications. First, it assists in 
understanding the limited ability of  current formalistic approaches in macroeconomics to engage 
seriously with complexity. Second, it unveils the crucial causal role of  monetary and banking institutions 
in forming emergent complex macro orders. Finally, the analytical and methodological limitations of  both 
statistics and modern macroeconomic models in attempting to illuminate complex phenomena are mostly 
derived in this chapter from the presence of  four inherent features of  complexity. These four crucial 
properties, which I will explore in this section, actually drive the emergence of  complex systems, yet they 
are deeply and philosophically incompatible with modern macro’s methodological criteria and 
reductionist assumptions.  
 
First, complex systems that display organized complexity comprise a large number of  elements that are 
related to each other and interact in particular ways (Hayek, 2014 [1964]). Organized complexity is 
characterized firstly by the existence of  a very large number of  purposeful elements that establish 
simultaneous and interconnected ways of  behavior among them (Hayek, 1952a). Hence the parts are all 
interrelated in a complicated fashion—but not in individually erratic or unknown, helter-skelter ways—
thus forming an organic whole (Weaver, 1948). An organized system is ‘a coherent structure of  causally 
connected . . . parts’ (Hayek, n.d., 4). Thus, ‘only certain kinds of  regular arrangements’ can actually produce 
an order (Hayek, 2014 [1964], 258, emphasis added; see also Lewis and Lewin, 2015).  
 
Second, the particular and orderly interactions between the parts are what constitute the system’s core 
structure, and they are also the causal generative mechanism that produces a complex order and its 
emergent properties (Colander and Kupers, 2014). Moreover, given the myriad of  intricate, local, and 
dynamic interconnections, these interactions cannot be entirely understood and represented in full detail; 
however, they can be largely explained and described indirectly and in general terms either by the system of  
rules or the institutional framework that configures them (Lewis, 2015). Thus while it is impossible to 
know, model, and fully detail the myriad of  interconnections (Colander and Kupers, 2014, 15; Hayek, 
1952a, 105–106), they can nonetheless be described in terms of  the sets of  rules, replicator dynamics, 
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and institutions that define the general principles that guide those relations and the interactions of  the 
parts (Lewis and Wagner, 2017).  
 
The key feature then in analyzing orderly interactions and organized complexity—while bypassing the 
intractability of  formalizing the whole dynamic network and the impossibility of  accounting for the 
myriad of  interactions that generate the complexity—is being able to identify their specific governing 
rules and institutions, or their ‘replicator dynamics’ (Colander and Kupers, 2014, chapter 4). The 
replicator dynamics, or meta-rules, are the (broadly understood) ‘formulas’ and ‘programs creating the 
patterns’ (Colander and Kupers, 2014, 112). Thus meta-rules that define relations are in reality the 
fundamental aspect generating ‘persistent structures of  relationships’ (Hayek, 1952a, 142).  
 
The above suggests that the complex wholes are ‘defined in terms of  certain general properties of  their 
structure’ and rules (Hayek, 2014 [1964], 262). Consequently, in a complex order, there must be a set of  
institutions, rules, or a physically guided structure that governs the general principles and properties of  
orderly interactions (Lewis, 2015). Particular institutions therefore define and require that the individual 
parts will interact with each other only in certain and orderly ways, proscribing others, hence producing 
an order (Hayek, 2014 [1967], 285; see also Ostrom, 2005). 
 
The third relevant property of  complexity is that the orderly system that forms (when the parts relate to 
each other in the appropriate manner) generates new properties that could never have been predicted 
even with full knowledge concerning the properties of  each part (Colander and Kupers, 2014, 130; 
Lawson, 1997). These properties are ontologically and qualitatively distinct from the sum or aggregation 
of  all the original, and intrinsic, properties possessed by the parts before engaging in the system of  
relations (Axtell, 2014). Since individual parts stand in specific positions and orderly relations to one 
another, such emergent properties are inexplicable by, and causally and ontologically irreducible to, mere 
intrinsic and isolated properties of  the parts or even their linear sum. The inherent and unrelated 
properties of  agents—either taken separately, partially combined, or taken as a sum—also fail to explain 
and represent the emergent and novel properties present in such systems (Mayr, 1985). 
 
Hence the hallmark of  emergence resides in that ‘a certain combination of  . . . structures produces an 
overall structure possessing distinct characteristic properties’ (Hayek, 2014 [1964], 261). Consequently, 
emergent properties are highly institutionally and relationally dependent (Hayek, 1973; Hodgson, 2000b). 
Thus they depend not only upon the presence of  inherent attributes among the elements, nor just on 
their large numbers within a structure, but also, and perhaps most importantly, on their standing in certain 
coherent and institutionally specific relations with one another (Alchian, 1950; Lavoie, 1985; Ostrom, 2005). 
This feature renders them ontologically and causally irreducible to, and inexplicable by, the intrinsic 
properties of  the agents or their sum (Lawson, 1997).  
 
Fourth, emergent properties of  complex systems form a constant, endogenous, and unpredictable source 
of  novelty and radical uncertainty (Buchanan, 1982; Lewis and Wagner, 2017). These complex systems 
exhibit ‘perpetual novelty in the system as mutations lead it to evolve new ecological niches’ (Rosser, 2004, 
47). Hence the features of  rule-guided interactions, endogenous perpetual novelty, and radical emergence 
lead us to recognize the fourth property of  organized complexity: a fundamental lack of  steadiness within 
these systems, meaning the radical absence of  any general-equilibrium state or endogenous tendencies 
toward one (Colander and Kupers, 2014). Hence these systems exhibit constant ‘out-of-equilibrium 
dynamics with either none or many equilibria, with little likelihood of  a global optimum’ (Rosser, 2004, 
47).  
 
The presence of  emergence and the endogenous recurrence of  novel properties indicate that complex 
systems cannot be meaningfully conceptualized as static equilibrium outcomes (Lewis, 2015). They 
cannot be conceptualized as such because the existence of  equilibrium would imply that an end state, or 
a lack of  novelty and endogeneity within the system, has been or could be reached; therefore, the system 
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of  relations and the interconnectedness among the parts would have ceased to work, and thus they would 
no longer be producing generative mechanisms and perpetual novelty (Axtell, 2014). Alternatively, 
complex systems, which display the features of  emergence and novelty, can be better conceptualized as 
orders, such as the idea of  a ‘basin of  attraction’ whereby the parts’ constant dynamic changes and 
interactions sustain a higher-level pattern or organization (Axtell, 2014; Hayek, 1973).8  Equilibrium 
excludes the idea that higher-level patterns and ontological transformations of  the parts to the whole are 
actually generated by change and dynamic interaction of  the parts (Lawson, 1997).  
 
Based on these four aforementioned properties, we can recognize that the macroeconomy and complex 
macroeconomic wholes that arise from market settings—also based on similar kinds of  orderly 
(monetary) relations established by purposeful agents that compose them—are really much more than 
the mere sum or aggregation of  the parts that constitute them (Colander and Kupers, 2014; Keynes, 
1936). Indeed, it has recently been recognized in the literature (see for example Holt, Rosser, and 
Colander, 2011; Kirman, 2016) that the macroeconomy seems to possesses the four features that define 
organized complex systems: causally connected parts; (monetary) interactions defined, in general terms, 
by systems of  monetary rules and frameworks; emergent properties not contained within the properties 
of  the parts; and out-of-equilibrium dynamics (Axtell, 2014; Howitt, 2012; Lewis and Wagner, 2017; 
Rosser, 2004; Wagner, 2012). Thus the macroeconomy truly resembles an ecology of  monetary interactions 
(Wagner, 2012); and thus it also critically depends ‘on the [rule-guided and monetary] manner in which 
the individual elements are connected with each other’ (Hayek, 2014 [1975], 365). Indeed, for Hayek 
(1973) and Keynes (1936), the most paradigmatic example of  an emergent, complex, and orderly system 
is the market economy and its macroeconomic emergent structure (Colander and Kupers, 2014).  
 
Thus, by extrapolating and by taking into account the four properties of  complexity in economic analysis, 
it seems clear today—for most economists at least—that the macroeconomy resembles a complex system 
much more than a linear and mechanical one, and thus it possesses the four features that distinguish 
organized complexity (Holt et al., 2011; Rosser, 2004). Indeed, ‘over the last several decades the view that 
economic reality is somehow fundamentally complex has increasingly taken hold among economists’ 
(Rosser, 2004, 45). This has been further underscored after 2008 by the deep failure of  macroeconomists 
in attempting to predict and control the business cycle and in micromanaging macroeconomic 
fluctuations (Caballero, 2010; Calvo, 2013; Howitt, 2012; Romer, 2016). Consequently, as Hayek (1973) 
and Keynes (1936) recognized, if  the macroeconomy resembles a complex system, then it must be treated 
analytically and conceptually as such; otherwise the analysis will miss important and causal elements. 
Indeed, based on that philosophical recognition of  complexity, both Keynes and Hayek advocated a 
nonformalist, nonlinear, and pluralist methodological position in economics and a complexity vision of  
what constitutes the aggregate economy (Colander and Kupers, 2014, 38–40).  
 
As suggested above, Hayek and complexity scientists today seem to have subscribed to a nested 
framework of  different levels of  organization in society or to a general type of  ‘layered ontology’ in 
complex systems; in other words, they have subscribed to a view of  nested types of  emergent orders, 
particularly in the macroeconomy (Lewis and Lewin, 2015; Lewis, 2015; see also Hayek, 1973, 2014 
[1975]). The above means that complex social phenomena, particularly the macroeconomy, are 
ontologically real and they differ in complexity from the sum of  the parts that generate them. This is 
because they exhibit dramatic transitions, phase and ontological changes, and novel properties in 
dimensions and qualities that are absent within the complexity level of  the parts and their partial 
combinations (Kauffman, 1996). This alternative vision concerning the ‘layered ontology’ of  economic 
reality suggests that the nested kind of  relation between microeconomic reality and macroeconomic 
phenomena can no longer be conceptualized coherently as a simple matter of  aggregation or 
multiplication or as a linear scaling up from the micro properties to the aggregate (Lawson, 1997). 
 
8 Order is here conceived as: ‘a state of  affairs in which a multiplicity of  elements of  various kinds are so related to each other 
that we may learn from our acquaintance with some spatial or temporal part of  the whole to form correct expectations 
concerning the rest, or at least expectations which have a good chance of  proving correct’ (Hayek, 1973, 36).            
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This critically indicates that the macroeconomy can no longer be represented and treated as if  it were 
displaying the same types of  nature, phenomena, and properties that occur at the level of  the parts 
(Wagner, 2012). Importantly, the philosophical concept of  the macroeconomy as a complex system 
displaying a nested and layered ontology (Lewis, 2015) poses severe analytical and methodological 
challenges to current reductionist macro models and formalist methods in their ability to illuminate such 
nested and emergent economic reality. The philosophical notions of  layered ontology, emergence, and 
irreducibility in economics suggest that it is incoherent, and thus a conceptual and methodological 
mistake, to treat the relationship between micro and macro as one of  simple linearity, of  ontological and 
complex homogeneity, and thus as a mere matter of  scalability among similar phenomena (Wagner, 2012; 
Hodgson, 2002b).  
 
The inherent and unavoidable presence of  these four explored features defining organized complexity 
and the macroeconomy make it analytically difficult and methodologically challenging for scientists to 
coherently extend and apply statistical and formalistic methods to shed light on complex systems without 
falling also into questionable assumptions concerning the lack of  emergence, the ‘unnested ontology’, 
and the radical reducibility of  the macro phenomena to the isolated component parts (Wagner, 2012). 
Alas, all such questionable assumptions are concomitantly carried through scientists’ attempts to extend 
and apply such formalistic methods to render complex phenomena intelligible, tractable, and 
mathematically coherent. However, by the use also of  such hand-waving and reductionist assumptions, 
social scientists concomitantly are paradoxically and conceptually eradicating those very same crucial 
complexity properties that should have been taken into account to render the phenomena coherent and 
actually distinct from the parts. This suggests correspondingly a kind of  analytical paradox or a 
methodological dilemma in the social sciences that wish to study complex phenomena.  
 
Hence, the above proposes a crucial analytical dilemma between, on the one hand, relying on 
mathematical refinement, formalistic elegance and logical simplicity, and statistical tractability with their 
unavoidable, questionable, and reductionist assumptions and, on the other hand, the scientific (but 
nonformalist) attempts to take analytically and seriously into account the four key properties of  
complexity examined. The aforementioned echoes with what Caballero (2010) has identified as a 
fundamental an unavoidable methodological tension in macroeconomics; meaning ‘the tension between 
a type of  answer to which we aspire but that has limited connection with reality (the core [modern macro]) 
and more sensible but incomplete answers (the periphery [unorthodox explorations in macro])’ (Caballero, 
2010, 86). This is a deep, inherent analytical paradox, or a conceptual trade-off, that seems to plague most 
of  the scientific and formalistic attempts to formalize and study complex systems and the attempts to 
render them mathematically tractable and coherent (Axtell, 2104; Rosser, 2004).  
 
This methodological and analytical dilemma identified above relates to the fact that in their attempts to 
be narrowly scientific and precise by applying statistical, formalistic, and mathematical methods of  
analysis, social scientists in general, and economists in particular, are simultaneously employing unavoidable, 
but questionable, assumptions, reductionist techniques of  thought, and numerical procedures and 
transformations that analytically and conceptually preclude and/or negate the complex system’s existence, 
its crucial causal properties, and its ontological uniqueness. 
 
This narrow and paradoxical way of  scientifically confronting complex phenomena by mere radical 
reductionism unfortunately obliquely continues by disregarding the causal mechanisms generating 
complexity, as well as the properties that make these phenomena organizationally and ontologically 
distinct from the comprising parts. In other words, in order to render complex phenomena tractable and 
coherent with our own narrow conceptions and visions of  science and our preferred formalistic methods 
of  analysis, scientists (particularly economists) are transforming and severely simplifying the organized 
complex phenomena in question so that they (the phenomena) can fit our modern and narrow definitions 
of  ‘rigorous’ and ‘scientific’ analysis.   
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Consequently, complex phenomena, such as the macroeconomy, are forced analytically and conceptually 
to fit the methods of  our liking, rather than the other way around. Thus in dealing with complex 
phenomena, social scientists are currently seeking to fit them within their own narrow methodological 
preconceptions or methodological Procrustean bed, rather than adapting or replacing the scientific 
methods to the properties of  the phenomena we seek to study. However, in doing so, scientists are 
analytically cherry-picking only the tractable and manageable aspects of  the phenomena, while discarding 
the four more problematic, intractable, but crucial and causal, properties reviewed here. This is, as Hayek 
(1952a) and Ostrom (1982, 2010) recognized, a treacherous road for the sciences that have to deal with 
complexity, leading toward an unscientific and dogmatic attitude, or a form of  ‘scientism’.  
 
To conclude, it seems today that macroeconomics is actually deploying such a methodological 
Procrustean bed. We are forcefully attempting to make macroeconomic complexity fit our preferred 
methods and fancied frameworks of  analysis, rather than the other way around. Nevertheless, this is done 
at the extreme cost of  eliminating crucial causal parts of  the phenomenon and severely damaging the 
economic reality that we originally should have been concerned about illuminating, rather than obscuring. 
The next section will extend and apply the four features of  complexity into macroeconomic analysis; 
thereafter, the section will deeply challenge the current methodological criteria being employed in 
macroeconomics. Further, these properties indicate that current reductionist approaches in modern 
macro and dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models are actually deeply flawed, both 
conceptually and methodologically, at handling the macroeconomy’s fundamental features (Caballero, 
2010; Romer, 2016). More problematic still, because of  its reductionist practice, methods, and 
Procrustean framework of  analysis, modern macroeconomics is currently unable to illuminate the core 
features that drive (constitute) complex economic phenomena and thus paradoxically unable to shed light 
on its own subject matter.  
 
1.3 Current Macroeconomic Models and Their Incongruities with Complexity  
 
The four reviewed properties of  complex systems help to shed light also on the key shortcomings and 
analytical limits of  using general-equilibrium models, statistical analysis, and DSGE models to understand 
the macroeconomy as an emergent complex reality. By exploring the four aforementioned properties of  
organized complex phenomena, I also concomitantly recognize in this section where the conceptual and 
methodological shortcomings and intellectual blind spots of  current macroeconomic DSGE models 
reside. 9  Hence in this section I focus on the underlying methodological criteria and assumptions 
contained within macro DSGE models because these models are currently used by central banks as the 
major and most prominent tools ‘for projection and policy analysis’ (Howitt, 2012, 14). 
  
Essentially, DSGE models and modern macroeconomics in general are unable to recognize that 
macroeconomic phenomena are conditioned emergent qualities of  monetary interactions within a particular 
societal and institutional framework (monetary constitution) that defines those monetary networks and 
interactions. Macroeconomic DSGE models face three critical methodological and analytical 
shortcomings in properly dealing with the aforementioned features of  complexity. Indeed, in examining 
the following three analytical incongruences and methodological shortcomings of  current macro models, 
I show that DSGE models are correspondingly deeply incompatible both with understanding economic 
emergent reality and with treating the macroeconomy as a complex system.  
 
First, neo-Walrasian conceptualizations of  the economy and DSGE macro models overly rely on 
 
9 For specific details of  DSGE models, consult Blanchard (2016), De Grauwe (2010), Howitt (2012), Korinek (2015), Romer 
(2016), Smets and Wouters (2007), or McCallum’s (2014, 158) specification of  a ‘standard three-equation New Keynesian (NK) 
model.’ These models are characterized by a three-static-equation system, or common core, in which the first equation is an 
expectational IS curve, the second equation is an expectations-augmented Phillips-style curve, and the third is an interest rate–
targeting type of  Taylor rule. The unknowns in each are real income, the inflation rate, and the nominal interest rate, 
respectively (McCallum, 2014). Despite subtle differences, all DSGE models share the same underlying assumptions, 
methodological criteria, and the strict methodological restrictions reviewed in this section (on this see also Korinek, 2015).  
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conceptualizations of  systemic equilibrium and constant effortless adjustments toward general 
equilibrium (assumed tendencies to always revert back towards its steady state), which are 
conceptualizations originally derived from the classical general-equilibrium theory (Axtell, 2014; Colander, 
2006; Kirman, 2010; Korinek, 2015). These static or ‘steady state’ conceptualizations are ultimately 
incompatible with the properties of  complexity regarding emergent phenomena and endogenous change 
(the third and fourth properties explored in the previous section) (Korinek, 2015). After all, the DSGE 
model ‘is an applied general equilibrium model that is considered as more scientific than earlier models 
since it is based on microeconomic foundations’ (Kirman, 2010, 500).10  
 
Thus, despite DSGE models’ possibly being grounded on ‘more scientific’ and highly formal 
microfoundations, they nonetheless firmly rely on Walrasian general equilibrium and systemic-static 
notions (Colander, 2006), which conflict with the ideas of  dynamic agents’ interactions and of  an 
emergent order being sustained only through constant processes of  change and dynamic relations among 
the parts (Axtell, 2014). Moreover, the DSGE modelling approach has strong conceptual biases toward 
assuming infinite time horizons with a ‘well-behaved ergodic steady state’ (Korinek, 2015, 3). Thus, these 
models are not contingent on notions of  order, internally generated structures, and organizations derived 
from changes among parts. In other words, these models are unable to convey the idea that an overall 
‘order can be preserved throughout a process of  [endogenous] change’ (Hayek, 2014 [1968], 308). 
Consequently, and according to Korinek (2015), these ‘steady state’ assumptions: 
 
may be problematic because there are many real-world processes for which it is not obvious 
that they follow a defined ergodic distribution. If  an economy is assumed to always revert 
back towards its steady state, there is much less concern about destabilizing dynamics than 
there may be in the real world. (Korinek, 2015, 3) 
 
For macroeconomists, obtaining a unique and stable equilibrium is analytically important. Comparative 
statics, through which we can compare equilibrium states whenever we change the parameters, makes no 
sense in the presence of  endogenous change (Kirman, 2010). Macroeconomists found a way out of  this 
problem by assuming the presence of  a single representative agent for the whole economy in order to 
obtain a single and stable equilibrium (Kirman, 1992; Smithin, 2004). Furthermore, assuming equilibrium 
enables the construction of  closed-system types of  tractable and solvable mathematical models of  the 
economy (Colander, 2006). However, the dynamic and orderly interactive processes of  the relations 
among parts, by which the emergent properties of  macro coordination can only arise, are entirely 
assumed away (Kirman, 2010).  
 
Equilibrium in economics does not consider the fundamental issue of  how macro states are initially 
generated or come about or how they are sustained by dynamic processes at various lower (less complex) 
levels of  reality (Lawson, 1997). The assumption of  equilibrium and the assumed capacity of  economic 
systems to reach a single-equilibrium end state are fundamentally at odds both with ontological and 
complexity transformations that rest upon processes of  interaction and with the notion of  endogenously 
generated order that actually defines complexity (Lewis, 2015). In other words, the assumptions of  
equilibrium, static orders, and end states are profoundly at odds with the notion of  a higher-level order 
sustained by the parts’ constant dynamic changes and interactions, which is the fourth crucial property 
that defines organized complexity as reviewed in section 1.2.   
 
The second and third analytical and conceptual shortcomings of  current macro models in dealing with 
organized complexity jointly stem from their unrealistic and highly reductionist approaches and their 
atomistic (radically isolated) individual basis for constructing models of  simple aggregative behavior. This 
 
10 Smithin has recognized that the ‘microfoundations quest’ of  macroeconomics is ‘the pure theory of  individual “choice”, 
essentially divorced from the institutional or social context in which the choice is supposed to take place. The insistence on 
microfoundations . . . is therefore the insistence that an explanation of  macroeconomic phenomena should be based on the 
logic of  the outcomes of  the . . . atomistic agents, without reference to any higher-level social structure’ (Smithin, 2004, 3).    
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means adopting the unwarranted assumption that macroeconomic aggregates correspond linearly to, and 
behave much like, a scaled-up, enlarged, and linear representation of  the hypothetical choices made by a 
single and isolated representative individual (Korinek, 2015; Wagner, 2012).11 Indeed, as Caballero also 
recognized, estimating the parameters of  macro models based on microfoundations, ‘may be a reasonable 
estimate for an individual agent facing a specific micro decision, but what does it have to do with the 
aggregate? . . . why do we call this strategy microfoundations rather than reduced-form?’ (Caballero, 2010, 
89). Implicitly, this reductionist way of  interpreting the economic order assumes that monetary (and other 
media of) social relations, institutional contexts (rules that define interactions), higher-level social 
structures, and heterogeneity among the parts are unimportant features for producing a conceptually 
different and complex order.  
 
The current unrealistic and reductionist approaches in macroeconomics, built upon both the 
microfoundations dictum (see footnote 10), and based on the assumed existence of  a single and 
representative agent (see footnote 11), are responsible for the following two analytical shortcomings and 
theoretical incompatibilities present in modern macro models which I will review below. Particularly, the 
second critical shortcoming of  these DSGE models relates to a lack of  emphasis on and analysis of  
systems of  social relations and the complexity-based role of  monetary interactions among agents (on 
this see also chapter 2). The third shortcoming relates instead to the models’ radical analytical divorce 
from any institutional considerations (or higher-level social structures) and from any analysis and 
comparisons of  monetary rules and the social contexts that specifically define and determine the 
interactions of  the agents; and thus these models are divorced from the final form of  complex 
macroeconomic orders and their institutionally contingent emergent properties.  
  
In regard to the second shortcoming, it has been recognized that ‘our models are based on the same 
fundamental building blocks. The most important of  these is the idea that individuals act in isolation. . . . 
All that we have to do, to deduce the behavior of  the economy at the aggregate, or macro level, is to add 
up the behavior of  the individuals who make it up. Furthermore, the theoretically unjustified assumption 
is made that the behavior of  the aggregate can be assimilated [linearly represented] to that of  an individual’ 
(Kirman, 2010, 501). Hence macroeconomics maintains the pretense of  scientific and formalistic rigor 
by following the reductionist microfoundations program and thus restricting the analysis to closed-
systems types of  optimization problems, which only the representative (non-interacting) agent solves 
(Korinek, 2015). This maximization analysis occurs without any reference to agents’ heterogeneity, social 
positioning, systems of  relations, or social structures (institutions) that bind them (Lawson, 1997; Wagner, 
2012).  
 
The reductionist and simplistic assumption of  representing the whole macroeconomic order by a single, 
and highly rational, representative agent shows how far macro DSGE models have abstracted from social 
structures, causally connected parts, interactions, and systems of  social relations. Indeed, as Howitt 
unfavorably recognized, ‘the idea that the entire household sector of  say the US economy is just a blown 
up version of  a single person is on the face of  it about as bold and unlikely a hypothesis as one could 
imagine’ (Howitt, 2012, 14). Furthermore, by disregarding interactions in its microfoundations and 
assumptions, unjustified macroeconomic reductionism conceals also any possibility of  considering the 
existence of  radical emergence and novelty and thus the possibility also of  nested complex systems.  
 
 
11 The representative agent is this mythical character whose choices are supposed to reflect all the choices made by society 
(Howitt, 2012; Kirman, 1992). The representative agent’s choices are literally taken to be illustrative—in other words, a direct 
representation—of  the aggregation of  the choices made in the entire economy. Under such an idealized, and isolated, ‘single 
representative household’ model, there is no trade nor interactions, and therefore no need at all for mechanisms of  social 
relations, such as language or money (Howitt, 2012; Kirman, 1992, 2010). Even more problematic is that ‘at the operational 
level, the first order conditions . . . of  the representative agent’s maximization problem are taken to be valid mathematical 
expressions also of  aggregative behaviour’ (Smithin, 2004, 4). It is this sole assumption which implicitly suggests that 
macroeconomic and aggregate behaviour correspond linearly to, and behave much like, a scaled-up, enlarged, and linear 
representation of  the hypothetical choices made by such mythical single and isolated representative agent.             
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Representative-agent DSGE modeling therefore questionably assumes that aggregated outcomes and 
macro variables are linear, scaled-up, and magnified versions of  the original variables that constitute the 
isolated agent’s optimization problem (Korinek, 2015; Wagner, 2012). Accordingly, it illegitimately 
assumes that the macro variables and the representative agent’s constrained-optimization variables are 
ontologically and qualitatively equal and thus homogenous and analogous in complexity. In turn, this 
severely negates the role of  interactions, systems of  relations, and emergence in deeply affecting the 
economic and ontological reality and the nonlinear relationship between micro and macro phenomena 
(Lewis, 2015). Problematically, this mistakenly implies also that both (the micro and the macro) socio-
economic domains possess similar, homogenous, and reducible properties and that they face the same 
ontology and degree of  complexity; this misleads social scientists regarding what they can know, manage, 
and predict about aggregated and self-organizing systems (Hayek, 2014 [1964]; Romer, 2016). 
 
Consequently, these issues concerning a lack of  analytical consideration of  social relations, the large 
number of  dissimilar agents, and the agents’ interactions are at the core of  the second shortcoming of  
macroeconomic models in illuminating complex phenomena and their properties. Because of  radical 
reductionism, linear and simple scaled-up representation of  the social order, and the assumption of  a 
single representative agent, these models’ conceptual and formalistic explanations (simplifications) of  
macroeconomic phenomena are incapable of  shedding light on systems of  social relations and orderly 
interactions among parts; and therefore they are unable to illuminate the emergent properties exclusively 
generated by such orderly systems of  relations (Hodgson, 2002b; Lawson, 2012). Accordingly, these 
reductionist assumptions severely negate the existence of  the first and third features of  organized 
complexity reviewed in the previous section. In other words, they are profoundly and theoretically 
incompatible with the notions of  both a ‘coherent structure of  causally connected . . . parts’ (Hayek, n.d., 
4) and the novel properties of  emergence that stem from them. 
  
Finally, the above discussion about the questionable reductionist assumptions currently employed in 
modern macro leads us to recognize the third and final key analytical shortcoming of  DSGE models, 
meaning: they severely disregard the social and institutional structures (higher-level social structures) that 
frame and enable particular sets of  orderly interactions while proscribing others (Hodgson, 2000a; 
Smithin, 2004). Essentially, resorting to the mythical and isolated representative agent for formal 
modeling—thus implicitly assuming that the interactions among heterogeneous agents do not matter for 
producing macro phenomena—correspondingly requires also assuming away the entire role of  the 
higher-level social structure and the properties of  the institutional framework that define and guide the 
organization and general behavior of  those orderly interactions (Hodgson, 2000b; Kirman, 2010).  
 
This one-dimensional way of  treating the relationship between micro and macro has deep implications 
for the way macroeconomists analytically disregard the role of  monetary institutions and banking rules 
in forming and determining complex macroeconomic phenomena. DSGE models just presume a 
coherent, simple, and direct link, at the same level of  complexity and ontology, connecting these two 
socio-economic realms. By assumption, macro models thus conceptually force the two entirely distinct 
socio-economic realms to be actually, but wrongly, ontologically and qualitatively indistinguishable 
(Wagner, 2012). Hence DSGE models illegitimately collapse micro and macro phenomena conceptually 
onto the same level of  ontological reality, assuming then also homogenous uncomplex properties, when 
in fact, as showed in section 1.2, they are entirely different because of  the existence of  rule-guided 
interactions and radical emergence (Colander and Kupers, 2014; Lawson, 1997).  
 
Accordingly, these reductionist assumptions negate also the existence, in macro, of  the second property 
of  complexity explored in section 1.2. By assuming away social relations, and by treating economic reality 
in this one-dimensional fashion, they preclude also any theoretical necessity to concentrate on and explore 
the properties of  monetary institutions as the crucial ontological and complex link between the two 
ontologically and qualitatively distinct, but real, micro and macro social realms (Hodgson, 2000b; Lewis, 
2015). Thus, ‘few institutions play important roles in models today’ (Axtell, 2014, 38).  
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Consequently, given both (1) the above arguments concerning macro models’ limitations and their severe 
analytical and philosophical incongruity with complexity, and (2) the unavoidable presence of  the four 
core features of  complex phenomena within macroeconomic reality (see section 1.2), we can contend 
that DSGE models in particular, and most macro models in general, might become an ill-suited analytical 
and descriptive tool, and perhaps worse yet an illegitimate intellectual pursuit, for understanding the 
relevant and causal aspects that generate a macroeconomic complex reality distinct from the parts that 
compose it. This deep-rooted incongruity between contemporary formal frameworks of  macro analysis 
and complex economic reality problematically suggests that DSGE modeling could become an 
illegitimate intellectual pursuit in macroeconomic research if  our scientific goal is to shed light on the 
crucial features that make the macroeconomy irreducible to and distinct from both microeconomic 
phenomena and the parts composing it. 
 
The problem highlighted in this section has been that ‘in order to make the DSGE model tractable, they 
[macroeconomists] had to assume away almost all elements of  complexity’ (Colander and Kupers, 2014, 
105–106), which paradoxically negates also the existence of  the causal properties that actually produce 
the subject matter (macroeconomic phenomena). In this section I have argued that current macro models 
entirely negate and preclude the existence of  the four causal properties of  complexity via their 
unavoidable assumptions, tools of  analysis, and methodological stance. By negating the causal properties 
of  complexity, most macro models are ultimately assuming away also the existence in economics of  
emergent macro (higher-level) phenomena and hence paradoxically assuming entirely away the core 
subject matter that we are supposed to be analyzing.  
 
Importantly, the issue is not that modern macroeconomic models use mathematics, abstractions, and 
assumptions per se, since most models by definition do that; the issue rather lies in which crucial aspects 
of  the economy and reality are actually disregarded or concealed by employing certain types of  
mathematics and assumptions. Using abstraction to remove the inessential is the appropriate way to 
advance in economic and scientific inquiry; however, hubris and scientific problems arise whenever we 
use abstraction, not only to make things simpler along inessential dimensions, but also as a way to simplify 
(negate) reality itself, and thus to disregard its essential and causal elements (Caballero, 2010).  
 
Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that ‘the problem will not be whether the model as such is 
true, but whether it is applicable to (or true of) the phenomena it is meant to explain’ (Hayek, 2014 [1955], 
199). It has been argued in this section that macro DSGE models are analytically and methodologically 
inapplicable to, incompatible with, and perhaps even untrue of  complex economic phenomena that social 
scientists seek to explain. Given that the macroeconomy behaves much like an organized complex system 
(Axtell, 2014; Caballero, 2010; Holt et al., 2011; Wagner, 2012), these modeling procedures, formalistic 
methods, and assumptions could be considered intellectually and scientifically objectionable, insofar as 
we consider economics as a science that should help us comprehend, rather than disregard, complexity 
and socio-economic reality. Indeed, as Caballero (2010) has recognized: 
 
[C]ore macroeconomics often has aimed not for a realistic anchor and a simplification of  
the rest . . . By now, there are a whole set of  conventions and magic parameter values 
resulting in an artificial world that can be analyzed with the rigor of  micro-theory but that 
speaks of  no particular real-world issue with any reliability. (Caballero, 2010, 90)  
 
The point has been to notice the deep analytical paradoxes and conceptual incongruences that plague 
current macroeconomic models when they attempt to deal with complexity and macro phenomena. The 
three explored analytical incongruences and methodological incompatibilities between modern macro 
models and complex economic reality are the fundamental reasons why these methods will persistently 
remain conceptually incompatible with the core features of  complex phenomena and therefore 
intrinsically unable to illuminate macroeconomic reality. Social scientists must recognize that 
‘understanding a phenomenon requires building a plausible model that incorporates some of  the 
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dynamics that are actually observed in the real system’ (Colander and Kupers, 2014, 124). Insofar as 
macroeconomic models are incapable of  incorporating and representing the reviewed core features of  
complexity and the emergentist dynamics that are actually observed in economic reality, they will continue 
to be inadequate as scientific means of  understanding the macroeconomy.  
 
To conclude, it seems that a unique intellectual Faustian bargain exists in macroeconomic research: 
economists are forfeiting a small amount of  concrete knowledge about economic reality, complexity, and 
institutions in exchange for mathematical rigor, tractability, and the pretense of  appearing scientific 
(Caballero, 2010; Romer, 2016). Alas, the ultimate price to pay for this intellectual Faustian bargain is high 
since this creates scientific hubris, a pretense of  knowledge in macro, and a detrimental intellectual 
movement that paradoxically negates its own complex subject matter, shifting disturbingly far away from 
its original scientific task. I have argued that the underlying cause of  the existent detrimental state of  
affairs in macroeconomics stems from the fundamental methodological incongruences and analytical 
tensions between: on the one hand, the self-organized and complexity properties of  the subject matter 
under study, and on the other hand, the current methodological and formalist predispositions and the 
microfoundations-like precision that macroeconomists deem indispensable in order to claim a valid 
scientific status within the social sciences (Caballero, 2010, 100).  
 
This tension between preferred and ‘more scientific’ methods of  analysis, and the complex nature and 
properties of  the material under study is not new either in economics, or in other social sciences (Hayek, 
1952a; Hodgson, 2004). Indeed, the old institutional school (and also a few scholars within the new 
institutional tradition) responded to this challenge by concluding that the scientific task within 
macroeconomics and economic complexity was ultimately impossible to undertake merely through 
formalizing it in mathematical and closed-system terms (Coase, 1994; Hodgson, 2004; Ostrom, 1982; 
Samuels, 1987). Thus, their proposed solution to this crucial tension was to embrace methodological 
pluralism, via narrative descriptions, historical analysis and facts, and comparative institutional analysis.               
 
Given the explored incompatibilities and incongruences between statistics, formalistic approaches, 
DSGE models, and macroeconomic reality as an organized complex phenomenon, a challenging question 
arises for the philosophy of  sciences and economics: which analytical frameworks can be instead 
encouraged in macroeconomics in order to address crucial issues concerning institutions, organized 
complexity, and emergence? In the following section, I suggest that what could be needed is a 
nonformalist political-economic and institutional approach to the study of  money. In other words, we 
might need to explore alternative political-economic frameworks for dealing with complexity, in order to 
‘not let this formalization [of  macroeconomics] gain its own life and distract us from the ultimate goal, 
which is to understand the mechanisms that drive the real economy’ (Caballero, 2010, 87).  
 
1.4 Toward Macro-institutional Foundations of  Economic Complexity  
 
The discussion thus far has not been a mere ontological point about economics nor a minor and abstract 
exercise in philosophical reasoning lacking any repercussions for our ways of  thinking and practicing 
economics as a science. Quite the contrary, understanding the enormous differences between how things 
really are in macroeconomic reality (see section 1.2) and how things are assumed to be in current 
macroeconomic thinking (see section 1.3) has deep implications concerning how we practice the 
discipline and how scientifically valuable it ultimately becomes. Exploring these immutable differences 
and incompatibilities potentially suggests a change of  vision and practice and the adoption of  alternative 
frameworks to more realistically and accurately engage in macroeconomics as a social science that 
analytically deals seriously with complexity. Therefore, the rather-philosophical themes explored in this 
chapter have practical and methodological implications concerning the plausible incorporation of  
alternative and unorthodox methods in economics that could be more suitable for engaging with macro 
complex phenomena and their causal properties.  
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It has been suggested here that acknowledging macroeconomic complexity and its properties demarks 
the actual analytical and conceptual limits of  how far formalistic approaches and current mathematics 
can be coherently extended and applied to the realms of  complexity and macroeconomics (Axtell, 2014). 
Thus at the level of  formal modeling, the properties of  complexity represent problematic aspects for the 
standard models, the systems of  equations (particularly from the point of  view of  standard mathematics), 
and the entire microfoundations project (Kirman, 2010). Hence regarding formalizing economic 
complexity by the use of  contemporary mathematics, the time has come to acknowledge that ‘today there 
is no mathematics capable of  describing such an economy’ (Axtell, 2014, 42).  
 
In order to overcome, or at least bypass, the explored methodological impasses, analytical inconsistencies, 
and radical reductionism, what seems to be needed in macroeconomics is, as Smithin (2004) argued, a 
theory of  social ontology in monetary economics. In other words, macroeconomics needs a broader and 
more qualitative theory from which we can affirm the importance of  institutions, social structures, and 
relations that form the nested ‘monetary-ecosystem’ that determines economic complexity (Wagner, 
2012). To grasp complexity in macro, what could be analytically helpful is to engage in forms of  
institutional analysis coupled with a focus on comparing institutions and their effects on monetary 
relations and their emergent properties. This consists in focusing on the system of  banking rules and the 
ways they affect incentives and interactions, or as Smithin stated:  
 
One of  the main objectives would be to uncover those aspects of  social structure . . . which 
are relatively enduring . . . and can therefore provide some type of  theoretical explanation 
for the actual course of  events. . . It establishes the crucial point the treatment of  . . . 
institutions. . . What is required in economic science is . . . the ‘macrofoundations of  
microeconomics’. . . . The social institution or structure which is most in need of  
investigation is that of  money . . . [which is] the entire social apparatus of  banks, central 
banks, and other financial institutions, which are involved in the production of  money. 
(Smithin, 2004, 11–12) 
 
Given the explored incongruences and difficulties of  modern macroeconomics in dealing with complex 
economic phenomena, Smithin (2004) proposed moving the nature of  the scientific inquiry toward both 
a higher-level focus on the meta-rules and the details and aspects of  enduring institutional and social 
structures. In short, he proposed an intellectual move in macro toward institutional analysis, or the 
‘macrofoundations of  microeconomics’. This analytical shift would mean scrutinizing and comparing the 
enduring aspects and core features of  banking and monetary institutions because institutions provide the 
higher-level type of  framework, which affects the interactions between agents as well as the emergence 
of  complexity that stems from those interactions as explored in section 1.2.   
 
Hayek (2014 [1964]), in a manner similar to Smithin (2004), was also quite emphatic about how 
institutions affect the emergent properties of  complex systems. For Hayek (2014 [1955], 1973), one of  
the most important (if  not the most important) focuses in the social sciences that deal with complex 
phenomena is the overarching rules and frameworks that generate and govern the general properties and 
patterns of  interactions among the parts. Furthermore, Hayek (2014 [1967]) recognized that despite the 
fact that different sets of  rules might have the same types of  individual elements that constitute them, 
not all of  those rules would produce the same kinds of  positive emergent properties. Critically, this 
suggests that the types of  elements constituting the whole and their intrinsic and isolated properties are 
secondary (and perhaps even irrelevant) aspects when it comes to determining the emergent and higher-
level properties of  complex systems (Alchian, 1950; Gode and Sunder, 1993, 1997; Ostrom, 2005, 100–
103).  
 
Indeed, the findings of  Alchian (1950), Becker (1962), and Gode and Sunder (1993, 1997) concerning 
the fact that market efficiency is an emergent irreducible property of  systems that is derived from certain 
sets of  rules and particular frameworks that define the interactive arena of  markets—rather than 
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rationally derived from sophisticated calculations and highly rational properties of  the separate 
individuals—implicitly refute the fundamental building blocks and philosophical and scientific 
reductionist foundations of  DSGE and representative-agent modeling. Thus, ‘Alchian, as well as Gode 
and Sunder, show that it is the structure of  markets that leads participants to make efficient choices rather 
than the assumptions . . . about the internal structure of  individual valuation and choice’ (Ostrom, 2005, 
101).12 Consequently, if  the essential properties of  the market economy are emergent phenomena, not 
contained in or explicable by the micro properties of  the agents that compose them, then reductionist 
attempts and models that rely on the single-representative-agent assumption will be persistently unable 
to grasp and illuminate them. These (institutionally contingent) emergentist findings reinforce the idea 
that institutions, rules, and the macro-institutional foundations of  macro are the crucial elements in 
significant macroeconomic analysis (Smithin, 2004; Hayek, 1973, 2014 [1975]).  
Further, Hayek (1973, 43–44) also argued that detrimental social states and lack of  order could still arise 
even under some rules and institutions that nonetheless create interactions and orderly patterns of  
regularities among the elements. This indicates that by engaging in institutional analysis and comparing 
their properties, we can seek to answer questions such as which kinds of  rules will produce order in 
society and which kinds of  order certain rules would produce (Hayek, 1973, 44). Hence Smithin’s (2004) 
macro-institutional foundations of  macroeconomics are intimately related with comparative institutional 
analysis.  
Moreover, the crucial point to emphasize from Hayek’s (1973) insights about emergent orders involves 
two insurmountable epistemological limitations: first, our actual limited knowledge concerning the full 
underlying data (the properties) of  the parts constituting the whole; and second, the limited information 
about their ongoing and extensive relations. Both these elements are crucial for creating and conforming 
a complex situation (Hayek, 1952a). Thus in complex systems, there is a vast difference between, on the 
one hand, the information we might possess and what we can realistically access about the parts of  the 
whole and their interconnections and, on the other hand, all the relevant data and properties actually 
required to produce a complex whole. This abysmal informational and epistemic difference severely 
challenges our capacity to model the information neatly and capture it in a mathematically and tractable 
manner.  
Thus in the sciences dealing with organized complex phenomena, we encounter: 
 
[L]imited knowledge of  the data of  the complex situation. . . [We] cannot hope to know 
more than the types of  elements . . . will scarcely ever know even of  all the elements of  
which it consists and . . . will certainly never know all the relevant properties of  each of  
them. . . . The number of  separate variables which in any particular social phenomenon will 
determine the result of  a given change will as a rule be far too large for any human mind 
to master. (Hayek, 1952a, 105–106)  
 
In short, there are drastic informational limitations preventing one from knowing all the relevant data 
and the underlying information that ultimately produces the complex whole. Given such epistemic 
limitations on our ability to obtain all relevant data that constitute a complex system, there is no feasible 
way to create a single model that accurately and completely captures all of  the important and ongoing 
interconnections or the intrinsic properties of  the heterogeneous agents, which are elements that drive a 
 
12 It should be noticed that this notion of  the institutional structure doing much of  the explanation instead of  the assumptions 
concerning the human nature is also Mirowski’s (2002) argument in his book Machine Dreams. There, Mirowski calls into 
question the notion that economics has been immune to postmodern currents found in the larger Western culture, arguing 
that neoclassical economics has negatively participated in the deconstruction of  the integral “Self ”, neglecting also institutions. 
Thus, Mirowski—similar to the arguments therein—argues for a different style of  economics, blending computational and 
institutional themes. For an alternative view see also Hodgson (2006), which contends that this argument fails to distinguish 
between agent-sensitive and agent-insensitive institutions.    
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complex system (Colander and Kupers, 2014, 46, 136). Because, under such a system, the 
‘interconnections make it really complicated to describe and model a system precisely, because the 
mathematical formulas that characterize the system will have no ready solutions’; in other words, the 
‘interrelationships are so multitudinous and changing that standard equations can’t capture them’ 
(Colander and Kupers, 2014, 46, 136).  
 
Therefore, a crucial concern for complexity and social sciences going forward is methodological and 
epistemological. It lies in being able to identify how one can best approach the task of  understanding and 
representing such complex systems given that the relevant interactions and local properties of  the parts 
that produce complexity are far beyond conceptual, epistemological, and analytical reach (Colander and 
Kupers, 2014, 15, 112; Rosser, 2004).  
   
As the first property of  organized complexity suggests, interactions, a higher number of  agents, and 
agents’ heterogeneity are important to create complexity (Anderson, 1972). Nonetheless, as argued above, 
profound epistemic and technical difficulties exist regarding knowing both all the relevant data about 
them and how to incorporate even the meager knowledge that we possess into the analysis without falling 
also into intractability and analytical and mathematical chaos (Axtell, 2014). Social scientists instead must 
find alternative methods and frameworks of  analysis that allow us to account for the properties of  
complexity whilst bypassing the aforementioned conceptual and informational limitations that affect the 
abstract and formal models (Ostrom, 1982, 2010).  
 
Consequently, in order to overcome these limitations, the analytical focus could instead reside on the 
‘ecostructure metapolicy’ of  the system, which requires ‘deep institutional knowledge’ (Colander and 
Kupers, 2014, 25, 30). Thus, in order to ‘grasp how the system is likely to evolve, one can study the rules 
at the small scale and get a sense of  how order can emerge spontaneously’ (Colander and Kupers, 2014, 
49). The particular (and insurmountable) informational and modeling difficulties briefly alluded to in this 
section, which also seem to be ubiquitous in complex systems, suggest actually that analyzing them could 
be done mostly indirectly through examining and comparing rules, ‘replicator dynamics,’ and institutions 
(Hodgson, 2000b; Wagner, 2012). This indicates that ‘looking for . . . rules that govern the evolution of  
a system . . . is the primary way in which complexity social science differs from standard social science’ 
(Colander and Kupers, 2014, 51).  
 
This alternative and oblique focus recognizes that institutions within complex situations ‘constitute a 
generative mechanism that, when set in motion by the behavior of  the people whose (inter)actions they 
shape and structure, gives rise to the emergent causal power to coordinate people’s plans’ (Lewis and 
Lewin, 2015, 11). Hence importantly for the methods and philosophy of  the social sciences, social 
complexity and the whole idea of  macroeconomics as a complex system are conceptually and 
methodologically indivisible from institutional and rules analysis. Consequently, under this alternative 
vision of  the macroeconomy, a major task of  the social sciences that deal with complexity going forward 
must involve exploring alternative rules and institutional analyses, and thorough comparisons of  their 
diverse incentive and informational properties.  
 
Hence a plausible way to deal with economic complexity indirectly, yet scientifically, is to scrutinize and 
compare different institutional properties, the context-specific incentive structures, and the epistemic 
generating and learning mechanisms that different institutional arrangements possess and to study how 
those institutionally contingent properties affect social relations and the ways the parts interact to produce 
an order (Ostrom, 2005, 2010). Institutional comparisons and scrutiny will allow us to identify which sets 
of  banking rules are robust and conducive to generating positive and wealth-enhancing macro orders 
(Ostrom, 2005; Wagner, 2012). In other words, ‘the question which is of  central importance . . . for social 
theory . . . is thus what properties the rules must possess so that the separate actions of  the individuals 
will produce an overall order’ (Hayek, 1973, 45). Focusing on the institutional framework and rules that 
structure and govern agents’ monetary interactions provides a way to sidestep the aforementioned 
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problems concerning access to information, scarce knowledge about interactions and agents, and also 
the formal models’ methodological and technical limitations and incongruences with the properties of  
complexity.  
  
This alternative way of  thinking about macroeconomics is what Smithin (2004) and Lewis and Wagner 
(2017) have denominated the search for the institutional macrofoundations of  microeconomics. This 
means a process-sensitive institutional analysis that scrutinizes and compares how certain rules will affect 
people’s monetary interactions, incentives, and knowledge. Thereafter, whenever the parts are structured 
by those systems of  rules, their orderly exchanges will unintendedly lead to organized complexity and 
facilitate an order. The focus resides in studying rule-contextualized monetary-exchange relationships and 
their emergent properties, revealing how certain monetary-exchange-governing institutions encourage 
particular forms of  economic interactions and proscribe others (Buchanan, 1964).  
 
Accordingly, this dissertation seeks to contribute to the search for both new directions in 
macroeconomics and political economy, and also for the macro-institutional foundations of  economic 
complexity through an institutional and nonformalist perspective on money. Put differently:  
 
In contrast to the orthodox micro-foundations project, which seeks to reduce 
macroeconomic phenomena to the behavior of  isolated, atomistic economic agents, the 
approach advocated here would focus on attempting to identify the sets of  social 
relations—and the systems of  social rules that give rise to them. . . The central focus of  
macro-theory is the institutions in virtue of  which the things conventionally regarded as 
macroeconomic phenomena exist. . . . Central to such an approach would be the 
examination of  the comparative properties of  different . . . institutions. (Lewis and Wagner, 
2017, 13) 
 
The quote concisely captures the core alternative focus, broad methods, and philosophical vision of  the 
entire nonformalist approach undertaken throughout this thesis. The macro-institutional focus of  the 
present work resides in three interrelated socio-relational, institutional, and complexity-based aspects 
about money and its surrounding banking institutions, as summarized in the following section.  
 
1.5 Conclusions: Complexity Brings Macroeconomics Back to Its Classical Heritage 
 
From the discussions on organized complexity and their conceptual and analytical implications for 
macroeconomics, a radical and challenging conclusion emerges. It is the paradoxical realization that the 
notion of  macroeconomics does not really mean what most economists today think it means (Wagner, 
2012). If  the macroeconomy indeed behaves much like a complex and self-adapting system, possessing 
the four features of  organized complexity (Rosser, 2004), then the idea of  macroeconomics as a field of  
research could be instead defined as the institutionally and rule-oriented study of  money, its processes 
of  production (the apparatus of  banks and central banks), and its associated complex and emergent 
phenomena. It also could critically refer to the ontological transformations of  economic and epistemic 
features in society based on monetary relations. This philosophical redefinition of  macro has implications 
for encouraging changes in the practice, methods, and analytical frameworks that macroeconomists could 
potentially adopt to accurately address the properties and nature of  the complex subject matter.  
 
Consequently, in order to study complex economic phenomena scientifically—yet not quantitatively—it 
is necessary to apply methods of  analysis that are dictated by the nature and properties of  the material 
under study (Hayek, 1952a, 77), not vice versa. The study of  economics needs to be ‘guided in the choice 
of  its methods in the main by the nature of  the problem it [has] to face’ (ibid., 77), rather than the other 
way around, which is scientifically unsound (Ostrom, 1982). Accordingly, it would be judicious in the 
social sciences, to attempt to supersede the formal methods and frameworks that do severe analytical and 
conceptual damage to the complex reality we seek to study, with more sensitive and suitable methods that 
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do less damage to the idea of  complexity and its properties. The radical, and also highly uncomfortable, 
conclusion of  this chapter is that in order to tackle economic complexity in a constructive, scientific, and 
meaningful way, we have to eventually set aside most of  the current models and techniques of  thought, 
formalist methods, and closed-system ways of  thinking about macroeconomics and money.  
 
I have argued that if  macroeconomic phenomena truly behave similarly to organized complexity, then 
we must follow alternative and creative methods and adopt heterodox frameworks of  thinking that can 
address such phenomena’s complex nature and core properties, rather than assuming them away just for 
the sake of  preserving our preferred and ‘more scientific’ methods of  analysis (Axtell 2014; Wagner, 
2012). Consequently, economics as a social science embracing complexity may become more productive, 
useful, and truthful to the nature of  the subject matter going forward by becoming Smithian in its inquiry, 
political-economic in its orientation, and institutional in its focus (Boettke, 2012; Colander and Kupers, 
2014).  
 
As explored throughout this chapter, if  we take the complexity-based perspective in macroeconomics 
seriously, then the idea of  macro simply refers to economic phenomena that emerge from institutionally 
contextualized monetary interactions among fallible, yet purposeful, individuals. In other words, ‘[t]he 
ultimate goal of  macroeconomics is to explain and model the (simultaneous) aggregate outcomes that 
arise from the decisions made by multiple and heterogeneous economic agents interacting through 
complex relationships and markets. Neither the core nor the periphery [of  modern macroeconomics] is 
able to address this incredibly ambitious goal very satisfactorily’ (Caballero, 2010, 87).   
 
The four causal properties of  complexity pose a severe paradigmatic and methodological challenge to 
macroeconomics since they suggest that the manner in which macroeconomics is currently practiced and 
envisioned should perhaps be entirely different. I anticipate that a nonformalist institutional and political-
economic analysis of  money, one that sidesteps the explored methodological and reductionist 
shortcomings as well as the questionable assumptions of  DSGE models, could more accurately capture 
the core properties and essence of  organized complex phenomena.   
 
This chapter has also suggested that there can be neither insightful nor meaningful macroeconomic 
analysis without institutional analysis, monetary interactions, and banking institutional comparisons. Thus 
macroeconomic entities and the entire macroeconomy are conceptually and methodologically inseparable 
from monetary institutional and rules analysis. Moreover, the nonformalist, yet institutional, mode of  
analysis suggested in this work echoes and relates closely with the classical economists’ nonmathematical 
and descriptive methodologies and analytic-narrative approaches, and their sensitivity toward complexity 
and against hubris (Colander and Kupers, 2014; Mill, 1929 [1848]; Smith, 1981 [1776]; Hume, 2008 
[1748]).13 This relates also with what Boettke (2012) broadly denominated ‘the economic way of  thinking’ 
(see also footnote 7). My aim has been to provide arguments to begin forming a compelling case for the 
analytical advantages of  the Smithian political economist and institutional approach to macroeconomic 
and monetary analysis over the mainstream framework as an engine of  social theory and inquiry that 
engages seriously with economic complexity.  
 
Given the above suggestions for attempting to bring macroeconomics back to its classical heritage, the 
remaining five chapters of  this dissertation are developed in the traditional form of  verbal models, 
qualitatively and historical analysis, and logical analytic narratives. I apply these verbal models and the 
nonformalist ‘economic way of  thinking’ to the role of  money in society and the role of  monetary 
institutions in producing macroeconomic complex phenomena (see also footnote 3). In short, while 
throughout this dissertation I attempt to shed light on the complexity-based role of  money in society 
 
13 Interestingly, it was also Malthus one of  the first economists that introduced the idea of  complexity into economic analysis. 
In his economic disputes with Ricardo and elsewhere, Malthus argued that the complexity of  economics and the uncertainty 
of  economic action—using different terms at the time—placed severe limits on formal and mathematical approaches. On the 
economics of  Thomas Malthus consult Hollander (1997).      
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and its surrounding institutions, the reader will not encounter any use of  formal and mathematical models 
in this work. Their absence is to deliberately avoid the reviewed conceptual and methodological 
incompatibilities and analytical incongruences between them and the self-organized and complex nature 
of  the subject matter under study.   
 
The logical order of  the remaining five chapters is as follows: First, the political-economic approach aims 
to identify the complexity-based role of  money in creating a novel system of  social relations (identifying 
the crucial set of  social relations) that sustains the emergence of  social knowledge (chapter 2). Second, I 
will seek to understand the rationale for, and role and evolution of  monetary institutions (identifying the 
essential system of  social rules), particularly central banks, and how they ‘manage’ and provide both 
crucial banking services and also the money supply (chapters 3 and 4). Third, and central to this 
nonformalist approach to macroeconomics, is an exercise in comparative institutional analysis that allows 
for comparisons between the epistemic and incentive properties of  different institutional and banking 
alternatives (chapters 5 and 6).  
 
Finally, following classical political economists such as Smith, Mill, and Hume, and following also 
contemporary political economists such as Buchanan, Hayek, E. Ostrom, and Samuels the following five 
chapters and diverse forms of  engaging in the ‘economic way of  thinking’ (Boettke, 2012) regarding 
money and its institutions are entirely verbal or narrative (verbal discussions), yet economically and 
institutionally oriented, in their expositions. Ultimately, I leave it to each reader to judge the scientific 
value, contributions, and the potential intellectual gains that these new directions and nonformalist 
explorations to money and banking may bring to macroeconomic thinking and more broadly to 





























‘The basis of  monetary order may indeed be the private knowledge of  
acting humans, but the essence of  a monetary order is how that private 
knowledge becomes social and how such social knowledge makes an 
advanced, complex, and prosperous society possible’. 




The benefits and complexity of  the commercial world would be unlikely without the use of  money in 
exchanges. As Simmel (1978 [1907]) acknowledged, money is the essence of  commercial modernity and 
social complexity. Despite this recognition, little else has been said about the crucial symbiotic and 
ontological relationships between money, social complexity, and the beneficial order formed in markets. 
Weber (1978) hinted at the crucial epistemic role of  money in individuals’ commercial cognition and in 
enabling rational calculation, opening the path for exploring the relationship between money and 
knowledge (see also Mises, 1981 [1922]; Mitchell, 1937). Despite the contributions of  Simmel and Weber, 
not much else has been written in exploring the relationship between complexity, money, and knowledge 
(Horwitz, 1992a; Ingham, 1998; Lawson, 2016). This chapter seeks to bridge that gap in the literature by 
providing a complexity-based and social-ontological account of  the relationship between money and 
emergent knowledge in commercial societies.  
 
Following chapter 1, this chapter continues to apply the theory of  complex phenomena and its core 
properties in order to illuminate the following: first, the socio-relational and complexity-based role of  
money in society; second, that role’s implications for the formation of  organized macroeconomic 
complexity in the form of  emergent economic and social knowledge. As recognized throughout the 
previous chapter, one of  the crucial features required to generate organized complexity resides in the fact 
that the elements that constitute the whole need also to establish a wide and dynamic network of  similar-
in-kind (homogenous) and orderly interactions. In other words, the elements that constitute the order 
need to create an orderly and organized system of  social and purposeful relations among them (Weaver, 
1948). Building on Hayek, Mayr, and Weaver, chapter 1—particularly sections 1.2 and 1.4—argued that 
the orderly system of  relations and its dynamic composition and order are of  fundamental importance 
for generating novel, positive, and wealth-enhancing emergence and thus organized complexity in the 
economic system.   
 
The previous chapter also argued that the emergent properties and the ontological transformations of  
organized systems are complex properties derived from the orderly system of  interactions that the 
elements of  the whole establish between them. Chapter 1 concluded by arguing that the roles of  both 
interactions and the media of  relations to establish them are fundamental causal features of  any theory 
of  organized complexity (Lewis, 2015). Thus, given the conclusions of  chapter 1 concerning the 
theoretical relevance of  interactions and of  systems of  relations for creating macroeconomic complexity, 
this second chapter—by building on the complexity properties surveyed and enumerated hitherto—seeks 
to explore the complexity-based, epistemic, and ontological implications of  using money in exchanges in 
order to create a system of  socio-commercial relations.  
 
 
14 A modified version of  this chapter was published in the Review of  Social Economy (Paniagua, 2018a).   
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Consequently, using the ideas about organized complexity and macroeconomics developed in chapter 1 
will help us here to acknowledge the fundamental and ontological reasons why money is relevant for 
coordinating the economy and thus never neutral in the macroeconomic order. In short, this chapter deals 
with money’s epistemic and complexity-based relevance in commercial societies. Indeed, if the 
macroeconomy truly resembles an organized complex system, then one of its defining features seems to 
be the orderly system of exchanges that only money can sustain. Consequently, the core focus of this 
chapter moves from the macroeconomy as a complex order toward the specific role of money in 
generating such an order.     
 
Chapter 2 therefore attempts to extend recent explorations on the ontology of money (Hodgson, 2000b; 
Ingham, 1998; Lawson, 2016; Peacock, 2017). Its contribution resides in providing sociological and 
ontological accounts for the emergence of novel (and emergent) economic knowledge that is fundamental 
in coordinating commercial societies and decentralized exchanges. Building on chapter 1, it provides 
novel insights that explain the important epistemic and ontological role money has in generating a system 
of social relations. Having such a distinctive role, money sustains the emergence of a social type of 
economic knowledge based on—but not contained within—the disseminated pieces of knowledge 
scattered throughout society. Thus, in a nutshell, part I focuses on complexity, emergence, the theory of 
money in more abstract and theoretical terms, and money’s irreplaceable role in generating economic 
complexity.   
 
It is known that money presents theoretical and analytical difficulties for neoclassical economics, which 
treats it as a cost-reducing tool and takes a socially neutral, aseptic view of it (Alchian, 1977; Gilbert, 
2005; Hahn, 1965; Horwitz, 1992a, chapter 1; Ingham, 1998). Drawing from complexity theory, chapter 
2 provides a socio-epistemic rationalization for money’s irreplaceable role. Building on Ingham’s (1996a) 
Money Is a Social Relation, I argue that money generates a new orderly system of complex social relations. 
This, in turn, engenders a type of social knowledge as an emergent and ontological phenomenon irreducible 
to the mere mobilization or aggregation of the fragmented knowledge that individuals held prior to the 
process of pecuniary exchange. Consequently, I contend that money cannot be separated from economic 
knowledge, macroeconomic complexity, or market rationality. Chapter 2 thus poses critical challenges to 
the traditional neoclassical and orthodox macroeconomic conceptions of money as a ‘veil’ over real 
exchanges (Alchian, 1977; Hahn, 1965; Schumpeter, 1934 [1912]) and of the fundamental, yet narrow, 
epistemic role of money as merely a ‘knowledge conveyor’ or simple ‘knowledge mobilizer’ (see Hayek, 
1948 [1945]).  
 
Nevertheless, most economists today recognize that the fundamental so-called ‘coordination problem’ 
that societies face in promoting a rational economic order stems from operationalizing and organizing 
the fragmented and tacit nature of  a vast portion of  the knowledge required for social coordination 
(Hayek, 1948 [1945], 1973). The coordination problem is fundamentally an informational, epistemic, and 
communicational problem at the societal level (Clower, 1984a, 1984b; Lavoie, 1985; Leijonhufvud, 1981; 
Paniagua, 2018c). In other words, it concerns how society can accurately create, mobilize, and 
operationalize hard-to-codify (tacit) knowledge that is indispensable for rational and efficient market 
decision-making, and allocations (Lavoie, 1985; Leijonhufvud, 1981). The coordination problem of  
markets’ and society’s economically rational allocation of  resources has been considered by economists 
as the most fundamental challenge any social system needs to address to promote prosperity and to deal 
successfully with scarcity (Buchanan, 1964; Clower, 1984a; Howitt, 2012).15  
 
For instance, Hayek (1948 [1945]) identified disequilibrium market prices as indispensable epistemic 
signals and mechanisms to alleviate the coordination problem and operationalize and distribute the 
knowledge available in society (Boettke, 1998b). Hayek added an emphasis on how prices and markets 
can allow us to communicate, mobilize, or operationalize existent fragmented contextual bits of  
 
15 On the tacit nature of  some knowledge, see Polanyi (1958, 1966). A relevant part of  our knowledge is nonlinguistically 
articulable and emerges from the practices, interactions, and communication of  minds (Boland, 1979; Gigerenzer, 2008).  
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knowledge dispersed among minds (Hayek, 1948 [1945], 1979). Nevertheless, not much contemporary 
sociological and economic literature builds on Hayek, Simmel, and Weber to focus on two crucial 
epistemic and ontological issues and research gaps related to money and coordination. These two crucial 
research gaps are the following.   
 
First, how market knowledge develops in society and can be said to actually exist in a communicable and 
comprehensible manner has been severely underexplored (Horwitz, 1992a). Further unexplored are the 
necessary institutional (pre)conditions under which unrelated and fragmented bits of  economic knowledge 
can be first contextually formed and held in individuals’ minds and later used, arranged, and 
operationalized by society in a complex and organized manner that subsequently obtains a wealth-
enhancing higher-order (or emergent) type of  social knowledge. Second, there is a gap in the economic 
literature in evaluating whether that crucial emergent economic knowledge, seen in markets, can be in 
principle ontologically reducible to, and explained directly by, the combination, mobilization, or simple 
aggregation of  the individuals’ previously unrelated and unorganized bits of  knowledge—and therefore 
simply explained or replicated by knowledge aggregation and mere epistemic mobilization.  
 
In other words, we need to question whether the emergent economic knowledge of  markets can be 
reduced to, or merely explained directly by, the mobilization and aggregation of  the scattered bits of  
unrelated tacit knowledge that originally constitute it. In this chapter, I address these research questions 
by providing a theoretical underpinning for the ontological and epistemic role of  money in society and 
money’s relationship with the emergence of  economic knowledge. Put differently, this chapter seeks to 
borrow mostly from the insights developed in chapter 1 concerning organized complexity and social 
relations, but it seeks also to apply them particularly within the realm of  monetary theory and monetary 
relations. Thus this chapter can be broadly considered as an application of  the ideas previously developed 
in chapter 1, but within the realm of  the use of  money in society and its complexity-based and epistemic 
implications.      
 
More specifically, here I address the aforementioned gaps in the literature by arguing first, in section 2.4, 
that market knowledge—similar to scientific knowledge—is a system of  social monetary relations in 
context and is institutionally contextual and socio-relational. As such, market knowledge that is devoid 
of  socio-relational processes and independent of  the specific use of  money and debt relations actually 
does not exist in an available (conveyable) form to be used or communicated (see also Buchanan, 1982). 
Rather, such economic knowledge is only generated in the context of  the complex system of  monetary 
relations sustained by money’s dual role as the unit of  account and as media of  exchange (see section 
2.2). Consequently, this chapter argues that without money there is neither economic knowledge, nor 
market rationality; thus money is also indivisible from macroeconomic coordination (Leijonhufvud, 1981). 
Second, in section 2.5, this chapter argues that money and exchanges play a crucial ontological and 
complexity-based role in socially transforming existent and scattered knowledge into higher degrees of  
emergent ‘social intelligence’. Accordingly, I contend that money does not merely assist us to convey 
existent knowledge, but it also contributes to orderly relating such knowledge in order to produce emergent 
and novel irreducible totalities. This ultimately helps to explain money’s ubiquitous non-neutrality and 
wealth-enhancing properties in commercial societies.     
 
Furthermore, this important socio-epistemic role of  money in moving beyond knowledge discovery and 
knowledge conveyance toward the generation of  complex and emergent knowledge is a relevant argument 
that the socio-economic literature on money has not yet emphasized. Besides the contributions of  Hayek, 
Simmel, and Weber, there have been very few explorations of  the social and institutional preconditions 
necessary for complex knowledge and coordination to exist (Lewis and Wagner, 2017). Hence, the title 
of  this chapter echoes Hayek’s (1948 [1945]) celebrated paper on economic knowledge, but I seek to 
complement his rather narrow view on the socio-interactive aspects of  knowledge (Polanyi, 1966) with a 
perspective on complexity and systems theory and the social ontology of  money. This contribution 
concerning the irreducibility and emergent-complexity properties of  economic knowledge and the use 
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of  systems theory for understanding the positive consequences of  monetary-social relations has 
profound implications for the socio-economic literature on money since it helps in understanding the 
ontological non-neutrality and unique underlying epistemic role of  money.16 Hence this chapter provides a 
distinctive socio-economic justification as to why money is indispensable and always non-neutral in the 
evolution and manifestation of  all macroeconomic emergent outcomes. 
 
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2.1 explores some relevant functional aspects of  money. 
Particularly, it attempts to delineate what money is for the scope of  this thesis by arguing that money is, 
and also generates, a system of  social relations. The section also explores the roles of  money both as the 
generally accepted means of  exchange and as the unit of  account. Section 2.2 examines some unique 
social features of  money and the unexplored ontological properties that money generates. This section 
reviews and appraises the contemporary socio-economic literature on money, emphasizing its insights 
and also the most relevant research gaps present within that literature. Section 2.3 reviews the epistemic 
and cognitive role that institutions play. This section argues that institutions shape cognition and mind-
to-mind relations, arguing also that institutions matter for producing a more complex ‘social intelligence’. 
Section 2.4 analyzes further the relationship between institutions and the emergence of  knowledge by 
focusing on Polanyi’s (1951, 1966) sociology of  scientific knowledge. The section thus provides parallels 
between how scientific knowledge is generated in science and how economic knowledge is generated in 
markets. Section 2.5 considers the relationship between money and economic knowledge as complex 
phenomena by suggesting that money creates an orderly system of  exchange relations that engenders 
emergent irreducible totalities. Section 2.6 concludes.   
 
2.1 Some Relevant Aspects of  Money: From Epistemological Conveyance to Emergence   
 
Hayek (1948 [1937], 1948 [1945]) considered the economic knowledge that is crucial to enhance social 
coordination as scattered, fragmented ‘bits’ and held (perhaps largely tacitly) in individuals’ minds and 
embedded in the exercise of  contextual skills. Thus prices are largely conceived basically as indispensable 
social tools to convey, communicate, and mobilize fragmented and tacit existent bits of  knowledge, and 
also to provide them (the scattered knowledge) with a positive social use (Hayek, 1948 [1945]; see also 
Clower, 1984b and Thomsen, 1992). They could also be seen collectively as an ‘extralinguistic social 
conveyance mechanism’ in which hard-to-articulate knowledge can be conveyed in exchange actions and 
mobilized across agents to be later reinterpreted (Horwitz, 1992a, 1992b).  
 
This view—albeit a great contribution to unveiling the relational and communicational properties of  
money—by focusing merely on mobilization and conveyance of  fragmented knowledge already 
disseminated, unintentionally de-emphasizes the unique social and ontological role of  money and other 
institutions in the formation of  novel ‘higher order’ knowledge stemming from a system of  organized 
and complex relations; and it emphasizes instead the linear and simpler social outcomes stemming from 
mere processes of  mobilizing and communicating something that is already there (Buchanan, 1982; 
Lavoie, 1985; Paniagua, 2018c; see also section 1.2 in chapter 1).  
 
Hence the aforementioned literature overlooks the novel ontological properties and the qualitatively 
different economic knowledge generated from social interactions, focusing only on conveyance. It frames 
social relations—perhaps too narrowly and individualistically—as mere processes to mobilize and 
reinterpret pieces of  existent knowledge among the separated agents, rather than interpreting social 
processes as mechanisms that generate novel organized complex phenomena. Thus it neglects the 
emergent and ontological properties that are not to be found in the mere communication, mobilization, 
or sum of  knowledge held by individuals separately (or unrelatedly). Thus, in regard to economic 
 
16 Systems theory focuses on relationships between parts and wholes in which the system has relevant properties irreducible 
to and distinct from the properties held at the level of  the parts that constitute the system (Bertalanffy, 1968). For details on 
their general properties and the list of  features of  complex orders, see chapter 1 and also Bertalanffy (1968), Lewis and Wagner 
(2017), and Hayek (2014 [1967]). For social ontology, see Ingham (1996b, 1998) and Lawson (1997, 2012, 2016). 
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knowledge, there is also an ‘absence of  anything resembling an adequate specification of  its social 
structural conditions of  existence’ (Ingham, 1996a, 509). Conceptualizing prices merely as epistemic 
enablers or as conveyors of  current and existent fragmented knowledge disregards the complex 
relationships between social structures and human agency and disregards also the emergent unforeseeable 
ontological properties that might arise from individuals’ organized social interactions (Colander and 
Kupers, 2014).  
 
By considering relevant economic knowledge in society as largely explicable by (or reducible to) the sum 
or interpretation and communication of  the unstructured and unrelated fragmented epistemic bits held 
by individuals’ prior exchanges, prices and money can be understood as merely related to processes of  
discovery, distribution, and ‘extra-linguistic’ mobilization of  those scattered pieces of  knowledge already 
disseminated (Hayek, 1948 [1945]; Horwitz, 1992b). Implicitly, this communication-interpretation view 
on money considers relevant economic knowledge to be on the same level of  complexity and ontology 
as that of  individuals’ original and scattered knowledge (Lewis, 2016). Therefore, the socio-economic 
literature treats economic knowledge as easily reducible to the mere sum or aggregation of  individuals’ 
epistemic (informational), but disseminated, resources that constitute the market order (see for example 
Boland, 1979; Dyer, 1989; Notturno, 2014; Rabin, 2004).  
 
This current view focuses on the signaling function of  money, thus overlooking the possible system-
organizing function that leads to ontological and relevant changes that could emerge in social knowledge 
(Lavoie, 1985). It also conceals the crucial complexity-based, or higher-order, role of  money and markets 
in generating socio-dependent novel and more intricate forms of  knowledge. It is argued here instead 
that such knowledge is actually emergent and did not exist prior to the system of  social relations among 
individuals, established and sustained only through money (see also Buchanan, 1982). As discussed above, 
previous work concerning money, rationality, and knowledge has therefore severely discounted the 
ontological and complex epistemic role that money could potentially play in society through sustaining 
and enlarging orderly social relations.   
 
The modern ontology of  money instead suggests that money could potentially play an emergent 
economic role greater than (although containing) an extralinguistic communication process (Horwitz, 
1992a; Ingham, 2000; Lawson, 2016) or a ‘symbolic medium of  social communication’ (Ganssman, 1988, 
5; see also Dodd, 1994). This chapter, building on Lawson (2012, 2016), Ingham (1996a, 2000), and 
Horwitz (1992b), argues that money’s crucial role in the economy is an epistemological and ontological 
one that has not been totally explored in the literature. That role resides in money’s ubiquity and unique 
capacity to generate and sustain a new and vast system of  orderly social relations that (constantly) brings 
novel and ever-changing ontological and complex properties of  market emergence—emergent properties 
that would have never existed without money as the medium of  relation (and exchange). Money therefore 
engenders a socio-relational system that further sustains and arranges, in specific manners, the bits of  
local and disseminated knowledge, consequently having qualitatively distinct and ontologically diverse 
properties. 
 
For the purposes of  this work, money in modern capitalistic economies is considered as socially constructed 
and broadly represented by liabilities (complex systems of  debt relations) in the form of  bank currency 
(banknotes) as a generalized means of  exchange, and as bank or demand deposits (bank-deposit liabilities) 
issued by commercial banks (Laidler, 1990; Smithin, 2000). In the words of  Friedman and Schwartz (1982, 
24), the total quantity of  money available in circulation can be broadly defined as ‘currency plus adjusted 
demand and time deposits held by the public’. Thus both types of  bank liabilities together constitute 
money as a system of  debt relations and as the generalized means of  exchange in markets (see section 
2.5.2). The sum of  both banknotes (currency) held by the public and commercial bank or demand 
deposits then broadly represents inside-money as liabilities and as debt relations among agents and banks 
(Laidler, 1990; Selgin, 1988). Accordingly, the above definition of  money as a system of  debt relations 
relates closely to the concept of  inside money balances; whereas outside money is only the ultimate means 
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of  payment (settlement), which is usually established as a commodity money, like gold or silver (see also 
section 2.5.1). In general, outside (commodity) money as the ultimate means of  payment (or settlement) 
does not circulate from hand to hand as the generalized means of  exchange enhancing trade; instead, 
inside money (currency and demand deposits) does (Selgin, 1988; Smithin, 2000).          
 
Moreover, banknotes, which in most societies today means central bank notes, are debt relations with 
respect to the state or the legitimately sanctioned monetary authority that issues notes as central bank 
liabilities. Banknotes are socially constructed debt categories in which the social relation acquires the 
form of  the state’s promise to pay (Ingham, 2000). This socially constructed debt category ‘is constituted 
by social relations between the monetary [state-based authority] and other economic agencies in the 
society’. It is a type of  ‘state money’ in which ‘the liabilities of  state central banks acquire the status of  
valuata money or base money’ (Smithin, 2000, 7). 
 
In addition, bank deposits, as commercial liabilities are money as debt relations produced by commercial 
banks and arise from bank credit. Bank deposits are generated through commercial banks’ debt 
relationships (promises to pay) and nowadays ultimately constitute most of  society’s means of  exchange. 
Therefore, the overall money supply primarily consists today of  commercial bank deposits rather than 
banknotes, even though both represent money as debt relations in one form or another (Laidler, 1990, 
33; Smithin, 2000). Hence modern capitalistic money ‘now consists in nothing more than a symbol or 
signifier of  states’ and banks’ promises to pay’ (Ingham, 2000, 23). Accordingly, both bank deposits and 
banknotes are debt relations (conceived of  as money), and thus both are extremely important in 
sustaining and enlarging the orderly system of  monetary exchanges that generates the ontological 
transformation of  knowledge as argued in the following sections. 
 
Hence this work considers money as ‘credit money, in which special signifiers of  debt (promises to pay) 
issued by states and banks, become means of  payment. . . capitalistic credit money is a qualitatively 
distinct form in which money-stuff  itself  is essentially the social relation of  the promise to pay’ (Ingham, 
2000, 18–19). Thus money, in the form of  modern capitalistic credit money—as Simmel (1978 [1907], 
177) saw—is not simply a veil over economic and barter exchanges. Instead, it socially and qualitatively 
transforms pure (or barter) exchange relations into ‘structurally distinct [monetary and debt] social 
relations’ (Ingham, 2000, 23), which nowadays have a social triadic form (Smithin, 2000).   
 
Money as a generally accepted means of  exchange is not necessarily a single essential commodity that 
acquires special properties and is an end in itself, nor should it be longer consider a ‘money-stuff ’ as 
commodity-objects (Ingham, 2000). Its essence as the means of  exchange is ‘most usefully seen as a 
socially constructed (and continuously re-negotiated) category, and is constituted by social relations 
between the monetary and other economic agencies in the society’ (Smithin, 2000, 7). What makes money 
distinct from barter is not its physical properties or the nature of  the ‘money-stuff ’ itself, but rather the 
fact that it acquires a centrality in expressing exchanges and debt relations, enabling a widespread and 
homogenous system of  monetary exchanges as triadic social relations (Yeager, 1968). In such system of  
relations, money ‘necessarily consists in [trilateral] social relations between economic agents and between 
them and a monetary “authority”’ (Ingham, 2000, 19, emphasis in original).  
 
Consequently, the focus here resides on the modern conception of  money as capitalistic credit money, 
represented as a system of  social and debt relations that creates systems of  exchange that have a trilateral 
and homogenous social nature. The emphasis is on money’s role as a means of  exchange that establishes 
new intricate trade relations, generating a ‘higher order’ form of  economic and social knowledge. 
However, we must not disregard the ‘actual social processes by which money is produced . . . [and the 
fact] that money of  account is the pivotal element of  monetary practice [of  exchange and debt relations]’ 
(Ingham, 2000, 18). Indeed, not disregarding the actual social processes by which money is supplied to 
the economy fundamentally leads to a focus on the specific monetary-institutional contexts (the meta-
rules) in which money is ultimately produced in the banking system. Such an institutional and 
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constitutional focus on money will be the main theme of  the following four chapters.   
 
Ultimately, money’s centrality in the economic order stems from the fact that virtually all exchanges and 
trades in both organized and informal markets take place through monetary means of  exchange, which 
include also debt (deferred payment denominated in money of  account), itself  a social relation (Clower, 
1984a; Horwitz, 2000; Ingham, 2000; Yeager, 1968). Additionally, it is important to recognize that 
‘something which is merely being used as a convenient medium of  exchange on the spot may approach 
to being money . . . [but] Money-Proper in the full sense of  the term can only exist in relation to a Money-
of-Account’ (Keynes, 1930, 3; see also Smithin, 2000).17  
 
Hence money as money of  account, in addition to money as means of  exchange, allows people to 
homogenously and consistently define debts and market prices and to express them also in a common 
numeric denominator; subsequently enabling numeric comparisons of  alternatives and the different 
market values of  goods, ultimately supporting also the process of  rational economic calculation 
(Ganssman, 1988; Mises, 1981 [1922]; Weber, 1978). Additionally, it provides a commonly agreed 
denominator (focal point) by which to widely trade goods and to engage in more complex and general 
debt relations without the physical use of  the ‘money-stuff ’ (or commodity) to intermediate trades 
(Smithin, 2000; Keynes, 1930). Money of  account (as unit of  account) therefore means a standard-
reckoning form of  money (Heinsohn and Steiger, 2013).  
 
In other words, money of  account ‘is the essential means by which price lists are constructed and 
multilateral, inter-temporal exchange is made possible. . . . [T]he actual money-stuff  is not required for 
the immediate transactions’ (Ingham, 2000, 18). This role helps to enable the general and ubiquitous use 
of  money in multilateral inter-temporal and spot exchanges. Thus, as Clower recognized, ‘Goods buy 
money, money buys goods—but goods do not buy goods in any organized market’ (Clower, 1984b, 100). 
For these reasons, conventional base money (or valuata) and credit and debt relations—as means of  
exchange, sustained and enlarged also by the money of  account—‘touch’ and intermediate all socio-
economic exchanges and affect the form and extension of  most socio-economic relations in markets. 
 
Money, thenceforward, as means of  exchange and money of  account, acquires both a unique degree of  
social pervasiveness and a relevance for epistemic and intertemporal organizing of  markets, which allows 
it to sustain a widespread system of  orderly, recurrent, and commonly expressed (homogenous-in-kind) 
social interactions (Horwitz, 2000). Importantly, this unique system of  relations that money engenders 
extends both market complexity and the formation of  higher-order and social knowledge beyond what 
language, or any other form of  human social relations, could actually achieve. The crucial aspect of  both 
functions of  money aforementioned is how they together allow money to express and order economic 
reality, to organize (homogenize) debt relations, and to bring people together into new and more complex 
social processes, unintendedly producing intricate and novel social configurations that are not designed 
(or expected) by the agents forming them (Horwitz, 1992a; Smithin, 2000).  
 
This chapter then contributes to the existent socioeconomic literature on money, by moving beyond 
money’s narrow role in the communication of  existent knowledge (Horwitz, 1992a; Dyer, 1989), and by 
arguing instead that money is the unique social medium to relationally organized and arranged those 
disseminated bits of  tacit knowledge, therefore providing a vital relational monetary context which 
generates (irreducible) emergent epistemic totalities in the form of  social knowledge. Hence by 
borrowing from systems theory (see Bertalanffy, 1968; Lewis, 2016), this chapter also seeks to clarify and 
 
17 Horwitz (1992b) for example argues that throughout the evolution of  monetary systems, the medium of  exchange and unit 
of  account have coevolved (see also Salter and Luther, 2014). Other scholars instead have argued that money’s function as a 
medium of  exchange derives from its function as a money of  account (Smithin, 2000). It is beyond the scope of  this work to 
contribute to that debate. I recognize both functions—independently of  which one did in fact emerge first—as crucial to the 
epistemic and ontological role of  money in sustaining complex systems of  exchange and debt relations required to produce 
higher-order and social knowledge. See also the next section 2.1.1 in this chapter concerning some alternative views about 
money’s origins and its functions.   
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expand further Clower’s (1984a), Hayek’s (1948 [1937], 1948 [1945]), and Horwitz’s (1992a, 2000) views 
on economic knowledge, the epistemic role of  money in exchanges, and the generation of  information 
in society.  
 
The chapter ultimately contends that the role of  money does not reside merely in its capacity to 
communicate and signal existent information about local circumstances through prices (Thomsen, 1992). 
It also resides in money’s unique capacity to provide an organizational structure or a new system of  
relations in which individuals can arrange and concatenate their knowledge and establish complex, but 
orderly, economic and mind–mind networks throughout its ubiquitous use. This serves not solely to 
mobilize and signal personal local knowledge, but to also assemble and socially configure knowledge in 
complex and novel manners that generate an organized system that obtains new ontological and 
coordinative properties never seen before in commercial societies (see also Lewis, 2016; Lewis and Lewin, 
2015). But before diving into the core subject matter of  this chapter (the epistemological role of  money), 
the next subsection will briefly review some alternative views of  money, so that the reader can have a 
general overview about the theoretical debates around money’s origins and functions.       
 
2.2 Some Alternative Views on Money: Does the Origin of  Money Matters?  
 
In regard to the evolution and origins of  money, Horwitz (1992b) for example, following Menger, argues 
that throughout the evolution of  monetary systems, the medium of  exchange and the unit of  account 
have coevolved (see also Salter and Luther, 2014). Other scholars instead have argued that money’s function 
as a medium of  exchange derives from its function as a money of  account (Smithin, 2000). It is beyond 
the scope of  this work to contribute to that broad debate concerning money’s origins.18 Thus, this work 
recognizes both functions—independently of  which one did in fact emerge first—as crucial to the 
epistemic and ontological role of  money in sustaining complex systems of  exchange and debt relations 
required to produce higher-order and social knowledge. In any case, the main focus here is on money’s 
role as a means of  exchange (including debt relations), which might suggest a secondary role for the unit 
of  account. However, here I also understand money, defined broadly as—and developing throughout as—
the money of  account used to denominate and coordinate exchanges in all markets and to express and 
denominate debt and prices (Keynes, 1930). Thus, the ‘money of  account is the pivotal element of  
monetary practice’ (Ingham, 2000, 18).  
 
That ‘pivotal element’ seems to be the starting point for the emergence of  an orderly social structure of  
complex monetary practices based on the development of  an asset that constitutes the medium of  final 
settlement (unambiguously united with the unit of  account in the same asset) (Smithin, 2000). From this, 
a multiplicity of  generally accepted monetary media of  exchange can arise, sustaining and enlarging the 
orderly exchange and social relations that produce the emergent knowledge stressed throughout this 
chapter. Such novel economic relations can rely on different forms of  exchange media: the conventional 
base money (medium of  final settlement) as means of  exchange, and other debt relations denominated 
in money of  account (settled by or related to the ultimate means of  payment) (Smithin, 2000).  
 
Hence, I recognize that money could potentially evolve from money of  account, and it is then conceived 
in this chapter as a means of  exchange sustained on, and enlarged from, money as the unit of  account. 
Consequently, money is not a particular asset, but rather different forms of  social and debt relations that 
individuals habitually use as means of  exchange (Ingham, 1996a). Granted, generally accepted exchange 
media, in order to carry confidence and acceptability, are usually fixed (anchored) in terms of  the unit of  
account (and related to the ultimate means of  payment). Thus, money’s crucial functions are 
interdependent (symbiotic) and not entirely separated (Menger, 1892). Accordingly, throughout this work, 
both functions are crucial and closely related in the formation of  a broad and orderly exchange network 
of  economic relations, and also a monetarily (in the sense of  unit of  account) expressed context for debts 
and prices that sustain monetary practices and rational calculation. Consequently, both functions are vital 
 
18 A complete and interesting overview around that debate can be found in Zelmanovitz (2015).   
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in enabling different aspects of  the general epistemic functions of  money that sustain complex market 
phenomena. Implicitly, the historical period assumed here is broadly the modern capitalistic economies 
that developed in the twentieth century and that rely on credit money and on vast credit-based monetary 
systems and debt relations as means of  exchange. 
 
Nevertheless, despite of  the evolutionary view or ambivalent position on money taking in this work, there 
are several different perspectives concerning money’s evolution, and consequently also, concerning 
governments’ proper role in determining the medium of  exchange. The “true” origins of  money and its 
evolution are indeed hotly contested research questions in contemporary social science, particularly in 
anthropology, history and socioeconomics. Most of  the debate around the “true origins” of  money reside 
in the fact that scholars from different disciplines seek to ascribe normative and political conclusions 
from the origins of  money. In other words, some scholars argue that if  we can discover money’s “true 
origins” and essence (its ontology), then we might be able to derive some normative conclusions 
concerning the use of  money in society, deriving also political and institutional implications from such 
origins (Zelmanovitz, 2015).  
 
For example, some scholars believe that if  money’s “true origins” reside in the state and its capacity to 
impose taxes, then, they claim, that is a sufficient basis to justify monetary arrangements in which the 
state is heavily involved in the supply of  money. Thus, the alleged origins of  money are used to eventually 
promote or justify normatively certain monetary institutions.19 This is the reason why the debate over if  
money is a naturally evolved institutions, or if  it is a creature of  the state, is apparently relevant for any 
arguments for or against certain monetary institutions. I will shortly review this debate below and critically 
assess if  we can actually derive normative conclusions from it.       
 
In short, economists concern about money’s role and evolution have developed broadly two alternative 
views. On the one hand, state theorists argue that government plays the most fundamental role in the 
emergence and continued acceptance of  the commonly accepted media of  exchange used in society. On 
the other hand, spontaneous order theorists (or catallactic theorists) argue that the evolution of  money 
does not require the state involvement, maintaining that money ultimately emerges, and continues to be 
accepted, as a result of  decentralized market and discovery processes. In what follows, I will briefly review 
both alternative views on money, so that the reader can be aware of  the existence of  other plausible 
arguments and theories around money’s evolution and its fundamental roles.20 This subsection concludes 
with some critical reflections concerning the actual relevance of  the debate over money’s “true” origins 
for monetary institutions, comparative analysis, and monetary theory.  
 
The first mentioned tradition, the state theorists of  money (also called the chartalists or chartalism), 
follow the tradition initially laid out by Georg Knapp (1924) and Abba Lerner (1947), in which they 
maintain that money is ultimately ‘a Creature of  the State’ (Lerner, 1957, 312). The chartalists then argue 
that it is ultimately the unique coercive role of  government the one that allows for the emergence and 
continued acceptance of  money in society. The extreme argument within the chartalists is that money is 
always a creature of  the state, thus deriving its pervasive acceptability from the legal tender status granted 
by government (also known as public receivability); moreover, the extreme end of  the argument maintains 
also that, if  money is essentially a ‘creature of  the state’, then the state can choose virtually anything they 
 
19 It is important to recognize that these attempts to promote normative conclusions and political claims from money’s alleged 
origins are valid for most of  both chartalists or state theorists of  money, and for catallactics or spontaneous order theorists 
of  money. Interestingly, this does not apply to neoclassical economists concerned about money. Despite the fact that most 
neoclassical economists subscribe to some form of  spontaneous order theory of  money, they do not derive normative 
implications or political conclusions from money’s alleged “true origin”. In this sense, this entire work aligns with the 
ambivalent position taken by most neoclassical economists on this matter about money’s origins: it is an interesting research 
topic, but we cannot derive normative, institutional, and political implications from such debate.           
20 Readers interested in a more thorough review on the two main theoretical positions concerning money’s origins—the 
chartalist theory of  money and the catallactic or Mengerian theory—should consult Zelmanovitz (2015) and Salter and Luther 
(2014).    
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wish to use as money and force it upon society. Alas, less extreme state theorists recognize that granting 
legal tender status to something and requiring that taxes should be paid in such a particular medium, 
might not be enough to ensure widespread acceptance in society.21 Nevertheless most chartalists still 
maintain that existing monies are largely the product of  government involvement. 
 
According to the chartalist view, money is always a social phenomenon and thus, money is, in essence, a 
debt relation that cannot be understood without reference to the social and political institutions in which 
it is embedded (Ingham, 2000).22 Usually chartalists use the historical record to show that money has in 
fact arose as a system of  payments for the discharge of  debt (Wray, 2004). Simply put, chartalists view 
money mainly as a balance sheet relation or a debt relation: to hold money is to finally hold and asset, 
which is a claim drawn on somebody else (Ingham, 2000). Even though chartalists tend to recognize also 
money’s role as the medium of  exchange, they tend to focus primarily on money’s role as the unit of  
account and its properties as the store of  value. In synthesis, the state theory of  money claims that the 
government is the main actor in the determination of  money and in defining the general medium of  
exchange by defining first the unit of  account used to impose its citizens with taxes and general 
obligations. This view then emphasize the non-market sources of  the origin of  money.  In other words,  
 
the state (or any other authority able to impose an obligation) imposes a liability in the form 
of  a generalized, social unit of  account—a money—used for measuring the obligation. 
This does not require the pre-existence of  markets, and, indeed, almost certainly predates 
them. Once the authorities can levy such obligations, they can name what fulfills this 
obligation. They do this by denominating those things that can be delivered, in other words, 
by pricing them. (Wray, 2004, 7)     
            
Thus, according to Wray’s view, money has extra-market or non-market origins, through governments’ 
capacities to impose obligations (taxes) upon citizens. This vision on money’s origins was first fully 
developed by Knapp (1924), a student of  the German Historical School, and now synthesized and carried 
forth mainly by Randall Wray’s work (1998, 2004) among others. According to Knapp’s theory, state-
based money arises whenever the government specifies the specific object and the unit it will accept as a 
legitimate or legal payment or discharge for the obligations that are owed by its citizens (the taxes being 
imposed are defined in a single unit established by the sovereign). Finally, ‘the circle is complete when 
the government begins issuing the “money-object” it legitimately accepts. Intuitively, the principle means 
by which the state imposes these obligations is taxation. Hence, the state can create a demand amongst 
the citizens for any money-object it accepts as payment for that purpose” (Salter and Luther, 2014, 164-
165). In essence, and according to this view, money arises from extra-market means, mainly coercion; 
meaning the capacity of  a string group to impose tributes and taxes upon weak groups.  
 
When that debt relation is established throughout the use of  coercion and the threat of  violence, some 
goods that are legally used to the discharge of  those debt relations and taxes, will become an economic 
“focal point”; acquiring a strong demand from the general population, since now they can be used 
generally to discharge thus involuntary liability. The general population thus generates a new set of  market 
expectations around those state-defined goods, since the members of  the tax-paying group know that 
they need those specific goods in order to legally discharge their debt relations in the future, and 
consequently they will be willing to rescind from barter exchanges, and to start accepting only those state-
defined goods in market exchanges today. Hence, according to this chartalist view, it is ultimately the state 
and its capacity to impose coercion the focal point upon which money emerges, causing some specific state-
 
21 This point was first raised by Max Weber (1947) when he criticized the extreme version of  the chartalist theory of  money. 
Indeed, Weber criticized Knapp’s state theory of  money, arguing that state power or coercion alone might not be enough to 
constitute and sustain money as an economic practice; a system of  paper money without a metallic standard would have “only 
a relative degree of  formal rationality” (ibid., 308). For this reason, Weber advocated for a metallic standard, based on customary 
and emergent practices, to supplement rather than replace the “legitimate authority of  the state” (ibid., 308).      
22 The concepts of  “chartalism” and “chartalists” derive from the Latin word “charta”, meaning a “ticket” or a “token”.      
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defined goods to eventually become the general medium of  exchange.  
 
Recently, and linked to current developments on chartalism also, there are some new and hotly debated 
alternative views on money being put forth by what is being known as Modern Monetary Theory 
(MMT).23 In this way, chartalism or the state theory of  money is being carried forward in economics by 
MMT, which seeks to synthesize both Knapp’s ideas concerning the state-led origins of  money, and the 
ideas of  Alfred Mitchell-Innes on the credit theory of  money. In short, MMT seeks to describe money 
as a public monopoly and unemployment as a consequence of  a currency monopolist overly restricting 
the supply of  the legally accepted asset needed to pay taxes (Tymoigne and Wray, 2013).24 Most notably 
perhaps, the major contribution of  economists working around the MMT vision of  money, is that they 
have tried to fully fleshed-out the unusual—and rather questionable—policy implications that follow 
from the chartalist vision of  money (Kelton, 2020). In the words of  Stephanie Bell (now Stephanie 
Kelton):  
 
The Chartalist theory provides not only a better theoretical foundation (one grounded in 
historical facts) for monetary theory … Additionally, some important policy implications 
follow from the Chartalist theory. First, an understanding of  the Chartalist theory of  money 
leads to a fundamentally different vision of  government finance. Specifically, … the role 
of  fiscal policy is much more important for the determination of  the money supply than is 
usually recognised. This is, of  course, antithetical to mainstream theory, which attributes 
control of  the money supply to monetary, rather than fiscal policy. Secondly, the lender-of-
last-resort role of  the state must be extended beyond simply the ultimate supplier of  
liquidity in times of  crisis to include its ongoing hierarchical role based on the public’s need 
to pay taxes. Both of  these, of  course, strengthen the endogenous money position. (Bell, 
2001, 162)          
      
MMT has been severely criticized by several mainstream economists for lacking a coherent theoretical 
and monetary framework (Bisin, 2020; Coats, 2019; Chicago Booth 2019; Hummel, 2019; Palley, 2015; 
Sumner and Horan, 2019). Also, it has been criticized for its unusual policy implications; particularly for 
two ideas: first, the idea that government deficits don’t really matter much in themselves for countries 
like the United States (that borrow in their own currency issued by the same state), whilst MMT does not 
really reveal more scope for deficit spending without generating harmful amounts of  inflation (Coats, 2019; 
Hummel, 2019; Sumner and Horan, 2019). Second, its proposal to use taxation as an instrument to 
engage in monetary policy, disregards all the well-known public choice and political problems around 
conflating or blending the fiscal part of  the state (fiscal tax authorities) with the monetary institutions in 
charge of  issuing money (central banks); neglecting of  course centuries of  historical evidence showing 
that this is indeed a very bad idea (Bisin, 2010; Sumner and Horan, 2019).  
 
Indeed, a 2019 survey of  leading economists in the United States showed a unanimous rejection of  
MMT’s most controversial claims concerning: (1) “Countries that borrow in their own currency should 
not worry about government deficits because they can always create money to finance their debt”; and 
(2) “Countries that borrow in their own currency can finance as much real government spending as they 
want by creating money” (Chicago Booth 2019). In some fundamental sense, MMT uses the chartalist 
view concerning the state-guided and tax-based origins of  money to develop policy prescriptions and a 
 
23 Readers interested in the general and most recent arguments being put forth by some key authors around the Modern 
Monetary Theory vision on money should consult Kelton (2020) and Mitchell, Wray and Watts (2019). For a brief  critique on 
MMT consult also Bisin (2020), Coats (2019), and Palley (2015).  
24 The initiators of  MMT have defined their own monetary vision as: ‘an alternative approach to monetary theory that 
integrates the insights of  Knapp’s (1924) state money approach (also called chartalist and adopted by Keynes (1930, 1914)), 
the credit money view of  Innes (1913, 1914), Lerner’s (1943, 1947) functional finance approach, Minsky’s (1986) views of  
banking, and Godley’s (1996) sectoral balance approach. In addition, most of  us have used our understanding of  the operation 
of  the monetary system to propose an employer of  last resort or job guarantee program to provide an anchor to the value of  
the currency. The approach has come to be known as modern money theory (MMT)’ (Fullwiler, Bell, Wray, 2012). 
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normative view on monetary matters, based on the preeminence of  state power and imposed financial 
coercion in order to achieve certain political ends, whilst disregarding the institutional dangers and social 
costs associated with such policies. Due to both length constraints and the focus of  this work, I will not 
develop further a critical review on MMT here; it suffices for now to highlight Bisin’s comments:  
 
it is the core of  MMT that appears as merely a rhetorical exercise. As such it is interesting, 
but not a theory in any meaningful sense I can make of  the word. The T in MMT is more 
like a collection of  interrelated statements floating in fluid arguments. Never is its logical 
structure expressed in a direct, clear way, from head to toe. It is very hard for the reader to 
capture all the moving parts in a coherent structure, which would allow for some sort of  
confutation. (Bisin, 2020, 3)25     
    
Now concerning the second mentioned tradition, the spontaneous order theory of  money (or the 
Mengerian theory of  money) argues that money as an institution is largely an emergent and unintended 
product of  decentralized exchange and barter processes (Menger, 1892). Money then is created as an 
institution without design; meaning that is an emergent process arising from barter exchanges in which 
individuals are merely seeking to maximize their own welfare, yet—without intending it—those welfare-
maximizing exchanges produce unintendedly the origin of  money, which benefits the whole society 
(Horwitz, 1992a). Indeed, today most economists subscribe to a broadly Mengerian and spontaneous 
order theory of  money (Alchian, 1977; Dodd, 1994; Duffy and Ochs, 1999; Horwitz, 1992a; Kiyotaki 
and Wright, 1989; Kocherlakota, 1998; Rabin, 2004; Selgin, 2017). Thus, for most economists today at 
least money is the unintended social outcome of  individual actions in decentralized market.  
 
Under a barter system, there is the general challenge of  the mutual coincidence of  wants; meaning that 
if  I want to barter or trade, let’s say, a sheep for olive oil, I have to first invest in time and effort of  finding 
an olive oil producer interested in my product and willing to exchange his olive oil for my sheep, otherwise 
the trade cannot be made. For barter to become efficient and to satisfice the needs of  trade, traders must 
be able to deal with the double coincidence of  wants in an expedient and effortless manner; otherwise 
barter becomes a challenge for traders impeding exchanges. The challenge of  the double coincidence of  
wants (the coincidence that the seller will actually want the product of  the buyer and vice versa) therefore 
is a big transaction cost that affects barter exchanges (Menger, 1892). In the absence of  a mutual 
coincidence of  wants, a rational economic actor will find convenient to look at the situation around him 
and start trading his goods for the most saleable object being used by other merchants. Doing so will 
improve his odds of  finding a trading partner that will actually want such most saleable object, helping 
him to trade more easily and overcome the challenge of  the double coincidence of  wants. 
 
Unintendedly however, by using that good or commodity, that is being considered as the most saleable 
object among merchants, the subsequent decentralized actions of  individuals will further enhance the 
saleability of  that original object that was commonly being used, thereby encouraging others to accept it 
as well. The end social result, according to Menger, is a process of  narrowing down to a stable set of  a 
few highly saleable objects that one might finally denominate money. Thus, for Menger and for Adam 
Smith also, the origin of  money can be traced back to a form of  ‘spontaneous order’ which arises from 
both exchanges and the economic agents’ decentralized attempts to overcome the challenges posed by 
the mutual coincidence of  wants.26 Finally, Menger also briefly considers the actual role of  the state in 
 
25 See also Coats (2019, 564) critical remarks: ‘MMT is an unsuccessful and empty attempt to convince us that we can finance 
the Green New Deal and a federal job guarantee program painlessly by printing money. But it remains true that shifting our 
limited resources from the private to the public sector should be judged by whether society is made better off  by such shifts. 
Printing money does not produce free lunches.’ Ultimately, it seems then that ‘[b]oth the excitement and motivation for MMT 
seem to reflect the desire to promote a political agenda, without the hard analysis of  its pros and cons — its costs and benefits’ 
(ibid., 575).  
26 See for example Adam Smith’s remarks concerning the origins of  money in Chapter IV of  The Wealth of  Nations; “Of  The 
Origin And Use Of  Money”: ‘in order to avoid the inconveniency of  such situations [the double coincidence of  wants], every 
prudent man in every period of  society, after the first establishment of  the division of  labour, must naturally have endeavoured 
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monetary acceptance: ‘Money has not been generated by law. In its origin it is a social, and not a state-
institution. Sanction by the authority of  the state is a notion alien to it’ (Menger, 1892, 255). It is relevant 
to recognize also that Menger saw the role of  the state as irrelevant, or unnecessary (the intervention of  
the state was not a necessary condition), only in regard to the emergence of  money alone and nothing else; 
thus, he explicitly recognized the positive role of  the state in the guidance and manage of  money, after it 
has emerged. Menger then acknowledged the positive role of  the state after the emergence of  money, 
particularly in adapting and improving the spontaneously emerged money to the needs of  formal 
commerce, by providing for the minting of  coins of  reliable weight and purity, and convenient 
denominations.27  
 
Nevertheless, for the spontaneous order theorists, money arises unintendedly and without necessarily the 
intervention of  the state, from the mere fact that certain goods become the general media of  exchange 
whenever they are widely accepted in society (after they become the most saleable commodity). 
According to this second vision then, money is a paradigmatic example of  the “invisible hand” at work, 
in which a social institution is generated, not by coercion, but by the myriad of  narrow profit seeking 
actions of  individuals in markets; nevertheless, this new institution makes everyone better off, despite the 
fact that nobody intended it or designed it as such (Horwitz, 1992a). 
 
Now these two aforementioned visions concerning money’s origins—the chartalist and the spontaneous 
order vision—might seem to suggest two entirely different visions concerning how the monetary order 
can be sustained and generated.28 From the Mengerian vision of  money one could derive a more pro-
liberty and a spontaneous worldview, whereas from the chartalist vision, a more centralist and pro-
government vision of  the monetary order is suggested. If  the Mengerian theory of  the origin of  money 
is correct, then money is a product of  markets and freedom to trade, money then becomes an outcome 
of  freedom and collaboration, suggesting a normative pro-liberty vision about how money should be 
managed and produced. On the other hand, if  the chartalist theory of  money is correct, then money is 
a product of  coercion and of  state intervention, suggesting that the state has a huge role to play in 
sustaining a monetary order. The normative implication stemming from the chartalist theory of  money, 
is that the government and the power of  coercion are fundamental aspects in generating a coherent and 
sound monetary order.  
 
Clearly these two theories concerning the “true origin” of  money seem to suggest two entirely different 
worldviews, suggesting also entirely different normative and institutional conclusions about how money 
should be managed. Nevertheless, ‘small concessions by authors on both sides of  the debate leave room 
for a unified theory that emphasizes the spontaneous order aspects of  money without trivializing the role 
of  government’ (Salter and Luther, 2014, 163). Indeed, these two apparently opposite theories about 
money’s origins can be reconciled and made compatible.  
 
For instance, is perfectly plausible that earlier forms of  money might have been generated spontaneously 
from individual exchanges, allowing a certain set of  goods to become the general media of  exchange; 
and, subsequently, governments and monarchs recognizing this emergent process, might have later 
authorized the payment of  taxes and made exclusively legal the use of  only one particular good from 
 
to manage his affairs in such a manner, as to have at all times by him, besides the peculiar produce of  his own industry, a 
certain quantity of  some one commodity or other, such as he imagined few people would be likely to refuse in exchange for the produce 
of  their industry’ (Smith, 1981 [1776], 37-38, emphasis added). 
27 This does not suggest that the state or governments are the only institutions able to provide reliable minting and coining 
services. Indeed, historical evidence has shown that private associations and civil society have been perfectly able to provide 
those monetary services spontaneously and reliably, whenever the state fails in those monetary duties (Selgin, 2011).      
28 This division of  views and apparent dichotomy concerning money’s origins (markets vs states), can actually be reconcile 
and made compatible theoretically, by synthesizing both state and spontaneous order theories of  money (Salter and Luther, 
2014). Indeed, Salter and Luther (2014) ‘provide a generalized theory of  the emergence and perpetuation of  money informed 
by both state and spontaneous order theories and consistent with recent theoretical and empirical advances in the literature’ 
(ibid., 161).            
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those saleable assets that arose spontaneously. Hence the state, by stamping a legal “seal” linked to one 
commodity, might greatly contribute to increase its market desirability as an instrument for enabling 
indirect exchanges (Zelmanovitz, 2015).29 In other words,  
 
If  the Chartalists concede that the first forms of  medium of  exchange, those that had 
evolved spontaneously in society, happened before the introduction of  coined money; and 
if  the Catallactics accept that money has been provided by the state since the introduction 
of  coined money, the two accounts would suddenly become compatible. The two versions 
may be interpreted simply as partial accounts, one until the introduction of  coined money, 
and the other afterwards. Making these two versions compatible seems easy and it actually 
is. (Zelmanovitz, 2015, 11-12) 
    
As argued above, it is perfectly plausible that the state might have used its coercive power, through 
taxation, to augment the demand for a specific commodity, greatly affecting the emergence of  money 
and converging the process into a single object.30 Thus, it is perfectly plausible to acknowledge both the 
role of  the state in the emergence of  coined money, provided also that we recognize that the state 
intervenes constrained by a historical and cultural milieu and a path dependence process which arises 
spontaneously within society and without necessarily state intervention. In other words, it is perfectly 
plausible to reconcile the endogenous and spontaneous social processes that allow money to arise, with 
a more moderate chartalist approach, to finally arrive at a more general theory of  money with more 
explanatory power (Salter and Luther, 2014). The main conclusion we can derive from this synthesis, 
which echoes Max Weber’s (1947) original critique on Knapp’s state theory of  money, is that ‘the state 
(or other elites) can contribute to the demand for holding a commodity for exchange purposes, but they 
cannot bypass the emergence process and declare a monetary order ex nihilo’ (Salter and Luther, 2014, 
172).31  
 
To conclude this debate, we can recognize that, ‘both views—that which presumes the government acts 
on the market as wells as that which presumes the market is unaffected by government action—are 
inadequate’ (ibid., 173). In other words, and according to this new moderate (non-normative) and more 
compromising synthesis between the state and spontaneous order theories of  money, it is not the case 
that the state can always and everywhere determine ex nihilo the commonly accepted medium of  exchange; 
whilst it is not the case either that governments are altogether impotent in their capacity to influence the 
emergence of  money (ibid., 175). Consequently, ‘the state may influence, for instance, by accepting the 
money it produces as an instrument to pay taxes and then creating a “utility” even for pieces of  painted 
paper, but it cannot determine the subjective value which the agents will perceive in this “utility”’ 
(Zelmanovitz, 2015, 40).  
 
Governments, therefore, under some specific contexts and population sizes (i.e., a government of  
sufficient size relative to the number and size of  agents in the system) can affect and indeed potentially 
improve upon some monies which have emerged naturally (i.e., in the absence of  government) (Li and 
Wright, 1998; Duffy and Ochs, 1999). Duffy’s (2001) work suggests that governments can help to solve 
 
29 In fact, it is perfectly reasonable to assume that governments might have preferred to build upon or piggyback from an 
already existent and ongoing social process in which some media of  exchange was already developing from social customs; 
political-risk-wise this might have been actually the most reasonable thing to do, since ‘it was in the interest of  the political 
authorities to select as the unit of  account they will impose on society one that would have the least resistance possible, probably 
one that had already been in use, and at a certain ratio not much different than the one practiced in the daily transactions of  
their subjects’ (Zelmanovitz, 2015, 34-35, emphasis added).     
30 In fact, this point has been recognized by most spontaneous order theorists at least since Adam Smith remarks on the 
matter: ‘A prince, who should enact that a certain proportion of  his taxes should be paid in a paper money of  a certain kind, 
might thereby give a certain value to this paper money; even though the term of  its final discharge and redemption should 
depend altogether on the will of  the prince’ (Smith, 1981 [1776], 328).     
31 Similar results and conclusions can be found in formal search-theoretic models; for more details consult: Li and Wright 
(1998) and Aiyagari and Wallace (1997).  
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the multiple-equilibrium difficulty associated with the emergence of  money, thus improving welfare by 
anchoring the beliefs of  the agents in the economy, finally enabling the achievement of  a challenging 
monetary equilibria upon a single focal point (i.e., helping to establish a better form of  money). 
Undeniably, ‘as a matter of  historical record, since money became coined money, almost always, almost 
everywhere, money production has been monopolized by the state; and, as previously mentioned, that 
seems to be supported by historical evidence. However, that does not imply that the purpose of  money 
in society is given by the state, or that money should be subordinated to the political goals of  the rulers’ 
(Zelmanovitz, 2015, 47).  
 
Similarly, under other certain social conditions—meaning, ‘every time the social conditions for indirect 
exchanges present themselves, a medium of  exchange gradually gains acceptance [without the need for 
state intervention] because such behavior is ingrained in human nature, because individuals have the 
rational faculties to time and again perceive the utility that may be derived from the use of  such an 
instrument’ (ibid, 2015, 74).32 Nevertheless, one thing is certain from recognizing the partial validity and 
truth of  both visions around money explored:   
 
The fact that the government enforces the currency is no more proof  that the money is a 
State creature than the definition of  a standard grammar by some state-sponsored agency 
to be adopted by the schools in the country is proof  that the language was created by the 
State, or the enforcement of  corporate law is proof  that corporations are creatures of  the 
State, or that enforcing civil law in the courts is proof  that marriage itself  is a creation of  
the State. (Zelmanovitz, 2015, 29)                      
      
Finally, we have to ask ourselves a crucial question: does the origin of  money matters for monetary 
institutional analysis? As it turns out, seeking to discover the “one true theory” of  money’s origins—even 
if  such a discovery could ever be achieved—it doesn’t matter much for the more relevant debate 
concerning which monetary institutions are relatively more robust; and consequently, which institutions 
should be in place in order to manage and produce money correctly. Hence this whole historical debate, 
concerning money’s origins, does not matter much for both monetary institutional analysis and for 
monetary policy. This is actually evident once we recognize that understanding the origins of  something 
does not necessary imply either that things must remain as they originally were, or that you could derive 
normative and institutional implications out of  the historical development of  something. Otherwise, this 
could be considered as a “leap of  logic”, since you cannot derive institutional conclusions and normative 
implications from the mere fact that, historically, money has evolved in a certain manner.    
 
It is relevant here to recognize, as Zelmanovitz (2015) points out, that trying to locate the essence and 
crucial properties of  money in the particulars of  its historical origins is an example of  a logical fallacy 
denominated the “genetic fallacy”.33 Understanding the origin of  something does not necessarily imply 
understanding or being able to explain its essence. Thus, ‘the origin of  a thing does not necessarily explain 
 
32 In fact, there is nothing in both the historical account of  the origin of  chartal money, or in the chartalist claim that a unit 
of  account was first established by the state, that actually negates or disproves the other relevant claim that, once certain social 
conditions are established, individuals will use indirect exchanges (money) to acquire the goods they desire. Indeed, Klein and 
Selgin (2000) have provided valuable experimental evidence through simulating in a laboratory the consistency of  Menger’s 
spontaneous account of  the origin of  money. From that experimental evidence, they concluded that: ‘Money can emerge 
spontaneously even where traders have only a very dim perception of  the marketability of  distinct goods, based on very 
limited random sampling, and even where all goods are equally marketable at the onset of  the evolutionary process’ (Klein 
and Selgin, 2000, 232).     
33 Concerning the notion of  the “genetic fallacy”, and according to Den Uyl and Rasmussen (2005), the naturalistic fallacy is 
“the alleged fallacy of  deducing a statement of  what ought to be from a statement of  what is the case, or a statement about a 
value from a statement about a fact” (ibid.,112). An example of  the genetic fallacy would be the following: if  we can trace the 
origins of  human mobility to the fact that humans can use their legs and hence mobility has arisen from the existence of  legs, 
then all forms of  mobility ought to be exercised only through walking; thus, electric trains and submarines ought to be found 
spurious forms of  mobilizing since they go against the origins of  mobility. A similar problem can be found in the normative 
and institutional conclusions of  the chartalists concerning money’s origins.             
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the essence of  that thing is easy to accept’ (ibid., 46). This suggests that even if  money was indeed 
historically the result of  state coercion, there could still be plausible efficiency and public choice 
arguments for monetary decentralization and freedom today.  Likewise, as we have seen above, even if  
money was historically the result of  spontaneous forces and freedom of  exchange, there could still be 
plausible arguments for monetary control by government or central banks today.  
 
In other words, recognizing the obvious historical facts—pointed out by the chartalists—that coined 
money has indeed arisen, almost always, and everywhere, as a product of  state coercion and the 
monopolization of  its coinage by the state, that, alone, ‘does not imply that the purpose of  money in 
society is given by the state, or that money should [always] be subordinated to the political goals of  the 
rulers’ (ibid., 47). Although it is possible that money arose through government intervention or state 
coercion, this does not suffice to claim that the efficient way to manage and produce money today is by 
state monopolization. Pointing out the alleged origin of  money does not provide enough ground to claim 
that this is the best available institution to manage money or produce a sound monetary order. It is one 
thing to say that the origins of  money have been incredibly influenced by the state and that state coercion 
has indeed altered the emergence of  money, but from that premise it is not possible to claim that the 
state must monopolize money and always be in charge of  producing a monetary order. This is simply 
falling into the fallacy of  non sequitur.34 As Zelmanovitz acknowledges:  
 
as a matter of  historical record, since money became coined money, almost always, almost 
everywhere, money production has been monopolized by the state; and, as previously 
mentioned, that seems to be supported by historical evidence. However, that does not imply 
that the purpose of  money in society is given by the state … one can … still recognize that 
coined money has been provided directly or indirectly by the state since it was introduced 
twenty-five centuries ago. A completely different thing is to say that money must be 
provided by the state or that the state is following the most beneficial course of  action for 
society in keeping its monopoly on money production through legal tender. … The fact 
that money has been monopolized by the state does not imply that it is the right thing to 
do or that it must continue to be that way. (Zelmanovitz, 2015, 47)  
  
To conclude this section, I have argued that ultimately it is not a valuable debate to quarrel over organic 
(spontaneously grown) institutions and pragmatic (consciously design) institutions; since they are good 
and bad institutions which are spontaneously grown, as well as good and bad institutions that are 
consciously design. You can find spontaneously grown institutions, that arise from exercising freedom 
and exchange, yet they might still be efficiency, institutional and moral arguments showing that those 
“natural” institutions need to be corrected or amended by the state (Schelling, 1971); similarly, you can 
also find institutions that arise from or are generated mostly by state coercion, yet they might still be 
efficiency and institutional arguments showing that they might be other non-governmental forms for 
better managing those institutions (Ostrom, 1990). Ultimately, the historical origins of  certain institutions 
do not matter much for arguments concerning political economy, institutional robustness, governance, 
and comparative institutional efficiency.  
 
Thus, from an institutional and robustness perspective, it seems that it is more relevant to move away 
from “organic” versus “state” historical debates, and rather focus our attention on the essential epistemic 
role of  money in society and the institutional character of  money (i.e., the likely institutional structures 
required to govern money’s production); and therefore, to eventually focus on a comparative analysis of  
its surrounding and relevant institutions, rather than quarreling ceaselessly over money’s plausible origins. 
To summarize the arguments above, determining the “one” and “true” origins of  money: 
  
 
34 According to the Encyclopedia Britannica: ‘The fallacy of  non sequitur (“it does not follow”) occurs when there is not even 
a deceptively plausible appearance of  valid reasoning, because there is an obvious lack of  connection between the given 
premises and the conclusion drawn from them’ (Rescher and Schagrin, 2020). 
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both in general and in particular historical contexts, is a valuable project.  But whatever 
knowledge arises out of  this project, it is unlikely to matter much for the structure and 
conduct of  existing monetary institutions. Arguments for (or against) monetary freedom 
stand or fall for reasons unrelated to money’s origins. Let’s not confuse questions of  history 
for questions of  comparative institutional analysis. (Salter, 2017b, 1) 
 
2.3 Social Features of  Money and Unexplored Ontological Properties  
 
As suggested previously, the ontology of  money and the application of  systems theory, which considers 
the emergence of  new and complex economic phenomena, or wholes, through orderly social interactions, 
suggest that money could play an economic and complexity-based role far greater than (although 
containing) a communication process or a ‘symbolic medium of  social communication’ (Ganssman, 1988, 
5). Neoclassical economics, however, cannot grasp this complexity-based and ontological relevance of  
money because it cannot adequately conceptualize social structures, social relations, and the emergent 
properties generated from them (Ingham, 1996b; see also chapter 1). Economics has been alas too 
narrowly focused on money as an individualistic efficiency tool and a cost-reducing device that atomistic 
utility-maximizing agents use (Alchian, 1977; Smithin, 2000). Hence economists have disregarded the 
social, constitutional, and institutional context and the networks of  interactions that agents form through 
using money, proscribing any considerations concerning social relations.  
 
On the other hand, in the sociological literature on money there have been several other non-ontological 
and non-emergent social, power, and cultural properties of  money highlighted that might seem prima 
facie relevant for the attempts of  this chapter to show money’s unique socio-epistemic relevance. Some 
of  the current non-economic (or indirectly economic) aspects concerning money and sociology treated 
in the literature are social and cultural issues concerning sharing and constructing symbolic relations and 
commercial meaning and codes about the world, money’s emergence as a denominator and signal of  
financial wealth and its tensions, money’s role in defining and signaling social power and thus generating 
power issues (struggles) within markets, and money’s communicational and semiotic aspects (Dodd, 1994; 
Dyer, 1989; Heinsohn and Steiger, 2013). 
 
Nevertheless, despite the socioeconomic literature’s relevance on some social and cultural issues, this 
chapter does not focus directly on these aspects since they do not address explicitly the ontology of  
money. Particularly, they do not address the vital relationship between specific institutional contexts, the 
formation of  social relations, and the novel emergent market phenomena that might arise from them.35 
Thus they leave unexplored the ontology and epistemology of  money and markets, the higher-order 
coordinative implications of  systems of  social relations associated with money, and how those monetary 
 
35 Heinsohn and Steiger (2013) suggest that money plays a crucial role as a denominator of  wealth and thus social power. 
Indeed, there are some social aspects of  money aforementioned that are related to additional epistemic and social-signaling 
functions that actually contribute to the emergence of  economic knowledge—particularly, the role of  money as an epistemic 
aid in enabling the measuring of  private wealth (and debt contracts) and thus the ascertaining and comparing of  economic 
value. This helps promote intertemporal economic calculation and a rapid expansion of  rational debt relations. Money plays 
a role in measuring wealth and debt, and thus it enables individuals to plan through time their actions and debt relations. 
Through money, individuals can rationally manage and compare wealth, debts, and economic actions by comparing the 
economic value of  alternative means and rationally use debt or their resources (wealth) to obtain their ends. In addition, there 
are potential power issues within markets that are associated with the production of  money and private property and that 
might arise as consequences from the use (and production) of  money and dispersed ownership (Ingham, 2000). Private 
property is also intimately linked first with decentralized trade and the capacity to exchange property and enact contracts, then 
with the emergence of  money (and debt) (Heinsohn and Steiger, 2013). However, this could also be associated with the 
existence of  power issues (struggles) within those same emergent totalities. Indeed, power issues and the form taken by wealth 
and social powers in markets might be intimately related to the use and production of  money to establish social relations and 
then closely tied to money’s epistemic role. The emergence of money and that of prices are themselves social processes in 
which politics and power struggles today play a key indivisible role (Salter and Luther, 2014; Weber, 1978). Hence money is ‘a 
system of social relations based on power relations and social norms’ (Ingham, 2000, 19). Power issues and tensions are 
relevant in constantly shaping and affecting the social relations that generate and constitute money and its production, 
therefore having a large impact in coordination and the emergence of economic knowledge (Wagner, 2010). 
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associations can actually generate new complex knowledge in the economic process (Lawson, 2012). 
Moreover, such aforementioned cultural, power, and efficiency aspects, by not specifically focusing on 
the process of  exchange and the system of  market relations enlarged by money, are also not concerned 
with how the use of  money could ameliorate the coordination problem (Yeager, 1968). 
 
Thus the aforementioned aspects of  money are silent on epistemic issues such as how money organizes 
and arranges bits of  knowledge in manners that reach irreducible emergent totalities. Hence they are 
considered ancillary to this chapter’s scope since they do not address the complexity-based relationships 
between the ubiquitous use of  money in exchanges and the formation of  orderly relations. Building on 
chapter 1, this chapter instead sheds light on the underdeveloped epistemology and complexity of  money 
(Ingham, 1998), thereby building a bridge between social theory and complexity theory.  
 
Building upon Ingham’s (1996a) Money Is a Social Relation, I argue that money generates a new and orderly 
system of  complex social relations, making orderly interactive processes possible. Those relational and 
orderly processes engender a higher-order type of  knowledge as a social phenomenon that has unique 
and novel properties that are beneficial to society yet were nonexistent before the widespread system of  
monetary relations. Thus, I contend that money uniquely engenders economic knowledge as emergent 
and irreducible phenomena. This emergentist perspective differs also from the aforementioned narrow 
utility-maximizing and transaction-costs justifications for the use of  money seen in neoclassical 
economics (Alchian, 1977; Clower, 1984a, 1984b; Smithin, 2003). Money’s economic uniqueness, I argue, 
stems from its role in organizing complexity and thus in allowing a more highly organized epistemic 
phenomenon to arise from social relations helping to promote higher degrees of  market rationality and 
in obtaining novel epistemological outcomes that are not contained in the parts that constitute the 
relational order (Hayek, 2014 [1964], 263).  
 
On the other hand, the recent sociological literature on money, building on Ingham, has focused on the 
‘social production’ of  money and how money is conceptualized as a ‘system of  social (and debt) relations’ 
(Ingham 1996a; 1998; Lawson, 2016). However, there has been little attention to the ontological and 
epistemic implications or the emergent economic effects that such a system of  social relations could 
generate (Lawson, 206; Lewis, 2016). Scholars have recognized that money’s existence poses severe 
problems for neoclassical economics, yet little effort has been conducted in economics towards 
addressing such challenges (Horwitz, 1992b; Ingham, 1996a; Lawson, 2016).  
 
In the following sections I contend that there is no other institution (or meta-rule) as important for the 
formation of  economic knowledge as money. Money is ontologically never neutral in society, since it plays 
a unique social role in producing novel epistemic complexity, thereby giving economic transactions a new 
nature beyond barter, and generating novel social relations (see also sections 1.2 and 1.4 in chapter 1). Its 
social non-neutrality resides in allowing intricate and irreducible social knowledge to emerge from social 
relations. Consequently, money cannot be considered neutral since it creates new epistemic and 
ontological properties in society not contained within individual minds. Thus money is the sole 
institutional context in which economic knowledge and coordination ultimately exist, and enhances 
‘social intelligence’.36 Hence economic knowledge itself  is a system of  social relations.  
 
2.4 Institutions and the Broadening of  the ‘Social Mind’  
 
In exploring the specific connection between money and knowledge is also necessary to articulate the 
 
36 There are two levels of  intelligence: one at the individual level, and the other at the social level. Individual intelligence 
depends mainly on personal cognitive capacities. Instead, the ‘social intelligence’ or ‘interacting intelligence’ of  the whole 
system can be greater or less than the sum of  the system’s individual parts (Lavoie, 1985). It relates less to the individuals’ 
capacities in isolation and more to the social and communicational properties that arise from their specific methods of  
interaction. Social intelligence is an emergent property not entirely located in, nor reducible to, the aggregation or sum of  
individuals’ minds or consciousness (Lavoie, 1985; Marx, 1973 [1939]; Paniagua, 2018c).  
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general relationship between institutions and individuals’ contextual cognition, and to articulate the 
ontological implications of  institutions in human relations (Lawson, 1997). In other words, it is important 
to explore how (if  at all) institutions affect how knowledge is generated and eventually disseminated at 
both the individual and social levels (North, 1994; Rizzello, 1999). Relating the concepts of  knowledge, 
individuals’ relations, and institutional contexts provides a view in which ‘institutions lose their purely 
functional nature outside of  the individual and become the expression of  the capabilities of  the mind, 
which are not innate but develop and are organized in connection with other individuals’ (Rizzello and 
Turvani, 2000, 177).37  
 
Moreover, the literature on contextual cognition and the growth of  knowledge provides further support 
for considering institutions and their rules—which govern social interactions—to have deep 
repercussions for the epistemic resources they generate (Boland, 1979; Gigerenzer, 2008). It is important 
to note that institutions not only provide the limitations and rules for guiding action, but also provide the 
mechanisms and means of  social interaction and the social frameworks in which experiences are shaped 
and cognition will ultimately operate. Through specifying the norms and means of  interaction, and the 
form of  social relations, institutions could have a large effect on the knowledge individuals produce 
through mind–mind relationships (Polanyi, 1958; Rizzello, 1999).  
 
Institutions are commonly defined as the formal and informal rules that govern and guide human 
behavior (North, 1994; Ostrom, 2005). Hence they are usually depicted mainly as affecting actions and 
determining the limits and incentives for rational choice. However, they can be also conceived as doing 
something much more relevant than imposing restrictions on decision-makers (Boland, 1979). We need 
to move beyond the functionalist view of  institutions, in which they simply improve individuals’ utility, 
lower transaction costs, or bind the individuals. Agents are not only guided and bound by institutions in 
regard to their autonomy and plausible sets of  actions. What their minds express, how their choices 
unfold, and how they think are largely influenced by the context of  their experiences, the rules that define 
cognition, and their social settings (Hodgson, 2004; Rizzello, 1999).  
 
Our cognitive processes are filtered through the institutional context in which our cognitions operate and 
in which our minds interact with other minds (Gigerenzer, 2008; Polanyi, 1951, 1958). In other words, 
institutions and social structures—with their rules and incentives—guide our interactions and real 
experiences, providing the mindset and framework that structure our interpretations of  reality, shaping 
personal cognition and knowledge (Gigerenzer, 2008; Hodgson, 2004).  
 
Institutions shape and define restrictions, the incentive structures and context in which individuals 
interact (North, 1994). The institutional context matters for guiding and incentivizing the development 
of  specific actions and social interactions, and then producing wealth-enhancing social outcomes. The 
same principle and role of  the institutional context in guiding action and collaboration also apply to 
cognition and mind–mind relationships (Boland, 1979). By establishing rules and particular mechanisms 
of  social relations, they influence cognitive processes and the knowledge present in different institutional 
settings (Lavoie, 1985). How institutions guide and provide the mechanisms of  social relations also affects 
the interaction and communication among the minds, significantly shaping also the cognitive processes 
that occur not only at the individual level, but also at the level of  epistemic resources formed as outcomes 
in the entire society.  
 
Institutions then are social institutions, and by shaping cognition and mind–mind relations they have a 
profound role to play in social ontology and cognitive complexity (Ingham, 1996b; Lawson, 2016). We 
need to recognize that acting and thinking exist in a social context marked by experiences generated 
through interacting with other individuals, and hence cognition and mental processes are ‘embedded in 
concrete, ongoing systems of  social relations’ (Granovetter, 1985, 487).  
 
37 Therefore knowledge is here conceived as ‘a kind of  spontaneous outcome of  . . . [individuals] interacting under certain 
special circumstances within a particular kind of  community’ (Lavoie, 1985, 58). 
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Seen in this light, institutions enable novel mind-to-mind interactions to emerge, shaping mental 
processes and making complex epistemic social phenomena possible (Polanyi, 1951). Such novel 
epistemic phenomena arise from the unique interactions and communications among the minds present 
in those specific institutional contexts (Hayek, 2014 [1967]). Institutional economics—in its neoclassical 
form as new institutionalism—has largely disregarded contextual cognition and the epistemological and 
ontological implications of  the relationship between institutions and the manner in which minds are 
related in a given context (Boland, 1979; Granovetter, 1985; Hodgson, 2000a, 2004).  
 
The mind itself, for example, is a complex order that evolves and arises from rules and procedures that 
govern acts of  classification, neural-electrical patterns of  relations, and perception at the individual level 
(Hayek, 1952b, 1979). Furthermore, the mind cannot be reduced to nor explained by the behavior and 
properties of  the neurons in isolation (Hayek, 1952b). Thus the biological rules and mechanisms that 
govern and guide neural-electrical patterns, neural interaction, and acts of  classification are crucial to 
determine the emergent properties and complexity of  the mind. Analogously, our ‘social intelligence’ is 
a complex emergent outcome of  a system of  specific and recurrent processes of  communication and 
interactions among agents and minds (see also footnote 17). In other words, it is an organizing social 
structure defined by a set of  rules and institutions that guide our mind–mind relationships and shape the 
specific manner in which individuals are connected and cognition formed.   
 
Therefore, the institutional context and rules define social interactions, particularly the interactions 
between minds, affecting not only material outcomes but also the social intelligence developed under 
them. Similar to the mind–neuron structure (Hayek, 195b), social intelligence is produced as a higher-
order epistemic outcome, more complex than and irreducible to the unstructured aggregation or simple 
sum of  minds involved and their properties in isolation (Lawson, 2012; Lewis, 2016). This ultimately 
suggests that institutions matter for producing social intelligence through affecting and defining the 
mechanisms throughout which minds relate, and the recurrent way in which individuals can connect or 
communicate (Lavoie, 1985; Ostrom, 2005). 
 
Consequently, knowledge and coordination, much like money itself, ‘should be seen as having “social” 
[institutional] conditions of  existence’ (Ingham, 1996a, 509). However, social scientists have remained 
largely silent on these matters, suggesting that a complexity or systems theory related (coupled) with 
institutions and institutional analysis is warranted (Lewis, 2016; Ostrom, 2010). Institutions could also 
enlarge the social order and allow processes of  self-organized (rule-guided) responses and interactions 
among agents. Such rule-guided responses and social relations could lead to the emergence of  unique 
beneficial social properties distinct from those held by the separate individuals and irreducible to their 
unrelated properties (Lewis and Wagner, 2017). These new social phenomena stem from specific 
institutional contexts, possess different ontological properties, and display an emergent order that 
possesses some regularities, thus forming a process-based ‘organized complexity’ (Hayek, 2014 [1967]).38 
In this sense we can argue that institutions help to broaden the ‘social mind’ (Boland, 1979).   
 
Importantly, this conditional emergent complexity that arises from particular sets of  social relations and 
rules-based systems is what accentuates the underdeveloped relationship between institutions and 
emergent knowledge. Knowledge, then, can be conceptualized as an emergent property indivisible 
from—and a direct outcome of—the specific and contextual rule-guided social processes by which we 
relate and perceive (Polanyi, 1966; see also footnote 18). Similar to the mind then, the market and 
monetary practices are not only mechanisms to mobilize and convey existent fragmented knowledge 
(Hayek, 1948 [1945]), but perhaps more importantly, an overlapping set of  monetary, exchange, and 
property institutions that sustain a creative socio-relational process which allows novel epistemic 
 
38 ‘Organized complexity here means that the character of the structures showing it depends not only on the properties of the 
individual elements of which they are composed, and the relative frequency with which they occur, but also on the manner in 
which the individual elements are connected with each other’ (Hayek, 2014 [1975], 365). See also chapter 1.   
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complexity to emerge. Thus, some institutions—such as money—enlarge our collective or social 
intelligence by providing specific mechanisms and mediums for establishing coherent and orderly social 
interactions, which could increase the amount and quality of  epistemic resources available (Lavoie, 
1985).39  
 
2.5 Social Epistemology and the Growth of  Knowledge in Science and Markets  
 
The aforementioned relationship between institutions and the emergence of  knowledge is not limited to 
markets. In fact, Michael Polanyi, when he studied the sociology and social theory of  scientific knowledge 
(Polanyi, 1951), suggested, first, the crucial role of  institutions, norms, and culture in providing the 
framework in which certain social processes can be generated, producing unintended beneficial outcomes 
and scientific social relations for the discovery of  new knowledge. Second, he noted how that new 
scientific knowledge could only be generated exclusively from precise competitive and rule-following 
academic social contexts (allowing knowledge, beyond the individuals’ capacities, to accumulate in the 
Republic of  Science) (see also Scott, 1995). 
 
Following Polanyi’s sociology of  knowledge, the crucial epistemic and coordinative role I am suggesting 
money has, and the relevance of  its institutional and banking framework, appear to be just a special case 
of  a more generalized ontological and emergentist property of  certain institutions in producing organized 
complexity (Lewis and Wagner, 2017; see also chapter 1).40 Specifically, it appears that certain institutional 
frameworks have ontological and complexity implications for knowledge, in that their rules and norms 
allow the formation of  complex epistemic systems by enlarging and sustaining rivalry, routine and orderly 
mutual adjustments, and specific connections and interactions among agents (Lavoie, 1985; Lawson, 2012; 
Paniagua, 2018c). Thus, there is a general ontological property and emergentist relationship between rules 
and institutions defining the manner and means of  interacting, and the complexity of  outcomes that arise 
from them (Hayek, 2014 [1967]).  
 
Institutions are sets of  rules that define, constrain, and allow organisms to relate, communicate, and act 
according to some general and uniform principles by which more highly organized and complex 
phenomena can occur at the societal level (Lawson, 2012). This suggests that if  individuals follow certain 
rules and use specific media for social relations (interactions), they can produce a new definite order for 
the whole. In Polanyi’s (1951) terms, the spontaneous formation of  a polycentric order is produced by 
the multiple responses and relations of  the individuals interacting and responding to their respective 
institutional surroundings (Ostrom, 2005). Hence the social outcome generated by people’s interactions 
under specific institutions is orderly and possesses new ontological and qualitative properties (Lawson, 
2012).      
 
Consequently, institutional settings define rules of  behavior and the mechanisms of  interactions, such as 
academic rivalry (contestation) among scientific theories in science (Lavoie, 1985). In such an institutional 
context, academic interactions, the contention among theories, and scientific discussions could produce 
new knowledge and the discovery of  unexplored scientific theories (Polanyi, 1951, 1958). This scientific 
knowledge is a particular form of  relational and social-based scientific knowledge neither previously 
located, nor contained in, individuals’ minds prior to the scientific process; and not fully located also in 
 
39  This relates to the growth of  knowledge under specific social processes guided and defined by certain institutional 
frameworks. See for example Hayek’s and Polanyi’s conception of  the social spontaneous growth of  knowledge in the market 
and in the scientific community (Hayek, 1979). In them, relevant knowledge is socially created as a direct process of  rule-guided 
social interactions and contestations among minds, interactions that eventually enrich the social intelligence and would not 
exist without specific institutions, norms, and rules (Polanyi, 1951).   
40 Following Polanyi (1951), it has been argued that the emergent rationality of  scientific knowledge resides ‘in the particular 
kinds of  social processes taking place in the scientific community as a whole and guided by tacit judgments of  its skilled 
participants. It is through the tensions and pressures generated by struggles among scientists . . . that the process succeeds in 
continually discovering new knowledge. . . . Scientific knowledge, then, is seen as an evolving outcome of  the interplay of  
scientists who exercise their tacit skills’ (Lavoie, 1985, 63).  
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a reducible form to the sum of  the scientists’ separate consciousness (Polanyi, 1951). Therefore, those 
new scientific discoveries and ideas that arise from such professional relations and academic contentions 
cannot be said to exist at all separate from the specific academic culture, norms, and processes in which 
scientists interact (Polanyi, 1966; Scott, 1995).41  
 
The identified relationship among institutions, cognitive processes, and the social mind as a complex 
phenomenon that arises from such institutions and processes suggests that rationality and cognition are 
contingent social processes not entirely separable from norms, social interactions, and institutions 
(Gigerenzer, 2008; Ostrom, 2005; Weber, 1978). Human rationality and cognition are social, contextual, 
and largely determined by the institutional setting that frame our subsequent interactions and forms of  
thinking. The same ‘institutionally contingent principle’ applies also to market rationality and rational 
economic choice (Gode and Sunder, 1993, 1997; Weber, 1978). Hence the unique function of  money 
and markets in enabling economically relevant and more complex knowledge to arise seems to be just a 
special case of  those general complex institution–society–mind relationships that seem to be ubiquitous 
in most social orders based on interactions (Lewis, 2016; Lewis and Lewin, 2015).  
 
Indeed, Polanyi’s example of  a complex social system in which, through rivalry in specific settings, 
individuals unintentionally produce higher-order epistemic outcomes in society can be related to, and its 
properties actually generalized through, the theory of  complex systems (Colander and Kupers, 2014). It 
appears that the growth of  knowledge in society, and the discovery of  new knowledge by individuals, are 
decentralized emergent phenomena that are highly contextualized and dependent upon the established 
rules and social relations among them (Polanyi, 1951). As hinted in chapter 1, social relations can be 
described in general terms through institutions’ sets of  rules (replicator dynamics) and the medium of  
societal interaction that affects the general patterns of  collaboration (Colander and Kupers, 2014). As 
the example of  scientific discovery suggests, the social context in which knowledge is assembled, 
evaluated, and developed appears to be highly dependent upon the institutional framework and norms 
by which individuals interact (Polanyi, 1958). The growth and development of  novel scientific knowledge, 
for example, is largely dependent upon, and indivisible from, the procedures and rules by which scientists 
relate, communicate in journals, and criticize their theories (Polanyi, 1951). 
 
The key insight from Polanyi’s (1951, 1958, 1966) social theory of  scientific knowledge is that knowledge 
itself  and its growth are emergent social phenomena. Knowledge is an emergent social structure 
indivisible from societal processes and rivalrous relations among agents and specific institutions (Lavoie, 
1985). Therefore, a vast and relevant extension of  knowledge available in society cannot be meaningfully 
conceived as existent anterior to and separate from the unique institutional framework that provides both 
the rules and specific mechanisms by which minds relate and interact. This indicates that knowledge 
possesses deep complex and ontological characteristics related to emergence and institutions (Lewis and 
Lewin, 2015; Lewis and Wagner, 2017).  
 
This point has important implications since it suggests that knowledge is not only specific to the 
environment in which individuals engage in cognition. It is also indivisible from social networks, social 
relations, procedures, and media of  interaction that individuals establish in a given context (Buchanan, 
1982; Paniagua, 2018c). Thus ‘the existence of  emergent properties [such as knowledge] depends not 
only on the presence of  particular agents but also on certain relations to one another’ (Lewis and Wagner, 
2017, 10; see also chapter 1). Institutions and media of  social relations (such as money) form the unique 
social and ontological bridge between the limited individual mind and the higher-order level ‘social 
intelligence’ present in society (Lavoie, 1985).  
 
This idea concerning how knowledge is developed in society relates also with some recent advances in 
 
41 See, for example, how knowledge advances in science. The social processes of  argumentative dialogues and contestation 
among alternative ideas allow science as a social order to advance (Polanyi, 1951). Scientific discovery (or ‘truth’) is an outcome 
that advances from the process of  professional contention and relationships among the scientific community. 
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social epistemology (Longino, 1990). For instance, the philosopher of  science Philip Kitcher (1993), 
applied social epistemology to the understating of  the scientific community. He argues that scientific 
knowledge is developed by rule-following and institutionalized communities of  researchers that check 
and scrutinize each other, and that those contestable processes play a fundamental role in the 
advancement or rejection of  particular methods toward understanding. Kitcher further recognizes that 
science is done, not by logically omniscient scientists working in isolation, but rather by socially connected 
people with a variety of  personal and social interests, who both cooperate and compete with one another 
under certain specific institutional structures. Thus, we have to conceive the growth of  science and 
knowledge as social processes in which both our vision of  nature and our ways of  learning more about 
nature improve (Kitcher, 1993, Longino, 1990).  
 
Hence, Kitcher also argues that academic institutions and rules that scientific communities possess, 
demarcate the conceptual language, define the set of  questions that are deemed important, establish 
acceptable modes of  explanation, and highlight the paradigms of  acceptable scientific reasoning. For 
both Polanyi and Kitcher then, the scientific undertaking is an ongoing social process for truth, and 
scientific communities are institutionalized “epistemic communities” (Haas, 1992), and thus “machineries 
of  knowing” (Knorr-Cetina, 1981).42            
 
Indeed, after the work of  Polanyi (1962), Kuhn (1994), Kitcher (1993) and others, the social 
embeddedness of  scientific production has become better understood. Instead of  the old romantic 
picture of  the isolated and reflective scientist, today we have acknowledged that effective inquiry and the 
advancement of  science requires an interactive network of  scientists embedded in certain specific 
institutional milieus and following specific rules and social procedures. Science and scientific knowledge 
consist of  coordinated practices and interactions performed under certain institutionally structured social 
communities (Hodgson, 2019, 134). Science thus possesses a crucial social and interactive dimension.43    
 
 Thus, scientific communities, under certain institutions, and social and academic rules, become 
decentralized coordination systems that produce novel knowledge nonexistent before the establishment 
of  such socio-interactive communities. Given the scale and complexity of  any science, and the enormous 
amount of  knowledge and information involved, individual scientists cannot make sound and rational 
appraisals or scientific scrutiny on every single scientific aspect. Thus, scientists depend on the 
contestability and the screening capacities of  others, which requires also certain level of  trust, mutual 
respect and consensus. In other words, for science to function properly and produce knowledge, it 
requires some level of  sharing and coordination of  knowledge—through the guidance of  rules and 
consensus—in order to keep science together, to scrutinize new knowledge and, finally, to enable 
progress. Hence, under the perspective of  social epistemology, science is “a cognitive organism of  
intersecting individual knowledge” (Hodgson, 2019, 135). These are the fundamental reasons why science 
cannot be centrally planned or conducted by a benevolent despot or bureaucrat.  
 
As Hodgson also acknowledges:  
 
Science advances through critical scrutiny and dialogue with experts in the same field. 
Hence science requires concentrations of  specialists who intensively interact with one 
another, to correct errors, to pose alternative hypotheses, to check results, and to draw 
attention to related work in the area. … science is a social process and it works partly 
through the creation and ongoing amendment of  established positions in a scientific 
 
42 On these issues related with social epistemology, the production of  knowledge and scientific communities see also Fuller 
(1988) and Longino (1990).    
43 For instance, Michael Polanyi argued that: “Scientific opinion is an opinion not held by any single human mind, but one 
which, split into thousands of  fragments, is held by a multitude of  individuals, each of  whom endorses the other’s opinion at 
second hand, by relying on the consensual chains which link him to all the others through a sequence of  overlapping 
neighbourhoods” (Polanyi, 1962, 60). Polanyi’s 1962 essay is considered to be his classic summary statement on the socio-
interactive and spontaneous nature of  science.       
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community … It involves ‘epistemic communities’ and institutionalized ‘machineries of  
knowing’. In any scientific community there is a trade-off  between diversity and consensus. 
(Hodgson, 2019, 17; 122)44            
 
Consequently, these insights from social epistemology suggest that knowledge is not only personal, but 
also socially dependent and highly sensitive to context and the social milieu. The creation of  knowledge 
then appears to be highly dependent upon how interactions are established and choices unfold within 
institutions. Moreover, its social form and valuable content cannot be known anterior to and outside of  
the social processes in which it can be created (Buchanan, 1982). Therefore, it is best understood as a 
particular complex ‘whole’ composed of, and indivisible from, a dynamic set of  social relations (Lawson, 
2016). Thus, “knowledge is open-ended and knowing involves processes of  discovery and creation. . . . 
The interactive dimension of  the knowledge-creating process requires activities and capabilities to 
develop individual and social communication channels. . . . Institutions are means for the creation of  
knowledge and they are ‘places’ where knowledge is developed” (Rizzello and Turvani, 2002, 201). 
 
A satisfactory analysis of  social intelligence and collective rationality ‘requires knowledge not only of  the 
isolated parts but also of  the relations in which those parts stand to each other and, therefore, of  rules 
governing how the parts related and interact’ (Lewis and Wagner, 2017, 10). This institutionally dependent 
property of  the development of  knowledge appears to affect all social processes individuals are engaged 
in, producing social phenomena distinct from those possessed by individuals before those interactions 
ever took place (Lawson, 2012). Returning to Polanyi’s (1951) illustration of  scientific discovery, the 
knowledge that stems from such a context would not exist if  scientists did not have the institutional 
setting with the freedom to pursue their projects and the academic competitive—but rule following—
relations among them. Outside of  specific complex social systems of  relations, such as the free 
competitive scientific community, the ‘epistemic whole’ or ‘social intelligence’ would not be more (and 
would perhaps even be less) than the sum of  its parts (Colander and Kupers, 2014; Polanyi, 1966).  
 
In the absence of  certain institutional structures and specific media of  relations (such as money) that 
allow us to socially connect in orderly manners to produce organized complexity, knowledge is not only 
not institutionalized, but also nonexistent and hence impossible for society to use (Buchanan, 1982). 
Following this view, money is not only important (as the neoclassical framework argues) because it 
maximizes individuals’ utilities, and reduces informational problems and transaction costs (Alchian, 1977; 
Jones, 1976). It is also vital since it provides the social context or unique ‘place’ that shapes and determines 
our exchange interactions in the market and the specific assembly of  our mind–mind relationships, 
producing complex social intelligence (see also footnote, 17).  
 
Consequently, money enlarges the social mind (or social intelligence)—beyond language—through 
expanding the set of  possible regular relations, by providing a homogenous mechanism by which 
elements can be recursively and systematically connected through debt and exchange relations. Thus it 
enriches economic knowledge with ‘more highly organized phenomena’ (Hayek, 2014 [1964], 263), 
economic and coordinative phenomena previously absent (non existent) before the use of  money in 
exchanges (Howitt and Clower, 2000). Money uniquely broadens the ‘interactive dimension of  the 
knowledge-creating process’ (Rizzello and Turvani, 2002), expanding the social order and regularity of  
our interactions beyond language.  
 
2.6 Money and Economic Knowledge as Complex Phenomena 
 
The key to understanding the role of  money in sustaining coordination and ameliorating the economic 
problem resides in recognizing that a relevant portion of  our knowledge is not linguistically articulable 
and is institutionally dependent or contextual. Economic knowledge, much like scientific knowledge 
reviewed in the previous section, is difficult to generate and largely depends upon the institutions from 
 
44 On these issues concerning social epistemology, communities, and the advancement of  science see also Knorr-Cetina (1981).   
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which its springs (Lavoie, 1985; Paniagua, 2018c). Its existence, as suggested above, is conditioned upon 
a set of  institutional structures that encourage certain coherent social interactions.  
 
The reason why money is indispensable in society is that it itself  becomes a new system of  intricate social 
relations and engenders, throughout its use, a wider system of  previously nonexistent relationally 
organized patterns of  interactions among individuals (Ingham, 1996a; Lawson, 2012). Accordingly, it 
generates an organizing structure or a wider social configuration with novel ontological and coordinative 
properties (Lawson, 2016). This monetary institutional framework provides the context where relevant 
and complex economic knowledge is ultimately developed. 45  The social development of  market 
knowledge, much like knowledge in the scientific community, uses decentralized and personal knowledge 
and arranges it, through monetary-social relations, into novel totalities or ontologically more complex 
epistemic resources (Read, 1985; see also footnote 23 for an example).  
 
In other words, there is a crucial ontological and complexity-based difference between the coordination 
and knowledge attained and structured through monetary relations, and the ex ante knowledge disseminated 
and held in individuals’ minds without them (or anterior to the use of  money in exchanges) (Buchanan, 
1982; Howitt and Clower, 2000; Paniagua, 2018c). Or as Horwitz (1992a) has also recognized: 
   
To view the shift from direct exchange to monetary exchange as simply the redistribution 
of  existing information, as do a number of  general equilibrium approaches, is to miss the 
crucial point that such a shift creates what previously did not exist in any accessible form. 
(Horwitz, 1992a, 88)  
 
Thus money allows novel economic knowledge and coordination to emerge and be expressed as the 
unintended social outcome of  the system of  social and debt relations intermediated, denominated, and 
constituted by its widespread use. For instance, ‘[a] market characteristic of  a good, such as salability or 
scarcity in comparison to wants, is not a piece of  objective information . . . Rather such knowledge can 
be revealed or created only through the actual process of  economic exchange . . . actors discover which 
goods are more or less salable—knowledge that was previously unknown’ (Horwitz, 1992a, 87).  
 
Such an epistemic and coordinative role of  money has largely remained unexplored in the literature 
(Gilbert, 2005; Lawson, 2016; Smithin, 2003). Money is therefore indispensable in a capitalistic society 
because it provides the social means and unique relational mechanisms for establishing orderly exchange and 
debt relations by which we can subsequently develop relevant higher-order market knowledge, through 
complex and recurrent monetary arrangements. Moreover, the formation of  these epistemic resources 
and orderly exchange and debt relations could ameliorate the coordination problem of  decentralized 
trade (Howitt and Clower, 2000).  
 
Additionally, throughout such monetary system of  social and debt relations, we can obtain emergent, 
unanticipated, and wealth-enhancing properties through those novel epistemic and complex 
 
45 An example of  economic knowledge as a complex and emergent phenomenon is the ex post emergent property of  the 
salability of  money (Horwitz, 1992b). The knowledge concerning the unique salableness or (near-)perfect liquidity of  a certain 
good (asset) that will be used as money is a contextual and social characteristic that needs to be generated ex post (after) 
exchanges, and is constituted through a network of  path-dependent social interactions (Howitt and Clower, 2000; Jones, 1976; 
Menger, 1892). Importantly, such knowledge concerning money’s salableness (or extreme liquidity) does not exist disseminated 
(fragmented) or anterior to the dynamic social interactions that specifically constitute it. In other words, ‘the process of  the 
evolution and use of  a medium of  exchange do not merely redistribute existing, objective knowledge from actor to actor but 
rather create knowledge that did not previously exist’ (Horwitz, 1992a, 87). Moreover, economic knowledge, such as the 
market characteristics of  goods and that arise from market interactions, cannot be considered as (nor is it ontologically 
reducible to) the outcome of  a mere redistributed or aggregated sum of  existing tacit knowledge present in society (Buchanan, 
1982). See analogous ontological and emergent properties in Polanyi’s (1951) example of  scientific theories, Hayek’s example 
of  the mind (Hayek, 2014 [1967], 1973) and Leonard Read’s (1985) example of  the pencil. Money itself, similar to knowledge, 
can only be conceptualized and understood as an emergent complex property stemming from a configuration of  social 
relations (Ingham, 1996a).  
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arrangements. Without the use of  money to: first, define and express prices and our debt-economic 
relations; second, to relationally organize our interactions in specific homogenous manners; and finally, 
to sustain new coherent and regular methods of  social relations, we would be unable to arrange the 
disseminated knowledge in an organized (coherent) but intricate way that develops new meaningful and 
complex knowledge (e.g. the allocation-distribution result of markets) and other emergent properties.  
 
Put somewhat bluntly, without the use of  money, both the efficient allocation-distribution outcome of 
markets, and L. Read’s (1985) example of  the efficient creation of  the pencil, would become practically 
epistemic and technical impossibilities for those societies that do not rely on money to intermediate 
exchanges (Lavoie, 1985). This is because the arrangement (concatenation) of  all the specific and 
scattered knowledge, and productive elements (technical inputs) required to produce allocation-
distribution results and pencils efficiently—which are forms of  economic knowledge—can only arise and 
be assembled through market processes sustained by orderly exchanges intermediated (enhanced) via an 
homogenous and pervasive medium of  exchange.  
 
Consequently, without money society would be incapable of  supporting a sustainable rational economic 
order that possesses higher degrees of  ‘social intelligence’ and epistemic wealth-enhancing properties 
irreducible to and not contained in the sum total of  the preexistent unrelated elements. In Buchanan’s 
(1982) words:   
 
[T]he ‘order’ of the market emerges only from the process of voluntary exchange among the 
participating individuals. The ‘order’ is, itself, defined as the outcome of the process that 
generates it. The ‘it,’ the allocation-distribution result, does not, and cannot, exist 
independently of the trading process. Absent this process, there is and can be no ‘order.’ . 
. . Individuals do not act so as to maximize utilities described in independently existing functions. 
They confront genuine choices, and the sequence of decisions taken may be 
conceptualized, ex post (after the choices), in terms of ‘as if’ functions that are maximized. 
But these ‘as if’ functions [a form of economic knowledge] are, themselves, generated in 
the choosing process, not separately from such process. If viewed in this perspective, there 
is no means by which even the most idealized omniscient designer could duplicate the 
results of voluntary interchange. The potential participants do not know until they enter the 
process what their own choices will be. (Buchanan, 1982, 5, emphasis in the original)   
 
Along similar lines, Amartya Sen (1993) has also recognized that in regards to market efficiency, ‘[t]here 
is also an informational problem . . . to achieve social optimum. The informational economy [epistemic 
properties] of the market mechanism [ex ante] does not cover the information needed to ascertain the 
set of feasible [ex post] market outcomes and to pick the socially best from that class’ (Sen, 1993, 522n7). 
Neoclassical economics in general misses this aforementioned ‘epistemic-generative’ role of  money since 
it ‘cannot easily accommodate any role for underlying social structures including, on one level, social 
relations’ (Ingham, 1996a, 527).  
 
2.6.1 The distinction between means of  exchange and means of  payment   
 
Since Menger’s (1892) theory on how money spontaneously evolves to overcome the deficiencies of  
barter, there has been a rather asymmetrical focus on money as the medium of  exchange, when compared 
against money as means of  payment and as unit of  account. Menger (1892) maintained that money had 
only one (primarily) function in markets, as the medium of  exchange, establishing that money as the 
means of  final payment was not a distinctive and relevant function (Ingham, 2000). There is still ‘a 
tendency to use the two functions interchangeably, but the distinction is an important one that helps to 
distinguish different types of  economic transaction’ (Ingham, 2000, 20).46 In spot, small, and continuously 
 
46 An example of  this difference is in dual-currency systems of  the earliest times, in which base-metal tokens were used as 
means of  exchange in small and spot transactions. But precious-metal coinage was instead legally valid as means of  payment 
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operating trades, abstract purchasing power in the form of  exchange money (as the means of  payment) 
need not actually be held for a long period of  time, and the actual ‘money-stuff ’ of  media of  exchange 
is what intermediates those exchanges. However, in modern economies most exchanges and economic 
transactions—relevant for the formation of  intricate economic knowledge—are not performed in spot 
transactions using the ‘money-stuff ’ of  actual media of  exchange or valuata (the asset that constitutes the 
medium of  settlement and payment) (Smithin, 2000).  
 
Indeed, currently, bank liabilities (a type of  commercial debt relations), particularly in the form of  bank 
deposits generated by commercial banks and arising from bank credit, are commonly and broadly 
conceived also as money (as debt relations). In addition, banknotes, which in most societies today means 
central bank notes, are money as debt relations with respect to the state or the monetary authority that 
issues notes as central bank liabilities. Money therefore not only refers to banknotes, but also refers to 
deposits arising from bank credit, and these bank-deposit liabilities actually provide nowadays most of  
the means of  exchange used in markets (Laidler, 1990; Smithin, 2000).  
 
Hence the overall money supply in the economy, used to enable the broad, crucial, and orderly monetary 
market exchanges emphasized in this chapter, consists today largely of  bank deposits and not only of  
banknotes (Laidler, 1990), even though both of  them are forms of  money as debt relations and ‘a symbol 
or signifier of  states’ and banks’ promises to pay’ (Ingham, 2000, 23). Therefore, commercial bank 
deposits in addition to banknotes are a crucial type of  bank liability (and money) and a part of  the broad 
system of  debt-social relations that sustains and extends the ontological transformation of  economic 
knowledge through market exchanges. We need to recognize that what we conceive of  today as the 
medium of  exchange, which enables a widespread system of  orderly exchanges, consists of  forms of  
bank liabilities or debt relations (conceived of  as money) that are not narrowly limited to banknotes but 
also include bank deposits. Nowadays these liabilities (debt relations) provide most of  society’s actual 
means of  exchange (Laidler, 1990). 
 
Accordingly then, modern transactions involve instead contracts and deferred (final) payment or 
settlement usually denominated in money (abstract value), and they also can include debt relations with 
payments in kind. Thus here the ‘actual money-stuff  is not required for the immediate transactions’ 
(Ingham, 2000, 18). Hence most exchanges and widespread socio-economic relations are sustained and 
performed through credit and debt relations—such as bank deposits, mentioned above—and not 
through the conventional ‘money-stuff ’, which is usually used as the means of  (final) payment. Thus 
‘money is uniquely specified, first, by being a measure of  value/unit of  account and, second, by the 
capacity to store abstract value in a universally accepted form that enables it to act as a means of  payment’ 
(Ingham, 2000, 21).47  
 
to settle and exhaust official debt relations (Ingham, 2000n15). In this case, we can see how debt (deferred payment) relations 
are indeed means of  exchange, but not legally granted and final means of  payment. Moreover, base-metal tokens were neither 
habitually used as means of  exchange in large and important transactions (hence the existence of  a multiplicity of  means of  
exchange), nor as means of  payment in debt relations. Nevertheless, the focus in this chapter is on money as a means of  
exchange (including debt relations) because means of  exchange are the socio-relational mechanisms that are required to 
generate ‘immediate transactions’, and to sustain the ‘extensive and complex monetary practice (as opposed to barter)’, and 
also that they can be generated even in the absence of  a universally acceptable means of  payment (Ingham, 2000, 18).         
47 An asset can only be accepted in payment if  it works also as a good store of  value. This allows money—as a store of  
abstract value—to be withheld from exchanges because of  increased liquidity preferences. Liquidity preferences are informed 
by local interactions, by social conditions, and by the level of  economic uncertainty in markets. Thus factors that determine 
liquidity preferences have a large interactive and social dimension, and they also play an epistemic signaling function. 
Individuals, in determining liquidity preferences, draw from market knowledge, social signals, and market conditions that 
inform decision-makers. Thus we have an epistemic feedback mechanism or an endogeneity process within the use of  money 
and the determination of  liquidity preferences. Monetary relations have a unique function in the formation of  a higher-order 
and ontologically distinct economic reality and in the emergence of  market phenomena. Subsequently, those same emergent 
market conditions, constituted by monetary relations (and their inherent unpredictability), feed back into the decision-making 
level informing individuals about market conditions and their level of  uncertainty, influencing back again liquidity preferences 
and the use of  money (a feedback loop).     
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In modern capitalistic economies, money as the means of  exchange can take different forms (multiplicity 
of  media of  exchange) and includes spot trades—performed through conventional money (valuata or 
base money)—bank liabilities in the form of  bank deposits, and debt (or deferred payment in a final 
means of  settlement), which is a social relation (Smithin, 2000; see also footnote 24). Moreover, money, 
instead, as the (final) means of  payment or settlement of  debt is generally ‘hierarchical in nature’ and 
does not include all forms of  debt relations (deferred payment) since, by their nature and definition, they 
cannot logically be an ultimate and final form of  payment to settle and exhaust debts (promises to pay) 
(Smithin, 2000, 6). Even if  there is a multiplicity of  means of  exchange, including debt as social relations, 
there must be an object or a unique (financial) asset that plays the role of  the generalized medium of  
payment and settlement and helps in the final liquidation of  debts and liabilities.  
 
Today, in modern capitalistic societies, that object (or asset) is represented by specific institutionally legitimate 
signifiers of  debt and payment, issued by states and banks (Ingham, 2000). In other words, ‘even if  there 
is a multiplicity of  media of  exchange in any given monetary system, there invariably seems to be a unique 
asset which constitutes the medium of  (final) settlement’ (Smithin, 2000, 6). Therefore, money as the 
means of  payment refers to a different type of  economic transaction (and a narrower range of  assets) 
that occurs to settle and extinguish promises to pay and to settle credit and debt relations. Additionally, 
the actual ‘money-stuff ’ that constitutes the means of  (final) payment, and ‘namely that by delivery of  
which debts contracts and price contracts are discharged[,] . . . can only exist in relation to a money of  
account’ (Keynes, 1930, 3).  
 
Money as means of  payment, then, as Keynes (1930) noticed, is hierarchical and differs from the different 
and multiple exchange media insofar as it is only produced by legitimately sanctioned agencies or banks, 
and it is uniquely related (and closely tied) to and defined through the unit of  account (Ingham, 2000, 
32). This form of  settlement is also a different type of  economic transaction that occurs at a later date 
(probably even in a different place) and after the immediate transaction and exchange relation performed 
through money as the means of  exchange (see also footnote 24). As hinted earlier in this chapter (see 
section 2.1), money, as the ultimate means of  payment or settlement, can be considered as outside money, 
which is usually a commodity (material) money or ‘money stuff ’ that does not circulate from hand to hand 
enhancing trade. Instead, money, as the generalized means of  exchange can be actually considered as 
inside money, which is usually represented by bank liabilities (or wide debt relations) such as currency 
and demand deposits issued by commercial banks and held (accepted) by the public (Laidler, 1990; Selgin, 
1988; Smithin, 2000). 
           
Wicksell (1967 [1906], 17) defined the generalized medium of  exchange as an asset not to be particularly 
used in consumption or production but ‘which is habitually, and without hesitation, taken [on its own 
account] by anybody in exchange for any commodity’ (see also Clower, 1984b). Hence today, it could 
refer to any particular asset (or specific credit and debt contract and relation) in the economy that is 
generally and habitually accepted as an exchange medium in exchange for goods and services, or socio-
economic debt relations that intermediate and enhance the process of  exchange (Smithin, 2000).  
 
In contrast, the notion of  means of  payment refers to an object (or asset) that can be used to ultimately 
pay for purchases and to extinguish or settle (the final discharge of) any debt, a different type of  economic 
transaction that occurs subsequent to the use of  debt relations (such as bank deposits) or money as 
exchange media in initiating the exchange (Smithin, 2000). As such, it is here of  a different (minor) order 
of  relevance in the functions of  money that involve the enabling and enlargement of  debt and exchange 
relations (and thus in the formation of  complex market knowledge), since an extensive and complex 
system of  monetary and debt practices and of  money prices—one that actually sustains the process of  
orderly socio-monetary relations that enlarges the ‘social intelligence’—is perhaps possible without a 
universally acceptable and legally defined means of  payment (Ingham, 2000, 18; Horwitz, 1992a).  
 
Hence for the scope of  this chapter, I focus on and refer to money as the generalized means of  exchange and 
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not particularly as the means of  payment (and settlement), in the Wicksellian sense stated above—which 
includes in modern capitalistic economies conventional exchange media (banknotes), liabilities in the 
form of  bank deposits (bank-deposit liabilities), and credit money and debt (deferred payment), a social 
relation—as, in addition to the money of  account, a crucial (and necessary) aspect of  money in 
establishing an orderly and widespread system of  complex monetary practices and exchanges that have 
ontological and emergent epistemic implications (Horwitz, 1992b).  
 
2.6.2 Orderly exchange relations and emergent irreducible totalities  
 
As suggested previously, money is able to accomplish an epistemic role through its pervasive and 
ubiquitous capacity to mediate almost all market exchanges and unintentionally generate knowledge 
through them. Money’s function as a medium of  exchange allows it to ‘touch’, intermediate, and be part 
of  all (or most) economic transactions (Clower, 1984a, 1984b). Therefore, money is a pervasive and 
ubiquitous element in markets, and all markets indirectly become markets for money (Yeager, 1968, 1986). 
This allows all prices in the economy to become money prices and hence to convey the new emergent 
phenomena of  knowledge in a homogenous form of  symbolic communication. The fact that money 
mediates and symbolizes new social relations is hardly a new insight in sociology (Dyer, 1989; Marx, 1973 
[1939]). However, the emergent properties of  more highly organized complexity and the ontologically 
different epistemic phenomena that stem from them, and how these properties ultimately relate to the 
coordination problem, are crucial macroeconomic and coordinative implications of  the use of  money 
not fully developed in the literature. This suggests that the ontology of  money is inseparable from 
sociology and perhaps also from macroeconomics (Ingham, 1996b).  
 
Money, by becoming the generalized medium of  exchange, allows—similar to language—a single and 
similar-in-kind (homogenous) process of  expression and socialization of  knowledge. Thus, ‘money and 
money prices make possible [novel] orderly processes between economic actors’ (Horwitz, 1992a). This 
subsequently allows a complex organized system to form (Lewis and Wagner, 2017; see also chapter 1). 
A crucial aspect of  money’s role as the generalized medium of  exchange is how it connects and relates 
people together into new and similar-in-kind social interactions, by ‘facilitat[ing] the development of  an 
ever widening circle of  economic interdependence based on the dispersion of  trust’ (Frankel, 1977, 14). 
Indeed, as hinted in chapter 1, such a uniform, extensive, and habitual process of  relations sustains and 
provides the base for a coherent form of  repetitive and widespread interactions among individuals, 
allowing a complex but orderly system to be formed.48 Thus the pervasive use of  money in exchanges 
allows individuals to transcend their personal cognitive and communicative limitations (Horwitz, 1992b). 
Thus ‘[a]ctions taken during the process of  exchange . . . bring knowledge from the personal to the social 
level’ (Horwitz, 1992a, 87), acquiring a novel and more complex social use.  
 
Accordingly, money’s cognitive task of  developing knowledge and promoting economic progress moves 
away from individuals’ narrow cognitive capacities and becomes a social process in which money relations 
sustain the formation of  social knowledge. This process of  extended and social cognition produces a 
type of  higher-order knowledge that is more complex than the sum of  its parts. The economic knowledge 
available under money is no longer the sum or aggregation of  the fragments and epistemic resources of  
individuals taken separately, but rather is the emergent phenomenon of  specific social and mind-to-mind 
relationships and nonlinguistic relational processes intermediated exclusively through money. Such higher-
order epistemic properties are qualitatively different from, and irreducible to, those that individuals could 
possess if  isolated from or outside the social market context that money facilitates.  
 
The most well-known—albeit often overlooked—role of  money is its function as the ‘generally accepted 
medium of  exchange’ (Yeager, 1986). The pervasive property of  money in being present in, 
intermediating, and denominating most market interactions has strong implications for the formation of  
 
48 See at depth the four crucial properties of  organized complexity (including that one concerning orderly and similar-in-kind 
social interactions) in chapter 1, sections 1.1 and 1.2 (see also Lewis and Lewin, 2015).  
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our social intelligence and hence for emergent coordination. Money is one side of  (almost) every market 
interaction, and most debt and commercial relations are denominated numerically in the unit of  account 
(Clower, 1984a, 1984b). Money symbolically ‘touches’ all other goods and commodities by virtue of  the 
fact that it is constantly being traded against them. Thus, every market is indirectly also a market for 
money, as every exchange is an exchange against money. It is from this role and ubiquity in mediating 
(bridging) all exchanges that money acquires large epistemic and social implications for coordination and 
rationality, and shapes society in ways not frequently recognized (Dyer, 1989; Mitchell, 1937).  
 
It is because of  money’s essential relevance and pervasiveness in the economy, both as the only generally 
accepted means of  exchange to intermediate most trades and economic relations, and as the unit of  
account to coordinate market exchanges and to homogenously express debt relations and market prices, 
that (almost) all market interactions and exchanges are actually coordinated, performed, and expressed 
through it. Ultimately, ‘this pervasiveness of  money enables it to function as a means of  social 
communication and dramatically to enhance the evolution of  the market and society. Again, the 
development of  the social institution of  a medium of  exchange is an order-generating process embodying 
creativity, complexity, and coordination’ (Horwitz, 1992a, 87).      
 
Through that pervasiveness in exchanges, and in helping define debt and prices (in addition to defining 
and developing the standardized means of  final payment or settlement), money extends rational 
calculation and management of  debt and wealth, expanding the range of  homogenous and orderly 
interactions and complexity of  socioeconomic contact between individuals beyond the limits of  language 
and barter. The ubiquity of  money, its role as a focal point to denominate and express debt and prices, 
and its pervasiveness (as the generally accepted media of  exchange) in trade are the foundations for its 
ability to generate a new orderly system of  novel epistemic and social relations. Money ultimately forms 
a new system of  social and economic relations that promotes the constant rearrangement and 
combination of  an organizing structure of  relevant economic knowledge, which becomes ontologically 
irreducible to the scattered elements that form it.49  
 
Money could be partially perceived as sustaining social cooperation by mediating a new complementary 
process of  extralinguistic (nonverbal) social communication and a process of  knowledge transmission or 
conveyance (Dyer, 1989; Horwitz, 1992a). For example, Horwitz (1992a, 81, emphasis in the original) 
maintained that money, similar to language, performs an ‘analogous communicative function’, and that 
‘through its ability to make contextual knowledge socially usable, also extends the range of  social 
communication beyond the limits of  language and the physical senses’. Nonetheless, this relevant 
extralinguistic role is not to maintain ‘that all that happens there, as far as social science [and social theory] 
is concerned, is communication’ (Ganssman, 1988, 306).50 Framing money’s social role merely as an 
extralinguistic mechanism to communicate or mobilize existent but fragmented (or tacit) knowledge 
oversimplifies and conceals money’s deeper ontological role in determining coordinated and emergent 
outcomes as complex social phenomena (Lewis, 2015). Indeed, Horwitz (1992a, 89) later acknowledged 
that for social theory, those ‘[extralinguistic] articulation processes are never sufficient to describe the 
knowledge generated and communicated in spontaneous social orders’.     
 
Hence as seen in this chapter, money does play a role as a mechanism of  extralinguistic interaction (Dyer, 
1989; Ganssman, 1988). However, its crucial role in coordination could better understood as the social 
 
49 In the words of  Marx, under the use of  money: ‘The whole of  this movement appears as a social process. . . . [T]he totality 
of  the process appears as an objective interrelation, which arises spontaneously from nature; arising, it is true, from the mutual 
influence of  conscious individuals on one another, but neither located in their consciousness, nor subsumed under them as a 
whole. Their own collisions with one another produce an alien social power standing above them, produce their mutual 
interaction as a process and power independent of  them’ (Marx, 1973 [1939], 196–197).  
50 See also Hayek: ‘Even the statement of  the [coordination] problem as one of  utilizing knowledge dispersed among hundreds 
of  thousands of  individuals still over-simplifies its character. It is not merely a task of  utilizing [or communicating] information 
about particular concrete facts which the individuals already possess [even tacitly], but one of  using their abilities of  
discovering such facts as will be relevant to their purposes in the particular situation’ (Hayek, 1979, 190n7).  
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organizing structure in which novel and orderly social relations are created, which further enhances the 
development of  higher-order and irreducible complexity. Money is not solely the mechanism by which 
knowledge is conveyed, but the context in which further knowledge is generated as a complex 
phenomenon inseparable from its relational use. Focusing merely on money’s extralinguistic role as a 
means to mobilize hard-to-articulate knowledge underestimates its vital ontological function in 
generating different and complex arrangements. Money does more than just redistribute existent personal 
knowledge; it provides the institutional and socio-relational context underlying, and the homogenous 
mechanisms (money of  account and generalized exchange media) that sustain orderly exchange and debt 
interactions behind complex market relations that encourage the growth of  social knowledge as a system 
of  organized complexity. 
 
As suggested in the introduction, it is both the habitual use of  money as generalized means of  exchange 
in all processes of  trade and market interactions, and its use as the unit of  account to express debt 
relations and prices, that ultimately enable money’s pervasiveness to establish new orderly, frequent, and 
homogenous processes of  interactions and exchanges. From both this wide and orderly monetary system 
of  relations and through the means of  money and debt relations performed and denominated in the 
money of  account, society can generate a novel self-organizing structure, or a more complex social order 
based on the disseminated and previously unrelated bits of  knowledge (Hayek, 2014 [1967]; Howitt and 
Clower, 2000).  
 
Moreover, this unfolding and self-organizing network of  orderly social-monetary relations generates and 
constantly rearranges the disseminated bits of  tacit economic knowledge into new social and epistemic 
wholes, and specific assemblies or intricate structures of  relevant economic knowledge that acquire 
ontological, qualitative, and new complexity-based properties not present or contained in the pre-existent 
disseminated parts that constitute it (Lawson, 2016).51 In other words: 
 
The emergent totalities of  which individuals and things are organised as components are, 
qua organised systems, irreducible to the sum total of  the elements that come to serve as 
components just because these totalities are constituted in part by the manner in which the 
components are arranged or relationally organised [in this case via money]; the relational 
organisation too is an emergent. As a result, ontological reduction of  any emergent totality 
to the pre-existing elements alone, considered apart from their being relationally organised, 
is proscribed. (Lawson, 2016, 5) 
  
It is ultimately money’s pervasiveness as the generalized medium of  exchange that enables it to function 
as the regular, uniform, and widespread mechanism for individuals to relate and interact in a specific and 
ingenuous way, enhancing complex phenomena (Hayek, 2014 [1967]; Yeager, 1968). This orderly system 
of  relations establishes ‘a coherent structure of  causally connected . . . parts’ (Hayek, n.d., 4; see also 
chapter 1). As seen in chapter 1, complex systems such as the monetary-based economy display significant 
ontological and emergent properties (Hayek, 2014 [1964]; Lawson, 2012). Indeed, the insights from 
chapter 1 suggest that money does not merely redistribute and communicate hard-to-articulate pre-
existent knowledge. Similar to Polanyi’s (1951) ‘Republic of  Science’, it rather generates higher-order 
social knowledge as a conditioned and procedural emergent outcome from those coherent monetary 
structures and social relations that did not previously exist, and hence such economic knowledge is 
ultimately not commensurable with or reducible to the sum total of  the separate knowledge held by 
individuals before the process of  exchange (Buchanan, 1982). In this important sense we can recognize 
that money does more than just communicate existent economic knowledge.   
 
 
51 Orderly systems of  social relations enable ‘the “emergence” of  “new” patterns . . . [which] means that this larger structure 
as a whole will possess certain general or abstract features which will recur independently of  the particular values of  the 
individual data. . . . Such “wholes”, defined in terms of  certain general properties of  their structure, will constitute distinctive 
objects of  explanation . . . [and depend upon] the relations between the individual elements’ (Hayek, 2014 [1964], 261–262). 
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Market characteristics of  goods, their technological and physical properties, their relative scarcities, value 
added in alternative uses, and other economic knowledge crucial to impart rationality and efficiency to 
markets can only arise and be derived through specific recurrent patterns of  social and mental (monetary 
intermediated) relations that are sustained through money exchanges and debt relations (see also footnote 
23). Money does indeed utilize and incorporate contextual and tacit personal knowledge into the system 
of  social relations (Horwitz, 1992a). But the social outcome stemming from them is a structural or 
‘organizational system’ that is far more complex and richer than its constituent parts (Lawson, 2016).  
 
In other words, economic knowledge is not explicable by nor fully intrinsic to and contained in our 
consciousness, and ourselves, but possesses a crucial social structure and procedural relational aspect 
(Marx, 1973 [1939], 1964). Hence it is not merely an unstructured aggregation or the outcome of  a 
communicational process of  scattered epistemic bits. Outside those specific relations enhanced by money, 
such an epistemic structure that sustains and coordinates markets would be absent (Buchanan, 1982). 
Indeed, if  you could take apart the personal ‘epistemic pieces’ and detach the individuals who use money 
and comprise the relational monetary components of  markets, and if  you could later arrange them in an 
arbitrary fashion without money as the specific manner in which they relate, it is highly implausible that 
the causal power and ontological properties of  the knowledge we produced under those monetary 
relations will re-emerge (Lawson, 2012, 2016). In consequence, the monetary social structure makes the 
difference for the epistemic resources available in society. Therefore, ontologically and epistemologically, 
money should never be considered neutral. The crucial role of  money consists in becoming a novel 
system of  social relations that encourages the assembly (concatenation) and constant rearrangement of  
personal knowledge, transforming it later into new emergent and irreducible totalities.  
 
Consequently, money prices do indeed play a semiotic function (Dyer, 1989). However, they do so 
through the expression of  money prices as symbolic representations of  the new epistemic relations. 
Prices could represent (signal) the ever-unfolding complex epistemic phenomena that stem from the 
myriad of  interactions of  our minds in markets. Prices then could be interpreted as semiotic outcomes 
of  market complexity. They potentially symbolize and signal in a numeric fashion the emergent and richer 
epistemic order or the new ontological properties being generated only through money’s use and the 
continuous rearrangement of  our mind-to-mind relations. Importantly, the semiotic and coordinative 
functions of  money and prices are inseparable from money’s social ontology (Lawson, 2012). Hence most 
of  the economic knowledge and social intelligence required to sustain a rational market order cannot be 
said to exist anterior to and dissociated from the processes of  money-exchange relations (Buchanan, 1982; 
Lavoie, 1985). Economic knowledge is an ontological emergent property of  the actual use of  money in 
society and is thus indivisible from the system of  social relations money and debt relations engender (see 
also Paniagua, 2018c).  
 
Hence, analogously to Ingham’s (1996a, 1996b) framework, economic knowledge is actually constituted 
by a complex system of  social relations, and money prices are the relations’ semiotic representation in 
markets. Separate acts of  exchange performed through money might indeed allow participants to be 
somewhat able to articulate their tacit and subjective knowledge and transmit it into the price system 
(Horwitz, 1992b). Nevertheless, when those isolated transactions and relations form part of  a 
homogenous, orderly, and coherent network of  social competitive relations (as under money), the 
interconnected whole will possess epistemic and ontological properties different from and greater than 
the sum of  its constituent parts (Hayek, 2014 [1964]; see also chapter 1).52  
 
 
52 This does not suggest that money does not play also a role in allowing individuals’ knowledge to be ‘captured’ by the system 
of  prices and in bringing personal knowledge to a social use (Horwitz, 1992b). Polanyi (1951) showed that the process of  
generating scientific knowledge is intimately linked to rivalrous actions in which we partially articulate and translate tacit 
knowledge into scientific discoveries. The ontological point here is that the emergence of  knowledge from those relational 
processes cannot be reduced to nor explained by the mere communication, sum, or unstructured aggregation of  tacit skills and 
knowledge held prior to those specific social and debt-related processes that constitute them and give them form.  
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Ultimately, the market knowledge concerning goods and services, and formed through monetary 
interactions cannot be scaled back or reducible to the agents involved in producing it. In fact, it represents 
a disjunction between the micro and macro levels of  analysis (Wagner, 2012). Money—as hinted in chapter 
1—thus becomes the social bridge between separated minds and society’s economic complexity. It 
assumes a unique relational role that generates a qualitatively distinct and ontological change from the 
scattered unrelated minds (personal knowledge) toward a coherent epistemic whole (social intelligence), 
a complexity-based arranging role that no other system of  social relations is able to replicate.  
 
I have suggested that economic knowledge can be better conceptualized as a complex phenomenon and 
an exclusive emergent property of  a structure of  social and debt relations sustained by the use of  money 
to exchange and define debt contracts. Its relationship with the preexistent knowledge disseminated and 
held by individuals prior to the social interactions enabled by money is a nonscalable emergent relationship 
and cannot be meaningfully described by aggregation or conveyance. Thus, prices could be better seen 
as semiotic symbols of  such unfolding novel social intelligence and complexity. In sum, money and prices 
cannot be said to be social institutions that simply communicate and redistribute hard-to-articulate 
personal knowledge. This section has contended that knowledge does not only possess tacit, social, and 
institutional properties as suggested in section 2.4. The social production of  complex economic 
knowledge and the constant rearrangement of  disseminated knowledge that produces ‘collective market 
rationality’ are in themselves a complex organized system of  monetary and debt social relations, 
indivisible from the properties of  money surveyed in section 2.2.  
 
2.7 Concluding Remarks: Toward an Institutional Analysis of  Money  
 
Building on both the complexity properties and insights about organized complexity surveyed in chapter 
1, this chapter has explored a complexity-based theory and ontological rationalization to conceptualize 
money’s unique social dimension and its exceptional impact on coordination through the generation of  
social knowledge. Complexity and emergentist aspects about money have been neglected both by 
economists and sociologists (Lawson, 2012, 2016). I suggested that money prices, unlike what has been 
assumed before, symbolize such emergent complexity by becoming the new guiding signs for the 
subsequent adaptations of  our personal economic plans. These semiotic symbols of  complexity and 
emergent knowledge impart feedback and notify individuals of  the unfolding epistemic complexity and 
rationality of  the system as a whole.  
 
Money is a social institution that creates and constitutes a new system of  social relations (systematically 
connected parts) in which unintended and novel epistemic phenomena can arise (see also chapter 1). 
Therefore, it generates economic knowledge as a complex relational phenomenon. Prices thus are 
semiotic elements representing those unique unfolding higher-order social phenomena (Dyer, 1989)—
phenomena that are ontologically and qualitatively different from and irreducible to the tacit knowledge 
scattered and disseminated in our minds. This indivisible relationship between money and epistemic 
complexity suggests that prices are far more than the numerical codification or nonlinguistic translation 
of  preexistent disseminated knowledge. Further investigations into the ontology and sociology of  money 
might contribute to understanding in more depth this epistemic higher-order role of  prices.  
 
Systems theory suggests that an analogy for understanding money’s most critical higher-order role should 
not be limited to its similarities to language as a medium of  communication (Horwitz, 1992a). The 
linguistic analogy should perhaps be complemented by the sociology of  knowledge and the ‘growth of  
knowledge’ theory within the scientific community (Polanyi, 1951, 1958). I have argued that money is 
what ultimately makes the social and epistemological advantages of  the market possible. This chapter 
maintained that the use of  money in society is invaluable if  we desire to enhance social coordination, 
cooperation, and market rationality. Thus we cannot deliberately move away from or eradicate money 
from society and pretend that our social intelligence or collective wisdom will stand unscathed.  
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Our social complexity and economic knowledge are fundamentally dependent upon money. Eradicating 
or replacing money would eliminate the only relational mechanism besides language by which novel social 
relations are extended into wider realms of  social and economic life (Frankel, 1977), and thus it would 
severely curtail our social intelligence. The existence and properties of  economic knowledge and prices—
crucial for sustaining market coordination—are contingent upon the unique way and orderly manner in 
which individuals stand in relation to one another in their monetary-exchange relationships. Therefore, 
market rationality and coordination are emergent properties conditional to individuals, their positions in 
the market, the monetary institutions, and those institutions’ rules (Howitt and Clower, 2000; Smithin, 
2004). Without money, the higher-order phenomena built upon our tacit knowledge, skills, and organized 
relations—phenomena that constitute what we call the market economy—would never exist.  
 
Money plays a significant role in aiding not only the communication of  hard-to-articulate existent 
knowledge, but also the emergence of  complex cognitive and epistemic resources that enlarge and sustain 
coordination beyond what individuals could have achieved separately, consciously, or through language. 
Far from being irrelevant to economic decision-making, money becomes the medium of  relations by 
which economic rationality and market knowledge can only exist, thus making it indivisible from 
coordination, rationality, and macroeconomic outcomes (Ingham, 1998; Mitchell, 1937).  
 
Starting from the notion of  money ‘as a structure of  social relations’ (Ingham, 1996a, 507), I sought to 
expand the concept into the complexity properties and implications of  emergent social phenomena that 
such a conceptualization entails. I argued that most of  economic knowledge, which is vital for 
coordination (Hayek, 1948 [1937], 1948 [1945]), is in itself  a higher-order emergent outcome and 
constituted by a system of  intricate social relations sustained by money. Economic knowledge is therefore 
a system of  monetary relations. This emergent type of  economic knowledge is actually determined by a 
process-dependent network of  rivalrous and cooperative complex social processes that only exist throughout 
the use of  money. I hope that the insights highlighted in this chapter can contribute to developing a 
fruitful conversation between economics, political economy, and sociology in order to overcome the 
detrimental separation of  the disciplines (Ingham, 1996b; Lawson, 1997).  
 
Money does more than merely sustain a process of  interpreting and communicating what is actually being 
held in our minds. By creating an orderly system of  interactions, money allows for a constant assembly 
(concatenation) of  personal knowledge, which generates further epistemic resources that are 
ontologically diverse and qualitatively distinct from the preexistent ones held by the agents. Money is vital 
to coordination since it is the generative mechanism that shapes market interrelations, affecting the 
structure of  knowledge and markets. Coordination consequently is a conditioned emergent property of  the 
workings of  money and its institutions over society and over the manner in which individuals can relate 
(Howitt and Clower, 2000). In sum, money becomes the only socio-relational foundation for the social 
intelligence and epistemic complexity seen in markets and the basis for the semiotic function of  prices 
as signals of  complex ‘higher order’ phenomena. Commercial societies unintentionally attain a new and 
wealth-enhancing form of  social freedom and enhancement of  our epistemic abilities beyond the narrow 
possibilities we had prior to the use of  money as a system of  social relations.  
 
Scholars in the social sciences, particularly sociologists and economists, must study seriously the 
ontological and complex ways in which money may play an emergent role and extend coordination and 
our social and epistemic associations beyond the realm of  power issues and communication. This 
proposed view differs radically from neoclassical economics, which ‘distil[s] the economy from society 
and culture’ (Gilbert, 2005, 357). Instead, complexity theory and systems theory are required to 
understand ‘money’s embeddedness in social relations’ and its higher-order and emergent social 
implications (ibid., 357; see also Lewis and Wagner, 2017). Institutions such as money might restrain 
freedom and our range of  action. But paradoxically they also free us from our own individual cognitive 
limitations, enabling a new kind of  social and intellectual-cooperative freedom and rationality to 
develop—what Polanyi (1951) denominated ‘public liberty’. It is a unique social liberty that, when 
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exercised through money, contributes to the formation of  distinctive wealth-enhancing higher-level social 
orders and therefore is far from an insignificant neutral symbolic veil.  
 
Given that throughout part I of  this thesis, money as a system of  social relations has been presented to 
be a fundamental aspect of  the formation and dissemination of  economic knowledge (chapter 2) and in 
the generation of  macroeconomic complexity (chapter 1), we need to move further our analytical focus 
toward the monetary-institutional structures—or the monetary-institutional frameworks—that actually 
‘control’ or ‘guide’ the money supply in the economy (Smithin, 2004). Simply put, once it has been 
acknowledged that money, as a medium of  relations, matters severely in the formation of  economic 
complexity and in the generation of  economic rationality—and that these are also fundamental features 
to sustain the coordination processes of  markets (Hayek, 1948 [1945])—henceforward we have to 
subsequently emphasize, analytically, the crucial role of  the monetary and banking institutions (such as 
central banks) that actually produce that fundamental medium of  social relations that engenders economic 
complexity.   
 
As the title of  part I suggests (‘The Monetary-Institutional Foundations of  Complexity and Social 
Knowledge’), chapters 1 and 2 have argued that the most important elements needed to generate 
economic complexity, knowledge, and emergent macroeconomic phenomena are, first, the orderly and 
monetary systems of  relations among the parts (the use of  money in society) and, second, their associated 
systems of  rules (the monetary institutions) that define those orderly monetary relations. As I have 
suggested throughout part I, the fact that the medium of  relations and forms of  interaction matter 
severely in generating organized complexity (see chapter 1, section 1.2) implies also that the rules and 
institutions (the generator dynamics)—which affect the production, and define the specific uses and 
forms of, those particular media of  relations—matter crucially as well (Colander and Kupers, 2014; see 
also chapter 1). Consequently, and following those implications, monetary and banking institutions, such 
as central banks, will become the core focus of  analysis in the following chapters.    
 
Part I has argued that both the use of  money in society and its associated banking institutions are the 
two crucial elements that generate emergent macroeconomic complexity and its irreducible higher-order 
properties, as explored in depth in chapter 1. Accordingly, and as the quote from Lewis and Wagner (2017) 
that opens part I also suggests, the inexorable existence of  organized complexity and of  emergent 
properties within macroeconomics (as argued in chapter 1) indicates that there is a novel, and thus-far 
largely unexplored—complexity-based and distinctive political-economic subject matter for 
macroeconomic research. And thus there is a potentially necessary and intellectually valuable, yet mostly 
unexplored, subdiscipline within macroeconomic analysis that requires a deep and scientific, but 
potentially nonformalist, shift of  focus toward monetary relations, emergence, monetary institutions, and 
such institutions’ comparative institutional properties (Lewis and Wagner, 2017; Wagner, 2012).  
 
Indeed, as the preface and chapter 1 also suggested, the existence of  both emergent properties and the 
core features that define organized complexity in macroeconomic reality strongly suggest that there is an 
entire subdiscipline and research agenda in macroeconomics that cannot possibly be—neither analytically 
nor methodologically—disassociated from political economy, institutional analysis, and a comparative 
institutional exploration of  their properties. Such a novel and institutional research agenda, as delineated 
here, will be the main focus of  attention in the following parts of  this work.      
 
Lastly, part I of  this work concludes by recognizing that the foundations of  macroeconomic complexity 
and economic knowledge ultimately reside in both orderly social (monetary) relations and specific 
banking institutions that define those relations. More specifically for the scope of  this thesis, they reside 
in both money as a system of  relations and the associated monetary institutions that provide, and produce, 
such a pecuniary medium of  relations. The crucial research implication of  these conclusions for 
macroeconomic theory, and also for the remaining four chapters, is that ‘the central focus of  macro-
theory’ naturally becomes ‘the institutions in virtue of  which the things conventionally regarded as 
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macroeconomic phenomena exist’ (Lewis and Wagner, 2017, 13). Consequently, and following this 
research implication, part II and part III will explore and analyze the specific, and most important, 
banking institutions and monetary frameworks that deeply affect and guide the production and use of  
money in society. Hence particular attention will naturally rest upon central banks and their institutional 
properties.    
 
Undoubtedly, the above research implications for macroeconomics concerning institutional analysis 
necessary imply and require subsequently focusing on: the crucial role of  central banks within the 
production of  money, their politically entangled evolutionary developments, and their institutional 
justifications (see chapters 3 and 4), and lastly on their institutional properties (or robustness) as 
compared to other institutional banking alternatives (see specifically chapters 5 and 6). Henceforward, 
part II, comprising chapters 3 and 4, will focus on the institutional rationale, crucial role, and institutional 
evolution of  central banks within economic systems. Finally, part III, comprising chapters 5 and 6, will 
focus on the institutional properties (robustness) of  central banks compared to non-monocentric 
alternatives such as free banking and NGDP targeting.   
  
Accordingly, and building on part I, the following four remaining chapters of  this work will concentrate 
specifically on monetary-institutional analysis. They will focus on identifying and scrutinizing the 
associated monetary systems of  rules and banking institutions that could be in place in order to generate 
an orderly system of  monetary relations and thus a stable and wealth-enhancing macroeconomic order. 
Consequently, since nowadays central banks are the single most important institutional feature within 
banking orders, part II will concentrate on scrutinizing both the institutional properties and the 
institutional and economic rationale behind the establishment and politically entangled evolution of  


















The Institutional Rationale and Entangled  




‘I shall have failed in my purpose if I have not proved that the system of entrusting all our 
reserve to a single board, like that of the Bank directors, is very anomalous; that it is very 
dangerous; that its bad consequences, though much felt, have not been fully seen; that 
they have been obscured by traditional arguments and hidden in the dust of ancient 
controversies. . . . What would be better? . . . We are so accustomed to a system of banking, 
dependent for its cardinal function on a single bank, that we can hardly conceive of any 
other. But the natural system—that which would have sprung up if Government had let 
banking alone—is that of many banks of equal or not altogether unequal size. In all other 
trades competition brings the traders to a rough approximate equality. . . . There is no 
tendency to a monarchy in the cotton world; nor, where banking has been left free, is 
there any tendency to a monarchy in banking either’. 
 





















‘In the present century centralised banking systems have come to be regarded as the 
usual concomitant, if not one of the conditions of the attainment of an advanced 
stage of economic development. The belief in the desirability of central bank 
organisation is universal. . . . There is, however, a noticeable lack of any systematic 
examination of the bases of the alleged superiority of centralised banking over its 
alternative. . . . Very little attention has been paid in modern economic literature to 
the consideration of the rationale of the particular system of banking that we have 
succeeded in evolving, in the light of the progress that has been made in economic 
science since the time when the problem was in the forefront of discussion’. 




Recent experiences with business cycles, such as the 2007–8 Great Recession, have led some economists 
to put central banking arrangements under institutional scrutiny (Boettke and Smith, 2013; 2015; Hetzel, 
2012). These concerns come largely from the Great Recession and the plausible negative role that central 
banks might have played in it (Beckworth, 2012b; Hetzel, 2012; Sumner, 2012). Nevertheless, despite 
these postcrisis apprehensions, most academics and policy makers have remarkably continued to view 
central banking as a relatively efficient and adequate, perhaps even fundamental, institutional arrangement 
(Bullard, 2010; Goodhart, 2010; Hetzel, 2012).  
 
By utilizing Goodhart’s (1988) The Evolution of Central Banks as a theoretical motivation to start researching 
monetary institutions, chapters 3 and 4—which constitute part II—examine both the theoretical 
arguments and the historical evidence that are generally used in the banking literature to sustain the case 
for the ‘natural emergence’ of central banks as intrinsic and vital institutional solutions to banking 
challenges and information asymmetries (Paniagua, 2019b). Particularly, this chapter criticizes Goodhart’s 
theoretical and historical claims that central banks must evolve naturally. I do so by showing that they 
are far from being institutionally and uniquely capable of supplying essential banking services and 
regulation. This chapter also reviews some relevant historical evidence showing that Goodhart’s (1988) 
historical generalizations are inconsistent also with the development of the vast majority of the earlier 
proto–central banks established in Europe and later in the rest of the world.   
 
Despite the Great Recession and the negative role that central banks might have played in it, most 
economists continue to regard central banks as the best of  all possible means for managing the supply 
of  money and our banking affairs (Bullard, 2010; Giannini, 2011; Goodhart, 2010). However, this general 
consensus on the institutional need for, and institutional optimality of, central banks does not rest upon 
a careful institutional analysis and comprehension of  the actual evolution of  them (Selgin, 2017). 
Moreover, this consensus does not rest upon a careful comparison of  central banks’ performances with 
other arrangements (Salter, 2017a). Indeed, ‘the surprising truth is that most economists, including most 
champions of  the monetary status quo . . . are only vaguely familiar with alternative arrangements, 
assuming that they are aware of  them at all’ (Selgin, 2017, ix).  
 
53 A modified version of  this chapter was published in Constitutional Political Economy (Paniagua, 2017).   
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Undeniably, this institutional and superficial consensus about the inherent need for central banks seems 
to rest upon a mere leap of  faith, rather than a careful institutional and historical analysis of  central banks 
and non-monocentric alternatives (Paniagua, 2019b; Schwartz, 1993). Hence chapters 3 and 4 will 
concentrate on challenging this general, yet superficial, consensus on central banks, by focusing on 
institutional analysis and the institutional and historical evolution of  central banks and by focusing 
subsequently also on a careful scrutiny of  central banks’ institutional and political-economic properties 
compared with those of  non-monocentric arrangements (on this last issue see chapters 5 and 6 
respectively).         
 
Given the institutional consensus and apprehensions, I focus on a complementary question related to the 
institutional resilience and critical assessment of  central banks. Whereas recent banking research has 
largely focused on specific monetary-policy errors or looked to improve central banks’ decision-making 
processes (Hetzel, 2012; Sumner, 2012), I ask here unaddressed yet more fundamental research questions: 
Are central banks inherently necessary in the first place? And furthermore, are they necessarily the result 
of  the banking system’s natural institutional evolution? 54  The postcrisis literature lacks a specific 
articulation of  institutional arguments that could largely justify the necessity and evolution of  a non-
profit-seeking, government-managed institution to oversee banking stability and regulation (Paniagua, 
2019b). The contemporary postcrisis arguments for expanding central banks’ supervision and 
macroprudential-regulatory control (Goodhart, 2010) implicitly rely on a lack of  profound scrutiny 
concerning (a) central banks’ genuine institutional necessity in the banking system and (b) the actual 
historical evolution of  their roles and how they have developed according to political forces outside the 
needs of  the banking systems in order to function properly (Calomiris and Haber, 2014). 
  
Furthermore, the contemporary banking literature not only has argued for the comparative superiority 
of  central banks, but has gone as far as to argue for their inherent institutional rationale, their unavoidable 
institutional necessity in a banking system, and ultimately their natural and inherent institutional evolution 
(Congdon 1981; Goodhart, 1987, 1988, 2010). Such institutional necessity, as the banking literature argues, 
stems from the preceding ‘institutional vacuum’ and the severe banking problems that preceded central 
banks and persisted within the banking system (Schwartz, 1993). Hence, the banking literature suggests 
that central banks have evolved naturally as an endogenous and institutional response by commercial 
banks to previously unmet banking challenges and informational asymmetries (Broz, 1998; Giannini, 
2011; Goodhart, 1987).  
 
Importantly, if  the above arguments are accurate, then there is little scope for engaging in comparative 
institutional analysis of  more radical and non-monocentric alternatives (see part III of  this work). This 
is because if  central banks are the natural, evolutionary, and institutionally rational response of  the 
banking arrangements to severe banking challenges, then there is little space for proposing drastic 
institutional changes to them. This implicitly suggests that central banks, given their natural emergence 
from private banking orders, are therefore institutionally optimal or at the very least institutionally 
desirable. Otherwise, the argument goes, it is highly unlikely that they would have evolved endogenously 
and as naturally as they did from commercial and private banking (Congdon, 1981; Giannini, 2011; 
Goodhart, 1987, 1988). These are strong prima facie arguments favoring the institutional status quo of  
central banks that could potentially question, and undermine the arguments for, radical institutional 
arrangements that drastically seek to modify, or even eradicate, central banks. Hence given this rather 
 
54 I define central banks as systems in which a single banking entity has either a complete or residuary monopoly over the 
service of  issuing notes. In contrast, the complete absence of  governmental restrictions on entry and competition in note 
issuance and banking leads to a free-banking system. It is sensible to distinguish between the modern conception of  central 
banks and their broader roles with proto–central banks that previously had banking privileges without any clear stability role 
(Dowd, 1993, chapter 11; Meltzer, 2009). Proto–central banks reluctantly adopted clearer stability roles slowly and only in the 
late nineteenth century; this occurred following intense public debate on their need to acknowledge lender-of-last-resort 
responsibilities as palliatives to the already-existent problem of  the monopoly over issuing notes (Selgin, 1988, 119–122; 
Thornton, 1978 [1802]). Hence theories that treat monopoly privileges as an evolutionary consequence of  supervisory and 
regulatory responsibilities distort actual historical sequences. 
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superficial consensus about the natural evolution of  central banks, part II will focus on scrutinizing those 
prima facie arguments in order to challenge macroeconomists’ general consensus on the inherent need 
for, and natural evolution of, central banking.       
  
Hence contrary to the aforementioned claims, in part II I argue for a broader institutional rationale for, 
and for the possibility of  adopting, heterogeneous, adaptive, and more diverse institutional structures 
that can overcome severe banking challenges without necessarily centralizing the monetary system in a 
single structure, such as a central bank (see also Paniagua, 2019b). Goodhart’s (1988) narrow institutional 
arguments in favor of  establishing central banks are shown in this chapter to be actually broader 
arguments in favor of  encouraging broad institutional diversity and polycentricity in banking, much 
aligned with the Ostromian paradigm of  institutional diversity and self-governance (E. Ostrom, 2005, 
2010).  
 
Thus chapters 3 and 4 provide theoretical and historical arguments in favor of  a broader type of  banking 
institutional diversity, much in line with the Ostromian paradigm of  polycentric-contestable institutional 
structures in banking (Paniagua, 2019b; Salter and Tarko, 2018). These chapters then argue, contra 
Goodhart and others (see Congdon, 1981 and Giannini, 2011), that there is not a general and inherent 
theoretical justification for adopting central banks as a single one-size-fits-all institutional solution to 
severe banking challenges. Indeed, I argue for the need of  institutional diversity and polycentricity in 
banking in order to promote sustainable banking stability (see also Paniagua, 2019b).    
 
Furthermore, the banking history briefly reviewed here additionally shows that crucial banking services 
and financial regulation have tended to be successfully provided by polycentric and decentralized 
means—except when governments prevented or hindered their development (Bagehot, 1873; 
Goodspeed, 2016; see sections 3.1 and 3.2). This brief historical analysis, and the exploration in this 
chapter of key historical evidence concerning institutional evolution within banking, will be further 
developed in chapter 4.55 Finally, chapter 3 considers whether central banks, if not essential, are at least 
preferable to polycentric and cooperative arrangements such as contestable clearinghouses. This chapter 
then also conducts a brief exercise in comparative institutional analysis (see section 3.3) to compare the 
relative institutional robustness of central banking and a polycentric system of contestable clearinghouses. 
This exercise will be further developed and extended to the realms of monetary policy and monetary-
policy rules throughout chapters 5 and 6 (see also Salter, 2017a).    
 
Consequently, the purpose of  this chapter is twofold. First, it scrutinizes Goodhart’s (1988) institutional 
rationale for the emergence of  central banks as the natural and intrinsic outcome of  banking systems’ 
regular processes of  economies of  reserve holding (economies of scale in reserve holding, see sections 
3.1 and 3.2); second, it pursues a comparative institutional analysis of  contestable clearinghouses and 
central banking (section 3.3). Since Congdon’s (1981) and Goodhart’s (1988) arguments rest on both 
history and theory, it is imperative to address them separately. The historical evidence shows that 
Goodhart’s evolutionary generalizations are inconsistent with the historical developments of  the vast 
majority of  proto–central banks (see section 3.1). History shows that central banks were established not 
because of a natural banking evolution, but instead because of  fiscal forces, international political 
pressure, and government sovereignty (Marcussen, 2005; see also chapter 4).  
 
Similarly, theoretical considerations suggest that Goodhart’s (1987, 1988) narrow rationale for the natural 
emergence of  central banks is misplaced. In fact, arguments from club theory and E. Ostrom’s (1990, 
 
55 As key historical evidence of  these institutional and evolutionary arguments, part II—particularly chapter 4—explores in 
depth the paradigmatic historical case of  the institutional evolution of  the Bank of  England in order to show that central 
banks’ apparent natural institutional evolution can more coherently be described, in general terms, by political processes and 
economic-political bargains between interest groups and the sovereign. These politically entangled processes are, for instance, 
political bank bargains and political entanglement dynamics in which some proto–private commercial banks acquire political, 
nonmarket, and uncompetitive characteristics over time, in exchange for credit and banking benefits for the sovereign. See 
more details of  these political and economic institutional processes and banking evolution in chapter 4.  
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2010) insights on institutional diversity and self-governance sustain arguments for a wide spectrum of  non-
monocentric institutional possibilities and institutional creativity perfectly capable also of  supplying 
crucial banking services and banking self-governance (see section 3.2; Paniagua, 2019b). Moreover, by 
borrowing from Buchanan’s contributions to constitutional political economy and the theory of  clubs 
(Buchanan, 1964, 1965, 2008, 2010), I examine the institutional evolution of  banking systems to see 
whether their properties can justify the natural centralization of  reserves in a single nonprofit bankers’ 
bank or whether instead they justify a wider set of  institutional responses. Contrary to Goodhart and 
others, E. Ostrom’s work on self-governance and Buchanan’s club theory suggest that the institutional 
evolution of  banking does not necessarily lead to a single bankers’ bank nor to monocentric solutions to 
crucial banking challenges.  
 
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.1 examines the core ‘micro (regulatory) functions’ undertaken 
by central banks and proposed by Goodhart (1987, 1988), and it examines some relevant historical 
developments in both central banks and bankers’ banks that could challenge his historical generalizations. 
Particularly, the first section analyzes three crucial historical banking cases and considers evidence 
concerning the political development and diffusion of  earlier, proto–central banks in Europe and later 
in the rest of  the world. This historical analysis, undertaken throughout section 3.1, will be further 
developed in the following chapter, with a particular focus on the Bank of  England. Section 3.2 explores 
Goodhart’s (1988) theoretical arguments concerning the inherent need for central banks and also explores 
the theoretical and historical aspects in favor of  different institutional developments and the evolution 
of  heterogeneous institutional banking alternatives conditioned by the legal framework.   
 
Later in this chapter, section 3.3 undertakes a brief  comparative institutional analysis of  contestable, non-
monocentric clearinghouses (or banking clubs) and central banking. This is to see whether central banks, 
if  not essential, can still be justified and preferred when compared with possible decentralized 
alternatives.56 Central banks may not be the natural result of  the institutional evolution of  banking—as 
argued in sections 3.1 and 3.2—but comparatively speaking they could still be superior to non-
monocentric institutional alternatives. For this comparative analysis, section 3.3 draws on E. Ostrom’s 
work on self-governance and Buchanan’s club theory to see whether alternative forms of  clearinghouses 
or club arrangements might prove more resilient institutionally than central banks in providing the crucial 
micro-regulatory functions.57 Section 3.4 concludes.  
 
3.1 A Historical Account of  Centralization of  Reserves  
 
Although economists more frequently talk about the monetary-policy aspects of  central banks, it is often 
noted that they could be justifiable or even necessary instead because they could generate additional 
confidence in the banking system in times of  crisis. Central banks could accomplish this by providing 
liquidity, leadership, regulation, and surveillance of  the banking members (Goodhart, 1988, 44–47). 
Goodhart acknowledges that while the monetary-policy roles of  central banks have changed drastically 
through time, there are some functions that have remained unaltered. These roles include ensuring 
financial stability, supervising banks, and mitigating banking crises through regulation and liquidity. 
Goodhart defines these roles as ‘micro functions’ of  central banking.58 He maintains that ‘the monetary 
(macro) functions of  Central Banks were largely grafted onto the supervisory functions, and not the 
reverse . . .[this] implies that the central core and rationale for the existence and operation of  a Central 
Bank is not necessarily to be found in its macro-economic role’ (Goodhart, 1988, 7).  
 
56 Clearinghouses are voluntary associations with the main functions of  clearing notes, drafts, checks, and bills of  exchange 
and regulating the club members (Goodhart, 1988, chapter 3). These services are only accessible to club members. See also 
Paniagua (2019b), Timberlake (1984, 2014) and Trivoli (1979).  
57 For contributions to club theory and institutional self-governance, see Buchanan (1965), Ostrom (1990, 2000, 2010) and 
Tiebout (1956).  
58 I use Goodhart’s (1988) ‘micro functions’ concept throughout the rest of  this work to refer to a bundle of  banking services 
related to financial and banking supervision, bank regulation, and the role of  lender of  last resort (see also Paniagua, 2019b). 
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Consequently, Goodhart (1987, 1988) believes that the core justification of  central banking rests on these 
micro (regulatory) functions, consisting of  providing a central and efficient source of  reserves and 
liquidity to banks and therefore proper insurance and constant monitoring and regulation of  them. He 
ultimately establishes that these micro functions justify the institutional evolution of  central banks since 
these functions arise naturally as the consequence of  a gradual centralization of  reserves into the control 
of  a single entity in the whole banking system (Goodhart, 1988). The tendency for such a concentration 
of  reserves (economies of scale in reserve holding) puts the entity that receives the banks’ reserves in the 
unintended (and fragile) position of  being a for-profit ‘bankers’ bank’; in addition to competing with 
other banks, a bankers’ bank must also serve as the ultimate source of  liquidity and support for banking 
competitors. Thereafter, in order to perform that ‘liquidity support’ role, it also must assume 
complementary supervisory, monitoring, and regulatory functions (Goodhart, 1988, 7–8). 
 
This natural process of  concentrating reserves into a single competitive bank is the foundation of  
Goodhart’s justification for a noncompetitive central bank and hence its rationale (Goodhart, 1988, 5, 34, 
37, 73; Selgin, 1993). Subsequently, Goodhart seeks to further support his thesis on historical grounds; 
he analyzes mainly two historical episodes from which he subsequently generalizes his institutional 
conclusions. He reviews the evolution of  the Bank of  England and the Suffolk experience, episodes I 
review in subsections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3, respectively. Goodhart’s core assumption concerning how the 
institutional process of  concentration of  reserves causes the micro functions to arise rests on his claim 
that the natural competitive banking forces inevitably lead to the concentration of  ‘bank balances among a 
few, central, well-established commercial banks, in some cases one or two banks’ (Goodhart, 1988, 34). 
This allows those special bankers’ banks to become the systems’ main holders of  reserves and the 
ultimate source of  liquidity to the rest of  the system. 
 
From their unique role as the ultimate liquidity providers and holders of  reserves, they necessarily have 
to develop supervisory and regulatory functions over other banks. Consequently, the natural 
concentration of  reserves of  the entire system into a single for-profit bank worsens bank runs and 
liquidity issues. This is due to the contradiction of  those banking institutions: being the bankers’ bank 
while simultaneously being a for-profit competitive entity. The contradiction and the strong for-profit 
motive lead bankers’ banks to mishandle crises and act inconsistently with the public interest (Bagehot, 
1873). Such banking behavior stems from trying to profit from and leverage their preferred position to 
overload other competitive banks with unnecessary regulation or even potentially use discretion to make 
them fail in case of  liquidity constraints (Bagehot, 1873; Goodhart, 1988, 38–39).  
 
The institutional progression then has to conclude with the natural creation of  a central bank to establish 
a nonprofit structure. The nonprofit nature of  the central bank enables it to escape the fear of  draining 
reserves and thereby losing profitability (since it is not among its public functions) and therefore able to 
fully address the public interest (the core micro function) with strong leadership (Goodhart, 1988, 45–
46). In sum, Goodhart’s rationale for central banks rests on two elements: first, their natural institutional 
role as a major (or the only) accumulator of  reserves; second, their ability to monitor, regulate, and 
provide liquidity (the micro functions) while escaping any conflicts of  interest (Goodhart, 1988, 37–39, 
53–55). Concerning the following historical evidence that could support or refute the aforementioned 
thesis, the fundamental question I address is whether centralized institutions have indeed evolved 
throughout history as Goodhart suggests.  
 
3.1.1 The diffusion of  central banks  
 
Goodhart’s (1988) historical arguments rest mainly on his interpretation of  the development of  the Bank 
of  England and the Suffolk system (cases I later review). However, it is never prudent to draw generalized 
institutional conclusions based on such a narrow set of  historical experiences. Goodhart’s historical 
conclusions, supported by merely two cases, seem to be hasty and unsubstantiated. After all, the history 
of  the establishment of  central banks is a matter of  a much wider historical record (Singleton, 2011). 
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There is considerable historical evidence that challenges Goodhart’s historical proposition, supporting 
instead a broader fiscal- and political-origins interpretation.  
 
Concerning the proto–central banks (see footnote 32) established in Europe before the twentieth century, 
Smith (1990 [1936]) provides historical evidence that proto–central banks around Europe were 
established because of  governments’ financial and fiscal considerations. Proto–central banks originated 
in the necessity of  sovereigns to have access to better terms for their long-term financing efforts, to raise 
money for their governments, and to have expedient access to credit on demand (Broz, 1998, 234–236). 
They were specifically established as a type of  banker for the government with the objectives to become 
exclusive managers and fiscal agents with respect to governments’ debt and to provide institutional 
solutions to improve governments’ damaged creditworthiness (Broz, 1998). Their establishment 
consisted of  political-economic relationships in which those banks benefited from unique legal and 
banking privileges; their role also involved financial activities to improve states’ ability to borrow in order 
to further their international objectives, specifically those related to military competition and colonization 
(Calomiris and Haber, 2014).  
 
According to Broz (1998) and Glasner (1989, chapter 2), national defense and war uncertainty largely 
contributed to the establishment of  earlier proto–central banks and to the ever-increasing control of  
monarchs over coinage. Proto–central banks were conceived as state-led institutional answers to improve 
governments’ abilities to borrow and to quickly mobilize resources during wartime (Broz, 1998, 236–239; 
Calomiris and Haber, 2014). Unpredictable war-financing distress led sovereigns to gradually expand their 
control over both coinage and the banking system as expedient and cost-effective ways to obtain revenue 
during unforeseen emergencies (Glasner, 1989, 29–32).  
 
Selgin and White (1999) also show that the organization of  money production evolves institutionally as 
an unintended product of  the gradual accumulation of  tax- and revenue-enhancing innovations by 
sovereigns attempting to maximize government revenue. Governments in fact have not consciously 
designed monetary arrangements from scratch in order to attain fiscal ends. Nevertheless, their 
circumstantial fiscal needs and the ‘gradual accretion of  revenue-enhancing changes’ in the banking 
system through time have severely and unintendedly shaped them (Selgin and White, 1999, 164). Fiscal 
motivations to provide themselves with seigniorage and recurrent favorable terms in credit financing have 
led governments to control the supply of  currency. Thus ‘revenue-seeking governments have 
opportunistically modified private-market arrangements as these developed’ (Selgin and White, 1999, 
155). Thus national security and fiscal forces, not natural reserve dynamics, have severely shaped the 
institutions of  money and their structures toward revenue- and seigniorage-enhancing institutions such 
as monopoly banks of  issue (central banks).  
 
Additional historical examples that provide evidence contrary to Goodhart’s natural-evolutionary 
arguments concern the unusual and sudden increase in the establishment of  central banks throughout 
the twentieth century. The total number of  central banks grew exponentially from 19 in 1900 to 174 by 
2000 (Marcussen, 2005; Singleton, 2011). Interestingly, the sudden growth over the century took place in 
waves or successive specific periods of  large increases in establishments. Their growth reflected 
consecutive but different patterns of  international diffusion rather than an endogenous natural banking 
evolution (Marcussen, 2005). After World War I, the majority of  the newly established central banks were 
founded as part of  successive institutional ‘waves’ that answered to different ‘diffusion mechanisms’ 
frequently related to international politics and government sovereignty (Clay, 1957; Sayers, 1976). Thus 
the establishment of  central banks responded to the role of  ideas, nationalistic ambitions, and 
international political pressure as major drivers of  their international growth (Jácome, 2015; Marcussen, 
2005). These different mechanisms of  diffusion that explain the establishment of  central banks are 
historical facts at odds with Goodhart’s natural historical claims.   
 
For example, by the end of  World War I, there were twenty-five central banks (Marcussen, 2005). After 
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the war, active international coordinative efforts were led by Montague Norman and Benjamin Strong 
and consolidated at the Brussels and Genoa Conferences; the number of  central banks increased 
substantially to forty (Clay, 1957; Jácome, 2015). During the 1920s, cooperation between Norman and 
Strong helped financial and monetary reconstruction around Europe (Einzig, 1932). Norman and Strong, 
true believers in international postwar cooperation guided by central banks (Clay, 1957), framed their 
international-cooperation program early in the 1920 League of  Nations meeting. There, ‘with a 
remarkably broad consensus it was agreed to call for every country to have a central bank’ (Marcussen, 
2005, 912). Because of  this campaign and the international difficulties with reconstructing the gold 
standard, governments were convinced to establish new central banks and to join the international 
collaboration to build a postwar monetary order (Einzig, 1932; Singleton, 2011).  
 
Similar dynamics also occurred in Latin America and in the British Dominions during the interwar period 
(Jácome, 2015; Sayers, 1976). These international dynamics could hardly be considered a natural 
institutional development inherent to banking. Of  today’s central banks, twenty-one were established 
during these interwar political international efforts (Marcussen, 2005). This suggests that central banks’ 
international experiences throughout the twentieth century responded to diverse motives such as 
international politics and the role of  ideas (Clay, 1957; Sayers, 1976).  
 
The above is further supported by the unusual growth of  newly established central banks during the 
postcolonial wave in which their numbers increased by 75 percent in response to new sovereignty needs 
to project ‘a sign of  statehood’ by former colonies gaining political independence (Marcussen, 2005, 914–
915). These diverse mechanisms for the diffusion of  central banks cannot be said to respond to 
endogenous and natural dynamics inherent in banking. The fact that central banks were established to 
respond to different political and nationalistic diffusion mechanisms is crucial historical evidence 
demonstrating that Goodhart’s (1988) claims are inconsistent with how the vast majority of  central banks 
actually developed.  
 
3.1.2 The Bank of  England  
 
Goodhart’s (1988) historical generalizations in his evolutionary account of  central banks seem 
unwarranted, at least when considering the wider trends of  their establishment. In addition, the two 
relevant and specific cases he reviews in The Evolution of  Central Banks can be used to contest his historical 
claims. While I grant Goodhart’s argument true concerning the natural tendency toward the 
concentration of  reserves in banking or real economies of scale in reserve holding (see also Selgin, 1993), 
it does not logically entail an almost-complete concentration of  reserves in one competitive bank. The 
tendency toward a severe and unique concentration can only be understood once we fully acknowledge 
the legal-regulatory and market framework in which those banks make their choices and to which they 
adapt their institutions accordingly. Monopoly powers and legal restrictions in banking severely guide the 
institutional evolution from a decentralized banking system (in which banks hold their own reserves) 
toward a centralized and monocentric system (Bagehot, 1783; Selgin, 2010). 
  
As Bagehot (1873) recognized, the evolution of  the Bank of  England is a crucial historical example in 
which this tendency exists in the context of  growing banking privileges and legislation.59 After the 
establishment of  the Bank in 1694, it received several special legal privileges and monopoly powers at 
the time of  each renewal of  its bank charter (Broz, 1998; Smith, 1990 [1936]). Those early privileges were 
a monopoly on keeping government balances, a monopoly on chartered banking, and an exclusive 
 
59 This historical example of  political entanglement and institutional evolution will be further explored in the following chapter. 
Given the Bank of  England’s institutional and historical importance, and given the use of  its history and establishment as a 
main institutional justification for central banks throughout the banking literature (Goodhart, 1988), similar to Bagehot (1873) 
I consider that this specific case requires a chapter of  its own in order to further clarify some important historical claims. Thus 
see more details of  this historical case in the following chapter.    
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limited-liability status (this last privilege lasted one and a half  centuries), among others.60 Subsequently in 
1708 the Bank’s charter was renewed. The bank Act specified that ‘no firms of  more than six partners 
might issue notes payable at demand or at any time less than six months’ (Smith, 1990 [1936], 13). This 
effectively excluded joint-stock firms from the business of  issuing notes and hence from the banking 
business, establishing a monopoly over joint-stock notes issue that lasted till 1826 (Broz, 1998; Selgin, 
1988, 6). Through time, the legal restrictions and privileges changed according to the bargaining powers 
of  the government and the Bank (Broz, 1998).61  
 
More importantly for the concentration of  reserves, the Bank’s monopoly over London’s note-issuance 
business remained unaltered for an extensive period (Broz, 1998; Calomiris and Haber, 2014, 85). 
Regarding the dynamics of  concentration of  the reserves of  the banks in England, the key factor was 
then precisely the fact that, in practice, the Bank had a statutory monopoly of  note issue in the greater 
London area. This compelled other banks to treat its notes, and therefore its deposit liabilities, as cash 
reserves, superior to gold itself. Because of  the Bank’s London monopoly, other London banks had to 
rely on their reserves of  Bank notes to meet depositors’ currency requirements (Selgin, 1988, 119). 
London banks were not allowed to meet the public’s changes in their relative demand for currency.  
 
This compelled them to rely on Bank of  England notes to meet increases in the demand for currency, 
leading the Bank’s notes to unintendedly occupy a privileged position in banks’ portfolios. Thus ‘the 
extraordinary demand for currency in London could only result in an extraordinary demand for Bank of  
England notes’ (Selgin, 1988, 120; see also Thornton, 1978 [1802]). The Bank’s monopolist note-issuing 
position compelled other banks to use the Bank of  England’s notes as their cash reserves and to keep 
balances and gold reserves with it, which caused the English system’s reserves to gradually, but persistently, 
concentrate (Broz, 1998).  
 
The incentives to concentrate reserves in the Bank of  England were further exacerbated when English 
banks had the certainty (given by law or judicial precedents) that the special bank holding their reserves 
would under all circumstances be able to give out those reserves in a medium that would be accepted by 
the public at all times. This is exactly the case with a bankers’ bank whose notes are (or become) legal 
tender or that has suspended payment on its notes (Smith, 1990 [1936]).62 Banks further had the incentive 
to choose to concentrate their reserves in a competitor bankers’ bank since it was to their economic 
benefit to do so, given the Bank of  England’s unique monopolist and political status and given the 
exclusive (de facto) legal status of  its notes (Bagehot, 1873; Broz, 1998).  
 
With a centralized institution as the sole supplier of  currency in London that was able to secure and to 
provide the reserve medium—since it had the monopoly powers to do so—it was perfectly natural (given 
banks’ limitations on issuing notes) for a banking system to concentrate cash reserves and gold reserves 
in that single entity (Dowd, 1993). This, however, follows from the prior existence of  the monopoly of  
note issue, the legal powers granted by the government, and the subsequent legal precedents on the 
suspension of  payments of  the Bank’s notes, which further altered and exacerbated the institutional 
dynamics of  the concentration of  reserves.  
The concentration of  bank reserves was therefore guided mainly by the Bank’s monopoly of  note issue 
and later reinforced by legal precedents that ensured that the Bank and its notes were supported politically 
 
60 For a review of  the Bank’s evolution of  its privileges and charters, see Broz (1998). See also chapter 4, and the literature 
cited therein.  
61 The evolution of  the Bank responded to England’s war efforts rather than natural banking developments. The government 
reacted to spikes in military spending by renegotiating charter renewals. Since negotiations were within the context of  war 
pressures, they tended to secure increasing monopoly powers to the Bank, leading to an unnatural central position in England 
(Broz, 1998). 
62 In 1797 an act of  Parliament allowed the suspension of  payment of  Bank notes, legalizing the capacity of  bankruptcy of  
the Bank. This created a crucial legal precedent in which competitive banks started to expect the government to act in this 
way, giving a special status to Bank notes. This was further reinforced when the government declared them explicit legal tender 
(Dowd, 1993). 
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and by law. These privileges and legislations guaranteed that its notes would be accepted in the country, 
changing the incentives of  the competitor commercial banks to seek Bank notes to back their own notes. 
The suspension period between 1797 and 1811 further contributed to enhancing the political status of  
the Bank’s notes (Dowd, 1993). Additionally, in 1833 the government declared Bank of  England notes 
legal tender for all payments, with severe additional institutional implications, since ‘country banks began 
to look on them [Bank notes] as backing their own note issues’ (Smith, 1990 [1936], 16).  
 
Essentially, the legal tender status of  Bank of  England notes had additional institutional implications for 
the concentration of  reserves; but it was mainly by reinforcing the ‘centripetal forces’ and tendencies already 
present because of  the initial unusual situation in which the Bank had a monopoly of  note issue. By the 
time the legal tender status of  the Bank’s notes was established, the treatment of  its balances and notes 
as cash reserves was already established as a result of  its monopoly of  London circulation (Selgin, 1988, 
6). Nevertheless, the government’s credible commitment to ensuring that Bank notes would always be 
accepted as legal payments because of  their inconvertibility and legal tender status further assured other 
commercial banks of  the superior status of  Bank of  England notes. Thus these unique legal precedents 
and the Bank’s monopoly of  note issue generated a sort of  Gresham’s-law effect in the English system 
in which individual banks concentrated gold and cash reserves and started using Bank of  England notes 
as their reserves instead (Dowd, 1993).  
 
This unusual process of  drastically concentrating reserves stands opposite to what would happen under 
an institutional arrangement in which no bank is given monopoly status over note issuance and its notes 
made quasi–legal tender (Selgin, 1988). As Bagehot (1873) noticed, this concentration of  reserves is not 
the natural outcome of  all banking systems, but was in this case rather the logical conclusion of  a gradual 
accumulation of  special economic and political powers given to the Bank of  England (see also Smith 
1990 [1936]). The monopoly powers and legal precedents aforementioned radically shaped the framework 
and incentives that other commercial banks faced, compelling them to prefer Bank notes as their main 
reserves rather than seeking other institutional alternatives (such as bank branches and banking networks) 
to guide the reserves’ centripetal forces (centralizing economies of scale in reserve holding). Consequently, 
Goodhart’s first historical example does not actually support a generalized natural institutional evolution 
of  central banks (see also chapter 4).     
 
3.1.3 The Suffolk experience 
 
Goodhart (1987, 1988) uses the Suffolk Bank experience as his second historical example to attempt to 
show how the evolutionary tendencies of  banking inevitably lead to the concentration of  reserves in a 
single bank and how this concentration process can occur without the unique bank necessarily having 
special privileges. He uses the Suffolk case to sustain the claim that a quasi central bank can naturally 
emerge from competitive forces and the voluntary association of  competing members and to justify as 
necessary the institutional transition toward and rationale for a central bank.63 Bankers’ banks similar to 
those in the Suffolk experience (Goodhart, 1988, chapter 3) are sometimes considered to behave as quasi 
central banks, which differ from voluntary clearinghouses since the quasi central bank providing the 
service is still a single, competitive, and for-profit commercial bank, and not a voluntary club association 
(Smith, 1990 [1936]).  
 
This for-profit and competitive quasi central banking structure (bankers’ bank) raises a clear conflict of  
interest and creates perverse incentives, leading bankers’-bank systems to become dysfunctional because 
the bankers’ banks are incapable of  impartially dealing with a ‘public’ function while being for-profit 
competitive entities (Bagehot, 1873; Goodhart, 1988, 38–43). Nevertheless, defining a bankers’ bank such 
as the Suffolk Bank as a quasi central bank is actually misleading. Unlike central banks, the Suffolk system 
 
63 For a comprehensive review of  the Suffolk Bank, see Lake (1947) and Trivoli (1979). Also see the stability and self-governing 
(self-enforcing) properties of  the Suffolk banking system in Calomiris and Kahn (1996) and Salter (2018).  
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did not possess a legal monopoly of  note issue, and thus rival banks did not use the Suffolk Bank’s 
liabilities as high-powered money (Lake, 1947, 191; Salter, 2018).  
 
It is critical to emphasize the legal and market context and the institutional framework within which the 
Suffolk bankers’ bank was allowed to emerge. When the Suffolk system was established in Boston in 
1819, the United States had a banking system of  decentralization without freedom, due in large part to special 
legal limitations in chartering (bank branches) and restrictions on deposit banking and note issuance 
circumscribed under specific state laws (Calomiris and Kahn, 1996; Dowd, 1993). Of  crucial importance 
in this case was the prohibition of  branch banking, which ‘slowed the evolution of  an efficient system 
of  note exchange and clearing, thwarting normal competitive checks against overissue’ (Selgin, 1988, 14). 
The result of  prohibiting branch banking in the US was the institutional formation of  a unit-banking 
system that was highly fragmented, fragile, and dispersed (Calomiris and Kahn, 1996).  
 
This fragmented banking context hindered the development of  both an expedient system of  note 
exchange and strong institutional checks against banks’ overissue. This created the conditions by which 
notes needed to travel large distances to be redeemed by other banks, creating serious time-lag problems 
for clearing and incentives to overissue (Lake, 1947; Smith, 1990 [1936]). The time lags between note 
issuance and redemption created the economic incentives for country banks to issue larger volumes of  
notes as long as the chances of  their being presented for redemption were small. This was exacerbated 
for geographical reasons and by states’ restrictions on branch banking, which incentivized country banks 
to issue large amounts of  notes by placing themselves in remote areas away from large city centers.  
 
The above allowed, for example, country banks in Massachusetts to attempt to free ride on the clearing 
and circulation of  their own notes by moving as far away as possible from Boston, attempting to overissue 
notes in the city (Smith, 1990 [1936], 49). Thus country banks in Massachusetts increased their volume 
of  notes in circulation in Boston because of  that institutional and redemption lag. Branch-banking 
restrictions made it particularly difficult for Boston banks to redeem out-of-town (‘country’) banks’ notes 
expediently and to counter their circulation and overissue in Boston (Dowd, 1994).      
 
The Suffolk system was therefore the private institutional reaction to the branching prohibition and the 
geographic and legal context in order to form a collective response by city banks against country banks’ 
note circulation in Boston and their risk of  overissue (Calomiris and Kahn, 1996). The formation of  the 
Suffolk was meant to deal with those large volumes of  country banks’ notes that remained in circulation 
in Boston with ‘the intended effect of  curtailing circulation of  the country banks’ (Smith, 1990 [1936], 
49). Hence the Suffolk was actually not the result of  the banking system’s inherent natural forces to 
concentrate itself  (Calomiris and Kahn, 1996). The Suffolk could actually be seen as an endogenous 
response—given branching restrictions—to the inefficient note-exchange and clearing system, which was 
frequently unable to return notes to its issuers and incapable of  maintaining checks against overissue 
(severe time lags between issuance and redemption). Problems largely originated in prohibitions of  
branch banking in the first place (Selgin, 1988, 14).  
 
Additionally, states’ charter regulations and limitations (although Massachusetts’s were among the least 
strict) raised severe barriers to entry and costs of  establishing new competing or contestable ‘bankers’ 
clubs’ (Lake, 1947). Other groups of  banks were constrained from forming their own competitive 
clearinghouses without strict hierarchical and coercive arrangements, severely weakening clearinghouse 
competition. Stiffer branch-banking restrictions and states’ charter regulations led banks to rely not on 
voluntary association, but rather on bankers’-bank arrangements with much broader and more 
authoritative regulatory powers over their members. Thus the Suffolk Bank operated with overly 
constraining rules, shifting operating costs and risk to its members, while also giving them a ‘high-handed 
attitude’ (Calomiris and Kahn, 1996; Dowd, 1994, 295). Suffolk members’ discontent incentivized them 
to try to establish another competitive and more horizontal banking club. However, states’ charter 
restrictions and political opposition by the legislature made the entry and establishment of  such 
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competitive and more cooperative clubs excessively difficult (Lake, 1947, 193–196).  
    
Nevertheless, after several attempts to obtain a charter, the rival Bank of  Mutual Redemption (BMR) was 
established in 1855, which offered clearinghouse and banking services on much better terms and was less 
hierarchical than the Suffolk system (Calomiris and Kahn, 1996). The crucial institutional difference 
between the BMR system and the Suffolk system is that the former was an actual voluntary bankers’-club 
arrangement, in which the BMR was owned by its bank customers rather than a direct commercial bank 
competitor or a bankers’ bank such as the Suffolk (Lake, 1947, 196).  
 
Hence the BMR had the structure of  a competitive and voluntary bankers’ club, which avoided the 
conflicts of  interest, coercion, and over-regulation of  its members (Dowd, 1994, 296). The fact that 
Suffolk clients defected to the BMR and the Suffolk eventually abandoned the market for banking 
services and clearing indicates commercial banks’ actual preferences for a much more limited, more 
cooperative, and less hierarchical bundle of  services (Dowd, 1994, 296; Lake, 1947). More importantly, 
the fact that banks opted out of  a hierarchical bankers’ bank for an actual cooperative bankers’-club 
arrangement is crucial historical evidence that further disputes Goodhart’s historical claims. Hence this 
example shows that competitive clearinghouses were in fact not only successful and feasible institutional 
solutions (whenever allowed) but also preferable to hierarchical bankers’ banks to provide the bundle of  
services that banks actually desired.  
 
Hence it is not at all evident that without restrictions on branch banking, charter procedures, and legal 
restrictions against entry, the dynamics of  banking and reserves would have naturally tended to form 
something like the Suffolk system (Calomiris and Kahn, 1996). What this experience actually 
demonstrates is that the natural tendencies to centralize reserves were—in this specific case—guided by 
the regulatory framework that severely restricted chartering, competition, and branching. Thus the 
centripetal forces of  reserves concentration and the need for expedient clearing, guided by branch-
banking restrictions, temporarily led a for-profit bank to act as a bankers’ bank until club competition could 
arise. Accordingly, this legally-conditioned case does not justify Goodhart’s generalization claiming that 
the natural tendencies of  reserves (economies of scale in reserve holding) and clearing will inevitably lead 
to a bankers’ bank that will transition toward a central bank.  
 
3.1.4 Voluntary clearinghouses and branch banking  
 
Additional historical evidence also shows that institutional frameworks that did not institute rigid banking 
legislations and restrictions over branch banking experienced entirely different institutional 
manifestations of  the dynamics of  reserves and clearing. Most of  them have actually led to institutional 
arrangements predominantly decentralized and self-governing in order to provide crucial banking 
services. Indeed, there are several documented historical episodes of  relatively successful institutional 
banking arrangements, largely based on branch banking, bilateral clearing arrangements, and voluntary 
clearinghouses, whenever freedom of  competition and branching existed (Calomiris and Haber, 2014; 
Dowd, 1992; Goodspeed, 2016; Schuler, 1992).  
 
For example, during the ‘free banking’ antebellum period in the United States, different regions 
established private clearinghouses that helped their banking systems to clear banks’ rival notes, check  
their overissue, increase ‘netting economies’ of  interbank dues, and regulate their members (Dowd, 1993, 
chapter 8; Timberlake, 1984).64 During this period, banks started to use these institutions voluntarily not 
only as clearinghouses but also to coordinate private lending by keeping part of  their reserves as deposits 
with them (Dowd, 1994; Timberlake, 1984). This allowed clearinghouses to adopt certain functionalities, 
particularly the supervision and private regulation of  their members, evaluating applicants’ financial 
 
64 Before the establishment of  the Fed in 1913, the US banking system was far from competitive in its branching, which could 
make the US case somewhat misleading. The regulatory framework that prohibited branch banking across state lines led to 
the formation of  far more centralized, less competitive, and more autocratic clearinghouses (Dowd, 1992).   
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integrity, and coordinating lending in the event of  liquidity constraints (Salter and Tarko, 2018).  
 
The crucial characteristic of  clearinghouses is that they successfully provided the central banks’ micro 
functions competitively. Unlike central banks, they competed without having monopoly over note issuance 
or any other specific legal or banking privilege (Dowd, 1994). In addition to clearinghouses, in 
institutional settings that largely allowed competitive branch banking to develop (as was the case in 
Canada and Scotland), the natural tendencies for the concentration of  reserves led primarily to private 
branch-banking networks (Dowd, 1992, 1993; Schuler, 1992; White, 1984). Those private banking 
networks were often and later either accompanied by bilateral informal agreements to clear notes or 
voluntary associations of  clearinghouses in order to coordinate and reduce the need for overall reserves 
(Dowd, 1993; Schuler, 1992).  
 
It is worth noting that the institutional possibility of  bank branching and banking networks is a crucial 
aspect of  credit efficiency, economies of  scale, banking stability, and netting economies of  interbank 
dues (Calomiris and Haber, 2014; Calomiris and Kahn, 1996). In fact, historical evidence suggests that 
banks largely seek to rely on branch banking and networks and treat it not as an alternative to but as a 
key complement to bilateral agreements, clearinghouses, or bankers’ banks (Dowd, 1994; Schuler, 1992). 
Building a vast network of  branches allows interbank clearing and settlements to occur at the local level, 
avoiding unnecessary management and transactions costs of  clearing and settling solely in one central 
location, thus severely reducing also time lags between issuance and redemption.  
 
Branch banking is crucial to reap economies of  scale and netting economies (Calomiris and Kahn, 1996). 
In fact, in legal contexts dominated by contestability and competition among few banks and with freedom 
of  branching, the institutional evolution leaned toward wider branching networks and cheaper bilateral 
clearing arrangements (White, 1984). Thus clearinghouses and bankers’ banks become far less relevant, 
or perhaps even unnecessary, for banking systems to work properly and efficiently (Dowd, 1992, 1994; 
Schuler, 1992).65  
 
For example, during its free-banking period, Canada largely allowed competition and branch banking. 
This created the conditions for the banking system to function properly largely on the basis of  private 
branching networks and informal bilateral clearing arrangements. Banks’ private branching networks can 
attain economies of  scale comparable to other arrangements, up to a point, making more complex and 
costly centralized institutions less necessary (Dowd, 1994; Schuler, 1992).66 The Canadian experience and 
that of  others around the world (Dowd, 1992; White, 1984) show in fact that private institutional 
solutions are possible, contrary to Goodhart’s generalizations in which small, independent bank units will 
always seek ‘quasi-Central Banking functions’ in a competitor (Goodhart, 1988, 34–38). 
 
In contrast, some countries such as the aforementioned US had stiffer branch-banking restrictions and 
far more regulation for banks’ charters and operations. The institutional tendencies led instead toward 
establishing more complex and formal multilateral clearing arrangements, which exercised greater 
regulatory powers over their members (Dowd, 1994, 298). These systems relied on stronger and more-
controlling clearinghouses, but not by granting a privileged unique position to any competing bank. They 
 
65 In a free banking context, the emergence of  clearinghouses might not even be that necessary. This holds true in cases in 
which the cost of  instituting an overseer of  interbank lending outweighs the benefits of  going to a decentralized market. In 
systems with few banks, the netting economies of  interbank settlement can be reaped solely through branching and bilateral 
agreements, which require much less coordination and collective action (Dowd, 1992; Schuler, 1992).  
66 The benefits of  the convergence (centralization) of  reserves stems from economic efficiency. Considerations include 
economies of  scale, risk diversification, lack of  branches in a given geographical sector, and simplification of  interbank 
payments (Dowd, 1994). The economies of  scale achieved through centralizing reserves mainly come from netting and 
clearing economies. Banks that park reserves in a single bankers’ club can achieve expedient and cost-efficient ‘netting out’ of  
interbank dues prior to settlement. Importantly, those economies of  scale could actually be reaped without any strong 
centralization of  the settlement medium in a single overarching bank. However, some degree of  voluntary centralization does 
offer economic and managerial benefits by largely reducing the settlement transaction costs. 
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usually formed strong ‘club associations’ that then developed more-hierarchical banking and regulatory 
services (Dowd, 1994; Timberlake, 1984).  
 
These different levels of  centralization and hierarchical institutional differences in historical cases indicate 
a direct institutional-legal relationship between clearinghouses’ degree of  hierarchy, coercion, and 
regulatory powers and existent banking legal restrictions over branching and competition (Dowd, 1994, 
295–297). In fact, whenever banks experienced considerable freedom to cooperate, compete, and branch, 
the institutional evolution leaned away from hierarchical bankers’ banks and ‘strong clubs’, leaning instead 
toward a combination of  private branch banking, bilateral clearing agreements, and possibly some 
voluntary and more complex associations or clubs (Calomiris and Haber, 2014; Dowd, 1992; White, 1984).   
 
All these different cooperative systems or institutional possibilities show a broader range of  alternative 
and plausible private institutional formations in banking and of  successful combinations of  them. The 
evidence of  both successful private institutional heterogeneity and diversity in banking systems again 
disputes Goodhart’s (1988) narrow historical claims. Moreover, history further disputes Goodhart’s 
monocentric evolutionary thesis by showing that crucial banking services have been successfully provided 
by other voluntary and polycentric institutional means (Goodspeed, 2016; Paniagua, 2019b). This 
conclusion has important and broader constitutional and legal implications. It suggests that the existence 
of  branching restrictions, the degree of  market competition allowed, and the rule of  law that governs 
banking interactions and defines banks’ property rights have been crucial in shaping the evolution and 
the structures of  banking cooperation. Therefore, the broader constitutional framework of  banking and 
its rules for controlling cooperation and competition have severely determined and limited how banks 
can plausibly create scale economies and promote cooperative non-monocentric arrangements in order 
to supply central banks’ micro functions.  
 
As suggested throughout this section, there will always be an institutional tendency for banks to allocate 
and concentrate their reserves (the centripetal forces) and to seek interbank lending and clearing 
arrangements whenever possible to economize resources, reap economies of  scale, and to minimize 
operational risk (Schuler, 1992; Selgin, 1993). As argued, this tendency could also lead to branching 
networks or other private formations and diverse institutional combinations that could provide the 
required services in accordance with the given context of  incentives and legal precedents (Calomiris and 
Haber, 2014). The constitutional context and regulatory regime in which banks function severely shape 
how clearing, netting, and the economies of  holding reserves operate institutionally; they also constrain 
how voluntary collective action among banks could potentially internalize and provide crucial banking 
services (Bagehot, 1873; Smith, 1990 [1936]).67  
 
Therefore, the intrinsic and common existence of  Goodhart’s general centripetal forces (which drive and 
incentivize banks to seek to economize reserves, converge, and create netting economies) should not be 
confused with those more narrow specific and contextualized banking tendencies in given constitutional and 
more restrictive legal contexts. Consequently, Goodhart’s (1987, 1988) historical generalization of  central 
banks is unfitting not only because it is inconsistent with the vast majority of  their developments, but 
also because history shows that crucial banking services have tended to be effectively supplied by private 
means—whenever the legal and regulatory context permitted them—without any necessity for central 
banks to emerge (see also Goodspeed, 2016 and Paniagua, 2019b).  
 
3.2 Institutional Diversity Conditioned by the Legal Framework  
 
The different institutional arrangements explored in the previous section evince different plausible 
evolutionary paths that the banking system might take to carry out the micro functions identified by 
Goodhart (1988). These varying institutional forms can theoretically be rendered comprehensible with 
 
67 The ‘constitutional context’ refers here to the specific framework of  rules, or ‘the rules of  the game’, and the mechanisms 
for their enforcement (Brennan and Buchanan, 2000 [1985]).   
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what Buchanan (2008) called ‘different rules, different games’. Based on these diverse institutional 
formations and banking diversity, I reckon that some sort of  concentration of  reserves within the 
banking network is a natural tendency of  the competitive banking business and it is present regardless 
of  the banking regime (Selgin, 1993; White, 1984). However, this inherent nature of  banking does not mean 
that the tendency will inevitably be toward a single and monocentric entity that naturally transitions into 
a noncompetitive central bank. To do so, the legal and constitutional framework under which banks are 
making their choices would need to be clearly defined and specified since these determine banks’ 
incentives, possible economies of  scale, and institutional possibilities for voluntary cooperation.  
 
In other words, the institutional equilibrium of  the concentration of  reserves, netting economies, and the 
formation of  clearing and branching nodes across the banking structure does not necessarily lead to a 
single overarching entity, as Goodhart (1987, 1988) assumes. Following Buchanan (1964, 2008), different 
banking rules and restrictions can determine the different institutional ‘games structures’ for how banks 
deal with reserves and cooperate institutionally in order to provide the micro functions. There is nothing 
inherent in these real reserve and netting banking tendencies furthering themselves to a single point 
structure and even less so into a single competitive bank (Schuler, 1992).  
 
As Buchanan (1964) suggests, the degrees of  competition in the market order ‘come to be established as 
institutions emerge to place limits on individual behavior patterns’ (Buchanan, 1964, 29, emphasis in the 
original). As in the market order, the banking system will also form an institutional structure according 
to limits imposed by the constitutional context. It will also obtain a degree of  competition through 
establishing auxiliary cooperative arrangements to seek gains from cooperation and economies of  scale 
whenever allowed. The establishment of  such cooperative structures however depends on the legal and 
regulatory framework under which they make their institutional and collective choices.  
 
To reap economies of  scale and netting or clearing economies, banks might find it beneficial to simply 
spread their reserves among their own private branches and headquarters and rely on ad hoc bilateral 
agreements (Schuler, 1992; Selgin, 1988). Instead, when transaction costs and economies of  scale are 
external to the firm but internal to the industry, the tendency will be to form more complex institutional 
structures so banks can collaborate and internalize them through clubs (Dowd, 1994). However, the 
institutional decision of how banks will direct those centripetal forces to internalize economies of  scale 
and netting (clearing) economies will widely vary according to the context and constitutional framework 
determining the number of  banks, incentives and costs to collaborate, and availability of  (internal to the 
firm) economies of  scale (Boettke et al., 2007; Calomiris and Haber, 2014). Possible firm and industry 
economies of  scale and collective strategies depend on the legal and regulatory framework they face while 
attempting to form more complex banking structures.  
 
Additionally, the real institutional heterogeneity and diversity seen in banking arrangements resonates 
with Ostrom’s (2000, 2010) conception of  different patterns of  possible organizational and governance 
structures given the institutional context that binds decision-makers’ incentives and determines their 
collaboration possibilities. Only by understanding organizations’ decision-making processes in light of  a 
given institutional and legal context can the rationale behind collective outcomes and rules become clear 
(Ostrom, 2010). Thus Elinor Ostrom’s (1990, 2005) notions of  the contextual patterns of  governance 
structures and institutional diversity conditioned to context are equally relevant to understand the 
different institutional and historical evolutions of  banking systems.  
 
Hence only through understanding the constitutional and legal context in which banks act, and how this 
affects and limits their incentives and information to collaborate, is it possible to explain the formation 
of  alternative and diverse (either monocentric or polycentric) banking structures. More importantly, this 
Ostromian-oriented notion of  banking’s diverse and heterogeneous institutional equilibria and their 
different governing structures conditioned by the legal and geographical context severely undermines 
Goodhart’s (1987, 1988) general account of  the natural evolution of  only central banks. Consequently, 
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the constitutional and legal context then constrains the possible individual and collective choices in the 
institutional discovery process of  banking in order for banks to seek economies of  scale through different 
cooperative arrangements.  
 
These insights illuminate theoretically the wider possibilities for the institutional banking evolution of  
the centralization of  reserves and clearing services (Paniagua, 2019b). They show that the institutional 
formation of  the banking system depends on the patterns of  collective outcomes and collaboration in 
the organization of  banking, which are shaped by the regulatory framework that structures and limits 
collaboration and incentives (Buchanan, 2008; Calomiris and Haber, 2014). These insights imply that 
Goodhart’s narrow rationale for central banking could be potentially instead a broader polycentric rationale 
that sustains wider and dissimilar forms of  cooperative banking structures dependent on the 
constitutional context that constrains self-governing collective action and collaboration (Brennan and 
Buchanan, 2000 [1985]; Ostrom, 2000; Salter and Tarko, 2018).  
 
This richer constitutional and political economic perspective on banking institutions severely weakens 
Goodhart’s narrow evolutionary arguments for the emergence of  only central banks. This perspective 
suggests that an a priori unknown polycentric order of  clearinghouses, bankers’ banks, or bank-branch 
networks could emerge, conditioned by the rules of  the game in which banks could potentially collaborate 
(Buchanan, 2008; Paniagua, 2019b). In fact, this analysis and the historical evidence reviewed strongly 
suggest that wider possibilities for polycentric and decentralized private banking arrangements can 
successfully exist in order to provide—at different levels of  governance—the micro functions 
(Goodspeed, 2016; Paniagua, 2018b; Salter and Tarko, 2018). Goodhart’s (1988) account of  the 
emergence of  a bankers’ bank as the sole evolutionary form of  banking reaches a narrow and unfitting 
conclusion since it neglects the constitutional and regulatory context that constrains governance, 
polycentricity, collaboration, and institutional formation.  
 
3.3 Central Banking and Clearinghouses: An Institutional Comparison  
 
As I have argued, Goodhart’s (1987, 1988) claims for the generalized natural formation of  bankers’ banks 
and their natural transition to central banks are unwarranted both historically and theoretically; hence 
they need to be constitutionally contextualized in order to be coherent. Nevertheless, despite the lack of  
any historical or theoretical natural evolutionary justification, central banks might still be preferable to 
contestable clearinghouses in a comparative institutional sense to provide the crucial micro functions. 
Regarding the micro functions (see footnote 36), the usual institutional responses for the problems that 
a banking system faces are similar to institutional responses in other economic activities that suffer also 
informational inadequacy (asymmetries), monitoring problems, and the provision of  specialized services. 
The common institutional response to those challenges is to establish some form of  club or voluntary 
association (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Ostrom, 1990). The reason is that voluntary associations can 
deal better with economies of  scale and the need to reduce costs to effectively deal with free-rider 
problems, reputation commons, and informational asymmetries (Ostrom, 2010; Paniagua, 2019b; Yue 
and Ingram, 2012).68  
 
Hence, clearinghouses could emerge as private clubs in which nonmembers are excluded from the key 
micro-function services and bank members show direct and constant evidence of  their trustworthiness. 
The banking club, then, in a way encapsulates information concerning the reputation of  the whole club 
and the responsibility and soundness of  its members, informing the market of  their accountability and 
soundness (Gorton and Mullineaux, 1987). The arguments for the existence of  this form of  club 
arrangement rest on the fact that the nature of  banking leads to the concentration of  reserves and to 
economize on clearing services. In addition, banking activities also possess information asymmetries, 
potential systemic risks, and reputation and confidence effects that might lead to negative externalities 
 
68 I am referencing an exclusive (private) club that deals with an impure public good, namely public trust and confidence in 
the banks through self-regulation (Buchanan, 1965; Paniagua, 2019b; Yue and Ingram, 2012). 
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and potential free-rider problems among competing banks (Goodhart, 1988; Hardy, 2006).  
 
At the source of  potential and systemic bank runs are problems related to conflicts of  interest, 
asymmetries of  information, and reputation commons (Bordo, 1990; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; 
Goodhart, 1988; Paniagua, 2019b). These reputational and externality problems suggest that the 
formation of  clubs or a central bank could potentially ameliorate and internalize them (Giannini, 2011; 
Goodhart, 1987; Yue and Ingram, 2012); nevertheless in evaluating these potential banking problems and 
comparing the institutional properties of  how clubs and central banks could handle them, Goodhart 
(1987, 1988) favors the latter.  
 
Goodhart’s major claim in this institutional comparison leading him to favor central banks rests on his 
belief  that voluntary associations are unable to effectively perform the micro functions (the bundle of  
banking services related to financial and banking supervision, bank regulation, and the role of  lender of  
last resort). Goodhart maintains that—similar to the Suffolk experience—a strong competitive bank 
member will most likely dominate private clubs and then assume a central administrative role within them, 
undermining the clubs’ performance and impartiality. Goodhart argues that bank clubs could be fragile, 
ineffective, and fail because of  greater conflicts of  interest, lack of  cohesion, bankers’ pressure, and for-
profit incentives that plague clubs; these commercial conflicts impose negative externalities on the 
banking system’s regulation and stability (Goodhart, 1988, 37–39, 71–73). These deficiencies and tensions 
make clubs unlikely to reliably manage the micro functions in a way that is consistent with the public 
interest (Goodhart, 1988, 45). Goodhart’s preferred solution is consequently for a bankers’ bank that 
dominates clearing and netting arrangements to transition to a full nonprofit governmental status. 
 
Nevertheless, just because self-governance possesses challenges and might be imperfect, this is not a 
sufficient condition to justify the claim that a government solution is a priori and always superior and 
easily attainable (Demsetz, 1969; Ostrom, 1990). To avoid falling for what Demsetz (1969) denominated 
the ‘nirvana fallacy’, a more thorough comparative institutional analysis is warranted (Demsetz, 1969; 
Pennington, 2011; see also chapter 6). I briefly undertake this analysis in order to see whether competition 
among contestable clubs is ‘fragile’ enough (institutionally speaking) to justify the imposition of  an 
outside bureaucratic agency (Goodhart, 1988, 4; on this matter see also Salter and Tarko, 2018). 
Although—and as seen in the previous sections—the banking system’s natural evolution has not 
necessarily led to central banks; they might still be preferable to clearinghouses on comparative grounds. 
Thus a comparative institutional analysis is necessary. In order to do so, I evaluate their institutional 
comparative advantages and weaknesses based on how they might actually operate given real political 
conditions and incentives (see also Paniagua, 2019b).  
 
To effectively overcome conflicts of  interest among members, clubs could appoint an independent body 
or board of  directors. An external firm that provides clearing services, a club council, or a club 
commission—one that would have no involvement in regular banking businesses—could eliminate the 
conflicts of  interest natural in banking operations (Cannon, 1910; Gilpin and Wallace, 1904; Gorton and 
Mullineaux, 1987). However, how can such a council be insulated from the pressure of  banking members? 
How can clubs be conducted by entities insulated from banking pressures while also being able to 
maintain their independence and accountability? Given these potential conflicts, lack of  cohesion, and 
bank pressures, Goodhart advocates ‘the establishment of  a public body, which is, however, separated 
from, and independent of, the immediate political arena’ (Goodhart, 1988, 72).  
 
Nevertheless, Goodhart’s confidence in the possibility of  establishing such an institution by political 
design seems unjustified. While it is true that there are potential conflicts of  interest and pressure-group 
problems that critically affect private clearinghouses, these issues apply symmetrically also to any form 
of  government-established central bank; in fact, they may apply to an even-greater degree. The problem 
is symmetric: how is it that banking supervision and monitoring can be done effectively by public 
governmental entities insulated from political and private banking pressures? 
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It has been recognized in the literature that the concentration of  power and the increased concentration 
of  supervision of  economic activities by a single entity largely increase the potential private benefits from 
regulatory capture (Hardy, 2006; Laffont and Tirole, 1991; Stigler, 1971). Bank regulation in its most 
concentrated forms has been shown to be specifically susceptible to capture by interest groups (Calomiris 
and Haber, 2014; Hardy, 2006). These regulatory-capture problems present in a single central entity are 
potentially much more severe than in a system that relies on a decentralized regulatory structure of  
competing clubs.  
 
As Laffont and Tirole (1991) pointed out, regulatory capture is likely to be increasingly beneficial to 
interest groups in economic activities in which the groups are highly concentrated and there is much at 
stake. This is especially the case in banking systems lacking high levels of  existent or potential competition, 
with impediments to branching, and with a single overall political regulator that concentrates power 
(Hardy, 2006; Kroszner and Straham, 2001). Commercial banks in a central bank–regulated environment 
will possess higher collective market shares; this leads to the organization of  large banking associations 
and hence to greater incentives for and potential concentrated gains from regulatory capture (Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine, 2006; Hardy, 2006). The potential gains from capture are therefore larger and the 
organizational costs much lower in a system in which banks need to capture only a single recognizable 
supervisory agency. The opposite occurs in systems that have fragmented and competitively shifting 
(contestable) responsibility for supervision and regulation distributed among clearinghouses, diluting the 
potential benefits from capture (Cannon, 1910; Gilpin and Wallace, 1904).69  
 
Furthermore, unlike the case of  competitive and decentralized clubs, it is not only from private banks 
that a central bank potentially needs to insulate itself, but also from the whole structure of  politics, 
government, interest group pressures, and congressional oversight (Barth et al., 2006; Becker, 1983; 
Boettke and Smith, 2013, 2015; Kroszner and Strahan, 2001; Posner, 1974). Indeed, public choice 
scholars and political scientists have found these private and political pressures on central banks’ capacity 
to be independent policy makers and effective regulators to be far from negligible (Adolph, 2013; Alesina, 
1987; Grier, 1991; O’Driscoll, 2011).70 This suggests that economic pressure from banks, pressure from 
potential regulatory capture, and political pressure are potentially much greater and more generalized for 
central banks. Moreover, if  somehow central banks could be insulated from political pressure through 
providing them political independence, the problem is not resolved but is simply shifted toward how they 
could be kept accountable and to whom (Cukierman, 1994; Meltzer, 2009).  
 
Under the establishment of  a public body, politically appointed regulators are both protected and 
disassociated from the potential pecuniary and nonpecuniary costs of  a loss of  reputation and negligence 
of  the banking club members (Yue, Luo, and Ingram, 2009). This severely lowers their incentives to 
constantly monitor and guide banks toward socially optimal compliance, exacerbating the possibilities for 
irresponsible banking behavior (Adolph, 2013; Barth et al., 2006). Regulators, being part of  a bureaucracy 
rather than a competitive collective governance structure, are not part of  the reputation commons that 
usually holds clearinghouses and banks accountable, thus having fewer incentives and less ‘skin in the 
game’ to monitor and regulate effectively (Paniagua, 2019b; Yue and Ingram, 2009).  
 
Hence a politically appointed bureaucracy has a different organizational structure that largely allows it to 
be detached from the reputation commons of  banks and their financial behavior. This alters the 
regulators’ incentives structure, their cost-benefit analysis, and their optimal decision-making in regard to 
regulation. More importantly, this potentially allows for the possibility that regulators might pursue their 
 
69 Concerns about potential problems with regulatory capture of  central banks by big banks seem to be more than justified 
given the recent episodes of  the Baim Report, the Carmen Segarra recordings, and the case in which the New York Fed was 
involved with major Wall Street banks in the acquisition of  credit default swaps from American International Group (Bernstein, 
2014; Fox, 2014).  
70 For a review of  presidential and congressional pressures on the Fed, see Meltzer (2009). For a historical review and cases 
of  presidential political pressure on the Fed, see Boettke and Smith (2013, 2015).  
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narrow and non-bank-oriented self-interest rather than ‘socially optimal’ levels of  supervision and 
regulation (Adolph, 2013; Boot and Thakor, 1993). This political structure further intensifies wider 
potential pressure and capture from politicians, congress and parliaments, internal bureaucratic disputes, 
and interest groups’ pressures to use and leverage bank regulation for power and economic redistribution 
and other populist ends (Becker, 1983; Barth et al., 2006; Calomiris and Haber, 2014).  
 
Overall, the bureaucratic arrangement for banking regulation generates a misalignment of  incentives 
under the public structure in which regulators first externalize the potential costs of  banks’ negligent risk 
management and loss of  reputation, then internalize the benefits of  potential regulatory capture. These 
misaligned incentives and asymmetrical benefits bring potential negative repercussions in the long run 
for the stability of  the entire banking system. Indeed, the economic theory of  regulation provides reasons 
to be highly skeptical about how central banks can optimally deal with the micro regulatory functions 
(Boot and Thakor, 1993; Posner, 1974; Stigler, 1971). In contrast, the potential overall benefits from 
competitive private regulation might be larger since such institutions are driven mainly by profit, survival, 
competition, and banking efficiency, rather than by rent seeking and political bureaucratic objectives 
(Calomiris and Kahn, 1996; Stringham, 2016).  
 
Clearinghouses’ emergent regulations and standards are largely motivated by the convergence of  the self-
interest of  the members involved (Dowd, 1994; Yue, Luo, and Ingram, 2009). The costs of  a loss of  
reputation and quality of  the clearinghouse or the banks are entirely internalized by the members and the 
clearinghouse (Paniagua, 2019b; Yue and Ingram, 2012). Additionally, if  a bank member seeks to capture 
the entire club for its own benefit, in the long run it will only undermine the club itself, possibly leading 
it to collapse (Cannon, 1910; Trivoli, 1979). Hence, the cost and risk of  capture is internalized to all the 
bank members, making such cost in the long run higher than the possible short-term benefits.  
 
Furthermore, since commercial banks suffer from stochastic fluctuations of  their reserves (Selgin, 1988), 
they will potentially rely also on the interbank lending coordination of  the club. Thus, it is in their best 
interest to keep the clearinghouse afloat, defend its integrity, and constantly inform it of  their solvency 
and activities (Gorton and Mullineaux, 1987); this interbank lending coordination further aligns banks’ 
incentives toward compliance and transparency, and to allow others to monitor them. Competition and 
decentralization create the conditions in which the independent body of  the clearinghouse will have the 
incentives to uphold appropriate and efficient rules, and apply them equally to the bank members. 
Consequently, its objectives are to obtain some profit by providing a long-term (sustainable) valuable 
service and to avoid bank members’ exit or a degradation of  the quality of  the regulation and supervision 
provided. Similarly, bank members—by being part of  the reputational banking commons—also have 
incentives to collaborate and disclose information expediently (Dowd, 1994; Yue and Ingram, 2012).  
 
Under these competitive and voluntary arrangements, the reputation commons and the collective benefits 
lead private banks to willingly adjust their profit-maximization strategies and risks to private regulation. 
This voluntary adjustment is based on the banks’ potential costs of  noncompliance with the 
clearinghouse rules and hence the risk of  losing their membership and liquidity-reputational benefits. 
Since banks find it economically (and with respect to risk and stability) beneficial to be part of  the club 
to access an interbank-club lending market and to reduce their reputation and information problems, this 
further incentivizes them to adjust their profit-maximizing strategies to the club’s rules and regulations. 
A decentralized and contestable network of  banking clubs (clearinghouses) reduces moral hazard and the 
potential tensions between profit-maximizing behavior, the optimal amount of  reserves, and negative 
externalities from imprudent banking (Calomiris and Kahn, 1996; Yue and Ingram, 2012).  
 
3.3.1 Decentralized regulation and supervision  
 
Despite the above analysis, according to Goodhart the capacity of  banks to achieve a higher degree of, 
and stable, self-governance is questionable. He argues that the degree to which self-regulation can operate 
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by independent agencies critically depends on the cohesion of  the bank members, the actual number of  
members, and the complexity and heterogeneity of  their activities (Goodhart, 1988, 72, 103). Goodhart 
seems to attribute a large number of  members and a lack of  cohesion among them as the reasons why 
‘clubs’ associations’ will not be able to self-regulate properly. His theoretical mistrust of  clearinghouses 
is based on the assumption that a private regulatory service cannot be provided consistently because of  
large increases in membership, irreducible conflicts of  interests among members, or heterogeneity, which 
leads to a lack of  cohesion and club instability (Goodhart, 1988, 71–73).  
 
Contrary to Goodhart, Hardy (2006) shows that when there is only a single entity regulating the banking 
system, it increases the benefits for big banks to encourage stricter and unnecessary regulation (regulatory 
barriers of  entry) rather than socially optimal rules. Hardy also shows that when regulatory jurisdictions 
compete, the regulatory regimes do not need to converge to a homogenous set of  regulations. Nor will 
competition lead to a convergence toward low levels of  regulation or a ‘race to the bottom’ regulatory 
equilibrium (Hardy, 2006; see also Stringham, 2016 and Yue and Ingram, 2012).71 In fact, competitive 
clearinghouses may not always seek to weaken their regulatory regimes, even if  they act in the interest of  
their bank members. Instead, a clearinghouse or ‘jurisdiction’s competitive strategy needs to weight the 
direct cost of  tough regulation against the higher financing cost provoked by a reputation of  lax 
prudential rules and supervision. Moreover, jurisdictions may become highly differentiated’ (Hardy, 2006, 
19).  
 
The fundamental implication of  Hardy’s analysis is that the institutional and regulatory characteristics of  
a given clearinghouse are self-reinforcing and heterogeneous and do not need to converge (see also Yue 
and Ingram, 2012). Additionally, the clearinghouses’ self-reinforcing characteristics and differentiations 
allow a polycentric institutional and regulatory order to form in which each clearinghouse distinguishes 
itself  by providing a unique regulatory and monitoring bundle of  micro functions or banking services 
(Paniagua, 2019b). Hence under competition and contestability they will differentiate in a process of  
regulatory Tiebout sorting (Rosen, 2003; Stringham, 2016; Tiebout, 1956).72 This regulatory sorting leads 
to more personalized services and regulation of  the bank members, allowing the formulation of  
alternative sets of  rules that are better aligned with the members’ actual and ever-changing banking 
activities and needs. Hence as Rosen (2001) has recognized: 
 
We find support for the hypothesis that competition among [bank] regulators has beneficial 
aspects. Regulators seem to specialize, offering banks that are changing strategy the ability 
to improve performance by switching regulators. There is also evidence that the ability to 
switch regulators allows banks to get away from an examiner that desires a quite life [i.e., is 
inefficient]. (Rosen, 2001, 1)      
   
Competitive regulation benefits and profits from banks’ local preferences and contextual procedural 
knowledge, increasing transparency, regulatory efficiency, and financial stability (Hardy, 2006; Rosen, 
2003; Yue and Ingram, 2012). The emergent rules in this competitive setting reflect local banks’ needs, 
procedures, and business methods, promoting a constant regulatory discovery process on behalf  of  
clearinghouses (Gorton and Mullineaux, 1987). This also enables strong and constant economic and 
epistemic feedback mechanisms between banks and regulators. These mechanisms—under cooperative 
and local arrangements—are swifter and stronger (more robust) than those usually available through 
political and bureaucratic processes (Boettke et al., 2007; Ostrom, 1990). When banks as customers are 
involved in the self-reinforcing process of  establishing clubs’ regulations and procedures, they willingly 
communicate their common practices and preferences to clubs.  
 
71 For empirical evidence of  the positive properties of  competition among bank regulators, see Hardy (2006), Barth et al. 
(2006), Rosen (2003, 2001), and Yue, Luo, and Ingram (2009).    
72 For more details on this process see Rosen (2003) and Rosen (2001). One of  the advantages of  banking Tiebout sorting is 
that it occurs within a private competitive-governance context and therefore avoids problems associated with quasi market 
failures (Boettke, Coyne, and Leeson, 2007).  
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The regulations and monitoring processes of  the members can be achieved with more-specialized and 
local knowledge and therefore more efficiently (Ostrom, 1990). On the other hand, regulations that come 
from a top-down noncompetitive context can potentially respond to other sets of  extramarket incentives 
and political pressures, becoming ineffective to govern local situations (Boettke, 2010). Top-down 
regulation can indeed respond to inferior, and contextually different, regulatory feedbacks for learning 
and improving policy (Becker, 1983; Boettke et al., 2007; Ostrom, 1990). Central banking regulation can 
then be severely disassociated from the banking context (knowhow) and banks’ real business activities, 
and it can even respond better to interest groups and ideology (Barth et al., 2006; Kroszner and Strahan, 
2001; Posner, 1974). Top-down regulation potentially redirects the optimal set of  rules and monitoring 
away from what banks actually need and demand toward what interest groups and politicians need and 
demand (Calomiris and Haber, 2014).  
 
A crucial aspect of  the self-reinforcing regulatory element of  clearinghouses is that it actually leads to a 
sorting and concentration of  homogenous banks that seek similar sets of  regulations and other banking 
services (Hardy, 2006; Yue and Ingram, 2012). This concentration and sorting allows the market for 
banking clearing and regulation to fragment into a decentralized polycentric structure of  different sizes 
and into different forms of  cohesion and regulation. Additionally, contrary to Goodhart’s misgivings, 
system-wide sorting actually increases local homogenization, coordination, and cohesion among the 
sorted bank members by decreasing unnecessary growth of  bank membership and potential conflicts of  
interest among them (Calomiris and Kahn, 1996; Tiebout, 1956; Yue, Luo, and Ingram, 2009).  
 
Since banks actually benefit from lower rates, more-liquid interbank lending, and a sound reputation 
commons, they have the incentive to not impose (unreasonable) barriers to entry to new potential 
members (Paniagua, 2019b). 73  These polycentric characteristics increase the possibility of  a stable 
competitive set of  regulatory services across the system of  clearinghouses, avoiding cohesion problems 
and conflicts of  interest. Moreover, these stability and robust self-governing properties are actually 
nonexistent in a top-down centralized regulatory system that curtails competition and the decentralized 
discovery process of  rules and best practices (Boettke, 2010; Stringham, 2016).  
 
The conclusion of  the analysis of  competitive regulations is that the concentration of  regulatory roles 
into a single bureaucratic entity cannot be justified comparatively. Competitive self-governing regulatory 
institutions seem to be much superior to what Goodhart assumes. These findings are further supported 
by historical and statistical evidence with application to clearinghouses (Cannon, 1910; Gilpin and Wallace, 
1904; Yue, Luo, and Ingram, 2009).74 All this shows that Goodhart’s reservations regarding the degrees 
of  efficiency and institutional robustness of  bankers’ clubs in dealing with conflicts of  interest and 
member pressures seem far less justified. Furthermore, his confidence in a single politically isolated 




The postcrisis literature has not paid much attention to the micro regulatory functions that could justify 
central banks. It has drawn attention to neither the core arguments that sustain an institutional 
justification for central banks nor their evolution. I hope that this chapter has contributed to research in 
this direction. Since Goodhart’s (1988) thesis rests on the fact that the micro functions are the core 
justification for central banks, I provided historical and institutional evidence to scrutinize the rationale 
sustaining his thesis (see also Paniagua, 2019b). Further historical evidence that severely challenges 
Goodhart’s evolutionary claims of  central banks will be explored in chapter 4. I have extended the 
arguments on banking institutions by finding a bridge between them and the theory of  clubs and self-
 
73 The greater stability of  private arrangements has been shown by available data (Yue and Ingram, 2012). 
74 Additionally, Yue and Ingram (2012) review the episode of  the New York Clearing House Association. They show that the 
self-governance of  clubs can be quite a successful strategy for the members to deal with interbank lending, promote collective 
solvency, and promote prudent lending among themselves (see also Salter, 2018 and Paniagua, 2019b). 
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governance, which could be a fruitful path for further research (Salter, 2018; Salter and Tarko, 2018).  
 
In regard to Goodhart’s (1987, 1988) and Congdon’s (1981) claims, I reviewed evidence that disputes 
their generalized historical claims. Furthermore, I showed that Goodhart’s limited institutional rationale 
for central banking is not inescapably a narrow rationale exclusively for it, but rather a rationale for a 
wider possible set of  alternative polycentric arrangements able to provide crucial banking services. 
Importantly, I have also suggested that the possible emergence of  clearinghouse polycentricity, banking 
diversity, and branch-banking networks is severely conditioned to the constitutional context and the legal 
framework that banks ultimately face.  
 
These arguments have deep implications for banking research going forward. First, central banks are not 
a natural, inherent phenomenon but rather the outcome of  an evolution dependent on a skewed 
institutional framework that suppressed competition and granted monopoly powers (Bagehot, 1873). 
Thus societies do not carry the burden of  being ‘institutionally stuck’ with central banks. They can and 
they should look for more resilient alternatives based on rearrangements of  property rights and legal 
frameworks (Selgin, 1988, chapter 11). Second, by showing how competitive private clubs may better 
provide the micro functions, I have hinted that lending on distress, financial regulation, and prevention 
of  bank runs are not entirely ‘public goods’ but rather possess deep characteristics of  privateness. Hence 
their successful provision resides more within the realm of  cooperative and competitive clubs than in the 
system of  pure public goods (Buchanan, 1965; Yue and Ingram, 2012). This has repercussions for banking 
policy and financial stability since it opens the possibilities of  seeking banking reforms based on private 
governance and polycentric banking. These unrecognized institutional and self-governing arrangements 
are plausible and robust solutions to banking regulation and financial stability.   
 
On evolutionary and institutional grounds, there are no strong reasons to claim that there is a “natural 
tendency” of  banking systems to always develop the formation of  monocentric central banks over the 
formation of  competitive clearinghouses, in order to deal with the micro regulatory functions. I showed 
that given the nature of  banking and the historical evidence, the generalized argument for the natural 
evolution of  the banking system toward a central bank is groundless. Instead, the rationale and need for 
the micro functions justify the emergence of  different and cooperative institutional arrangements that 
might vary widely according to the context that banks face. Given the constitutional framework binding 
collective action, different forms of  arrangements might emerge—from the full decentralization of  banks 
to more hierarchical and cooperative structures. To what extent the banking system moves toward one 
or the other depends on the market context and the legal framework that severely conditions banks’ 
collaboration and collective action.  
 
In sum, there is no generalized and natural justification for central banking as Goodhart claims. Moreover, 
when evaluating the comparative properties of  arrangements, I showed that clearinghouses seem to deal 
much better with the micro functions than central banks. Banking self-governance is better at dealing 
with incentive misalignments, regulatory capture, and political pressure. Hence on comparative grounds, 
I find that the institutional preference for central banks over a polycentric system of  banking is erroneous 
(see further evidence in chapters 5 and 6). I conclude that both history and theory show that the natural 
justification for central banks is unfounded. Hence Goodhart’s and Congdon’s attempts to provide a 
general justification for central banks is ultimately mistaken, and their comparative institutional defense 
is much weaker than previously acknowledged.  
 
However, there is the need to acknowledge also that, as an historical and financial matter, central banks 
have been important players in the deepening and development of  financial markets; particularly those 
of  sovereign debt and long-term bonds, as well as innovations in public finance (Giannini, 2011; North 
and Weingast, 1989). One could argue that we fail to appreciate the broader social role of  central banks 
as institutions if  we judge them narrowly, based only on contemporary standards of  macroeconomic 
stability and bank runs. Nevertheless, due to length and focus, this issue will not be developed further in 
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this work. Hence, it’s worth clarifying that the main focus of  this thesis concerns only the narrow 
economic and macroeconomic justifications of  central banks; and consequently, this work seeks to assess 
the relevance and contribution of  central banks strictly on contemporary standards of  macroeconomic 
stability, monetary policy and banking regulation. In other words, the more recent mandates of  
macroeconomic stability and prudent monetary policy are the relevant issues for the purposes of  this 
analysis. This means that the conclusion concerning the lack of  strong reasons to favor the foundation 
of  central banks is limited to this margin. Further work should be encouraged to assess the justification 
for central banks on other grounds such as their alleged contribution to the development of  financial 
markets and innovations in public finance.     
            
In the following chapter, I will explore further the historical arguments, evidence, and evolutionary claims 
briefly explored here in order to provide additional, and more detailed, historical evidence against 
Goodhart’s claims concerning the natural evolution of  central banks, with a particular historical focus on 
the Bank of  England (one of  the oldest and most important central banks ever established). I will do so 
also to indicate that central banks’ apparent natural institutional evolution can more coherently be 
described by unique political processes and economic–political bargains. These unique political and 
entangled processes that actually generate the unusual (non-economic) establishment of  central banks 
are, for instance, repetitive political-bank bargains and political entanglement dynamics, in which some 
proto–private commercial banks acquire political, nonmarket, and uncompetitive characteristics over time, 
in exchange for credit and banking benefits for the sovereign.  
 
In other words, and as Bagehot (1873) suggested, the paradigmatic example of  the evolution of  the Bank 
of  England—based upon unique processes of  political entanglement—is particularly telling and relevant 
for understanding the politically based, and thus unnatural (non-economic), evolution of  central banks 
within banking systems. Therefore, and as Bagehot and Vera Smith intuited, it is important to scrutinize 
the case of  the Bank and its historical evolution in further depth in order to obtain relevant institutional 
and theoretical lessons that can enrich the debate over the inherent need for, and political evolution of, 






















Bank Bargains and Entangled Political Economy:  




‘A central bank . . . is not a product of  natural development. It originates 
through government favors and bears special privileges and responsibilities. 
Typically, it serves as banker for the government and for the ordinary banks 
and monopolizes or dominates the issue of  paper money. From this privilege 
derive the secondary functions and characteristics of  a modern central 
bank. . . . The special privileges and dominant position of  a central bank 
thrust responsibilities onto it that dilute or override its profit orientation’. 




As suggested in the previous chapter, since the publication of  Goodhart’s locus classicus The Evolution of  
Central Banks there has been little work on central banks’ nature, their fundamental roles, and, perhaps 
most importantly, their institutional evolution (Broz, 1998; Goodhart, 2010; Giannini, 2011; Selgin, 1993). 
The lack of  critical evaluation of  central banks’ evolution and their institutional rationale has been more 
acute in the postcrisis literature. Goodhart’s general overview of  early central banks’ evolution and 
establishment is well demonstrated by his account of  the Bank of  England (Goodhart, 1988, 15–19, 45–
46, 104; Selgin, 1993). Similarly, Vera Smith (1990 [1936[)—a pioneer in bringing back the old Bagehotian 
controversy concerning the rationale and evolution of  central banks—sought to explore the fundamental 
origins and evolution of  central banks with a particular focus on the Bank of  England.   
 
Goodhart’s and Smith’s focus on the Bank of  England echoes also Bagehot’s (1873) original concerns 
about the establishment of  central banks. Like Goodhart and Smith, Bagehot considered the Bank’s case 
as a paradigmatic and illustrious example of  how central banks truly arose and developed from processes 
of  political entanglement initiated by governments’ political interventions in the banking system. 
Additionally, Vera Smith’s (1990 [1936]) historical and institutional explorations sought to shed light on 
the fundamental origins of  central banks and to understand how they might develop as institutions from 
certain special privileges originally granted by governments. These political dynamics hinted at by V. 
Smith and Bagehot will be the core focus of  attention in this chapter, which provides further evidence 
that deeply challenges Goodhart’s (1987, 1988) and Congdon’s (1981) claims that central banks arise 
naturally and are therefore institutionally necessary (see also Giannini, 2011).    
 
Building on Goodhart’s main arguments and the theoretical and historical insights explored in the 
previous chapter about central banks, chapter 4 dives into the paradigmatic historical case of  the Bank 
of  England. It further explores and develops the underlying theory of  Goodhart (1988) concerning the 
evolution of  monetary institutions and the dynamics that can help explain the political evolution and 
emergence of  central banks. More specifically, this chapter examines the establishment and evolution of 
the Bank of England, approximately between the years 1694 and 1890 (see table 1 in section 4.2.1 for a 
summary of  the Bank of  England charters). It utilizes a framework of entangled political economy, which 
originates in a process of politically led bank bargains between private banking interest groups and 
governments (Wagner, 2017). The historical case of the evolution of the Bank of England is a 
 
75 A modified version of  this chapter is forthcoming in the Journal of  Public Finance and Public Choice (Paniagua, 2019a).   
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paradigmatic example of the establishment of a central bank, and it helps to shed additional light on the 
political and economic mechanisms of, and the institutional rationale behind, the development of central 
banks.76 Thus it further enriches and complements the insights about monetary institutions and their 
inherent need (or lack thereof) as detailed in chapter 3.     
  
A central bank may originate, V. Smith (1990 [1936]) argued, either as a privately owned and profit-seeking 
banking institution or as a politically established institution aimed at helping to finance government 
expenditures and war efforts since its foundation (see also Glasner, 1989). These two plausible origins 
are not incompatible, and they might be complementary aspects of  central banks’ origins and the original 
motivations for their establishment (Yeager, 1990). The key point, Bagehot (1873) and Smith (1990 [1936]) 
argued, is that a central bank, and its institutional capacity to grow in bureaucratic complexity, must find 
its origins and evolutionary catalyst within the special economic-political privileges and dominant position 
originally granted to it by government.  
 
If  this entangled and evolutionary conjecture is proven correct, then most of  the arguments reviewed in 
the previous chapter concerning the natural evolution of, and inherent institutional need for, central 
banks are severely weakened. Hence, given the relevance of  this Bagehotian conjecture for the debate 
over the institutional rationale and need for central banking, this chapter will address it in depth. The 
above conjecture is critical for part II of  this thesis and for the whole debate concerning the institutional 
rationale for central banks since it suggests that the true origins of  and catalyst for the establishment and 
institutional evolution of  central banks reside mostly within bank bargains and special privileges originally 
granted to them by governments and sovereigns.  
 
Thus central banks’ origins and the original impulses for their institutional evolution toward a nonprofit 
and public structure reside in the special dynamics of  political entanglements and bargains between 
private banks and political institutions (the sovereign). Thus this chapter argues that bank bargains and 
entangled political-economic dynamics might actually be the core features that provide the key dynamic 
mechanisms for what had been previously believed to be the natural institutional evolution of  central 
banks. 77  It argues that the bargains set in motion the processes of  political entanglement that 
subsequently led to the transformation of  selected for-profit banks into nonprofit and private–public 
hybrid kinds of  bankers’ bank and eventually central banks. The evolution of  the Bank of  England is a 
paradigmatic example of  this entangled dynamic.  
 
Consequently, it is the above Bagehotian conjecture concerning the unnatural (entangled) and primarily 
politically oriented institutional evolution of  central banks that will be the core focus of  attention of  this 
chapter. Ultimately, if  this chapter is able to show that central banks indeed evolve mostly out of  
entanglement dynamics and political processes initiated by bank bargains and by special privileges granted 
solely by the sovereign, then not only will Bagehot’s (1873) conjectures be proven accurate, but 
Goodhart’s (1988) and Congdon’s (1981) natural evolutionary claims will be questioned. Accordingly, this 
chapter complements the arguments explored in chapter 3 against Goodhart’s institutional claims.   
 
Smith (1990 [1936], chapter 2) argued that the political–private bargains for privileges noted above and 
the government’s needs to finance war efforts were the ultimate reasons for the establishment of  the 
Bank of  England. The Bank, as has been pointed out by V. Smith, Bagehot, and Goodhart, is a crucial 
 
76 The 1694 inception of  the Bank has been a matter of  extensive study in the banking literature. Classic works on the Bank 
and its early years include Andréadès (1924), Clapham (1944), Philippovich (1911), and North and Weingast (1989).        
77 This chapter borrows the concept of  ‘bank bargains’ from Calomiris and Haber (2014). They referred to ‘the game of  bank 
bargains’ as the whole political and economic process through which political coalitions in power receive, manage, and 
distribute the concentrated economic benefits and spoils offered by private banks in exchange for both political favors and 
monopolistic powers to those private banks. This includes also the subsequent political processes of  dispersing the cost of  
granting banking privileges, banking rescues, and regulation onto the rest of  society (e.g., uninformed voters). In other words, 
bank bargains can be considered as a subset of  the classical and more general form of  public choice political and economic 
exchange (see Buchanan, 1964; Olson, 1965; Tullock, 1965).  
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and paradigmatic example of  the institutional evolution of  a central bank (see also Clapham, 1944), given 
the Bank’s relevance in the institutional debates, in the world banking and financial system, and its 
longevity (the second-oldest central bank in the world after the Swedish National Bank).  
 
However, despite the works of  Bagehot (1873) and Smith (1990 [1936]) concerning the fundamental 
fiscal origins of  and war-related institutional needs for central banks, and even though economists now 
have a fair understanding of  the political and fiscal reasons why central banks might be established (Broz 
and Grossman, 2004), not much research has been done about how central banks evolve institutionally 
and as bureaucracies, how they grow in bureaucratic complexity, and how they acquire secondary (but 
extremely relevant) functions within the economy through time (Goodhart, 2010). These gaps in the 
banking literature will be a crucial focus of  attention throughout chapter 4, and they will be tackled mainly 
through a framework of  entangled political economy (Wagner, 2010, 2017).78 
     
Additionally, building upon the previous chapters, chapter 4 will use a broad emergentist and political-
economic framework of  bank bargains and entangled political economy pioneered by Calomiris and Haber 
(2014) and Wagner (2010, 2012, 2017), respectively (see footnotes 55 and 56 for definitions). This 
alternative political economic framework will enable us to understand the Bank’s changing role and how 
it evolved from a for-profit private structure to a nonprofit political structure. Ultimately, it is argued that 
the Bank of  England institutionally emerged as a non-profit and politically oriented bank through an 
unintended process of  political entanglement and repetitive bank bargains.  
   
The contribution of  this chapter resides in exploring the overlooked fact that repetitive bank bargains, 
enacted during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, actually created and sustained the unintended 
dynamics of  political-economic entanglement within the English banking system that led to the unnatural 
evolution of  the modern Bank of  England. This alternative account will set this chapter apart from 
Goodhart’s (1988) and Congdon’s (1981) claims by showing that the evolution of  the Bank was a dynamic 
unintended process conditioned through political entanglement rather than stemming from the natural and 
competitive evolutionary forces of  the English banking system.  
 
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 4.1 reviews the major concepts and definitions used throughout 
this chapter. It examines the theory of  political and bank bargains and political-economic entanglement, 
noting how they differ from the additive concept of  mainstream political economy. Section 4.2 explores 
the history of  the Bank of  England’s establishment and early evolution and how the continuous charter 
renewals (particularly two early important ones) exacerbated entanglement. Section 4.3 reviews the Bank’s 
evolution based on the process of  concentration of  reserves of  the entire banking system, enhanced by 
political signals, legal precedents, and the accumulation of  privileges. Section 4.4 concludes.  
 
4.1 Additive Political Economy, Bank Bargains, and Entangled Political Economy   
 
78 Entangled political economy is an alternative framework for analyzing the interactions between political and economic 
entities in a decentralized fashion. It differs from the standard ‘aggregative’ political-economic approach used in economic 
textbooks mainly in that the polity and the economy are not conceptualized through macro and aggregative reductions as 
having point-mass status (see figure 1). The difference between entangled political economy and the standard approach resides 
in the conceptual treatment of  systems of  political economy. While the standard approach uses the macro-level material 
associated with exogenous economic disturbances and treats the elements of  the polity and the economy as aggregative and 
separated conceptualized pure forms, the entanglement approach treats polity and economy as decentralized networks of  
interacting nodes (Wagner, 2010). For entanglement to be possible among different entities, they must be conceptualized as 
networks in which individual nodes (political or economic) create particular connections with other nodes (see figure 2). 
Furthermore, those connections run through both arenas of  action (the political and the economic), and hence they cannot 
be treated as isolated entities as the standard approach does. In socio-economic reality, market and political actions are 
undertaken simultaneously inside an entangled political-economic framework. Under this alternative framework, the ‘polity 
and economy are both arenas of  activity that contain numerous interacting enterprises that are connected in a network fashion 
whose systemic properties depend on the structure of  the network’ (Smith, Wagner, and Yandle, 2011, 47). The main feature 
of  entangled political economy, as depicted in figure 2, is that neither the polity nor the market organizations are 
conceptualized as reducible to a point-mass status (see also Salter, 2014a).                       
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Additive political economy refers to ‘a scheme of  thought where economic equilibrium is conceptualized 
prior to political activity, with political activity then modifying that equilibrium’ (Wagner, 2012, 9). The 
concept starts with the assumption that the economy as a whole is in a state of  equilibrium that might 
not be desirable. From there the political organization as a single entity comes as an exogenous unit into 
the system to take a specific action to move the equilibrium to a new, and preferable, state (see figure 1).  
 
The political entity therefore acts as a whole (united) mass to direct the economic system toward a new, 
preferred (Pareto-improving) state of  equilibrium. This entire concept possesses shortcomings. First, it 
assumes that both the economy and the polity are single, divisible entities or solid unities (separated entire 
wholes) of  equilibrated relationships (Wagner, 2010). In reality, the economic and political worlds are 
formed by a myriad of  interacting actors and decentralized entities (see chapter 1). In that heterogeneous 
setting, objectives and incentives of  actors might differ, but they interact in a meaningful manner. Second, 
the assumption that the political entity is detached both socially and economically from the economic 
sphere is unfounded since the polity’s foundation and survival require support from the economic order 
(Buchanan, 1990; Tullock, 1965; Wagner, 2017).  
 
It is important to notice that any analytical framework unavoidably will illuminate some aspects of  the 
phenomena in question while ignoring or discarding other aspects (see chapter 1). Entangled political 
economy differs from the standard and ‘normal approach’ (Wagner, 2010) of  political economy in 
understanding social relationships. For example, the framework of  ‘additive political economy’, or 
‘separated political economy’, as illustrated in Besley (2006) and Persson and Tabellini (2000), models the 
relationships between political and economic organizations as unidirectional relationships running from 
the political entity as a whole to economic organizations (see figure 1 below).  
 
 




This linear and sequential relationship seemingly arises from entirely distinct, divisible institutional 
frameworks, modeled as point-mass systems (Smith et al., 2011). This unidirectional and linear 
relationship severely limits the analysis of  socio-economic interactions to treating relationships as static 
equilibrated ones in a ‘one action, one outcome’ setting. For example, the government sees a space for 
 
79 In this figure, the polity is represented as a single whole and denoted by the square, and the single whole economy is 
represented by the circle. The polity acts as a single-massed entity upon the entire economy, which responds to the top-down 
policy as a single-massed entity, shifting its original equilibrium toward a new and Pareto-improving equilibrium. The four 
figures used throughout this chapter were created by the author but are based on versions of  Wagner’s (2010) and Salter’s 
(2014a) figures.           
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improvement and the political entity acts upon the economic system to move it toward the desired 
equilibrium. Figure 1 above illustrates this additive and standard analytical framework.   
 
Within the standard framework, the final societal equilibrium is generated by a process of  sequential 
addition of  two entirely separated institutional frameworks: a framework of  private property, competition, 
and freedom of  contract governing the market order, and a political-constitutional framework that 
governs political exchanges. Actions designed and undertaken in the political arena modify the 
equilibrium outcome attainable in the market arena. A crucial feature of  this standard approach is that 
both the polity and the economy are treated as point-mass wholes that act upon one another in a linear 
unidirectional manner, as billiard balls interact within a billiards game (Wagner, 2010).      
 
This standard view treats cause and effect as an exercise of  comparative static analysis (Wagner, 2010). 
Implicitly this approach models the outcomes of  the macro-linear relationships as if  they are on the same 
complexity and ontological level as that at which actors make their original choices (see also chapter 1). 
Since the causal relationships are linear and unidirectional, and the agents have assumed pre-reconciled 
objectives, the macro outcomes are therefore simply derived from the agents’ original choices (Kirman, 
1992). Hence the societal outcomes are conceptualized at the same level of  complexity and ontology as 
the choices made by the isolated agents (Salter, 2014a; Wagner, 2017).  
 
This ‘additive’ and linear approach severely disregards the open-ended nature of  choice along with the 
crucial yet unintended institutional consequences arising from the orderly relationships (Wagner, 2010, 
2012). As seen in chapter 1, relationships, interactions, institutional evolution, and their political-
economic emergent outcomes are social interactive elements of  a higher complexity level, irreducible to 
agents’ original choices in an equilibrium framework (Ostrom, 2000). These relational, emergentist, and 
institutional complex properties are precisely the elements that entangled political economy—and also 
this entire work—seeks to illuminate (Wagner, 2017). 
 
4.1.1 Central banks’ ‘joint production’ rationale and bank bargains  
 
As suggested in the introduction, the more concrete goal of  this chapter is to understand the evolution 
of  the Bank of  England through the ideas of  bank bargains and entangled political economy.80 Public 
choice and standard neoclassical economic analysis have thus far modeled central banks mainly as natural 
and rational institutional responses to crises and the demand for public goods, following the logic of  
collective action and the provision of  public goods (Olson, 1965; Giannini, 2011; Goodhart, 1988). Their 
establishment and evolution have been interpreted as a logical (rational) and beneficial convergence 
between public and private interests and thus as the rational establishment of  a ‘joint production’ kind 
of  exchange (Broz, 1998; North and Weingast, 1989).  
 
Thus central banks have been interpreted as an institutional manifestation of  a joint-production 
agreement between the sovereign and the private sector, bilaterally undertaken to collectively produce 
public goods such as financial stability, banking supervision, banking services, and easier and more 
predictable long-term forms of  government financing (Broz, 1998; North and Weingast, 1989). This sort 
of  monocentric institutional arrangement, the literature argues, has been rationally created ex ante to 
efficiently provide dispersed collective benefits to society; and it additionally establishes a bureaucratic 
entity providing concentrated benefits to private interest groups (Broz, 1998; North and Weingast, 1989). 
Hence central banks seem to be a rational compromise and outcome of  beneficial exchanges between 
well-intended politicians and interest groups (Broz, 1998; North and Weingast, 1989).     
 
 
80 For tractability of  the specific bargain dynamics, this chapter focuses on analyzing entanglement of  entities such as banks 
and Parliament, rather than single and specific decentralized actors involved in them. Nevertheless, propositions can still be 
made at the level of  interacting entities despite the fact that in reality acting local individuals form them (Calomiris and Haber, 
2014; Patrick and Wagner, 2015; Wagner, 2010).            
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While Broz’s (1998) public choice concept of  joint production is able to explain the microfoundations 
and rationale of  the original (1694) Bank charter, it implicitly assumes that the first bank charter was 
actually a permanent institutional entity and thus that the Bank was originally created as a fully developed 
central bank benefiting all parties and society (North and Weingast, 1989). In other words, it implicitly 
assumes that the banking entity was fully established with its banking goals and macroeconomic 
objectives already defined. Therefore, it critically neglects, and is unable to explain, the role of  the 
subsequent recharter bargains, in which the Bank gained extra, unpredicted, and, importantly, nonmarket 
characteristics and evolved unexpectedly and slowly toward a nonprofit structure and finally into a fully 
fledged central bank (see table 1 for a summary of  the Bank charters).  
 
In fact, history shows that the Bank’s institutional properties unintendedly changed through time as the 
entanglement processes advanced because of  the charter renewals and legal precedents, to the point that 
the Bank became a bankers’ bank and the center of  reserves of  the entire English system (Dowd, 1993). 
Hence given the shortcomings of  Broz’s joint-production account to explain institutional evolution, this 
chapter proposes a different theory that extends his and Broz and Grossman’s (2004) account. This 
proposed theory explains the unintended process by which the political-economy order becomes 
increasingly entangled, affecting the entire English banking system and the Bank’s role in it.  
 
The entanglement allows a polity organization (the sovereign) to transmit some of  its extra-market and 
political features to the economy organization (banks) with which it establishes relationships. The 
transmission of  such nonmarket features was an essential part of  bank bargains between the Bank and 
the government (Calomiris and Haber, 2014). Building upon Stigler (1971), the ‘game of  bank bargains’ 
(Calomiris and Haber, 2014) is a process that considers government policies and banking legislations as 
the outcomes of  dynamic partnerships and exchanges among private interest groups and political 
coalitions that control regulation, definitions of  property rights, and banking policy (see footnote 55). 
The constitutional, legal, and political framework shapes those partnerships and determines the current 
distribution of  political and economic powers that might influence negotiations among interested parties.  
 
The bank-bargain players are usually groups, entities, or institutions that have a stake in the banking 
system’s performance and credit allocation. In this particular case, the main players were Parliament, 
government, and the shareholders (owners) and managers of  the Bank (Calomiris and Haber, 2014, 
chapter 2). Coalitions, compromises, and agreements might form among the possible interested players 
and affect the banking industry’s rules and competitive properties. Calomiris and Haber (2014, 32–34) 
recognize that governments possess the power to regulate banks and the power to enforce credit 
contracts through altering the structure of  property rights via bank charters.  
 
Particularly, through legally granted charters and legislation, governments might seek to influence the 
banking system’s degrees of  competitiveness, altering its market contestability and economic properties, 
so that banking responds institutionally instead to political needs and pressure groups’ objectives rather 
than to competition, market signals, and economic efficiencies. When polity (and government) entities 
leverage charters, banking regulations, and the property-rights system through political deal making, they 
can generate a propitious environment in the chartering negotiations that could bind and entangle the 
polity and the banking sector. The possibility of  altering the property-rights system and the legal 
framework established by the government for enforcing contracts through charters affects the 
relationships between polity entities and banks through time (Broz and Grossman, 2004).  
 
When bank bargains—under incomplete and imperfect contracts—determine property rights and the 
legal and economic limits within which banks operate, banks and government actors that gain from those 
bargains are interested in perpetuating or enhancing (perfecting) those bargains to renegotiate and 
improve contracts in their favor by altering legal and property-rights structures in subsequent charters. 
This could generate a flexibly adjusted and symbiotic long-term bargaining relationship, opening the 
possibility of  dynamic entanglement among the involved entities. Hence bank bargains through time (in 
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the form of  charter renewals) could be a strong starting point of  an entanglement process that 
perpetuates through time. Commercial banks affected by these assignments of  property rights or legal 
constraints will no longer be private in the full meaning of  the term. Banks shaped under politicized 
chartering arrangements and negotiations are founded on systems of  partnerships with government, 
importing nonmarket characteristics through time that reflect different bargaining powers among the 
entities that negotiate the bank charter renewals (Calomiris and Haber, 2014, 13).  
 
The fundamental point of  the concept of  bank bargains is that a polity or political actors that have certain 
enforcement and legal powers might seek to form long-term partnerships (repetitive exchanges) and 
negotiations with private actors. Through a mutually beneficial partnership—under incomplete 
contracts—the political entity wants to gain from repetitive political trades while in exchange it gives a 
certain bundle of  property-rights (privileges) and beneficial regulatory structure to banks. The negotiated 
and politically oriented bank-charter structure severely affects the banking sector’s economic and market 
for-profit boundaries, which in turn blurs (erodes) its original market boundaries via the structure of  
charter rights and legal privileges. Repetitive games of  bank bargains therefore could start the process of  
political entanglement and more critically advance the entanglement’s own endogenous expansion and 
growth.  
 
Bank charters can be seen as institutional and legal formalizations of  ongoing exchanges and incomplete 
negotiations (incomplete contracts) between polity and economic entities. More importantly, they also 
generate institutional and political-economic novelty in the social order, affecting the network of  
relationships and their market boundaries (Wagner, 2010). Importantly, the dynamics and rationale of  
bank bargains can explain how the process of  political entanglement actually originates and extends 
across the banking system. Political entanglement can be carried forward and exacerbated with bank 
bargains based on flexible and incomplete contracts under uncertainty that allow for future renegotiations 
among parties to persist (Broz and Grossman, 2004). Critically for this chapter, the analytical nexus 
between, on the one hand, bank bargains under uncertainty and incomplete contracts and, on the other 
hand, the advancement of  political entanglement has not been previously explored in the banking 
literature (see for example Salter, 2014a). Hence the major contribution of  this chapter.   
 
Furthermore, this nexus can also contribute to enlarging a political-economic and complexity-based 
understanding of  central banks’ developments in general, and explain the Bank of  England’s evolution 
in particular. Bank bargains can be at the core of  the process that initiates political economic 
entanglements and continuously adds novelty to social relationships since ‘entangled political economy 
is centered on networks and evolutionary process of  development, where that development is kept in 
motion by individual efforts to seek gain by putting together deals that often are triadic’ (Patrick and 
Wagner, 2015, 105). Consequently, chartering and chartering-renewal procedures under incomplete 
contracts that define (or rearrange) property rights and grant special privileges to banks appear to be a 
propitious setting for entanglement and unintended institutional evolution within the banking sector.  
 
4.1.2 Bank bargains and the framework of  entangled political economy  
 
A key aspect of  bank bargains resides in the ongoing negotiations in which the involved parties make 
deals that provide concentrated benefits to them but often externalize pecuniary and nonpecuniary costs 
and risks to less informed and less organized third parties (Calomiris and Haber, 2014, 37–38; Olson, 
1965). This happens to also be at the core of  triadic relationships typical of  entangled systems 
(Podemska-Mikluch and Wagner, 2013; Wagner, 2017). In the case of  the Bank, the process is a dynamic 
and bidirectional economic and political exchange between the entities involved in bargaining under 
unfolding uncertainties and incomplete contracts. The concept of  entanglement can help to illuminate 
the long-term unintended institutional effects of  these relationships (see figure 2). In this framework, the 
economy and the polity are considered as nonhierarchical nodes that establish bidirectional relationships 
in a complex unfolding network. The polity is no longer a single entity but a constellation of  nodes with 
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different political and economic powers within a type of  loose hierarchy of  bureaucracies (Tullock, 1965; 
Wagner, 2010). Figure 2 below illustrates this alternative—non-additive and decentralized—framework. 
 
Entanglement dynamics originate from the actions of  the parties and actors involved in the bank bargains, 
who are also entrenched in a network of  political-economic relationships. Unlike what the joint-
production framework (see Broz, 1998) argues about institutions, the emergent and more complex 
institutional effects that arise from the entanglement dynamics are not part of  the ex ante, conscious, and 
rational plans of  the actors involved (Wagner, 2012). As in the process of  bank bargains, the entities (or 
parties) enter into incomplete contracts since they expect gains from bargaining. In their rational 
maximizing behavior, however, neither of  the parties involved has future knowledge and foresight as to 
where the relationships—under incomplete contracts—might lead, institutionally speaking. The 
unintended outcome of  the bank bargains leads to a process of  systemic entanglement that can be 
perpetuated and enhanced endogenously through the banks’ narrow interests or coalitions’ dynamics, 
affecting the overall institutional framework, incentives, and market setting in which banks ultimately 
operate.  
 






Importantly for the scope of  this chapter, the bank bargaining process has dynamic and endogenous 
synergy, because of  the charter renewals, that further feeds the process of  entanglement throughout the 
banking industry. The Bank of  England’s charter renewals were the unexpected product of  an original 
and incomplete contract between private and public actors that desired to adapt the original charter 
through time in order to deal with unfolding uncertainties related to debt and war contingencies.  
 
Consequently, and unlike what has been stressed in the literature (Salter, 2014a; Smith, Wagner, and 
Yandle, 2011), the dynamics of  entanglement do not solely arise from regular interactions with a single 
polity ‘big player’ entity overseeing and regulating economic entities (Patrick and Wagner, 2015). The 
 
81 Figure 2 represents the entangled-political-economy framework. Here the polity and the economy are not conceptualized 
through reduction to aggregative point-mass status. Here instead the decentralized individual entities in the economy 
(represented by circles) establish multiple relationships with local political entities (represented by squares). The polity and the 
economy are both arenas of  activities that are overlapping and interact, and thus they contain numerous interacting enterprises. 
This framework treats governments as polycentric orders, very similar to a form of  overlapping bureaucratic enterprises, and 
not as single and monocentric centrally planned organizations (Tullock, 1965). It assumes that the polity is not a unified and 
monocentric source of  power and governance, but rather a loose network of  overlapping bureaucratic entities (Wagner, 2017).     
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entangled dynamics—as the Bank of  England’s case shows—can also be found in processes of  political 
bargains and banking coalitions arising naturally within the network of  interactions, given an original set 
of  political and economic powers. In other words, the repeated interactions and banking privileges, in 
the case of  the Bank of  England, were the politically contingent consequences of  the adjustments among 
similar parties that renegotiated bargains and updated the contract, not the consequences of  a typical 
regulatory-supervisory relationship between government and economic entities (Ikeda, 1997).   
 
Through rearranging property rights and through banking regulation, the bargains between the Bank and 
Parliament initiated the entanglement process, which unintentionally affected the polity–banking order 
and the entire banking system. Moreover, the bank bargains’ direct effects upon the Bank of  England 
actually dissipated and spread beyond the individual entities’ borders, affecting also the English banking 
order at large, as will be shown in section 4.3. When the banking entity involved in the bargain (the Bank) 
reaped the benefits of  the exchange, it started to import extra-market (political) characteristics from the 
polity (Parliament). The privileged position and nonmarket properties granted to a bank through the 
bargain overshadow and erode the relevance of  the previous market process’s economic and competitive 
discipline and guiding signals (Smith et al., 2011). Thus the entanglement undermines market and credit 
signals originally generated within the competitive market ordering, making the banking system more 
dependent upon political and nonmarket signals (see section 4.3).   
 
Hence, as will be argued in the following section, through repetitive bargains the Bank of  England 
became ‘no longer purely a private ordering, since the terms on which it operates are now a mixture of  
the logic of  private orderings and common orderings’ (Salter, 2014a, 9). Furthermore, when such 
entanglement is visible and clear to other commercial banks, they will also seek to be part of  it in order 
to reap extra-market (polity) benefits, extending the entanglement throughout the rest of  the banking 
system (Baumol, 1990; Salter, 2014a; Smith et al., 2011). Indeed, because of  crucial legal precedents, the 
signaling aspect of  the entanglement was a decisive condition of  the evolution of  the Bank toward a 
central bank, further spreading the entanglement to the rest of  the system, as I will argue in section 4.3.       
 
Consequently, bank bargains in the form of  renegotiating incomplete chartering contracts not only jump-
started the entanglement dynamics between a commercial bank and Parliament, but further advanced 
into a progressive cumulative entanglement spreading among other commercial entities and banks in the 
network. The crucial unintended aspect is that gradual entanglement of  the system led to further 
exporting (transmitting) polity and nonmarket characteristics to the commercial banks involved, eroding 
the private-competitive ordering of  banks in England, and undermining the guiding market signals 
needed to efficiently provide and allocate money and credit. This point is important since these entangled 
and strategic interactions do not lead necessarily to the growth of  the bureaucratic apparatus, as Tullock 
(1965) suggested, but rather lead to the degradation of  the boundaries between private organizations and 
political entities (a form of  crony capitalism) and hence the detrimental shifting of  economic rationale 
toward political rationale among the organizations within the banking system (Baumol, 1990; Zingales, 
2012).  
              
4.2 The Bank of  England’s Political Entanglement Generated by Charter Renewals   
 
As argued throughout chapter 3, Goodhart’s (1988) account of  the natural evolution of  central banks 
resides mainly in recognizing that because of  economic considerations such as economies of  scale, 
simplification of  interbank lending and clearing, and reducing the overall need to mobilize reserves 
constantly among banks (all of  which reduce interbank transaction costs), competing banks have a natural 
tendency to centralize (and economize) reserves in the system (Dowd, 1993; Selgin, 1993). Goodhart 
(1988, 34) further suggested that this economizing tendency naturally leads banks to concentrate reserves 
with one important (and safe) bank; and that bank thus becomes a bankers’ bank and a controller of  
reserves of  the entire system (see section 3.1). From then onward, that for-profit bankers’ bank, because 
of  its crucial and systemic role in managing the reserves of  other commercial banks, will naturally 
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transform itself  into a nonprofit-for-profit hybrid central bank (see section 3.1 for more details).   
 
Goodhart’s generalized and ‘inevitable’ account of  the ‘centripetal forces’ of  the concentration of  
reserves leads him to assume that competitive banking is inherently hierarchical and monocentric as an 
optimal institutional arrangement, thus assuming away the possibilities of  institutional heterogeneity and 
polycentricism in banking (see also Paniagua, 2019b). Banking competition and centralization of  reserves 
(to economize on them) lead—according to Goodhart—to a gradual domination of  a single for-profit 
bank that handles high levels of  reserves of  other commercial banks, and thus lends to competitors 
(unwillingly) in times of  distress (Goodhart, 1988, 37). The bankers’ bank then, by gradually accumulating 
and managing the system’s reserves, adopts regulatory and supervisory roles over competing banks, and 
it establishes reserves and regulatory relationships with them. 
 
Unfortunately, according to Goodhart (1987, 1988), because of  inherent and deep conflicts of  interest 
between its previously for-profit role and its new nonprofit (public) role as interbank coordinator of  
reserves and lending, and regulator of  commercial banks, a bankers’ bank will have to become a 
noncompetitive (state-led) central bank to better play the new social and systemic role; reflecting the public 
interest of  safeguarding the entire banking system and its reserves. A monocentric and noncompetitive 
central bank, then, Goodhart claims, seems to be a natural and necessary institutional outcome of  
commercial banks’ inherent tendencies to concentrate, and economize on, reserves in a single for-profit 
banking entity.  
 
This section will now scrutinize and challenge this natural evolutionary account by reviewing the key 
historical events (the original charter, plus the two following charter renewals) that led the Bank of  
England to become the bankers’ bank of  the entire English system (see table 1 in page 106 for a summary 
of  the Bank of  England charters). This section indicates that what Goodhart believed to be a natural and 
generalized evolution of  central banking is in reality an unintended and emergent institutional effect of  
a specific political-economic dynamic entanglement process initiated by bank bargains between political 
organizations and a commercial, largely for-profit bank. The entanglement process in England led the 
Bank to gradually accumulate nonmarket (polity) characteristics and therefore to gradually become a 
polity–economy hybrid (Broz and Grossman, 2004).82  
 
The bank-charter model began with monarchs needing to finance the creation of  their international 
expansionary domains. Most successful empires used charter monopolies on different business activities 
as a way to subcontract and finance colonization (Calomiris and Haber, 2014, chapter 3). The bank 
charters allowed the banks involved to benefit from unique legal privileges and nonmarket features while 
furthering the financial and colonization goals of  the state. In the case of  England, after the Glorious 
Revolution of  1688, King William III needed resources to finance the war against Louis XIV of  France 
(Dowd, 1993). To do so while constrained by Parliament, he had to rely on corporate and chartered 
entities as an important part of  funding long-term debt for war efforts.  
 
The Financial Revolution (1693–1720) undertaken by Parliament allowed the English state to replace 
costly and unpredictable short-term floating debt with predictable and funded long-term loans secured 
by sector-specific revenue streams. Chartering a bank in exchange for long-term credit was part of  that 
innovation, which also helped reduce credit transaction costs, improving the monarchs’ financial situation 
and capacity to leverage and borrow in the long run (Broz and Grossman, 2004, 54; North and Weingast, 
1989). This process of  ‘incorporation of  the public debt’ (Philippovich, 1911) established a series of  
monopoly charter schemes by which government incorporated potential state creditors into joint-stock 
companies to have access to a stable pool of  creditors.  
 
82 Because of  length constraints, I review only the earliest, and most important, chartering bargains (the original charter and 
the two following recharters), which conveyed and explain the major nonmarket characteristics attributed to the Bank (Smith, 
1990 [1936]). Additionally, in section 4.3, I also review the period 1797–1821, characterized by suspensions of  gold payments 
(the ceased of  redemption in specie) and the de facto legal tender status of  the Bank’s notes.     
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These chartered companies were founded to provide funded loans and credit to the English monarchs 
in exchange for monopoly deals and corporate privileges. One of  the first of  these deals was with the 
‘Governor and Company of  the Bank of  England’ in 1694, as proposed by entrepreneur William 
Patterson (Broz, 1998). Unlike the other two chartered companies (the New East India Company and 
the South Sea Company), the Bank was the only chartered company able to survive in close entanglement 
with the government for centuries. Between 1694 and 1844, the Bank’s charter was renewed nine times. 
The renegotiations and agreements that perpetuated and enlarged the Bank’s entanglement in the 
economy reflected contextual and ad hoc economic and political uncertainties unfolding through time and 
the different bargaining powers possessed by the involved parties (Broz and Grossman, 2004). This 
section will now review the early evolution of  the Bank in line with the dynamics of  bank bargains and 
political entanglement as defined in section 4.1. 
 
A parliamentary act initially established the Bank with an expiration date, critically suggesting the lack of  
a serious compromise (or vision) among the involved parties to create a robust joint-production public 
institution to provide critical public goods and services in the long run. The Bank was originally chartered 
only for eleven years with initial capital of  £1,200,000, which was immediately lent to the government at 
8 percent (Broz and Grossman, 2004). As part of  the initial bargain, the government authorized the Bank 
to issue notes in the same amount (Smith, 1990 [1936]). The charters had explicit expirations after which 
Parliament could dissolve the Bank through exercising an option with a one-year notice by repaying its 
loan. Thus each charter renewal, until 1844, extended the lifespan of  the Bank for a limited time only.  
 
Furthermore, these renewals occurred at irregular intervals and always earlier than the original expiration 
date of  each charter, reflecting the necessity of  both parties to negotiate, bargain, and enhance the 
entanglement (Broz and Grossman, 2004). The Bank’s charter was never dissolved; it was renewed nine 
times by Parliament between 1694 and 1844, the date of  the last Continuance Act. Indeed, ‘during the 
century and a half  following the Bank’s founding, charter renewals were a recurrent feature of  the Bank’s 
life’ (ibid., 50). Hence, unlike what the joint-production literature suggests (Broz, 1998), the ‘early history 
of  the Bank was a series of  exchanges of  favours between a needy Government and an accommodating 
corporation’ (Smith, 1990 [1936], 12). Moreover, it is this ‘recurrent feature’ within the Bank’s early life 
that ended up transforming the Bank from a commercial, yet privileged, for-profit corporation into a 
non-profit central bank. 
      
The original bargain culminated in the creation of  the 1694 Bank charter as an ‘incomplete contract’ that 
reflected the relative bargaining power of  each party.83 The original charter was the product of  a mutually 
beneficial political-economic exchange between the government and the Bank’s shareholders ‘designed 
to ensure that the parties remained mutual hostages to an initial incomplete contract’ (Broz and 
Grossman, 2004, 58). This is the initial relationship that created an entangled link between the two types 
of  organizations. Consequently, the first Bank charter established endogenous bargaining flexibility and 
malleability in a ‘contracting under uncertainty’ outlook; thus opening the path for further interactions, 
bargains, and deeper entanglement through time.   
 
Subsequently, the British government benefited from the rechartering process and option features of  the 
incomplete contract in order to bargain and adjust the original agreement in response to unexpected 
changes in its fiscal and political environment. The Bank’s managers, meanwhile, used the charter 
renegotiations also as a mechanism to protect themselves from unfolding competition (ibid., 51). 
Accordingly, the ‘renegotiation clause thus gave the parties the flexibility to adjust the contract to changed 
conditions’ (ibid., 53). Adaptable bargains renewing the limited Bank charter then allowed both parties 
the flexibility to endogenously and constantly incorporate into the exchange process unfolding exogenous 
uncertainties, both from competitive market forces (competing banks) and international political and war 
pressure (competing states and empires).  
 
 
83 Readers interested in an overview of  the theory of  incomplete contracts can consult Tirole (1999).  
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Thus ‘the rechartering process reflected the needs of  both the government and the Bank of  England to 
respond to unforeseen contingencies’ (ibid., 53). A substantial part of  the bargain was then the flexibility 
to increase entanglement by eroding market pressures and competition via renegotiating the charter at 
the involved parties’ discretion. The first charter allowed the government more long-term capacity to 
borrow, smoothing the cost of  higher war expenditures and allowing the Bank’s coalition of  shareholders 
to profit from government-created extra-market rents and benefits (Broz, 1998; Calomiris and Haber, 
2014).  
 
It is important to notice that the first original charter reflected no intention of  establishing a robust and 
long-term central bank in any form (Broz, 1998; Smith, 1990 [1936]); nor was it intended to substantially 
affect the shape and form of  the entire banking system and to concentrate the English banking system’s 
reserves into a monocentric structure. Indeed, the Bank ‘received no exclusive privileges in its initial 1694 
charter beyond making the notes of  the Bank assignable by law’ (Broz and Grossman, 2004, 55). However, 
the first charter did establish a flexible bargain that set in motion the dynamic process of  renegotiating 
renewals among the involved parties, enabling the entanglement process to unfold, which has in fact 
impacted the English banking system up to today. This first charter then established the path between 
the polity and the economic organizations by which the polity’s characteristics could be further 
transmitted to the Bank through renegotiations of  the charter. This altered the structure of  banking 
property rights and eroded the Bank’s market order, leading to its transformation into a hybrid entity.  
 
4.2.1 The Bank of  England’s two rechartering bargains and further entanglement  
 
The two subsequent charter renewals, in 1697 and 1708, resulted in further entanglement. They were 
mainly driven first by the increases in the government’s budget deficit due to war financing and second 
by competitive banking pressures from the market ordering (Broz and Grossman, 2004, 54–55). In the 
original 1694 charter, the Bank was granted the following extra-market characteristics: the right to form 
a joint-stock company with limited liability, the right by Parliament to conduct a banking business (in the 
first charter, this was not an exclusive right), and the right to issue notes in the amount of  the Bank’s 
capital (Broz, 1998). Thus the Bank was formed as a corporation with regular shareholders entitled to 
dividends from the profits earned through the regular interest payments on the loans by the government 
and through the nonmarket benefits granted by the charter.  
 
The major extension and transmission of  monopolistic and nonmarket characteristics mainly came from 
two crucial rechartering (bargaining) processes: first in 1697 and then in 1708 (see table 1 in page 106 for 
a summary of  the Bank charters). These bargains can be seen as dynamic ones in which a political entity 
and an economic entity (rent-seeking group) contract under uncertainty in the form of  an incomplete 
contract (Broz and Grossman, 2004). Importantly, the initial (1694) contract included the possibility of  
renegotiating the charter in order to adjust to unfolding uncertainty in the government’s fiscal and credit 
position and shifts in the bargaining powers of  the contracting players, as contingencies and challenges 
arose in both the contestability and competition of  the banking system and the government’s needs to 
support war efforts.   
 
The 1697 and 1708 charter renewals then were used as a crucial mechanism to adapt the original 1694 
incomplete contract to unfolding war, political, and market uncertainties, in turn exacerbating the political 
entanglement of  the banking system. Indeed, the extensive and distinct monopoly privileges granted to 
the Bank came only with the recharters of  1697 and 1708 (Broz, 1998). The original charter was designed 
such that the entangled parties became mutual contracting hostages (which in turn was the core of  the 
continued entanglement) to the incomplete contract (Broz and Grossman, 2004, 58).  
 
Consequently, the first three charters (1694, 1697, and 1708) then established the main properties of  the 
incomplete, yet self-adapting and highly flexible, contract, which allowed both parties to remain entangled 
and survive as mutual hostages to contingencies and unforeseen challenges through time. This symbiotic-
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contractual situation led the parties in the original bargain to subsequently collaborate in 1697 with the 
first Continuance Act, when Parliament extended further and important nonmarket privileges in 
exchange for further credit and war financing. This rechartering process eventually led to the 
establishment of  the English central bank.   
 
The monarch needed to negotiate the first renewal in 1697 since war pressures had increased the budget 
deficit through time (Broz, 1998). Moreover, there were further market pressures stemming from the 
upcoming chartering of  the Land Bank. These pressures pushed the Bank of  England to pursue further 
entanglement in order to seek barriers to entry of  potential new-chartered banks. 84  The Bank of  
England’s original 1694 charter did not limit the ability of  Parliament to charter additional, competing 
banks. But soon after Parliament acted opportunistically on this ability in 1695—when it attempted to 
charter the Land Bank—the Bank demanded an earlier renegotiation of  the charter in 1697 so that the 
government could commit itself  to enforcing a legal Bank of  England chartered monopoly. Hence the 
idea was to use the flexible bank bargains to update and improve the former incomplete contract in order 
to adapt to the new market and political contingencies.        
 
Table 1: Summary of the Bank of England Charters, 1694–184485 
 
 
Date of Actual Charter Years of Actual Duration Original Time to Final Option (Years) 
1694 3 11 (1705) 
1697 11 13 (1710) 
1708 5 23 (1732) 
1713 29 29 (1742) 
1742 22 22 (1764) 
1764 17 22 (1786) 
1781 19 31 (1812) 
1800 33 33 (1833) 
1833 11 22 (1855) 
1844 Indefinitely 11 (1855) 
 
Sources: Andréadès (1924), Clapham (1944), Broz and Grossman (2004), Acts of Parliament 
 
This new round of  bargaining culminated in the first 1697 Bank rechartering, known as the Continuance 
Act, which increased the Bank’s nonmarket and polity characteristics—for example, by increasing its 
note-issuance capacity and giving it a monopoly over managing government accounts and balances. The 
latter was ‘a provision that added considerably to its prestige’ (Smith, 1990 [1936], 12). Even more 
importantly, in response to the Land Bank charter (see footnote 62), the Continuance Act stated that ‘no 
other Bank or Constitution in the nature of  a bank [shall] be erected or established, permitted or allowed 
 
84 In 1695, Parliament opportunistically allowed the chartering of  a rival bank called the Land Bank, which was a banking rival 
and of  much concern to the Bank. This unexpected legal precedent deeply challenged the Bank’s profitability and its preferred 
and monocentric political position. This pushed the Bank’s managers to seek a renegotiation of  the bargain earlier than 
expected (only three years after the original charter) in order to obtain legal exclusivity in the recharter and thus prevent future 
potential Land Banks from challenging the Bank’s hegemonic and political position (Clapham, 1944, 47). Interestingly, only 
two years after Parliament had established the Bank of  England, it attempted to replace it with a national Land Bank, thus 
precipitating a political “battle for the Banks’” (Rubini, 1970, 693). For further details concerning the chartering of  the Land 
Bank and the political struggle between the Bank of  England and the Land Bank consult Rubini (1970).   
85 Broz and Grossman (2004) provided evidence showing that through the years, renewal timing reflected increasing necessities 
of  each party to renegotiate the bargain and incorporate unfolding market and fiscal uncertainty. They found evidence showing 
that the government’s motive for rechartering was primarily fiscal. Indeed, ‘recharters that took place more than a decade 
before the option date of  the previous charter seem to have been motivated by substantial government deficit’ (ibid., 53). The 
probability of  early rechartering ‘increased as fiscal deficits, most likely unanticipated and war-related, increased. . . . [A] new 
charter was more likely when the Bank appeared to be earning excessive rents from its monopoly privileges’ (ibid., 53). On 
these incentives to recharter see also Calomiris and Haber (2014).  
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by Act of  Parliament during the Continuance of  the Bank of  England’. The first renewal stated also that 
the Bank’s profits were exempt from taxation, and it gave the Bank the nationwide legal monopoly on 
using limited liability in banking. This last feature was a new and special nonmarket privilege denied to 
competing banks for one and a half  centuries (Smith, 1990 [1936]).   
 
The 1697 rechartering process allows us to understand the entanglement that the first Bank bargain of  
1694 had started. When new market and political forces threatened the Bank’s position and expected 
profitability (such as the establishment of  the Land Bank or other potential competing bank charters), 
its managers sought ways to mend the incomplete original contract (see footnotes 62 and 63). Hence only 
three years after its inception, the Bank renegotiated the charter in order to incorporate these unfolding 
market threats (the potential establishment of  banks similar to the Land Bank). The renegotiation thus 
further degraded the Bank’s market boundaries and economic characteristics. 
 
A second crucial example of  how the incomplete contract was ‘improved’ by increasing entanglement 
between the parties came along with the second recharter (in 1708). During that time, the joint-stock-
company business model was spreading through different markets (Smith, 1990 [1936]). This new 
business model clearly challenged the Bank’s position because of  the innovation in corporate governance 
that could have made it possible for original owners to employ less personal capital, to establish banks 
faster, and to disperse risk over more shareholders. Thus the joint-stock-company business model could 
have increased the degree of  contestability and competition in banking, while keeping systemic risk 
contained (Goodspeed, 2016).  
 
At the same time, during the War of  the Spanish Succession the British government was looking to 
extend its loans and credit capacity, and saw its financial needs increase. In exchange, the government 
offered the possibility of  a second recharter. The recharter of  1708 had the objective to restrict 
competition in banking through limiting the capacity to use the joint-stock-company business model in 
opening new banks. The accumulated privileges until then gave the Bank a unique politically oriented and 
nonmarket position of  prestige, which other banks found difficult to compete with, especially in the 
Bank’s core lines of  business (Smith, 1990 [1936]).        
 
Because of  the potential pressure of  competition, the Bank sought to move further away from the 
competitive market order since it realized that the 1697 recharter had failed to foresee the rise of  business 
innovations such as unincorporated private competitors. The second recharter thus gave the Bank a 
monopoly through prohibiting other firms and banks to form associations of  more than six partners to 
carry out banking businesses in England and by reaffirming previous prohibitions (Broz, 1998). This 
restriction upon the maximum number of  partners severely raised risks and barriers to entry, and lowered 
competition and the whole contestability of  the banking system. This second recharter was crucial in 
restricting banking competition and contestability since issuing banknotes—while pooling risk—was the 
major source of  bank funding and sustainability  (White, 1984; 1989a, 73).  
 
Since the Bank regarded its de facto paper-currency monopoly as critical for its profitability, managers 
were ‘willing to make financial concessions to the government in order to protect and extend it’ (Broz 
and Grossman, 2004, 57). Moreover, the de facto monopoly over joint-stock banking and the severe 
limits upon note issuance and other banking activities by partnerships of  more than six partners (a 
monopoly and limit reaffirmed and strengthened in 1742) severely undermined banking competition for 
over a century (White, 1984). The 1708 rechartering fits the general pattern predicted by political 
entanglement (Patrick and Wagner, 2015; Wagner, 2017). Once the bank bargains started in 1694, it was 
in the involved parties’ interest to seek further entanglement by updating the original incomplete contract 
in response to their unfolding political and commercial needs and challenges.  
 
It is important to note that the Bank’s entanglement did not come during times of  economic crisis or 
from a strictly formal regulatory interaction between the parties, as most of  the public choice and 
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entanglement literature indicates (Patrick and Wagner, 2015; Salter, 2014a; Smith, Wagner, and Yandle, 
2011). The entanglement process can originate also through the dynamics of  banking bargains in the 
form of  open-ended charter renewals based on incomplete contracts. As long as business innovations, 
competitive markets, and political-legal developments threatened the Bank’s position and market 
profitability, it led to renegotiations at irregular intervals, allowing the Bank to escape from the market 
ordering and move toward a dynamic entanglement of  common polity ordering and a hybrid political 
structure. This entanglement continued throughout the charter renewals, as depicted in figure 3 below.   
 
The chartering processes reviewed were the major drivers by which the polity organization transmitted 
nonmarket and political-ordering properties to the Bank in exchange for credit and lax financing of  the 
public debt, placing the Bank in a unique and central position within the banking system (see figure 3). 
Moreover, because of  the incompleteness of  the contract in the face of  political uncertainty, the 
additional and unexpected nonmarket properties granted to the Bank were flexible, additive, and 
contextually dependent upon business developments, innovations, market competitiveness, and the 
international political order of  the time, which indicates that the Bank and the polity had incentives to 
seek such properties and entanglement as those unforeseen events came about.  
 
 






The ad hoc and contextualized nature of  the adaptation of  the original Bank charter as an open-ended 
(undesigned) institutional evolutionary response to unfolding market challenges and political 
contingencies deeply challenges Goodhart’s and Congdon’s rationalistic claims concerning the natural, 
general, and inherent evolution of  central banks. Additionally, it is important to underscore that every 
single Bank of  England charter ‘contained a renegotiation clause that gave the parties the flexibility to 
 
86 Figure 3 depicts, in a simplified manner, the process of  dynamic entanglement between Parliament and the Bank of  England. 
The square on the far left side represents the political entity (Parliament) that enters into bank bargains with a single for-profit 
banking entity (the original for-profit Bank). Surrounding circles represents other commercial entities such as banks. The left 
side represents the process of  bank bargains, in which the political entity conveys political favors and nonmarket (monopolistic) 
properties with a single commercial bank in exchange for credit and lax forms of  financing the public debt. The bidirectional 
arrows between the square (Parliament) and one of  the circles (the for-profit Bank of  England) represent the original bank 
bargains and charter-renewal negotiations between them that initiated the entanglement. It is through those bargains and 
exchanges that the political entity starts to transmit special nonmarket characteristics into the previously market-oriented and 
for-profit Bank. As the process of  entanglement continues through time, the Bank becomes increasingly entangled with the 
government, acquiring ever-growing nonmarket characteristics, because of  the rechartering bargains and because of  the need 
for new credit and better ways to finance the ever-expanding war efforts. The right side of  figure 3 represents this new, 
unintended institutional development, in which the Bank slowly becomes a nonprofit/for-profit hybrid bankers’ bank 
(represented by the center square with round edges) that concentrates the reserves of  the banking system (the other circles) 
and possesses several nonmarket properties.  
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adjust the initial bargain to changed conditions. . . . In short, the Bank of  England was not made a 
permanent institution due to problems of  incomplete contracting. The rechartering process mitigated 
these problems’ (Broz and Grossman, 2004, 58).  
 
The point above is important because the fact that the bargains were highly contextual, flexible, and ad 
hoc, along with the fact that they and the Bank changed dynamically and unpredictably through time to 
deal ex post with unforeseen contingencies, further challenges Goodhart’s (1988) and Congdon’s (1981) 
rationalistic and functional claims about the establishment of  central banks as rational institutional 
solutions to severe banking challenges. Indeed, the Bank’s unexpected transition from a largely for-profit 
and private structure with a clearly defined expiration date to a definitive and permanent nonprofit central 
bank was actually the unintended and emergent institutional outcome of  the growing entanglement and 
symbiotic contractual adaptation between Parliament and the Bank through time (Bagehot, 1873).  
 
This transition is represented graphically in figure 3 above, which shows how the Bank transitioned from 
a for-profit structure (left side of  the figure) to a bankers’-bank hybrid that provided, unwillingly, some 
banking and regulatory services (e.g., managing the concentration of  reserves) while still being also 
partially a for-profit banking entity (right side of  the figure). Hence, figure 3 depicts graphically also how 
the first three ‘charters of  the Bank—and indeed, the process generating these charter—had important 
[institutional] consequences. The economic privileges the Bank secured in recharters . . . helped propel 
its rise to a modern central bank’ (Broz and Grossman, 2004, 71; see also footnote 64).   
 
To conclude this section, note that the overall and systemic unintended consequence of  this gradual 
entanglement process is that other privately ordered (for-profit commercial) banks acknowledged and 
understood the severity of  the entanglement, which granted a special political and economic prestige and 
new managing roles to the hybrid Bank (Fetter, 1965; Philippovich, 1911). The nonmarket and polity 
characteristics acquired by the Bank so undermined the competitiveness of  the banking system by the 
early eighteenth century that other commercial banks were either pushed out of  the banking business or 
succumbed to the Bank of  England’s special strategic and dominant position within the English banking 
system (Smith, 1990 [1936]). The Bank thus gradually became a hybrid bankers’ bank that extended the 
entanglement between the polity and the economy to the rest of  the English banking system by 
concentrating the reserves of  commercial banks of  the entire system within it. This concentration of  
reserves led the Bank to (unwillingly) become also a lender of  last resort for the entire English system, 
further exacerbating the entanglement among all parties.        
  
4.3 Institutional Evolution and Central Banks as Unintended Consequences of  Entanglement  
 
The key to understanding the Bank’s evolution from a hybrid to a definitive central bank resides in how 
the entanglement, embodied in charter privileges and legal precedents, incentivized also the additional 
and larger dynamics of  the banking system’s concentration of  reserves (Smith, 1990 [1936]). These 
privileges aforementioned in the previous section led to the Bank’s notes becoming the principal reserve 
medium. Through entanglement, the Bank involuntarily came to possess a unique intangible asset: other 
banks’ recognition that it held unique extra-market and hegemonic properties. This recognition added to 
the Bank’s prestige, security, and value, which lowered its cost of  funding and its perceived financial 
riskiness (Broz, 1998; Smith, 1990 [1936]). This key financial and political position incentivized the 
smaller banks’ practice of  keeping balances and reserves with the Bank, which gradually increased and 
concentrated the banking system’s reserves.  
 
As the monopolistic London issuer of  notes, the Bank came to possess hegemony over the English 
currency system (Selgin, 1988). The extra-market sphere gave the Bank the possibility to expand its 
business, increasing in size and financial security. This added an extra-market competitive advantage to 
the Bank’s notes over privately ordered banks’ competitive notes (Dowd, 1993, 222). Competitive banks 
acknowledged the Bank’s new relevance and politicized extra-market structure and started treating the 
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Bank’s notes as their new reserve medium instead of  gold (Broz, 1998).87 These reserve activities were 
more convenient and safer for competitive and country banks since leaving part of  their cash and gold 
reserves with a single entangled entity, isolated from market pressure and economic crisis, reduced 
business and banking risk and economized the use of  reserves at a low cost and low political risk.  
 
Normal commercial country banks recognized that the special bank (the Bank of  England) holding their 
reserves would, under any circumstance, be able to provide those reserves either in money or as a reserve 
medium (Bank notes) that would be accepted anytime by the public and other banks (Goodhart, 1988). 
The competitive banks’ economic rationale for recognizing the Bank’s entanglement and hegemony is 
crucial in understanding the entanglement’s unintended effects: it affected the competitive banks’ 
incentives and decisions to relentlessly concentrate their reserves, and therefore it affected also the Bank 
as it became, unwillingly, a central bank (see also footnote 69). This process of  specie and reserve 
convergence into the Bank was further reinforced with key legal episodes and political decisions enacted 
between 1797 and 1821 (see below).88 Thus, the gradual accumulation of  the banking system’s reserves 
in the bankers’ bank was mainly incentivized by the entanglement and political signaling process between 
1797 and 1821.   
 
When the Bank became entangled with the government, at certain times it suspended gold payments, it 
established legal precedents for the de facto legal tender status of  its notes, and its notes were finally 
declared legal tender for all payments in 1812 (Smith, 1990 [1936]). This suspension period (1797-1821) 
allowed the emission of  political signals and the accumulation of  political and legal precedents that 
encouraged and secured the bankers’ bank’s banknotes and their status (the Bank’s notes), which could 
be guaranteed to be accepted throughout the country as a medium of  exchange and of  payments.  
 
Hence the further entanglement via both rechartering monopoly powers and the political signals and legal 
precedents during the suspension period of  1797–1821 led the Bank to increase in size, security, prestige, 
and uncompetitive powers that set it drastically apart from the competitive market ordering (see figure 3 
above). The above process severely undermined the profitability of  competitor banks and incentivized 
(forced) them to accept the Bank’s new political-economic-ordering hegemony through using the Bank’s 
notes as the main reserve medium on which to reissue their own country notes, which of  course 
reinforced the concentration of  reserves and furthered the entanglement of  the whole English banking 
system.          
 
Consequently, the following events between 1797 and 1821 played a significant role in the entanglement 
process since government actions and legal precedents, beyond the original bargains reviewed, also 
enhanced the entanglement. This period is important in understanding how the Bank ultimately became 
the bankers’ bank by significantly accumulating reserves. By the outset of  the Napoleonic Wars, in early 
1797, because of  excessive government borrowing and persistent fears of  a French invasion, the Bank 
had come under severe economic pressure regarding its reserve positions.89  
 
87 Since the Bank’s notes were deem safe and less costly to store and move compared to gold reserves, customers also preferred 
Bank notes as reserves on their own bank deposits. Moreover, because of  the Bank’s extra-market capacities and privileges, it 
was the only bank that could have offered notes as secure as gold as redemption media for bank liabilities even at times of  crisis 
(Dowd, 1993, 224).    
88 The period between 1797 and 1821 is known as the Restriction Period (see Fetter, 1950).  
89 In 1797, because of  the Bank’s endangered reserve position, the English government declared suspension of  payments in 
cash (specie) for the Bank’s notes. The Bank’s suspension of  payments was made official in 1797 by an official act of  
Parliament in order to meet a critical situation in which the Bank was faced with an incipient bank run. This legal precedent, 
enacted by the government, was a crucial signal of  political entanglement; it ‘amounted to a legislation of  the bankruptcy of  
the Bank, and it created a precedent which led the public in future always to expect the Government to come to the aid of  
the Bank’ (Smith, 1990 [1936], 15). After the passing of  the 1797 Bank Restriction Act, the entanglement between the 
government (led by British prime minister William Pitt the Younger) and the Bank became so evident in the eyes of  the public 
that Richard Brinsley Sheridan publicly bewailed the way the Bank had fallen under the negative influence of  the prime minister. 
Sheridan described the Bank of  England as ‘an elderly lady in the City, of  great credit and long standing who had unfortunately 
fallen into bad [political] company’. This remark subsequently led to James Gillray’s renowned cartoon entitled Political 
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During the Napoleonic Wars, the British government released an Order of  Council that prohibited the 
Bank to redeem notes in gold in order to finance the war—thus prohibiting the Bank from issuing 
(redeeming) more specie in exchange for its notes (Broz, 1998). This Order of  Council subsequently led 
Parliament to pass an act on May 3, 1797, known as the Bank Restriction Act, that legally allowed the 
suspension of  payment in specie (cash and gold) of  the Bank’s notes, de facto legalizing the Bank’s 
bankruptcy (Dowd, 1993; Smith 1990 [1936]). This initial and unique exemption from paying (redeeming) 
the Bank’s notes in specie was to be repeatedly renewed throughout the Napoleonic Wars and for several 
years afterward.   
 
In this case, the contractual and political obligation of  the Bank’s charter to provide ever-growing 
government financing, at restricted (capped) interest rates, to the government in time of  crisis and war 
overrode the Bank’s original commercial commitment and promise to the maintenance of  specie 
convertibility of  its notes (Capie et al., 1994, 8). The erosion of  the Bank’s specie and gold reserves and 
its incapacity to maintain convertibility of  its notes were clearly associated with wartime uncertainties and 
with the government’s volatile and growing fiscal pressure. The Bank’s managers then had also strong 
incentives, and convincing arguments, for pressing the government to discharge their original commercial 
obligation of  converting the Bank’s notes into specie for their costumers. This was performed by making 
the notes of  the Bank de facto legal tender, and thus instituting cours forcé (ibid., 8–9; Smith 1990 [1936]).   
 
The Napoleonic Wars between 1792 and 1815 brought about a period of  suspensions of  convertibility 
of  the Bank’s notes in England. The suspensions of  convertibility ‘reinforced the tendency for the other 
commercial banks to hold central bank liabilities, notes and deposits, as their main reserves, rather than 
holding their own stocks of  specie in coin or bar’. Hence ‘granting [de facto] legal tender status to the 
notes of  the central bank did bolster its primacy among other commercial banks, since their notes were 
not given similar status’ (Capie et al., 1994, 8).   
  
The 1797 act thus created a crucial legal precedent by which the public and competitive banks started to 
expect that the government would continue acting this way, giving a special status to Bank of  England 
notes (see footnote 67). This gave the Bank’s notes de facto partial legal tender status (Dowd, 1993, 
chapter 11). Indeed, after a severe depreciation of  the pound after 1800 and of  the Bank’s notes during 
1809 and 1810, the government declared the notes official legal tender in 1812 through Lord Stanhope’s 
Act, which further reinforced the entanglement process (Smith, 1990 [1936]). These political and legal 
precedents had severe unintended institutional implications since they changed the legal and economic 
status of  the Bank’s notes throughout the country. Therefore ‘country banks began to look on them 
[Bank of  England notes] as backing their own note issues’ (Smith, 1990 [1936], 16).90  
 
These legal precedents and signals during 1797 and 1812 further exported additional nonmarket 
characteristics to the Bank and also gradually to the whole English banking system. The suspensions of  
payments (the Restriction Period) and the transitory legal tender status of  its notes released the Bank 
from any competitive banking and customer pressure and obligation to redeem their notes in gold, which 
increased its outside (polity) nonmarket sources of  profitability. The government’s repetitive 
interventionist signals, and its assurances that the Bank’s notes would be good for all legal and commercial 
payments and thus accepted by the public at large, also significantly assured the other competitive banks 
of  the Bank notes’ superior nonmarket economic and legal status, again furthering the entanglement of  
 
Ravishment; or The Old Lady of  Threadneedle Street in danger!, which curiously depicts Prime Minister Pitt seducing (entangling) the 
Bank of  England, personified as an old lady dressed with £1 and £2 notes, for her fortune.     
90 The Resumption Act eventually eliminated the prior (1812) exemption of  the Bank notes’ legal tender status on May 1, 
1821, fully renewing (reestablishing) specie payments and convertibility in 1821. However, the accumulated legal precedents 
and political signals (between 1792 and 1821) had already generated expectations that the British government would behave 
again in this entangled manner (indeed, in 1833 the Bank’s notes again became legal tender). This unique political situation 
and signals increased the overall system’s entanglement, and commercial country banks started to see it as customary to treat 
the Bank’s notes as their own reserves in lieu of  gold even after the Restriction Period ended. This new set of  political 
expectations encouraged the Bank to hold further concentrations of  system reserves and adopt a special bankers’ bank role.         
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the rest of  the banking system via the furthered process of  concentration of  reserves within the Bank 
of  England.   
 
Hence the combination of  monopoly powers and extra-market characteristics granted through the 
charter renewals (see previous section), alongside the 1797–1812 additional suspensions of  payments and 
the legal restrictions (the so-called Restriction Period), increased the Bank’s hegemony, size, financial 
security, and legal power, making it the dominant bankers’ bank within the system. Hence the strong and 
visible entanglement between the Bank of  England and the government politically conditioned the centripetal 
forces of  the concentration of  reserves of  the entire system, guiding them toward the unique entangled 
entity. In other words, the institutional tendencies of  the English banking system, usually shaped 
economically by economies of scale in reserve holding, were in this particular case largely affected also 
by the political entanglement between the Bank and the British government.  
  
Given the suspensions of  payments, de facto legal tender status, and other political signals, and given the 
Bank’s superior and hegemonic position, it is no wonder that the normal process of  concentrating 
reserves along the banking network—usually undertaken in order to reduce commercial banks’ 
operational and clearing costs—was severely conditioned by that unique and hegemonic entity (see also 
footnote 68). In other words, the natural tendencies of  banks to economize on resources and reserves 
and to concentrate their reserves and specie in different nodes within the banking system (Dowd, 1993; 
Selgin, 1988) were severely conditioned and guided by the entanglement process between the Bank and 
the government, which led those natural and economic forces of  banks to be exceptionally concentrated 
upon a single entity. If  the entanglement between government and the Bank had not taken place, then 
those politically distorted economic tendencies would have never arisen (Bagehot, 1873).  
 
In this exceptional case, private banks had both the legal commitment of  the government and the 
monopoly bank assuring them that the Bank of  England would provide and issue a reserve medium at 
any time if  needed. Indeed, given the close collaboration among the entangled parties, the repetitive 
successes of  the rechartering bargains (seven up until 1812), and the legal precedents between 1797 and 
1812, ‘the market apparently viewed a successful recharter as signal that the voluntary “rents-for-loans” 
bargain . . . would be maintained’ (Broz and Grossman, 2004, 53). The legal precedents and 
interventionist signals between 1797 and 1812 incentivized commercial country banks to economize on 
gold reserves and specie, and to treat the Bank’s notes as if  they were as good as gold itself  in order to 
issue their own notes and hence to park their gold and (cash) reserves with the bankers’ bank.91  
 
Since the Bank of  England was the only entangled banking entity outside the market ordering, 
unconstrained to supply notes and free to suspend payments (redeemability) in gold if  needed, it 
exacerbated and politically directed the process of  concentration of  reserves exclusively within it. Hence 
the entanglement’s ‘natural’, but unintended, outcome was that commercial country banks in England 
gradually accepted the Bank’s liabilities, instead of  gold, as their exclusive medium of  reserves, which led 
the Bank (unintendedly and also unwillingly) to gain control and responsibility over the total level of  
reserves throughout the entire English system (Dowd, 1993; Smith, 1990 [1936]).  
 
Consequently, this politically distorted and entangled process of  the gradual concentration of  reserves 
critically associated and linked the Bank’s monetary and credit policies and actions with the commercial 
banks’ capacity to further expand credit and their own note issuance; thus unintendedly giving the Bank 
of  England indirect power and control over the overall level of  liquidity and the expansion of  credit and 
the money supply in the English banking system (Capie, et al., 1994, 63).  
 
91 As Dowd (1993, chapter 11) pointed out, it would have been economically inefficient for a competitive bank to redeem its 
liabilities in gold if  it could in fact, and by law, use the Bank’s notes of  the same nominal value, which were actually sold at a 
discount against gold. Indeed, the Restriction Period led to a severe depreciation of  the Bank’s notes against gold, but their 
de facto legal tender status nevertheless led to a sort of  Gresham’s-law process driving gold out of  circulation in the English 
system and leaving it operating under a de facto inconvertible (fiat) currency system (Dowd, 1993, 341; Fetter, 1950).     
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This by necessity forced commercial and country banks to acknowledge the Bank’s hegemony while 
incentivizing them also to lower their provisions of  reserves (and to become less prudent), thus further 
extending the entanglement’s moral hazard throughout the entire banking system (see figure 4 below). 
Accordingly, the English banking system after approximately 120 years since the Bank’s founding, now 
suddenly depended upon the polity-hybrid signals generated by the Bank’s unilateral and political (and 
highly unpredictable) monetary actions, instead of  market signals and banking competition, to adjust its 
levels of  liquidity and overall reserves in order to expand money and credit accordingly to demand.  
 







This rather exceptional, vertical, and gradual concentration process severely eroded market discipline, 
increased moral hazard, and eliminated previous (existent) market-banking and competitive signals used 
effectively throughout commercial banking in England (Calomiris, 1990). Thus, as Bagehot intuited, 
 
with so many advantages over all other competitors, it is quite natural that the Bank of  
England should have outstripped them all. . . . Thus our [concentrated] one-reserve system 
of  banking was not deliberately founded upon definite reasons; it was a gradual 
consequence of  many singular events, and of  an accumulation of  legal privileges on a single 
bank. (Bagehot, 1873, 66–67) 
 
 
92  The left side of  figure 4 shows the gradual process, performed by commercial banks (represented by circles), of  
accumulating and concentrating their gold reserves within the Bank of  England (represented by the center square on the left). 
In that concentration process (represented by the arrows between the circles and the center square), competitive market-
oriented banks started to concentrate their gold reserves and specie within the Bank and to use instead only the Bank’s notes 
as their own reserves on the basis of  which to subsequently issue their own notes. This was a crucial aspect of  how the 
entanglement process spread throughout the rest of  the banking system. The right side of  the figure represents such spreading 
of  the entanglement from the Bank of  England (represented now by the center square) toward other commercial banks 
(represented now by squares with round edges). Through the sole use of  Bank of  England notes as main reserves of  the 
system, in order to expand overall money and credit, the Bank of  England now introduced polity and nonmarket 
characteristics into other commercial banks, eroding previous market, banking competitive, and credit signals that had 
efficiently controlled and guided the private banks’ risky behavior and the correct supply of  money and credit of  the system. 
Commercial country banks therefore started to respond and adapt to the Bank’s entangled signals and its unpredictable 
political- and war-related financial actions concerning the supply of  its notes (polity signals) rather than respond to customers, 
competition, and market signals (the economic ordering), thus becoming entangled as well. This concentration of  reserves 
created also new systemic moral-hazard problems, while a single hybrid bank started affecting the commercial banks’ overall 
level of  reserves, risk and financial strategies, and local monetary actions. Given this new systemic moral-hazard problem, 
related to the concentration of  reserves, the Bank had to become unwillingly a lender of  last resort. 
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The fact that the whole English banking system gradually started using the Bank’s liabilities as reserves 
implied that the Bank had to assume a new central position in the entanglement process. This 
unintentionally also allowed the Bank to further erode the previous market signals and commercial 
ordering of  the banking system, to unilaterally affect the total level of  reserves in the system, and thus to 
indirectly guide the overall supply of  money and credit of  the English economy.  
 
Thus an entangled hybrid entity (now part of  the polity ordering), instead of  market signals and banking 
competition (the commercial ordering), was the ultimate guide to the supply of  money and credit. The 
fact that commercial banks became economically entangled with the Bank through using its notes as 
reserves and relying upon the Bank’s unpredictable decisions for liquidity exacerbated the entanglement 
across the network, extending the blurriness of  private and common ordering as seen in figure 4 above.  
 
The reviewed process of  entanglement led the Bank of  England to finally become mostly a political, non–
profit-oriented entity, placing the Bank in an unintended and unwanted position of  a hybrid between a 
commercial and central bank at the center of  the English banking system (a banker’s bank). This hybrid 
and highly contradictory position created severe problems and conflicts for the Bank since managing the 
system’s monetary policy, levels of  reserves, and liquidity and supervising commercial competitor banks 
cannot be effectively done within a for-profit competitive (and mostly private) banking structure because 
of  severe public–private conflicts of  interest (Bagehot, 1873).  
 
Hence, without seeking it, the Bank—by the mid 19th century—gradually became a quasi central bank 
that had to assume the role of  maintaining overall financial discipline, regulating bank competitors, 
managing the system’s concentration of  reserves, providing reserves and liquidity to other banks, and 
delivering support to bank competitors in time of  crisis; thus it had to disregard its original private and 
commercial ordering. The Bank’s ambiguous and hybrid position in fact created severe conflicts of  
interest and debates during the banking crises of  1847, 1857, and 1866 between the Bank’s shareholders 
and managers, on the one hand, and the social and public need for overall banking stability and last-resort 
lending services, on the other (Goodhart, 1987, 1988).  
 
Nevertheless, by the mid 19th century, the Bank rejected the idea that it had public and social financial 
responsibilities to provide liquidity and stability during those crises. However, a clear institutional case 
was developing during the nineteenth century that ‘the Bank was something other than a private profit 
maximizing institution’. Nevertheless, ‘the exact nature of  the relationship continued to be debated’ 
(Capie et al., 1994, 51). In the words of  Fetter (1965, 281), 
 
Officially the Bank made no suggestion to the Government, and officially the Government 
did nothing beyond letting the Bank know it was free to break the law if  it felt this necessary 
to carry out its public responsibilities. . . . The important thing was that somehow or the 
other the Government and the Bank worked things out reasonably well.  
 
The reviewed entanglement process not surprisingly culminated with the full and obligated transition of  
the Bank of  England from a largely for-profit, private, and competitive institution (in 1694) to a full-
fledged, noncompetitive, and politically oriented central bank (by the late 1800s). The final entanglement 
came with difficulties and caustic debates during the last half  of  the nineteenth century (Capie et al., 
1994; Dowd, 1993). Indeed, by the time of  the Baring crisis in the early 1890s, the Bank had come to 
fully admit its role as proto–central bank at the core of  the entangled banking network, putting its 
shareholders’ profitability and economic interests aside in order to provide last-resort lending to 
endangered commercial banks (Dowd, 1993; Fetter, 1965).  
 
Departing from its last remaining commercial and private aspects, this final institutional step of  full self-
recognition of  the publicness and entanglement of  the Bank ultimately settled the Bank’s debates and 
full entanglement to the point that its unintended public and systemic financial role as the overseer and 
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manager of  the reserves of  the system, and thus as its nonprofit lender of  last resort, had to be fully 
recognized, internalized, and substituted for its original and prior for-profit commercial ordering (Capie 
et al., 1994). Hence it finally ‘had become the bankers’ bank, a role enhanced by withdrawing from 
commercial rivalry’ (ibid., 15).93   
 
4.4 Conclusions: Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis of  Monetary Alternatives  
 
This chapter contributes to expanding our institutional understanding of  how central banks evolve, 
understood through a broad emergentist and political-economic perspective. This chapter has specifically 
focused on how bank bargains ignite and enhance the political-entanglement process of  banking systems 
and its dynamics, without relying on narrow accounts of  direct supervision, regulation, or financial crisis 
(Salter, 2014a; Smith et al., 2011; Wagner, 2017). According to the proposed framework, the entanglement 
process can upsurge through specific political-economic contract renegotiations (bank bargains), which 
allow polity organizations to transmit some of  their nonmarket property-ordering features to economy 
organizations. Chapter 4 has applied this theory to the Bank of  England’s unintended institutional 
evolution.  
 
The Bank’s evolution, it has been shown, was, contrary to what Congdon (1981) and Goodhart (1987, 
1988) claim, a politically conditioned and thus highly unnatural evolutionary example of  the emergent and 
unintended consequences of  political-economic entanglement in banking initiated by a process of  
dynamic bank bargains. Importantly, political entanglement and bank bargains clarify and extend 
Bagehot’s (1873) original intuitions about the Bank’s institutional evolution. They also explain how the 
Bank’s establishment and evolution can be better characterized by the emergent and highly contextual 
institutional phenomena stemming from a dynamic entanglement process through the gradual 
transmission and accumulation of  nonmarket characteristics; leading finally to a sui generis process of  
accumulation and concentration of  reserves within a monocentric structure. This process encouraged 
the commercial banks to use the Bank’s notes as their unique reserves and finally encouraged (forced) 
the Bank to become the sole lender of  last resort to the English system. Entangled political economy can 
help us to better understand the underlying political dynamics for the establishment and evolution of  
proto–central banks throughout Europe (see also section 3.1).  
 
Chapter 4 has complemented the institutional and historical arguments explored in chapter 3 concerning 
how central banks actually evolve and are established out of  political exchanges, bank bargains, and 
political involvement with the banking sector. Taken together, these two chapters have argued that central 
banking functions—such as the lender of  last resort—and central banks’ institutional evolution are not 
the natural tendencies and inherent evolutionary developments of  the competitive banking system, unlike 
what Goodhart (1988) assumes. Instead, and echoing Bagehot (1873), part II has shown that the 
evolution of  central banks, their nonmarket characteristics, and their banking and centralized functions 
emerge as unintended and politically conditioned phenomena that originate during the entanglement process 
initiated by bank bargains and the sovereign.  
 
Accordingly, chapters 3 and 4 have argued that the institutional rationale, origins, and evolution of  early 
central banks are far from natural, rational, and economic developments inherent within the normal and 
competitive dynamics of  banking. Hence the entanglement process reviewed further undermines 
Congdon’s and Goodhart’s generalizations concerning the natural evolution of  central banks, instead 
supporting Bagehot’s (1873) initial evolutionary intuition and conjectures. Furthermore, it is ultimately 
this politically conditioned Bagehotian intuition about central banks, confirmed in this chapter, which 
 
93 Thus, by the end of  the nineteenth century, the Bank ‘took steps to withdraw from commercial business and rivalry with 
the commercial banks . . . a process slowed by its organisation as a private sector body with a need to make profits to satisfy 
its shareholders. This was eventually effected in part by transforming the dividend [paid to shareholders] into a constant 
payment [like a coupon], unrelated to current profits, so that the shareholders [of the Bank] became transformed, in practice, 
into bond holders’ (Capie et al., 1994, 13). 
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suggests a logical change of  intellectual focus in banking theory toward a comparative institutional 
analysis of  monetary alternatives.  
 
I have suggested that the Bank’s evolution is poorly understood as stemming exclusively from a joint-
production rational framework (Broz, 1998, 235–236) and direct government intervention for revenue 
(Bagehot, 1873; Glasner, 1989). Instead, political entanglement initiated by bank bargains stresses two 
novel points. First, what can be seen as a direct and rational institutionalization of  a chartered bank to 
solve collective-action problems in government financing and banking through bargains (Broz, 1998; 
North and Weingast, 1989) can actually lead to important institutional phenomena (such as the emergence 
of  a hybrid bankers’ bank at the core of  the system) with wider institutional repercussions.  
 
Thus the rational joint-production approach to the provision of  public goods (such as easy government 
financing and reliable access to credit) can nonetheless create important entangled dynamics that can lead 
to drastic negative alterations of  the institutional order of  private entities and the form of  uncompetitive 
markets. In other words, a joint-production approach illuminates the original and effective provision of  
a public good (such as the public creditworthiness of  the sovereign through charters), but concomitantly 
obscures entanglement, institutional, and evolutionary details and their long-term effect on bank reserves 
and institutions, which arise through the dynamics within the adjoined excludable good produced 
simultaneously in the joint production process (e.g. the charters’ rent-seeking and noncompetitive 
aspects).   
 
Second, what may seem—prima facie—like simple and direct government intervention (Ikeda, 1997), is 
in reality repetitive bargains, exchanges, and participation of  both public and private entities within a legal 
and constitutional framework (Patrick and Wagner, 2015). The Bank of  England is one of  those 
unintended emergent cases of  political exchanges: it was gradually entangled to become a central bank 
through bank bargains that were made among interested parties. Thus entanglement, based on charter 
renewals, is not solely enhanced by government or political entrepreneurs, but also by an active 
participation of  private actors and commercial entities in the network. This recognition does not suggest 
that constitutional and legal limits on the capacities of  polity entities to bargain and grant privileges, 
devised to actually mitigate potential entanglements should be discouraged (Brennan and Buchanan, 2000 
[1985]). Constitutional political economy (Buchanan, 2008) might illuminate how we can alter the ‘rules 
of  the game’ at the preconstitutional level in banking to avoid subsequently adjusting property and 
political rights in exchange for government financing (Calomiris and Haber, 2014).  
 
Part II’s core contribution has been to provide both theoretical (chapter 3) and historical (chapter 4) 
arguments showing that central banks are not the institutional product of  inherent banking needs and 
natural institutional evolution of  banking systems. Neither they should be conceived also as the only 
institutional way possible to overcome severe banking challenges (see also Paniagua, 2019b). Part II has 
scrutinized at length the proposed theoretical and historical arguments to show that central banks are 
neither a rational institutional response to deep banking challenges, nor the inherent product of  natural 
historical evolution of  banking systems. Consequently, and having (hopefully) settled this institutional 
debate, this work can now move more confidently toward an applied comparative institutional analysis 
of  central banks and radical non-monocentric alternatives.  
 
Importantly, given that part II has argued that central banks are not the necessary and only product of  
inherently natural institutional evolution of  banking systems, societies do not carry the burden of  being 
institutionally and unavoidably ‘stuck’ with relying on monocentric central banks as sole institutional 
solutions to severe banking challenges. Thus, they can and they should look for more resilient and robust 
institutional banking alternatives based on rearrangements of  property rights and comparative 
institutional analysis. Indeed, part III will engage precisely in that comparative inquiry, expanding upon 
the theoretical and historical analysis of  central banking provided in chapters 3 and 4, but moving toward 
a comparative institutional analysis of  central banks with other non-monocentric alternatives.  
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The insights from part II concerning both the lack of  a serious institutional and economic justification 
for central banking (chapter 3) and the fact that central banks do not arise naturally out of  inherent 
banking dynamics—but rather as part of  a politically entangled, economically altered, and highly 
contingent banking process (chapter 4)—suggest that the intellectual field of  inquiry in macroeconomics 
is wide open for further explorations in comparative institutional analysis beyond the narrow rationale of  
central banking. Moreover, the arguments concerning the lack of  an institutional rationale only for central 
banking suggest that it is time to systematically explore and take seriously radical and non-monocentric 
alternatives, such as polycentric forms of  banking and free banking  (see chapter 6 for more details, and 
also Salter and Tarko, 2018).     
 
I end part II of  this thesis by concluding that the exploration of  diverse, and perhaps nonmonocentric, 
monetary-institutional alternatives is warranted in macroeconomics if  we desire to ultimately promote 
sound reforms and robust changes to our increasingly fragile and highly politicized banking systems. 
Consequently, the general scope of  part III will be to apply institutional analysis and political economic 
robustness considerations to banking orders, and a comparative institutional analysis to the realm of  
monetary policy. Specifically, the following chapter 5 will aim to first develop a broader framework of  
robust political economy for comparing monetary institutions and monetary policy, and then chapter 6 


























‘The key question of  money/macro theory is not: what determines whether aggregate 
demand for goods and services confronting their aggregate supply is deficient or 
excessive or just right? Rather it is: what determines whether or not the market process 
of  exchange and coordination in an economy of  decentralized decisionmaking works 
smoothly? Or, how can monetary disequilibrium impede exchanges of  goods against 
goods, the mobilization of  scattered knowledge, and the coordination of  decentralized 
activities? . . . Questions about exchange and coordination direct attention, instead, to 
what background of  economic institutions and policies can best help market processes 
work. For money is potentially a “loose joint’’’.  
 


























‘Predictability in the purchasing power of  the money unit is more important than 
stability as such. Monetary changes, if  fully foreseen and allowed for, leave 
economic calculation unimpaired and distort neither the distribution of  wealth nor 
the pattern of  production and relative prices. If  stability has any special virtue, it is 
merely in providing predictability of  the simplest, most understandable, and, if  
made the rule of  policy, most believable kind. . . . the essence of  the ‘rules’ 
approach is a search for a state of  affairs in which prevalent expectations reinforce 
monetary stability . . . The key idea is perhaps “steadiness” rather than “rules’’’. 




As suggested in the conclusions of  part II, the third and final part of  this work—which comprises 
chapters 5 and 6—explores the last institutional and applied topic in this thesis. This final part further 
elaborates the institutionally oriented themes about money, central banks, and the money supply (as 
introduced in part II). Moreover, it extends the analysis to monetary institutions and rules other than 
central banking and compares them. As concluded in the previous chapters, given that central banks are 
not the necessary and inherently natural institutional evolutionary outcome of  banking systems, societies 
actually do not carry the burden of  being institutionally ‘trapped’ with central banks as the sole 
institutional solution to banking challenges and informational asymmetries (Paniagua, 2019b).  
 
Accordingly, given that part II has suggested that central banks are not the only institutional possibility 
for successfully governing banking affairs and providing crucial banking services and regulation, nor are 
they the sole and natural institutional development of  banking dynamics, societies can, and perhaps 
should, look for more robust monetary alternatives based on comparative institutional analysis. In other 
words, the historical and theoretical findings of  part II suggest not only that institutional diversity and 
polycentricity are indeed feasible within banking governance, but that this possibility necessarily leads to 
the intellectual need for analytic mechanisms and frameworks by which we can compare and scrutinize 
the relative properties of  such non-monocentric institutional alternatives. Thus, recognizing 
polycentricity and institutional diversity in banking entails developing also alternative analytical 
frameworks by which we can scrutinize and compare the different alternatives (Salter and Tarko, 2018).         
 
Consequently, part III will build upon the previous theoretical insights and historical analysis on central 
banking and move toward an applied analysis comparing it with more radical and decentralized 
alternatives such as free banking. Thus part III further explores the specific institutional properties of  
central banks and the idea of  comparative analysis in macroeconomics, applied here specifically to the 
realm of  monetary policy, the stability of  expectations, and the money supply. The insights from part II 
concerning the lack of  a robust institutional and economic justification for relying only on central banking 
to govern banking affairs and maintain stability suggest that the intellectual field of  inquiry in 
macroeconomics is open for further explorations in comparative institutional analysis of  central banks 
and polycentric alternatives. This will be the task of  the last two chapters of  this work.   
 
The general scope of  the following two chapters is to apply institutional analysis and political-economic 
 
94 A modified version of  this chapter was published in the Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines as Paniagua (2016a).   
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robustness considerations in the field of  macroeconomics and to apply a comparative institutional 
analysis to the realm of  monetary policy, expectations, and the money supply. Specifically, the following 
chapters aim to provide as a unified whole an analytical framework of  robust political economy applied 
to banking, a comparative monetary-institutional analysis, and an applied exercise in comparative 
institutional analysis of  different monetary alternatives by using the proposed framework.95  
 
The conclusions of part II suggest that a comparative analysis of monetary institutions may be a 
necessary, albeit deeply disregarded, intellectual endeavor in macroeconomics (see also Salter, 2017a). To 
conduct such an analysis, however, we need first to define the ideal stability properties and ultimate 
objectives that monetary institutions must possess or aim at (Myrdal, 1965 [1939]). This is the task of this 
chapter. The need for confining our scientific analyses within a theoretical framework is acute whenever 
we conduct comparative analysis (Ostrom, 2010). In other words, if  we aim to compare and scrutinize 
institutions, it is necessary to have a common benchmark that serves as a basis of  comparison and to 
have a normative and theoretical framework to then compare and evaluate them (Demsetz, 1969; Ostrom, 
1990, 2005; Paniagua, 2016b; Pennington, 2011, 2016).  
 
Considering these needs for both a normative benchmark and a framework of  analysis and comparison, 
the first task of  chapter 5 is to delineate such a framework and benchmark and to define some 
theoretically desirable expectational properties that monetary institutions should possess so that we can 
subsequently engage in comparative institutional exercises. The combination of  monetary-equilibrium 
theory, money neutrality, and robust institutional analysis (aligned with constitutional political economy) 
should contribute important analytical and theoretical pieces to develop a richer framework that provides: 
the desirable monetary benchmark, the desired normative stability properties of  monetary institutions, 
and the analytical tools to finally engage in non-ideal and applied institutional analysis; throughout which 
we can realistically compare monetary alternatives and see how they can achieve those previously defined 
normative and expectational goals.  
 
It is relevant to acknowledge that the 2007–8 Great Recession brought about a higher degree of 
detrimental monetary-policy unpredictability and expectational volatility (Hetzel, 2009; Sumner, 2012; 
Taylor, 2009, 2012). Predictable monetary rules or stable monetary constitutions are needed to anchor 
expectations and to promote nominal stability (Buchanan, 1962; Yeager, 1962).96 Hence the main purpose 
of this chapter is to normatively and theoretically define the general expectational and stability properties 
that monetary constitutions should possess in order to function as constitutional coordination devices and 
thus to generate both an organized system of relations and a beneficial emergent macro complexity from 
monetary relations as suggested throughout part I.  
 
Hence chapter 5 attempts to define the desirable monetary-policy benchmark and the ideal normative 
properties that monetary institutions should possess for attaining neutral monetary policy and stability of 
expectations, both of which are conducive to an organized and orderly system of monetary relations 
(Horwitz, 2011; Sumner, 2015). Consequently, this chapter borrows from Buchanan’s (1962) 
predictability criterion and from the notion of ‘expectational monetary transmission mechanisms’ (Romer 
and Romer, 2013; Sumner, 2012). Chapter 5 proposes that monetary constitutions should be considered 
‘stable’ and ‘robust’ only insofar as they have institutional properties and dynamics allowing the self-
reinforcing and anchoring of expectations (stabilizing expectations) concerning a credible path of 
monetary-policy neutrality (Horwitz, 2006, 2011).  
 
95 Institutional robustness refers here to how well monetary constitutions can deal with informational, epistemic, and incentive 
problems present in their decision-making structures in order to achieve predictability of  monetary policy. See more on 
political-economy robustness in section 5.3, more particularly subsection 5.3.1. See also the following chapter for a more 
extended and detailed application of  robust political economy to monetary-constitutional analysis.   
96 I use the definition of  a monetary constitution found in Schwartz (1987, 391): ‘By a constitution I mean established rules, 
whether or not a written instrument embodies the rules.’ The concept is slightly broader than a constitutional rule in the 
narrow sense of  a written explicit one (Brennan and Buchanan, 2000 [1985]). Monetary constitutions are understood in this 
work broadly as monetary regimes, meaning the array of  institutions and rules that frame and guide the production of  money.      
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Both the self-reinforcement and the stability of expectations are integral properties of monetary 
constitutions that allow them to be agents of coordination and therefore stable and institutionally robust 
(Buchanan, 1962; Romer and Romer, 2013; Sumner, 2013). Constitutional stability and expectational 
(monetary) predictability mean it is possible to endogenously avoid generating patterns of discoordination 
and economic crisis due to monetary-policy unpredictability and expectational shocks (Bernanke, 2003; 
Hetzel, 2009; Romer, 1992; Sumner, 2013; Yeager, 1962).  
 
Thus, institutional comparisons of different monetary arrangements in this chapter entail evaluating their 
relative capacities to maintain a monetary policy’s expectational stability and a monetary policy’s stable 
future expected path consistent with the neutrality of money in the process of economic exchange 
(Horwitz, 2011). In other words, I compare and assess monetary constitutions according to how well 
they can stabilize expectations concerning monetary policy’s future path such that those expectations are 
consistent also with monetary neutrality at the individual level (Horwitz, 2011; Sumner, 2012).  
 
This chapter helps to illuminate the benefits of  understanding money and market coordination from a 
constitutional and political-economic perspective (Buchanan, 1962, 2010; Horwitz, 2011; Salter, 2014b). 
By affecting the behavior of  nominal magnitudes, relative prices, and expectations, the future expected 
path of  monetary policy largely affects today’s economic planning, collaboration, and economic calculation 
(Romer and Romer, 2013; Sumner, 2012). Consequently, monetary policy and monetary institutions—
since they affect coordination—can be fruitfully analyzed with the constitutional ‘coordinative device’ 
concept and paradigm (Buchanan, 1962, 2010). Accordingly, and building upon this analytical relationship 
between constitutions and coordination (Ordeshook, 1992), this chapter seeks to define the 
expectational-stability properties that monetary constitutions should possess in order to become 
coordination devices or at least avoid being agents of  discoordination.  
 
Thus, chapter 5 draws upon the constitutional literature to understand the properties by which monetary 
frameworks can be considered stable and therefore resilient to endogenous expectational shocks. If  
constitutions are understood as ‘coordinative devices’ (Hadfield and Weingast, 2013; Hardin, 1989), then 
the ultimate coordinative role of  monetary policy should actually reside in the institutional properties 
that monetary constitutions possess to deal with epistemic and incentive problems and thus avoid 
engendering an unpredictable and unstable future path of  monetary policy. Monetary rules and their 
institutional properties affect and guide the changes in the expected future path of  monetary policy, 
altering deeply current expectations concerning nominal magnitudes, with severe and immediate 
consequences for coordination, prices, and nominal GDP (Hetzel, 2012; Romer, 1992; Romer and Romer, 
2013; Woodford, 2003).97  
 
Consequently, this chapter first proposes a notion of  monetary constitutions’ coordination properties 
based on the predictability of  the future path of  the money supply, which anchors expectations at the 
‘micro level’ (i.e., at the agent level) concerning how prices and nominal magnitudes ought to behave 
(Horwitz, 2011; Sumner, 2012). Monetary policy that changes unpredictably and abruptly (i.e., 
unanticipated policy changes unrelated to actual changes in real money demand and in velocity) can affect 
exchanges and unanchor expectations, thereby hampering the coordinative properties of  the price system 
and NGDP growth (Hetzel, 2009, 2012; Koppl, 2014; Sumner, 2015).98 Chapter 5 subsequently suggests 
 
97 GDP is understood as ‘the monetary value of  all of  the goods and services produced within a nation’s borders in a given 
period of  time. GDP can be measured in real or nominal terms. Real GDP is adjusted for inflation. . . . It is intended to 
measure the actual output of  goods and services in the economy in physical terms. NGDP, on the other hand, does not make 
adjustments for the changing value of  the dollar. NGDP gives the value of  output in current dollar terms, without adjustments 
for inflation . . . During a period of  inflation, NGDP will rise faster than real GDP because the growth rate of  NGDP is the 
growth rate of  real output plus the inflation rate . . . Before the Great Recession, NGDP growth had averaged about 5 percent 
since 1990, roughly 3 percent real GDP growth and 2 percent inflation’ (Sumner and Roberts, 2018, 8).  
98 Reducing uncertainty about monetary policy does not suggest that the goal is to avoid any disturbances or change in the 
supply of  money. A neutral money supply should change according to real changes in the demand for money (Selgin, 1988). 
Those policy changes, however, should be part of  a predictable and credible future path of  monetary policy consistent with 
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resilient and general institutional mechanisms and procedures to uphold (self-enforce) such stability and 
expectational properties and thus systematically avoid both incentive and knowledge problems that could 
undermine it.99 Chapter 5 finally contends that monetary policy and rules should be strategic elements 
that do not systematically hinder economic coordination and expectational stability, and that that capacity 
largely rests on their specific constitutional properties and robust political economy (RPE) comparative 
robustness (Buchanan, 1962, 2010; Horwitz, 2000; Salter, 2017a).100  
 
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 5.1 reviews the Fed’s monetary policy during the 2007–8 Great 
Recession, including the plausible negative role played by the Fed in causing a boom-bust cycle and 
monetary expectational instabilities that severely hampered nominal stability and aggregate demand. 
Section 5.2 explores the general literature on constitutional political economy and its analytical 
relationship with monetary constitutions and policy rules. Section 5.3 proposes a predictability criterion 
for monetary policy more consistent with Buchanan’s (1964) catallactic system of  exchanges than 
Buchanan’s (1962) own stability criterion. Subsection 5.3.1 argues that a robust way to achieve monetary 
expectational stability and the proposed goals of  monetary-policy predictability reside in monetary 
constitutions’ own self-reinforcing expectational properties.101 Section 5.4 foreshadows chapter 6 and briefly 
undertakes a comparative institutional analysis of  alternative monetary constitutions. It succinctly 
assesses both free banking and NGDP targeting on the basis of  the stability properties proposed 
throughout this chapter. Section 5.5 concludes.  
 
5.1 Monetary Policy at the Center of  the Crisis, and the Necessity of  Robust Constitutions  
 
The Great Recession had major intellectual repercussions for the economics profession. Since the 
catastrophic crisis, economists have specifically emphasized the need to analyze a critical institution: the 
Federal Reserve System. The rationale behind analyzing the Fed’s role lies in the systemic nature of  the 
crisis (Beckworth, 2012b; Hetzel, 2009, 2012). Some economists and policymakers have criticized Federal 
Reserve (monetary) policies from different points of  view, which I will address in this section.   
 
Particularly, in this section I briefly review two major critiques: first, the 2005–7 ‘too loose, for too long’ 
aspect of  expansionary monetary policy during the housing boom; and second, the 2008–9 ‘too little, too 
late’ contractionary and passive policies during the housing bust and banking collapse. Both critiques will 
be shown to ultimately demonstrate that both the boom and the bust are merely different but 
complementary sides of  a more common (generalizable) and unitary institutional problem: the systematic 
emergence of  monetary disequilibrium and monetary expectational instability, which stem inherently 
from contextualized constitutional fragilities and lack of  institutional robustness of  our current monetary 
regimes (Beckworth, 2012b; Horwitz, 2000).102  
 
the actual changes of  money demand (Sumner, 2012, 2013). 
99 The idea of  constitutions as ‘coordination devices’ is drawn from Hardin (1989) and Hayek (1978 [1960]). By establishing 
a predictable and stable set of  rules, constitutional frameworks can be seen as coordinative devices since they allow individuals 
to accurately formulate plans based on commonly shared procedures, beliefs, and expectations about the behavior of  others, 
and of  how rules change and operate (See also Ostrom, 2005). A stable and predictable set of  rules enables individuals to 
share conventions and procedures, which eases cooperation and coordination (Hayek, 1978 [1960]). 
100 The ‘positive’ role of  monetary constitutions for coordination comes from their not being agents that disrupt expectations 
and economic coordination through monetary disequilibrium and expectational shocks or unanchoring (Horwitz, 2000; 
Sumner, 2012).   
101 The concept of  ‘self-reinforcing expectations’ comes from Buchanan (1962) (see also Sumner, 1989). These expectations 
should emerge endogenously as the postconstitutional outcome of  the ordinary operations of  the system. Self-reinforcing 
implies that ‘if  people are sufficiently sure that a particular result is to be achieved, their own private actions will tend to 
guarantee that their prediction becomes true’ (Buchanan, 1962, 170). Self-reinforcing expectations are a form of endogenous 
expectations since they arise from individuals’ actions under certain sets of  rules, which tend to guarantee that their own 
expectations will prove correct and therefore stable.    
102 Monetary disequilibrium refers to a detrimental situation in which the total money supply does not equalize with economic 
actors’ underlying desire (demand) to hold real money balances. Hence it is the opposite of  a ‘state of  affairs that prevails 
when there is neither an excess demand for money nor an excess supply of  it at the existing level of  prices’ (Selgin, 1988, 49). 
I refer broadly to constitutional fragility here as the opposite of  institutional robustness as defined in footnote 73.   
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In the postcrisis literature, there have been critiques concerning the Fed’s apparently excessively loose 
monetary policy during the early stages of  the Great Recession. Calomiris and Haber (2014) pointed out 
that lower interest rates and loose monetary policy interacted with lightly regulated financial systems to 
stimulate imprudent lending, which then channeled excessive credit into the housing sector. This period 
of  high discretion, unpredictability, and loose monetary policy created the special monetary conditions, 
some economists argued, for lowering interest rates below their natural equilibrium levels (Beckworth, 
2012a; Koppl, 2014; Schwartz, 2009; Taylor, 2009, 2012; White, 2012).  
 
This distorted credit environment, some economists argue, also influenced banks and creditors to 
severely loosen lending conditions (restrictions) in housing, which stimulated an unsustainable boom in 
the US housing market and related sectors (Beckworth, 2012a, 2012b; Schwartz, 2009; Taylor, 2009). 
Beckworth (2012a) for example pointed out that the US housing boom was partly induced by highly 
accommodative monetary policy, which arose because policy makers misunderstood productivity surges 
(good deflation) during the early 2000s.  
 
On the other hand, some economists have criticized the Fed for erring on the ‘too little, too late’ side of  
contractionary and passive policy. Right after the housing bust and at the onset of  the financial turmoil 
(mid-2008), the Fed did not act promptly and strongly in stabilizing nominal income (NGDP), and the 
velocity of  broad money fell while monetary policy was relatively contractionary (Hetzel, 2009). These 
critics have argued that, regardless of  whether the Fed enacted overly loose and expansionary policies 
during the mid-2000s, these expansionary policies alone cannot account for the Great Recession’s length, 
impact, and severity (Hetzel, 2012).  
 
Analyzing closely the turn of  events of  mid-2008, some economists maintain that what turned a 
moderate recession and a contained housing correction in early 2008 into the Great Recession by late 
2008 was that the Fed did not act promptly and credibly with a strong and expansionary monetary policy 
that would have stabilized expectations and nominal spending (NGDP) and its future expected growth 
path (Sumner, 2012, 2013, 2015). This allowed actual nominal GDP and prices to fall rapidly, depressing 
aggregate demand and ultimately magnifying the housing correction into a widespread banking and real 
economic crisis (Sumner, 2012).103  
 
According to these critics, it wasn’t the unsustainable housing boom that was the crucial element that 
created the damage, extent, and severity of  the Great Recession, but rather a subsequent policy failure by 
the Fed to act credibly to stabilize market expectations and to stabilize the expected path of  nominal 
income growth (Beckworth, 2012a). Sumner (2012) further argued that sudden deviations in NGDP’s 
expected future path from average historical trends reveal drastic unwarranted changes in monetary 
policy’s expected future path in late 2008. This ultimately had large and rapid dismal effects on financial 
asset prices and commodities’ prices and real production and therefore also reduced aggregate demand. 
  
 
103 For evidence on the contractionary-policy failures, see Board of  Governors (2009) and Hetzel (2009, 2012). Around June 
2008, the FOMC tightened the expected path of  future monetary policy by changing the expectations of  an increasing path of  
the federal funds rate through its hawkish statements concerning the risk of  high inflation during June 2008. From May to 
June 2008, federal-funds futures increased by fifty basis points despite being in an environment of  economic distress (Hetzel, 
2009). Furthermore, during the September 16, 2008, Fed meeting, and right after the collapse of  Lehman Brothers, ‘the Fed 
decided not to cut rates (from 2.0 percent) because of  the risk of  higher inflation. Yet, on that very day, the Treasury Inflation-
Protected Securities (TIPS) market was forecasting only 1.23 percent inflation over the next five years’ (Sumner, 2013, 23). By 
late 2008, it was obvious to market participants that the Fed had already allowed NGDP growth expectations (its future 
expected growth path) to plunge and to move erratically; and thus they expected, correctly, that actual NGDP growth for the 
2008–9 period would be significantly lower than the Fed preferred. Indeed, actual ‘NGDP fell by 4 percent between mid-2008 
and mid-2009—the steepest decline since the Great Depression. Asset prices were falling sharply as investors reduced 
forecasts of  future nominal growth’ (Sumner, 2013, 13). See also the Philadelphia Fed’s ‘Survey of  Economic Forecasters’, 
which by late 2008 showed a drastic drop in future NGDP growth expectations that reflected markets’ negative sentiments 
and concerns about current policy failures and the new contractionary future stance of  monetary policy throughout May–
October 2008. As a consequence of  all the above, actual NGDP fell about 9 percent below normal trend during 2008–9.       
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By early 2008, despite the housing bust in some states, markets and investors were originally expecting 
(forecasting) a future path of  monetary policy consistent with stable and sound NGDP growth, as had 
indeed occurred during most of  the Great Moderation period (1985–2007). However, by mid-2008 and 
in the face of  the housing bust and banking distress, the Fed and other central banks mistakenly engaged 
in passive and (relatively) contractionary monetary policies—such as the Fed’s decision in September 
2008 not to cut rates—thus allowing inflation expectations and NGDP growth expectations to drift 
below the Great Moderation norm and trend (Gerlach, et al., 2011; Sumner, 2015; see also footnote 81).104 
This sudden mid-2008 contractionary shift in policy actions created uncertainty about monetary policy’s 
future path, affecting expectations and producing a severe credibility problem for the existent monetary 
framework. This eventually caused economic discoordination, a fall in aggregate demand, and 
macroeconomic instability, exacerbating the (up until then) mild 2007–8 housing correction (Sumner, 
2012).  
 
In other words, the 2008–9 exacerbation of  the crisis can be seen as a set of  new, alternative, and negative 
expectations that suddenly overcame the existent set of  market expectations concerning the future 
behavior of  nominal aggregates such as inflation and NGDP. This negative expectational shock and 
instability created an environment of  uncertainty, thereby hampering the coordinative function of  the 
monetary constitution and in turn depressing investment and aggregate demand (Romer and Romer, 
2013). This interpretation suggests the necessity of  robust monetary constitutions that can credibly 
maintain the stability of  an expected future path of  monetary policy (the anchoring of  expectations), like 
the expectational stability properties found on nonmonetary constitutions (Hardin, 1989; Ordeshook, 
1992). According to this interpretation, the severe macroeconomic instability of  2008–9 came mostly 
from the unanchoring of  expectations and the instability of  NGDP’s expected future path, which were 
generated largely by unpredictable and mistakenly contractionary monetary policy (see footnotes 81 and 
82 for further empirical evidence).  
 
What matters, then, is to seek institutional monetary arrangements that avoid having monetary policy 
become unpredictable and unstable and therefore deviate severely away from what markets expect. In 
other words, what matters is to avoid having a system of  monetary policy whose expected future path 
(or future behavior) unpredictably deviates (unanchors) from current market expectations, which, as the 
literature has shown, generates severe nominal instability and real discoordination (Bernanke, 2003; 
Romer, 1992; Romer and Romer, 2013). Thus, as Friedman argued, what matters is not so much whether 
the money supply and prices are rising or falling, but rather whether they are actually consistent with what 
the public and individuals currently expect (i.e., consistent with market expectations) (Friedman, 1968, 
1975; see also Lucas, 1972).   
 
Indeed, contemporary macroeconomic research has suggested that unanticipated and unexpected 
changes in monetary policy that contravene (or deviate from) its previous expected path can severely 
affect expectations about nominal magnitudes, directly harming coordination in price setting and debt 
contracts and ultimately depressing also investments and current aggregate demand (Eggertsson and 
Woodford, 2003; Romer and Romer, 2013; Woodford, 2003). Hence the aforementioned 2008 
contractionary “expectational shock” in monetary policy, at the time of  the housing correction, decreased 
NGDP’s expected future path deviating it from trend, which subsequently had a big adverse effect on 
commodity prices, debt contracts, financial assets, and business confidence, all of  which exacerbated the 
Great Recession and extended it through the rest of  the real economy (Beckworth, 2012a; Hetzel, 2012; 
Sumner, 2015).  
 
104 There is additional evidence of  this expectational shift concerning the future behavior of  nominal magnitudes such as 
future inflation and nominal GDP. Real interest rates, measured by the real yield on five-year constant-maturity TIPS, rose 
rapidly between July 15 and November 24, 2008, from 0.57 percent to 4.24 percent (FRED Database). Inflation expectations 
measured as the five-year TIPS spread showed that the market expected rising real rates and falling future inflation deviating 
from the 2 percent trend. The TIPS spread fell from 2.72 percent on July 3 to 1.50 percent by September 12, and arriving at 
a critical -2.23 percent by late November (FRED Database).     
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Moreover, Bernanke (2003) has also been quite emphatic about the crucial role of  a credible stance of  
monetary policy in anchoring expectations about the future path of  nominal magnitudes (e.g. 
inflation/deflation and nominal GDP growth). A credible and clear path of  future expansionary 
monetary policy, Bernanke argues, could potentially insulate the real economy and output from transient 
exogenous shocks; making those exogenous shocks—such as the 2007 housing correction and the 2008 
banking difficulties—to have merely short-term and transitory effects upon relative prices and the price 
level. Thus future predictability in monetary policy, and convincingly anchoring the expectations 
concerning inflation and of  other nominal magnitudes, such as nominal GDP growth—in other words, 
the credible anchoring and stability of  expectations concerning overall nominal stability,   
 
has also reduced the sensitivity of  the economy to shocks. One important [‘transmission’] 
mechanism has been the anchoring of  inflation expectations. When the public is confident 
that the central bank will maintain low and stable inflation, [exogenous] shocks … tend to 
have at most transitory price-level effects and do not result in sustained inflationary [or 
deflationary] surges. In contrast, when inflation expectations are poorly anchored … shocks 
of  these types [real and exogenous] can destabilize [unanchor] inflation expectations, 
increasing the inflationary [or deflationary] impact and leading to greater volatility in both 
inflation and output. (Bernanke, 2003, 6, emphasis added)     
 
Consequently, the arguments presented above suggest that by mid-2008, predictability and credibility of  
the accommodative (and expansionary) expected path of  monetary policy would have been enough to 
stabilize markets’ expectations concerning the future growth path of  nominal variables at the crucial time 
when the housing bust materialized. Predictability and credibility in early and mid 2008 concerning the 
future accommodative stance of  monetary policy would have been enough to insulate markets’ 
expectations about the future path of  NGDP growth over the next few years from the transient and 
exogenous shocks to the housing, financial, and banking systems.  
 
Hence it is plausible that the Fed’s biggest policy failure during the early stages of  the Great Recession 
was that of  being unable to solve the ‘technical problem of  minimizing instability [and unpredictability] 
in the [expected] growth path for nominal income’ (Sumner, 2013, 27), and thus unable to credibly signal 
to markets a sufficiently expansionary expected path for monetary policy over the next few years (Hetzel, 
2009). In other words, ‘in an absolute sense [the stance of  monetary] policy was still too contractionary 
to generate stable growth in nominal spending, which is what really matters’ (Sumner, 2015, 233). 
 
The Fed’s unnecessarily contractionary (and passive) monetary policy during April–October 2008 
signaled to markets a negative departure and change from the expected monetary-policy path (Hetzel, 
2009). This contractionary change allowed inflation and nominal-income expectations to drift and to 
become negative (see footnotes 81 and 82). The mid-2008 contractionary change in the path of  policy 
created also a severe loss of  credibility concerning the Fed’s actual and feasible commitment to return to 
the previous normal path of  nominal-income growth and inflation. These mistakes in monetary policy 
could be interpreted as a ‘constitutional’ or institutional failure of  the Fed to fully and credibly commit 
to a predictable, foreseeable, and enforceable future path of  policy. This suggests also the irresolvable 
constitutional fragility of  discretionary central banking (Selgin, 2010; Selgin and White, 2005).  
 
Consequently, the 2008–9 Great Recession could be interpreted as a severe policy error and a deep 
credibility failure on behalf  of  the Fed in being unable to credibly commit to a sound and expansionary 
expected monetary-policy path, which would have stabilized the expected growth path of  NGDP (and 
other nominal variables) over the next few years (2009–11) and insulated it from a transitory shock in both 
the financial system and the housing market. Indeed, by mid-2008, the Federal Reserve could have 
potentially insulated the macroeconomy and the real economy from exogenous and transient shocks, as 
it did with the 1987 stock market crash (Sumner, 2012). Thus, it could have prevented both financial- and 
housing-market distress from causing a sudden and sharp decline in nominal magnitudes and 
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expectations (Bernanke, 2003). Alas, the Fed’s 2008 mistakes (or inactions) caused a radical negative shift 
of  both inflation and NGDP expectations, which decreased asset prices, raised real interest rates, and 
deeply depressed output.  
 
Put differently, both credible and expansionary monetary policy ‘might be necessary to offset shocks that 
would otherwise endanger nominal stability’ (Bernanke, 2003, 6). Yet, paradoxically, this is exactly what 
the Fed did not do and did not communicate to the market convincingly from mid-2008 onward (Hetzel, 
2012). Consequently, by late 2008, there was a sudden negative shift in monetary-policy expectations that 
led many firms and investors to cut back on investment projects and spending. As a consequence of  the 
monetary expectational shift, stock markets, financial assets, and commodity prices severely plummeted, 
all anticipating (correctly) that the Fed—with its mixed signals and ill-conceived contractionary policies 
at the time—would have been unable to revive (and stabilize) NGDP growth (Sumner, 2012; see also 
footnote 81). Hence by late 2008 many firms and markets were forecasting, correctly, the Fed’s severe 
failure to provide a suitably expansionary monetary policy path that would have safeguarded nominal 
stability in the near future.  
 
Thus a crucial objective for monetary policy going forward, in light of  recent research and the evidence 
of  2008-2009, is to generate a credible and predictable expected future path so that it minimizes the 
instability of  expectations and the unpredictability of, first, the expected growth path of  both nominal 
income and inflation and, second, the expected and potential money-led changes and effects upon 
disaggregated prices (Lucas, 1972; Yeager, 1962). In other words, wide swings and unwarranted changes 
in the expected future path of  monetary policy are deeply destabilizing, not only for market expectations, 
but also for current investments, nominal income, and output. Therefore, unstable monetary policy 
changes and expectational unpredictability (or expectational unanchoring) should be avoided (Romer, 
1992; Romer and Romer, 2013). 
  
As I suggested in the introduction of  this chapter, if  constitutional orders are conceptualized as 
coordinative and forward-looking devices (see footnote 77), then monetary policy’s expected path (which 
affects present nominal income, output, and prices) can be fruitfully analyzed broadly within the 
frameworks of  monetary constitutions and constitutional political economy (see also Salter, 2014b). As 
with other types of  constitutions, the constitution of  monetary policy should be robust enough to 
safeguard the monetary framework from internal human and political (intended and unintended) failures 
to uphold the stability of  expectations (expectational anchoring) concerning the future policy path and 
the future behavior of  nominal magnitudes such as NGDP growth.   
 
Put differently, monetary institutions should be robust enough to uphold the stability of  the public’s 
expectations regarding the future monetary-policy path so that it becomes predictable and credible 
(Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003). Robustness here implies possessing mechanisms and procedures to 
uphold a fully credible constitutional order so that it can avoid endogenous forms of  monetary 
unpredictability and unanchoring of  expectations through time (Sumner, 2013). Consequently, modern 
macroeconomic research suggests that unwarranted changes in monetary policy’s expected (future) path 
have far more important and immediate consequences for the real economy and output than previously 
acknowledged (Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003; Romer and Romer, 2013; Woodford, 2003). This role 
of  policy in anchoring expectations suggests the need for a constitutional attitude and solution in 
monetary affairs in order to avoid self-generated expectational shocks.   
 
As Buchanan (1962, 2010) argued, monetary constitutions, based on their preconstitutional structures 
(i.e., overarching rules), procedures, and meta-rules, determine the information, payoffs, and incentives 
influencing how decision-makers, within those structures, will decide upon monetary-policy matters 
through time (see also Ostrom, 2005). This section then has implicitly suggested that monetary 
frameworks and monetary regimes therefore largely determine and guide the changes in, and behavior 
of, monetary policy through time. Hence monetary rules guide and shape the set of  expectations the 
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public possesses concerning the future path of  monetary policy and the associated (expected) behavior 
of  nominal magnitudes such as NGDP growth (Koppl, 2014; Sumner, 2012). This is so since monetary-
institutional frameworks and preconstitutional banking structures—similar to any other institutional 
framework—largely bind and shape monetary policy makers’ actions with their rules, information, 
payoffs, and incentive structures (Buchanan, 1964, 2010; Salter, 2014b, 2017).  
 
This constitutional-political-economic interpretation of  monetary policy and the Great Recession 
extends Eggertsson and Woodford’s (2003) and Woodford’s (2003) macroeconomic insights by 
acknowledging that the expected path of  monetary policy is largely determined by: the constitutional 
structure of  money, rather than by the specific and ad hoc actions undertaken by specific people (e.g., 
the meta-rules, incentives, and knowledge/informational structures inherent within specific monetary 
rules that affect decision-making processes), and also determined by the monetary constitutional 
structure’s specific properties in avoiding credibility problems (Selgin and White, 2005).  
 
As the recent events of  the Great Recession suggest, central-banking institutional frameworks do not 
seem to possess those desired robust stability and expectational properties (Beckworth, 2012a; Hetzel, 
2009; see also chapter 6). Therefore, and given the recent track record, central banking can be 
preliminarily considered (prima facie) an unstable, unenforceable, and thus nonrobust monetary 
constitution—a fragile system (Paniagua, 2016b; Salter, 2014b, 2017; Selgin and White, 2005).  
 
The recent financial crisis also indicates that monetary systems that allow both their nominal and 
expectational anchors to drift and monetary policy to become unpredictable (or subordinated to 
discretionary decision-making) have unstable (nonrobust) constitutional properties that make them 
inherently unenforceable, fragile, and persistently prone to generate expectational unanchoring, precisely 
because of  fallible and arbitrary forms of  decision-making (Sumner, 2013). Indeed, as emphasized by 
Woodford (2003), a significant component to monetary policy is how its future path affects current 
market expectations. Hence, ‘[m]onetary policy works not only through the direct effect of  open market 
operations, but also by influencing expectations about the future path of  policy’ (Hendrickson, 2012, 
285).      
 
The main conclusion from the crisis then is that a lack of  an enforceable, credible, and robust monetary 
framework gave a few decision-makers the unconstrained freedom to commit monetary mistakes for the 
entire society and denied them both accurate information and incentives to quickly correct their mistakes 
and eventually learn from them. Moreover, the existent framework gave those decision-makers the 
unconstrained freedom to encourage an unsustainable housing boom, and then allow an unnecessary 
monetary contraction to develop; thus exacerbating both sides of  the economic cycle. All these policy 
mistakes occurred despite what investors and financial markets were anticipating (forecasting) and 
conveying to the economy through financial markets and asset prices (Hetzel, 2012; Sumner, 2013; 2015). 
Hence ‘markets react much more strongly to future expected policy than they do to the current stance 
of  policy’ (Sumner, 2012, 141; see also Romer and Romer, 2013).     
 
The catastrophic ‘boom and bust’ events reviewed in this section suggest that both severe monetary 
disequilibrium and expectational shocks, both of  which exacerbated the recession, are in reality inherent 
and likely outcomes of  postconstitutional monetary dynamics in which erroneous and unpredictable 
monetary policy making is allowed to emerge endogenously from the defective meta-rules and the fragile 
incentive and epistemic structures of  some monetary institutions (Buchanan, 2010; Salter, 2014b. 2017). 
Hence, negative (or positive) patterns of  macroeconomic outcomes, such as periods of  instability and 
the manifestation of  recessions—analogous to political outcomes (Buchanan, 2008)—are always rule 
dependent and monetary-constitutionally dependent. This cogently indicates the need for a robust 
monetary ‘constitutional attitude’ in macroeconomics and banking (Buchanan, 1962, 2010; Salter, 2017a; 
Yeager, 1962).  
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5.2 The Constitutional Political Economy of  Monetary Frameworks 
 
Buchanan’s constitutional research program, situated within the exchange paradigm, tries to understand 
the properties of  the ‘rules of  the game’ and the mechanisms through which they affect individuals’ 
actions (Buchanan, 1990, 2008). Constitutional political economy (CPE) discusses how the rules work 
within real settings and how the frameworks, the rules (the preconstitutional order), and their properties 
guide interactions among fallible individuals at the postconstitutional level. It also discusses the 
implications of  rules for coordination and welfare (Brennan and Buchanan, 2000 [1985]). 
 
In addition, CPE studies how to choose mechanisms and rules that set a framework in which individuals 
have contextualized information, rewards, and incentives that direct their activities into unintended or 
deliberate wealth-enhancing activities (Buchanan, 2008). This opens the field of  inquiry, including that 
of  monetary policy, to the rational choices that societies can make about selecting constraints and rules 
that may bind individuals’ and policy makers’ behavior (Congleton, 2014). Buchanan’s work emphasized 
that ‘we must distinguish between pre- and post constitutional levels of  analysis. Pre-constitutional 
analysis opens up the discourse over the rules of  the game, while postconstitutional analysis reflects an 
examination of  the strategies players adopt within the defined rules’ (Boettke, 1998a, 23). It is precisely 
the emphasis on the back-and-forth between these levels that economists must put in monetary affairs 
if  we desire to avoid events such as those of  2008–9. 
 
Buchanan’s exchange paradigm aims at comparing and designing robust constitutions that allow 
individuals to seek to exhaust the gains from trade and collaborate (Buchanan, 1964, 1982). Since most 
economic interactions in the catallactic order are performed through the medium of  exchange (see 
chapter 2), this requires also a profound constitutional understanding of  how monetary policy and 
institutions could affect such social order and postconstitutional interactions. A stable and predictable 
monetary constitution should thus play a crucial role in Buchanan’s (1964) concept of  economics as the 
science of  exchange. Consequently, monetary policy falls sensibly within the CPE research project.  
 
In addition, how monetary constitutions affect human interactions and expectations depends on how the 
postconstitutional dynamics of  monetary policy generate deviations away from monetary neutrality and 
unpredictability of  the money supply’s future path, which could affect what Buchanan calls ‘sophisticated 
catallactics’, or the emergent order (Buchanan, 1964, 1982). As suggested in the previous section, to 
function most effectively as coordinative devices, the catallactic system of  exchanges requires that 
monetary constitutions should not distort the patterns of  relative prices (avoid monetary disequilibrium) 
and unanchor individuals’ expectations concerning how prices and the price level (and other nominal 
magnitudes) will predictably behave under a future path of  the money supply (Friedman, 1994; Horwitz, 
2000; Lucas, 1972).105 In this sense, monetary policy should aim toward being as neutral and as predictable as 
possible in its effects on current exchanges and relative prices. And it should aim also to stabilize the 
public’s expectations concerning the future behavior of  nominal magnitudes such as nominal-GDP 
growth and the price level (Sumner, 2012).  
 
In the previous section, I reviewed how sudden changes to monetary policies’ expected (future) path (the 
policy stance) could severely affect current economic conditions, output, and coordination (Eggertsson 
and Woodford, 2003; Romer, 1992; Woodford, 2003). Indeed, the Great Recession and the Great 
Depression are both critical historical evidence of  the potential damage done by these monetary and 
 
105 Monetary neutrality is associated with achieving monetary equilibrium; which is a theoretical-ideal state of  affairs in which 
actual individual money balances are exactly equal to economic actors’ desired real money balances at any given time and at the 
existent price level. Monetary disequilibrium, in contrast, is the opposite situation in which there are incongruences 
(disequilibrium) between the actual individual money balances and individuals’ desired balances, which brings about monetary 
and spending adjustments detrimental to market coordination and the formation of  relative prices (Horwitz, 2000; Yeager, 
1986). The concept of  ‘neutral money’ is employ to designate a state of  affairs in which the holding of  money balances does 
not exert an active or distortive influence on portfolio choices, exchanges, prices, and other real variables. For further 
theoretical details on the concept of  ‘neutral money’ consult Hayek (1967 [1935]), Lutz (1969), and Patinkin (1989).      
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policy-expectational negative shifts due to sudden unwarranted and contractionary changes in monetary 
policy’s expected path and stance (Friedman, 1975; Friedman and Schwartz, 1982; Hetzel, 2012; Romer 
and Romer, 2013; Sumner, 2012, 2013). 
 
Modern macroeconomic research suggests that the greatest source of  macroeconomic fragility and 
instability of  expectations and output actually comes from the ‘expectational channel’ reviewed in the 
previous section (Romer and Romer, 2013). Macroeconomic fragility stems from unpredictability 
(unanchoring) in expectations concerning monetary policy’s stance and expected path; thus it is generated 
mainly through the public’s negative expectational shifts (expectational channel) that stem from unwarranted 
and negative changes (mistakes) in monetary policy making (Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003; Sumner, 
2015). Hence postconstitutional dynamics of  monetary institutions—meaning the monetary policy 
stance and its changes enacted under certain sets of  monetary and banking rules—can deeply affect 
market expectations by unanchoring them, in turn depressing also both present output and aggregate 
demand (Romer, 1992; Romer and Romer, 2013).   
 
Consequently, societies should implement and design monetary constitutions so that their 
preconstitutional structures and rules are robust enough to, first, provide the correct incentives and bind 
correctly decision-makers’ actions and, second, provide promptly the accurate information required so 
that postconstitutional dynamics (monetary policy stance) can emerge that generate a credible and stable 
future path of  expected monetary policy (Buchanan, 1962). The analytical focus in macro should then 
be on comparing and scrutinizing different monetary institutions’ incentive and epistemic-informational 
structures so that we can find those robust enough that they can generate postconstitutional dynamics 
(monetary policy making) that stabilize expectations of  monetary policy in a way that is both credible and 
consistent with a predictable future path of  the money supply that promotes money neutrality (Horwitz, 
2006; Sumner, 2012, 2015; concerning money neutrality see footnote 83).  
 
Hence Buchanan’s (1964) concept of  the complex network of  exchange (or ‘catallactics’) and its working 
implicitly depends on a robust monetary constitution that both credibly anchors expectations concerning 
monetary policy and is neutral to the allocative and epistemic signals of  the price system and relative 
prices (Horwitz, 2011; Yeager, 1962). Monetary constitutions that maintain such dual neutrality and 
stability properties—or in other words, that maintain a stable set of  expectations (concerning the 
predictable behavior of  monetary policy) consistent also with a future path and tendency toward 
monetary equilibrium—could severely improve coordination. They do so also by credibly anchoring 
individuals’ expectations that the future changes and behavior of  relative prices, the price vector, nominal-
income growth, and the price level will not be distorted through time by unwarranted money imbalances 
and policy shocks (Hetzel, 2012).  
 
Individuals’ capacity to coordinate and sustainably exhaust the gains from trade within a catallactic order 
depends largely on anchoring their expectation that relative prices and nominal magnitudes will convey 
relevant information about the real economy, productivity, and relative scarcity (Hetzel, 2012; Lucas, 
1972). Individuals then can coordinate their plans, debt contracts, and exchanges by credibly relying on 
the predictability and accuracy of  the price system and also on the predictable future behavior of  relevant 
nominal magnitudes as both precise and prompt epistemic conveyors of  underlying decentralized market 
knowledge and productivity enhancements (Hetzel, 2012).  
 
This dual framework of  expectational anchoring and neutral monetary stability fully supports 
decentralized economic planning, stable expectations, and rational economic calculation (Yeager, 1962, 
1986). It does so not only by avoiding detrimental monetary expectational shocks (negative expectational 
shifts) of  the sort that occurred in 2008–9, but also by promoting strong institutional tendencies toward 
monetary neutrality, which allows the price system to achieve its full epistemic-coordinative role through 
time (Hetzel, 2012; Horwitz, 2000). As argued, a lack of  robust, enforceable, and credible commitment 
in monetary policy opens the possibility that policy makers can make mistakes and suddenly deviate from 
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the predictable path of  policy, in turn allowing expectations of  nominal-income growth, the price level, 
and prices to become unanchored and volatile. Hence monetary constitutions can be considered stable 
and robust only if they diminish the postconstitutional appearance of  both monetary and expectational 
disruptions to the price system, thus enabling the money-based exchange network to coordinate and 
allocate resources to their highest-valued uses (Koppl, 2014; Salter, 2014b; Sumner, 2015).  
 
At the postconstitutional level, the stability and neutrality properties aforementioned let actors coordinate 
and sustainably exhaust the gains from trade by anchoring expectations and by predictably relying on 
both the future behavior of  nominal magnitudes (such as NGDP growth) and the credible maintenance 
of  monetary neutrality throughout the network of  exchanges. The constitutional framework briefly 
outlined here provides us with two elements. First, it provides the dual criteria of  predictability and 
stability (see also Buchanan, 1962) by which monetary rules can be compared. Second, it offers a way to 
scrutinize the different monetary rules’ intrinsic institutional robustness and properties and how they can 
actually uphold—or move closer toward—the ideal predictability criterion even when political pressure 
and human fragility are present.  
 
5.3 Buchanan’s Monetary-Predictability Criterion Reconsidered  
 
As argued throughout this chapter, a key lesson from the Great Recession is that a crucial property of  
monetary constitutions is the predictability and stability of  the expected path of  monetary policy and the 
expectations it generates for economic actors (Hetzel, 2009). Monetary-policy predictability, Buchanan 
(1962) argued, is desirable because it improves forward-looking coordination in debt contracts and 
economic exchanges. Credibly stabilizing the future path and behavior of  a nominal variable (such as 
nominal-income growth) helps to provide a common nominal anchor on which individuals can 
subsequently coordinate their debt contracts, compare their alternative future plans, and engage in 
rational price-setting strategies based on common expectations (Hetzel, 2012). Hence, monetary 
frameworks can work—through stabilizing the nominal ‘expectational channel’—as forward-looking 
coordinative devices (Romer and Romer, 2013).   
 
Coordinating and stabilizing individuals’ expectations concerning the future behavior of  nominal 
variables promotes coordination by organizing the future setting of  prices and debt and labor contracts 
in a way that allows economic actors to separate and differentiate fluctuations of  the known path of  the 
price level from the normal economic behavior of  prices and industries (Hetzel, 2012). Fully credible and 
enforceable predictability about the behavior of  monetary policy makes money a less disturbing element 
in the workings of  the price system and coordination (Sumner, 2013; Yeager, 1962).106 In what follows, I 
argue for the need for better, enforceable, and robust institutional structures and constitutional 
procedures that can generate postconstitutional dynamics that maintain endogenously (i.e., self-enforceable) 
the stability properties (anchoring) of  expectations within a fully credible and enforceable system.  
 
In order to pursue this institutional and constitutional approach to macro, I first redefine a meaningful 
criterion for monetary-policy predictability that enhances market exchanges and coordination. Just 
because a given monetary-policy outcome or procedure is predictable and stable at the aggregated level, 
it does not make it necessarily desirable and optimal as a coordinative device and also as a means of  
enhancing the wealth of  economic actors at the microeconomic level (Horwitz, 2011; Wagner, 2012). 
After all, what Buchanan’s (1964, 2010) catallactics seek to achieve is facilitating exchanges and 
coordination among entities at the individual level (Wagner, 2010). Hence, societies should aim for a robust 
and predictable monetary constitution that is also fully compatible with Buchanan’s catallactic order at the 
 
106 If  monetary policy is unpredictable and conducted in a way that causes the money supply to fluctuate unpredictably and 
unrelated to the actual demand for money, the price level and relative prices will behave and move in an unpredictable fashion. 
This nominal and price-related unpredictability, which stems from volatile monetary policy disassociated from the demand for 
money, damages the ability of  the price system to work as numeraire, undermining its epistemic role in price setting, economic 
rationality, and economic coordination (Horwitz, 2000; Yeager, 1986).  
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individual level (Horwitz, 2011).   
 
Buchanan (1962, 2010) for example, advocated an explicit and binding constitutionalization of  money in 
order to achieve predictability and stability in the value of  money since it would remove uncertainty about 
the future behavior of  the general price level. Stability and predictability of  the price level could, 
Buchanan argued, lead to ‘greater economic efficiency’, since money can thereafter act as a stable and 
predictable measure of  value, something useful for intertemporal assessment of  comparative economic 
value and plans (Buchanan, 1962). This ultimately enables economic evaluations and rational comparisons 
based on the stability of  money’s purchasing power. Buchanan, however, much like Wicksell (1967 [1906]) 
and other accomplished economists, disregarded the logical and economic incompatibility between a 
stable and constant price level and actual monetary neutrality (Myrdal, 1965 [1939]; Selgin, 1990).107  
 
As hinted in the previous sections, general stability (anchoring) of  expectations is important, but overall 
expectational stability must be consistent and compatible with a credible monetary framework that also 
promotes tendencies toward money neutrality at the micro level (Horwitz, 2011; see also footnote 85). 
This combination of  two goals has implications when evaluating and comparing monetary constitutions 
such as NGDP-futures targeting (see section 5.4). Monetary frameworks should provide a stable and 
predictable expectational setting in which actors can trade in and fully rely on prices (or the price vector) 
as accurate epistemic market signals (Horwitz, 2011; Lucas, 1972). In such an environment, they can 
predict and expect—with credibility—that future money-supply changes will not drastically distort prices 
and depress nominal magnitudes and hence will not distort their transactions, contracts, and economic 
plans through time (Brennan and Buchanan, 1981; Sumner, 2012).  
 
As Buchanan (1962, 2010) argued convincingly, a common predictability criterion allows us then to 
compare how alternative monetary institutions might seek to achieve or move toward such a stability goal. 
Nevertheless, unlike Buchanan (1962) and considering the lessons learned from the Great Recession, I 
argue that a superior criterion is for monetary policy to seek both to minimize nominal distortions and 
expectational shocks (expectational unanchoring) (Sumner, 2012) and also to become as neutral as 
possible with respect to relative prices at the micro level (Horwitz, 2000). This dual monetary-
expectational objective allows agents to avoid expectational instabilities and shocks concerning how 
nominal aggregates and prices ought to behave under a neutral-money environment.108  
 
The market’s competitive solution and its allocative efficiency depend on money prices accurately 
communicating underlying real economic fundamentals (Horwitz, 2000; Rabin, 2004), which require that 
monetary institutions not introduce endogenous nominal and expectational distortions (Lucas, 1972). 
How efficiently and sustainably the network of  exchanges develops depends on the price system’s 
predictability and capacity to work properly under monetary neutrality rather than under a general and 
‘crude’ (superficial) form of  stability of  the price level (Horwitz, 2011; Lutz, 1969).  
 
In other words, anchoring expectations at the micro level should focus also on stabilizing the price 
system’s future behavior, predictability, and working properties consistent with money neutrality in order 
 
107 The incompatibility between a stable price level and money neutrality (under productivity enhancements) was pointed out 
both by Hayek (1999 [1925]) and Myrdal (1965 [1939]). They argued that stabilizing (keeping constant) the price level in the 
face of  a productive and growing economy (i.e., productivity enhancements) implies also superficially stabilizing an aggregated 
‘macro’ nominal magnitude at the cost of  potentially distorting interest rates and prices through unwarranted monetary 
injections. On how the price level ought to behave under productivity enhancements and economic growth see Beckworth 
(2012a) and Selgin (1997, 1999).   
108 Here I assume a system that seeks to promote money neutrality as if following a ‘productivity norm’ (Selgin, 1990, 1997). 
Importantly, the implicit expectational properties in an environment that promotes such monetary neutrality (or productivity 
norm) refer to, first, the stability of  expectations that prices will always have a downward tendency in the face of  specific (sector-
oriented) growing productivities and, second, the expectation that the general price level will accurately vary and most likely 
fall in order to reflect permanent changes in the costs of  production and productivity. Finally, the third property implicitly 
assumed is that expectations of  nominal income will predictably vary, behave, and grow at a rate equal—or closely related—
to the growth rate of  real factor inputs (Selgin, 1990, 1997). 
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to allow micro-level coordination and individuals’ expectational stability concerning the benign future 
role of  prices and nominal magnitudes as accurate and relevant market conveyors and epistemic signals. 
Under those micro stability conditions, firms and individuals can credibly rely on intertemporal and future 
prices and nominal variables to smoothly coordinate plans, contracts, and timely adjust their economic 
actions (Hayek, 1999 [1928]; Horwitz, 2000, 2006).  
 
On the other hand, if  the aggregated price level is stabilized or kept constant, this will not necessarily 
minimize monetary-induced micro-level and price changes and distortions, especially when the economy 
experiences gains in productivity, since the price level tends to actually fall at such times to reflect falling 
prices and productivity gains (Hayek, 1999 [1925]; Selgin, 1997). Allowing monetary and microeconomic 
distortions necessary to keep the price level stable (constant) and predictable indeed stabilizes 
expectations concerning the future behavior of  the general price level. But this comes at the expense of  not 
allowing different sets of  local prices and the price level to actually reflect underlying and heterogeneous 
changes in industry-specific productivity and economic growth; thereby producing also local distortions and 
detrimental unpredictability within the real network of  exchanges at the microeconomic level (Beckworth, 
2012a; Horwitz, 2011; Selgin, 1997).  
 
The above kind of  aggregated policy also increases epistemic and signal-extraction costs for economic 
actors—that is, the cost to disentangle real productivity effects from monetary-distortive effects (Hetzel, 
2012; Lucas, 1972). In other words,  
 
achieving near-term price stability might sometimes not be sufficient to avoid serious 
macroeconomic downturns in the medium term. Moreover, recognising that all deflations 
are not alike, the active use of monetary policy to avoid the threat of deflation could even 
have longer term costs that might be higher than the presumed benefits. The core of the 
problem is that persistently easy monetary conditions [in the face of price stability] can lead 
to the cumulative build-up over time of significant deviations from historical norms. (W. 
White, 2006, 1) 
  
Hence, recent ‘boom and bust’ cycles and negative experiences associated with stabilizing the price level 
(Beckworth, 2012a; Schwartz, 2009; W. White, 2006) suggest that not all macroeconomic aggregated 
nominal stability and stability of  expectations are consistent also with expectations of  money neutrality 
at the individual level (Horwitz, 2011). Stability of  expectations concerning the future path and behavior 
of  the general price level (e.g. a constant zero-growth path) might still be unable to underpin and safeguard 
microeconomic stability, money neutrality, and predictability of  the future behavior of  disaggregated and 
local prices that are concomitant with money neutrality at the individual level (Hayek, 1999 [1925]; W. 
White, 2006; see also footnote 85).  
 
Consequently, ‘macro expectational’ stability (e.g. stability of  expectations concerning the future behavior 
of  the general price level) might not necessarily be conducive to either monetary neutrality or 
microeconomic and disaggregated price predictability that should actually reflect sector-specific 
productivity surges, real economic data, and local knowledge (Horwitz, 2011; Selgin, 1997, 1999).109 Put 
 
109 For instance, Horwitz (2011) argues that the predictability of  the general price level is a crude form of  macro predictability 
since, although predictable and stable in the aggregate, it might still hide microeconomic uncertainty and it does not minimize 
monetary disequilibrium. In cases of  growing economies, productivity causes prices of  final goods to fall; instead, stability of  
the general price level requires unnecessary monetary injections, causing micro unpredictability and price distortions to sustain 
it (see also W. White, 2006). This creates microeconomic uncertainty about how monetary policy will in fact affect the behavior 
of  different relative prices in specific sectors of  the economy that are becoming more productive, affecting also efficient 
resource allocation and perhaps even exacerbating unsustainable booms (Beckworth, 2012a). Crude macro predictability and 
aggregated expectational stability, in the form of  price-level stability, could then come at the cost of  both undermining micro 
predictability of  certain prices and bringing also monetary non-neutrality and distortions into individual markets. Hence it is 
not true that the fact that the general price level (or other macroeconomic nominal magnitude) is predictable makes it 
necessarily desirable for money to still remain neutral to relative prices and the allocative processes of  the catallactic order 
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differently, ‘[t]he behavior of  the price level is therefore not of  primary importance and might be 
misleading with regards to the [disaggregated] effects of  monetary policy’ (Hendrickson, 2012, 271). Or 
in the words of  Horwitz:  
 
Although a stable overall price level enhances predictability at the macro level, achieving 
that goal in a growing economy requires disruptions in some number of the millions of 
prices that comprise that price level. Those disruptions cause the sorts of problems 
discussed earlier and reduce predictability at the microeconomic level. Price level stability 
can only achieve a ‘crude’ notion of predictability based on the analytical aggregate 
construct of the price level, while reducing predictability in the individual [and local] 
markets that comprise it. (Horwitz, 2011, 337) 
   
Alternatively, to be actually consistent with money neutrality, monetary constitutions that aim instead at 
anchoring the public’s expectations concerning the future path of  the money supply in a manner 
consistent with money demand have the very advantageous characteristic discussed above over 
arrangements that instead anchor expectations about the future value (or behavior, or growth rate) of  
aggregated nominal magnitudes such as NGDP growth (see also footnote 87). The advantage lies in the 
fact that under this alternative, the price level and other nominal (aggregated) magnitudes can still remain 
predictably flexible—and thus behave predictably in the future—even in the eventuality of  aggregate supply 
shocks and productivity enhancements (Selgin, 1997).  
 
Thus, under this sort of  predictable future monetary policy consistent with money neutrality, the price 
level will be expected to rise in the event of  a negative supply shock and expected to fall, persistently, if  
overall economic productivity surges. This alternative ‘policy goal’ or form of  predictability of  the future 
path of  the money supply, one in which the future money supply is consistent with changes in demand, 
is ‘epistemologically superior’, as precise (non-distortive) market signals and nominal magnitudes can 
accurately behave and reflect underlying productivity enhancements and scarcity conditions (Selgin, 1997, 
22–23; Horwitz, 2011). 
 
5.3.1 Self-reinforcing and endogenous expectations as robustness 
 
Given the above suggestion for a predictable monetary policy, I now focus in this subsection on 
determining the institutional means or mechanisms of  how to maintain the aforementioned stability 
properties. In order to achieve predictability, monetary constitutions should seek consistent and credible 
rules (Simons, 1936; Sutter, 1997). Participants in the postconstitutional monetary game should form 
expectations in a way that is consistent with the framework’s systematic behavior and also its expected 
behavior given its institutional constraints (Sumner, 2012).  
 
If  the monetary framework’s operation is analyzed along with real human limitations and political-
economy considerations, then we see that its procedures and systematic behavior (policy outcomes) 
depend on possibly fallible decision-makers prone to misaligned incentives (self-interest), political 
pressures, and epistemic limitations (Pennington, 2011; Stigler, 1971). Hence, given this imperfect reality 
of  institutional arrangements, how can the appropriate predictability and expectational criterion 
aforementioned be fully upheld in practice? This is the question I seek to address in this subsection.     
 
It has been acknowledged by some economists that monetary arrangements that transfer the 
responsibility of  policy and action to a few public authorities or bureaucratic decision-makers who are 
immune to legal and reputational penalties are prone to generate instability and credibility crises 
(Friedman, 1994; Hetzel, 1985; Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Selgin and White, 2005; Simons, 1936). 
Hence, the suggested stability properties of  expectations should be analyzed along with political-
economic and institutional considerations. In particular, robust political economy (RPE) allows us to 
 
(Horwitz, 2011).   
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evaluate and compare different institutional arrangements and their properties under more realistic 
assumptions concerning human (epistemic-informational) capabilities and potential misalignment of  
incentives (Pennington, 2011). Institutional robustness here refers to ‘a political economic arrangement’s 
ability to produce social welfare-enhancing outcomes [such as maintaining stability of  expectations] in 
the face of  deviations from ideal assumptions about individuals’ motivations and information’ (Leeson 
and Subrick, 2006, 107; see also preface and chapter 6 of  this work).110 
 
The degree to which institutional frameworks can be considered robust or fragile depends, first, on 
whether they possess institutional tendencies and rules to consistently move monetary policy toward the 
dual-ideal benchmark of  neutral money predictability and expectational stability. Second, monetary 
robustness depends on how the different institutional tendencies toward expectational stability, 
predictability, and money neutrality can still emerge, and be upheld, given worst-case-scenario assumptions 
concerning decision-makers’ motivations (self-interest), political pressure, and information asymmetries 
or bounded rationality (Salter, 2014b). Thus, fragile (nonrobust) institutions are ones that are unable to 
promote and maintain the dual monetary objectives whenever imperfect knowledge (lack of  omniscience), 
political pressure, and lack of  benevolence are ubiquitous. 
 
Under reasonable and realistic assumptions of  imperfect human endowments (less-than-perfect 
information and misaligned incentives), the sensible institutional analysis should focus on understanding 
how monetary constitutions can still achieve both stability of  expectations and monetary neutrality even 
in that imperfect human reality and context. Building from these political-economic considerations, 
Buchanan (1962) suggested that to robustly maintain the predictability of  a stable price level, institutions 
should aim to uphold it endogenously through the normal functioning of  the system. In other words, they 
should aim to maintain monetary policy’s predictability by relying on postconstitutional dynamics in the form 
of  endogenous expectational anchoring as an attempt to sidestep inherent informational and incentive 
problems of  decision-makers (Buchanan, 1962, 163–165).111  
 
This endogenous and self-enforcing form of  predictability is consistent with Buchanan’s suggestion of  
‘self-reinforcing expectations’ (Buchanan, 1962) as a way to sidestep human frailty, lack of  knowledge, 
and credibility and incentive problems (see also footnote 79). Thus, expectational anchoring and stability 
should emerge as the postconstitutional outcome of  the ordinary and normal operations of  the system. 
Self-reinforcing of  expectations implies that ‘if  people are sufficiently sure that a particular result is to be 
achieved, their own private actions will tend to guarantee that their prediction becomes true’ (Buchanan, 
1962, 170). Put differently:  
  
The primary virtue of  any ‘automatic’ or commodity standard of  money lies in the fact that 
only in such a system would the forces of  the competitive market be directly utilized to 
achieve monetary predictability. . . . [in such system] The profit-seeking actions of  
speculators [at the postconstitutional level] will tend to ensure that the predictability implicit 
in the rule-as-directive to the monetary authorities will, in fact, characterize the rule-as-
result. The phenomena here have been referred to as self-reinforcing expectations. 
(Buchanan, 1962, 169-170; see also Sumner, 1989, 2013)    
 
The endogenous formation and self-reinforcing aspect of  expectations that arises from the normal and 
 
110 Institutional robustness relates to monetary constitutions’ capacities to promote wealth-enhancing goals, and to uphold the 
neutral monetary and predictability criterion throughout the system’s normal functioning, even with severe deviations from 
ideal epistemic (omniscience) and incentive (benevolence) assumptions. Robust monetary constitutions are the ones that can 
generate tendencies to uphold the expectational stability and money neutrality properties and that can maintain those policy 
tendencies, despite both imperfect benevolence (some degree of  self-interest) and imperfect information (less than 
omniscience) on behalf  of  the decision-makers involved in the system. See more details in chapter 6.   
111 Buchanan (1962) established that the normative stability and monetary criterion could most effectively (robustly) be 
achieved through self-enforceable conventions and procedures allowing predictability to emerge through the ‘normal ordinary 
operations of  private decision-making at the post-constitutional level’ (Buchanan, 1962, 164).  
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decentralized decisions of  actors (and exchanges) not only could avoid epistemic, informational, and 
public choice problems, but it would also be consistent with the required properties of  ‘stable 
constitutions’ when seen as coordinative devices (Hardin, 1989). This requires that constitutions should 
avoid seeking top-down (exogenous) forms of  enforcement and stabilization properties and instead 
establish endogenous conventions and procedures so that stability of  expectations arises from, and is 
maintained by, the self-reinforcing expectations about people’s actions at the postconstitutional level 
(Ordeshook, 1992).  
 
The suggested endogenous self-reinforcement of  expectations eliminates the risk reviewed in the 
previous sections of  having an external (top-down) decision-maker, such as the Board of  Governors of  
the Fed, which allows for unwarranted expectational shocks due to mistakes, lack of  knowledge, incentive 
misalignments, or political pressure. Robust constitutional properties of  self-reinforcing expectations—
as the ones suggested by Buchanan’s quote above—bolster rather than undermine the monetary policy’s 
expected future path, in turn reinforcing macroeconomic stability (Sumner, 2012, 2015).  
 
Under self-reinforcing expectations, the postconstitutional interactions of  decision-makers should define 
or reinforce the monetary policy’s guidelines: decision-makers act in such a way that their 
postconstitutional interactions and expectations reinforce the expected policy path rather than undermine 
it. The existence of  self-reinforcing and endogenous expectations insulates the real economy from 
endogenous and systemic monetary expectational shocks (Sumner, 2013). In contrast, systems that try to 
stabilize and anchor expectations from the outside (the top-down approach) actually dissociate policy 
making from the emergence of  expectations. They are also nonrobust, extremely fragile, and inherently 
subject to RPE problems, public choice and epistemic considerations, and human-fallibility challenges 
whenever decision-makers are not omniscient or benevolent, as in the case of  the Great Recession 
reviewed previously (Sumner, 2013, 2015).  
 
Full credibility is fundamental in guiding and anchoring market expectations, but as Buchanan (1962) and 
Sumner (2012) pointed out, the only robust and realistic way to maintain credibility and to fully solve the 
problem of  expectational anchoring—and thus to avoid public choice and epistemic problems—is 
through sidestepping it entirely, meaning stabilizing expectations through their own endogenous formation 
and self-reinforcement (Sumner, 2013). The stability of  self-reinforcing expectations seems to be far 
more fundamental for monetary robustness than previously acknowledged (Selgin and White, 2005; 
Yeager, 1962).   
 
Additionally, self-reinforcing and endogenous expectations concerning the future path of  the money 
supply consistent with money neutrality (or a credible monetary-policy path that seeks to minimize 
monetary disequilibria) can also provide a common set of  expectations concerning how prices will behave 
and change given that credible path of  the money supply. Put differently, monetary predictability can 
create the endogenous stability of  expectations concerning how prices and nominal magnitudes will 
behave under a framework that promotes strong tendencies toward money neutrality. This also avoids 
trying to stabilize expectations concerning other nominal variables, such as the general price level (or 
other nominal aggregates), whose numeric stability might prove inconsistent with monetary neutrality at 
the individual level (Horwitz, 2011; see also footnotes 85 and 87).112  
 
The above means that when expectations are credibly anchored in a monetary environment that promotes 
strong tendencies toward money neutrality, individuals also credibly expect that nominal variables and 
 
112 The actual expected future path of  nominal variables in a system that seeks monetary equilibrium will depend specifically 
on which monetary standard the economy is operating under. For simplicity, I consider the expected path of  nominal variables 
as if  under a free banking arrangement or a ‘productivity norm’ rule in a small, open economy under a commodity standard 
growing faster than the rest of  the world. Aiming at maintaining monetary equilibrium through, for example, free banking 
under such circumstances, implies (as an unintended outcome) a growth path of  nominal income equal to real factor growth 
(Selgin, 1997, 64).   
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magnitudes—such as local prices, the general price level, and nominal-income growth—will behave in an 
associated predictable way (predictably flexible) so that they will accurately reflect and convey underlying 
economic knowledge and transmit market signals such as real factor inputs’ growth and productivity 
enhancements in certain specific industries (Horwitz, 2011; Selgin, 1997, 22–23). 
 
5.4 A Preliminary Comparative Institutional Analysis of  Monetary Alternatives   
 
Monetary frameworks should recognize the aforementioned constitutional stability challenges (Foley, 
1990). They should promote postconstitutional dynamics that ensure predictable monetary policy and 
self-reinforcing expectations. Given the stability properties proposed earlier, I now briefly conduct a 
comparative institutional examination. I succinctly analyze how free banking and NGDP targeting might 
possess the suggested expectational and neutrality properties to see whether they can be considered stable 
and robust constitutions.113 Chapter 6 will delve much deeper into a comparative institutional analysis of  
monetary alternatives, including central banking and free banking. Regarding a market-based form of  
NGDP-futures targeting as proposed by Sumner (1989, 2012, 2013), it is not altogether clear whether 
the expectational nominal anchoring of  this system really anchors expectations concerning the future 
behavior of  nominal magnitudes in a manner consistent with monetary neutrality at the micro level (see 
also footnotes 85 and 87).    
 
Buchanan’s (1962) suggestion of  self-reinforcing expectations around a defined and stable future path of  
the price level (a stable zero-growth path), or Sumner’s (2012, 2013) suggestion of  anchoring the 
expectations of  NGDP growth (a stable 5 percent NGDP growth) are both forms of  top-down, 
exogenously provided numeric solutions. Nevertheless, these proposals—after they exogenously define 
the numeric values of  the nominal magnitudes and externally establish the numeric goals of  policy—do 
subsequently, and endogenously, self-reinforce and anchor expectations of  the public around those 
previously defined variables. These self-reinforced expectations about nominal magnitudes are, however, 
originally defined ex ante and imposed exogenously by a monetary authority.  
 
The above means that the definition, stable numeric value, and specific future behavior of  those nominal 
magnitudes, that these two proposals seek to stabilize, are defined and established exogenously and arbitrarily 
by an authority ex ante. Consequently, the aggregated and nominal magnitudes are here numerically 
defined and fixed prior to and outside the postconstitutional system in which individuals actually 
exchange. Put differently, the stable future path of  the price level, or of  NGDP growth, is in these two 
proposals defined regardless of  what the process of  exchange would have actually produced (Wagner, 
2012).  
 
Accordingly, the nominal magnitudes’ prearranged future behavior and numeric values are here 
paradoxically defined before the actual process of  exchange produces the emergent real value and 
behavior of  those very same nominal magnitudes. Thus NGDP targeting stabilizes (anchors) 
expectations of  a nominal magnitude (nominal-GDP growth), but this stable set of  expectations is 
entirely defined and imposed preconstitutionally, meaning established exogenously, arbitrarily, and ex ante 
by an authority. Paradoxically, the expectations are defined also before the process of  exchange unfolds 
and actually produces the emergent underlying value of  NGDP growth that would have been consistent 
with the system’s normal postconstitutional workings.  
 
These ex ante and exogenously defined stability properties are different in nature and in outcome from 
what the postconstitutional and catallactic order will actually produce. Hence how NGDP is actually 
obtained and stabilized matters for monetary policy and macroeconomic stability (Salter, 2013). 
Therefore they are disassociated from the actual expectations that would have emerged 
 
113 I analyze briefly here only these two systems since they do not rely on top-down exogenous forms of  expectational 
anchoring and instead use postconstitutional dynamics to uphold their policy objectives and to self-reinforce the expectational 
anchoring and goals of  policy. See also Salter (2014b).  
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postconstitutionally from the normal process of  exchange. In simple terms, how do we know, ex ante, 
that the exogenously defined value of  a stable NGDP growth, based on which we will anchor 
expectations under NGDP targeting, is at all times consistent with and equal to an ex post form of  
NGDP growth that would have emerged from a system that actually upholds money neutrality from the 
bottom-up? Consequently,  
 
NGDP as an emergent result of the market process is not the same thing as NGDP that is 
an object of choice for a central bank. In other words, fractional-reserve free banking and 
NGDP targeting by the central bank are not two different ‘technologies’ for achieving the 
same theoretical end. . . . The classic insights on knowledge, the pricing process, and the 
institutional framework for economic activity show that process matters; this is no less true 
for NGDP. (Salter, 2013, 49)   
 
Hence it seems that these arbitrarily defined, exogenous, and a priori established macro-level 
expectations—under NGDP targeting—are not homologous in nature, value, and process to the 
postconstitutional emergence of  expectations concerning the path of  a flexible price level and NGDP 
growth consistent with a monetary policy seeking to uphold money neutrality. Thus it is not altogether 
clear that the crude and macro stability of  expectations that NGDP targeting provides are consistent 
with the stability of  expectations that would have arisen postconstitutionally in a system that truly 
maintains money neutrality and monetary equilibrium at the microeconomic level (Salter, 2013). In other 
words, the institutional process throughout which the stability of  expectations concerning nominal 
magnitudes is attained matters greatly for macroeconomic stability and money neutrality (Horwitz, 2011).      
 
Instead, under a system that seeks to maintain money neutrality (monetary equilibrium) at the 
microeconomic level, a stable and predictable future path of  NGDP growth will likely emerge, but 
unintendedly and postconstitutionally from the process of  exchange (Selgin, 1988; see also footnote 90). 
Moreover, this ex post emergent form of  stable and predictable NGDP growth—consistent with money 
neutrality at the micro level—might not be equal, at all times, to the one that would be arbitrarily defined 
ex ante and exogenously by the monetary authorities seeking to stabilize NGDP expectations under 
NGDP targeting (Salter, 2013). This is the reason why NGDP targeting disassociates or separates the 
stability of  expectations concerning an arbitrarily defined value or growth of  a nominal magnitude from 
the actual process of  monetary exchange that should have generated both the expectations and the value 
of  those nominal magnitudes in the first place.  
 
Indeed, this top-down and arbitrary aspect of  NGDP targeting led Selgin (2013) to describe NGDP 
targeting as ‘a form of  economic planning’, with all the informational limitations and knowledge 
problems that such a form of  ex ante and monocentric form planning actually carries (Hayek, 1948 
[1937], 1948 [1945], 1973).114 Therefore, ‘[t]he consequence of this divergent approach to NGDP is that 
NGDP becomes a different phenomenon. Patterns of economic activity can differ between the two 
systems even should they equally well stabilize NGDP’ (Salter, 2013, 47).  
        
Free banking, by contrast, indirectly stabilizes expectations of  a future growth path of  nominal GDP and 
stabilizes expectations of  how disaggregated prices will behave under productivity surges after the process 
of  exchange actually unfolds (Salter, 2013; Selgin, 1997; see chapter 6). In other words, by promptly 
(automatically) and credibly correcting monetary disequilibria at the micro level when they arise, free 
banking promotes both strong monetary tendencies toward neutrality and a decentralized, yet predictable, 
 
114 Or as Schuler stated, ‘With nominal GDP targeting it may well also happen that there will be flaws that only become 
apparent through experience. My reason for thinking that flaws are likely is that, like inflation targeting, nominal GDP targeting 
is an [exogenously] imposed monetary arrangement. It is not a fully competitive one. . . . Nominal GDP targeting when carried 
out by a central bank, which has monopoly powers, is a form of  central economic planning subject to the same criticism that 
apply to all forms of  central planning. In particular, it does not allow for the occurrence of  the type of  discovery of  knowledge 
that comes from being able to replace one arrangement with another through competition’ (Schuler, 2013).             
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form of  the future path of  monetary policy consistent with money neutrality (Selgin, 1988). Hence this 
self-enforceable system subsequently—and unintendedly—anchors expectations about how nominal 
magnitudes and prices will behave (predictably flexible) through time in a manner consistent with such 
credible tendencies toward money neutrality at the microeconomic level (Horwitz, 2000, 2011; Selgin, 
1997).  
 
This self-enforcing and credible decentralized process of  a neutral-monetary-policy path allows also the 
ex post and postconstitutional emergence of  a common and stable set of  expectations concerning how 
both disaggregated prices and NGDP growth will predictably behave and change given this credible and 
robust constitutional background of  how the money supply will constantly adjust to correct individuals’ 
money imbalances. Free banking, thus, by having strong tendencies toward maintaining monetary 
neutrality through time, unintendedly obtains also macro-level expectational stability of  nominal 
aggregates (Horwitz, 2011; Salter, 2013). But their stable growth, behavior, and actual nominal values are 
determined ex post and as a postconstitutional by-product of  the workings of  the system that seeks firstly 




A free banking system . . . will minimize money-induced movements in the price level, it 
will allow for the price level to change in response to changes in total factor productivity. 
More specifically, the price level will move inversely to changes in productivity . . . If  prices 
are supposed to reflect underlying scarcities, then allowing them to move in response to 
changes in productivity would seem to be the appropriate policy. . . . Rather than attempting 
to keep the price level [or NGDP growth] constant and therefore predictable, the so-called 
‘productivity norm’ [or a form of  free banking] argues that the predictability of  the relative 
prices being indicators of  relative scarcity is a more important form of  predictability. (Horwitz, 
2011, 336-337, emphasis added)          
  
In contrast, NGDP targeting prioritizes a top-down and ad hoc form of  macro-level (or crude) stability 
of  nominal-GDP growth, established arbitrarily prior to and outside of  the normal workings of  the 
economic system. This might ultimately be revealed as inconsistent with money neutrality at the 
microeconomic level. Indeed, just as Hayek (1999 [1925]) emphasized the negative role of  the money 
supply in potentially altering the structure of  production and relative prices under a general price-level-
stabilization targeting (see W. White, 2006), we should be equally cautious about attempting to stabilize 
expectations concerning the growth path of  nominal aggregates defined arbitrarily ex ante and outside 
of  the postconstitutional dynamics that generally produce their actual value. This caveat holds especially 
true when the expectational macro targets and the overall nominal stabilization goals are simply decided 
by an authority a priori rather than stemming from a self-reinforcing process that emerges 
postconstitutionally from exchanges.  
 
Put differently, even if  both—free banking and NGDP targeting—eventually reach a similar nominal 
macro outcome in regards to stabilizing nominal spending growth, this result does not mean that achieving 
the same macro end throughout different monetary processes is irrelevant and equally neutral. Indeed, 
obtaining such a macro outcome through top-down pre-constitutional means would likely have entirely 
different effect upon the coordination process of  the economy if  it had been achieved instead through 
bottom-up postconstitutional means. The fact that there is an unintendedly predictable NGDP future 
behavior and its stable growth under free banking (Selgin, 1990, 1994), does not mean that any plausible 
way to achieve such NGDP goal will be equally stable and neutral to the economy and coordination. 
Stable and predictable NGDP growth as an emergent outcome and stable NGDP growth as an ex ante and 
bureaucratically defined object of  choice can have the same value, but entirely different monetary effects upon 
coordination and the sustainable allocation of  resources (Salter, 2013).   
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The stability properties outlined in the previous sections suggest that stabilizing expectations of  
statistically constructed macro aggregates should not be of  primary importance to promote coordination and 
money neutrality in a catallactic order—although we have also seen that they could nonetheless improve 
coordination and stability (Horwitz, 2011). As it has been suggested earlier, the objective is not to match 
and stabilize expectations in general, but rather to stabilize the correct kind of  expectations that are 
consistent with money neutrality. But how can we be sure that the central bank has decided correctly on 
which macro-level expectations to match and stabilize?  
 
A monopolist supplier of  money can certainly stabilize (anchor) any expectations concerning NGDP 
growth (Sumner, 2013), but that doesn’t mean either that those arbitrarely-defined expectational anchors 
are correct and consistent with money neutrality, or that expectations concerning nominal magnitudes 
are actually homogenous throughout the economy. Consequently, the policy objective is not only about 
anchoring expectations about the future path of  NGDP, but also, and perhaps most importantly, about 
choosing and stabilizing the correct future path of  NGDP growth consistent with money neutrality at the 
microeconomic level. These concrete features and matter of  policy choices—related with implementing 
NGDP targeting—pose severe practical and epistemological challenges to central banking not actually 
present in free banking  (Salter, 2013; Selgin, 1990, 1994, 2013).  
    
Hence the focus instead should be on anchoring individuals’ expectations concerning how relative prices 
and nominal-income growth will predictably behave (be predictably flexible) in a context of  a credible 
path of  the money supply that diminishes monetary disequilibrium at the micro level. As argued 
throughout this chapter (see footnotes 85 and 87), macro-level expectational stability does not necessarily 
translate into beneficial microeconomic-level stability and predictability (Horwitz, 2011). Arbitrarily 
defining stable but crude macro-level expectations of  nominal income growth (decided ex ante by an 
external authority) does not ensure micro-level stability of  expectations concerning how the future path 
of  the money supply will affect different markets and disaggregated and local prices in the face of  
heterogeneous and unanticipated changes in productivity (Cachanosky, 2015; Wagner, 2010). 
 
Consequently, NGDP targeting promotes a macro-level form of  stability decided entirely outside the 
postconstitutional market order, and thus it disregards individuals’ micro-level expectations concerning 
disaggregated prices and their local market conditions. This ultimately anchors individuals’ expectations 
concerning a macro variable or aggregated statistic but potentially destabilizes and unanchors individuals’ 
relevant expectations of  how disaggregated prices and local market conditions will actually behave in 
such an environment of  (an arbitrarily defined) stable nominal-income growth. Stabilizing aggregated or 
macro-level expectations ex ante and by fiat might actually be a misleading indicator of  microeconomic 
predictability and coordination (W. White, 2006). It thus potentially becomes an uninformative, and 
perhaps even a harmful, macro-indicator of  real underlying stability and predictability concerning long-
term distortive effects of  monetary policy on markets and the structure of  production.   
 
Hence one would expect NGDP targeting to anchor expectations concerning a nominal magnitude, and 
this macro expectational stability will indeed insulate the economy from major and negative expectational 
shifts and monetary shocks similar to those that exacerbated the Great Recession (Sumner, 2015). 
Nevertheless, this crude ex ante form of  ‘aggregated stability’ could still generate and conceal local 
monetary disequilibrium, sector-level imbalances, and local market distortions. It would thus potentially 
generate also microeconomic and price unpredictability, discoordination, and a general unsustainable 
misallocation of  resources similar to the one that occurred in the US housing sector (Beckworth, 2012a; 
Cachanosky, 2015). NGDP targeting could, most certainly, avoid the exacerbation and unfolding of  the 
next Great Recession, but it might still generate new forms and shapes of  money-induced unsustainable 
booms, similar in nature to the 2003-2007 unsustainable and undesirable US real estate bubble, with all 
the unsustainability, misallocation of  resources, and distortions that it entailed.    
 
To conclude, NGDP targeting does stabilize (anchor) market expectations through a futures-market 
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trading process that is indeed self-reinforcing and endogenous (Sumner, 2012, 2013). Accordingly, it does 
move very close to the ideal self-reinforcing expectational-stability properties suggested in section 5.3. 
This robustness and stability of  expectations, which is indeed self-reinforced and sustained by the 
postconstitutional dynamics of  a futures-market trading process, makes this proposal far superior to 
standard or traditional central banking policies (Cachanosky, 2015; Salter, 2014b, 2017; Schuler, 2013).  
 
However, NGDP targeting also promotes a top-down, crude form of  expectational anchoring, treating 
the stability of  nominal-income growth as the arbitrarily imposed and explicit goal of  policy and choice, 
rather than being the emergent and unintended outcome of  a postconstitutional monetary order that 
should primarily aim toward removing monetary imbalances at the individual level. NGDP targeting’s 
crude form of  exogenously established macro stability might still conceal micro-level uncertainty, 
microeconomic and expectational instability, and relative price distortions (Cachanosky, 2015). Thus it 
might not minimize, nor promptly correct, monetary disequilibrium, and, quite possibly, it might even 
prolong its monetary distortions and exacerbate them through time (Beckworth, 2012a, 2012b).115  
 
The results of  this institutional analysis challenge the monetary neutrality and expectational properties 
of  NGDP targeting as a fully stable, neutral, and robust constitution. It favors instead—at least 
preliminarily—a free banking regime that promotes endogenous tendencies toward monetary equilibrium 
(at the individual level) through a ‘productivity norm’ (Selgin, 1988). Nevertheless, more thorough 
examinations concerning the comparative and institutional robustness of  NGDP targeting are warranted 
before making definitive conclusions (Cachanosky, 2019; Murphy, 2013). What is conclusive, however, is 
that robust (self-reinforcing and stable) monetary constitutions are the only feasible mechanism to 
transform monetary policy, as Friedman (1994) hoped, from an element of  discoordination and mischief  
toward one of  coordination, stability, and human cooperation.  
 
5.5 Concluding Remarks  
 
As seen in this chapter, the Great Recession demonstrated the necessity for robust monetary frameworks 
that will avoid the recurrence of  such catastrophic events. The crisis demonstrated the importance of  
money in both enhancing and potentially undermining society’s rational allocation of  resources, and it 
demonstrated the need to robustly constitutionalize money (Buchanan, 2010). A robust monetary-
constitutional system should possess a structure (institutional properties) that provides both the right 
incentives and the appropriate epistemic-informational mechanisms to generate a common nominal 
anchor and stabilize expectations. Under robust rules, a postconstitutional environment will guide fallible 
and short-sighted decision-makers’ actions and expectations to create a self-reinforcing type of  system.  
 
As Buchanan (1962) argued, even with deviations from idealistic assumptions (omniscience and 
benevolence), self-reinforcing and endogenous expectations could still meet the predictability criterion. 
To encourage and maintain society’s coordination, there is a need to promote reforms to implement 
monetary constitutions with the emergent and self-reinforcing stability properties that take into account 
real public choice conditions and political-economic robustness challenges. Promoting reforms in this 
direction could potentially reduce societies’ exposure to negative expectational shocks, and severe 
economic crises.  
 
A fundamental conclusion that stems from this chapter is that the supposed fact that economic crises are 
evidence of  the inherent instability and unavoidable maladies of  capitalism, rather than the recognizable 
outcome of  specific constitutional and institutional failures, should be severely scrutinized (Calomiris 
 
115 The fact that both the unsustainable US housing boom and the subsequent misallocation of  resources occurred in an 
environment of  relatively stable nominal-income growth during 2002–7, and also during a period of  low and stable inflation, 
should make one highly skeptical about top-down stabilizing an ex ante and arbitrarily defined nominal-income growth target 
(i.e. a stable five percent NGDP growth) disassociated from the normal workings of  the market system (Beckworth, 2012a; 
Cachanosky, 2015, 2019; W. White, 2006 ). 
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and Haber, 2014). Alas, existing macroeconomic investigations about economic crises and recessions 
have not systematically emphasized particular institutional fragilities and the robust stability properties 
required to institutionally avoid them (Hetzel, 2012). This is a severe intellectual gap that this chapter has 
sought to address.  
 
Contrary to Keynes (1936), Marx (1964, 1973 [1939]), Minsky (1986) and others, I have suggested that 
economic crises and recessions are not an inherent and unavoidable malady of  the market order and of  
capitalism. Rather, building on constitutional political economy and institutional analysis, I have argued 
that economic crises and recessions are the outcomes of  specific institutional failures of  some nonrobust 
monetary constitutions. Hence, the emergence of  severe economic crises is deeply conditioned by the 
degree of  institutional and political-economic robustness (or by the fragility) of  different monetary frameworks 
and of  how well they can actually maintain stable expectations. Fragile (nonrobust) institutions, such as 
central banking, systematically allow expectational and monetary shocks to manifest, leading to credibility 
problems, expectational unanchoring, aggregate-demand instability, and finally deep recessions.  
 
As hinted in chapter 1, money is too important to be exposed to postconstitutional dynamics of  political 
bargains, misaligned incentives, arbitrary forms of  decision-making, and human fallibility. The key to 
insulating the economic system from monetary and expectational disturbances is to ensure a predictable 
and credible path of  monetary policy associated with strong tendencies toward monetary equilibrium. 
This ensures that the monetary constitution will be effective and robust in regulating (coordinating) 
sustainable long-term patterns of  economic interactions by guaranteeing the stability and predictability 
of  prices and nominal magnitudes as accurate conveyors of  market information that would not be 
accessible otherwise (Horwitz, 2011). Alas, NGDP targeting, despite its robust self-reinforcing properties, 
falls short of  fully achieving the desired neutrality and stability properties of  a robust constitution, given 
its top-down aggregative approach. Hence it maintains a crude aggregated form of  expectational stability 
at the cost of  potentially concealing and generating distortions at the micro level (Cachanosky, 2015, 
2019; Schuler, 2013).   
 
Nevertheless, embracing a rule of  NGDP targeting for guiding and self-reinforcing expectations and 
stabilizing monetary policy’s future path would have been sufficient to avoid the worst deflationary and 
expectational aspects of  the Great Recession. However, that does not mean that NGDP targeting 
possesses the robust ideal and normative goals of  monetary neutrality and the expectational stabilities 
associated with such neutrality at the micro level. Thus NGDP futures targeting would have been 
sufficient to avoid the worst deflationary aspects of  the Great Recession, but it would not have been 
enough to avoid other—and less evident—forms of  severe monetary distortions and misallocations 
(such as the US housing bubble), and some other monetary and micro-expectational disturbances. This 
makes it unable to actually achieve the goal of  monetary equilibrium (neutrality) and the associated 
expectational stability at the micro level. 
  
To conclude, NGDP futures targeting is indeed a more robust institutional arrangement whenever 
compared to central banks’ inherent discretion, fragility, and expectational unanchoring (Sumner, 2013, 
2015). However, it falls short of  fully achieving the normative monetary and expectational goals that are 
considered desirable for attaining the microeconomic neutrality of  money throughout the whole system of  
monetary relations. Nevertheless, further research concerning, first, the relationship between aggregative 
stabilities and monetary neutrality and their influence on individuals’ expectations and, second, the 
political-economic robustness and comparative institutional properties of  NGDP targeting should be 
encouraged and is warranted in order to make more conclusive and precise observations (Cachanosky, 
2019; Murphy, 2013; Salter, 2013, 2017).  
 
In contrast, as I will argue in depth in the following chapter, free banking seems to promote more robust 
and better institutional tendencies toward micro expectational stability and micro-level monetary 
equilibrium (at the individual level), mainly through an endogenous, competitive, and decentralized 
 155 
process associated with a self-reinforcing constitution (Horwitz, 2000; Salter, 2014b, 2017). Hence, unlike 
NGDP targeting, free banking seems to maintain and promote or at least move much closer to (micro 
level) monetary equilibrium and overall monetary neutrality in the whole process of  exchange (Horwitz, 
2000, 2011). Hence the analytical and institutional relationship between the maintenance of  monetary 
equilibrium at the individual level and the robust institutional properties of  free banking, which seeks to 
correct local monetary imbalances, will be the main focus of  the following chapter. Consequently, chapter 
6 will explore at depth the institutional robustness and comparative properties of  free banking and central 
banking by engaging in a comparative institutional analysis of  them.  
 
To finalize, what seems to be undeniable from the analysis of  this chapter is that critical thinking on 
monetary issues and macroeconomics should always be considered within broader political-economy and 
constitutional concerns. When disregarding institutions and comparative political economy in monetary 
affairs, societies are not able to discern which monetary constitutions are indeed robust and most 
appropriate and neutral to the catallactic market order. Consequently, economic crises will continue to 
manifest (Buchanan, 2010). Unfortunately, as showed by the events of  the Great Recession, an intellectual 
disregard for real institutional and political-economic considerations about money allows macroeconomic 
instabilities and boom-bust cycles to systematically manifest as institutionally endemic and contextualized 
forms of  monetary-policy failures. Thus, broader institutional and applied considerations in comparative 
monetary constitutions should contribute to reduce future endemic institutional failures and the 
materialization of  severe economic crises. Contributing to this broader, yet pressing, intellectual purpose 








































‘One of the great defects of our kind of monetary system is that its 
performance depends so much on the quality of the people who are put in 
charge. . . . That raises a question about the desirability of our present 
monetary system. It is one in which a group of unelected people have 
enormous power, power which can lead to a great depression or which 
can lead to a great inflation. Is it wise to have that power in those hands?’  




As argued in the previous chapter, as a consequence of the 2008–9 Great Recession, some economists 
have been highly concerned with the role of central banks in generating disturbances to relative prices, 
the general price level, and nominal income (Beckworth, 2012a; Sumner, 2015). But most economists, 
despite being concerned with cyclical fluctuations and macroeconomic disturbances, deny the necessity 
of critically evaluating our existing institutional arrangements’ robustness (Hetzel, 2012). Hence a broader 
postcrisis reassessment and scrutiny of our monetary frameworks has been lacking. Chapter 5 argued that 
the status quo of monetary affairs and of our institutional arrangements (central banking) has actually 
been reinforced rather than questioned since the Great Recession (Bullard, 2010; Goodhart, 2010). 
Paradoxically, this reinforcement has occurred despite the fact that central banks have been recognized 
as playing major detrimental roles in exacerbating both the Great Depression and the Great Recession 
(Friedman, 1994; Hetzel, 2009, 2012). This work has suggested that this paradoxical state of affairs seems 
to be the consequence of disregarding practical, institutional and political-economic considerations within 
macroeconomics.  
 
Chapter 5 suggested that the only way societies can avoid the recurrence of economic crisis and monetary 
disequilibrium is by engaging in broader political-economic considerations of money and in a comparative 
institutional analysis of monetary policy. As Buchanan (2010) and Friedman (1994) suggested, only 
through a comparative political-economic exploration of institutions will societies be able to discern 
which monetary arrangements are indeed robust and most appropriate for managing monetary policy. A 
comparative analysis of monetary institutions can illuminate the specific properties and mechanisms 
different arrangements possess so that macroeconomists can evaluate how, under realistic assumptions, 
they can manage the money supply in a manner that avoids monetary imbalances and instabilities. That 
is the task of this, the last chapter of this thesis.  
  
This chapter uses the framework of robust political economy (RPE) to assess whether free banking or 
central banking can better use its institutional structures and intrinsic properties to minimize 
macroeconomic disequilibrium and monetary imbalances. As hinted in the previous chapter, robust 
frameworks leverage their incentive structures, reward–punishment structures, information-
disseminating mechanisms, and epistemic resources to achieve close-to-ideal monetary-policy objectives. 
This chapter relaxes (and challenges) the assumptions of lack of political pressure, lack of self-interest, 
and also decision-makers’ superior knowledge to see which monetary arrangements are more robust in 
attaining the monetary-policy norm (or goal) of monetary equilibrium at the micro-level.  
 
 
116 An abridged version of  this chapter was published in the Review of  Austrian Economics as Paniagua (2016b).   
 157 
This final chapter uses the framework of robust political economy, introduced in the previous chapter, 
to engage in a comparative institutional analysis of central banking and free banking. I am here concerned 
with understanding how well different monetary frameworks can sidestep or overcome both incentive 
problems (knavery, political capture, and misalignment of incentives) and epistemic limitations (lack of 
knowledge and information asymmetries) in monetary policy and thus still allow us to avoid monetary 
mischief and monetary disequilibrium despite deviations away from the ideal assumptions concerning the 
decision-makers’ omniscience and benevolence. To that end, this chapter contributes to developing a 
broader framework of institutional and banking comparison, drawing elements from both monetary 
theory and political economy.  
  
This chapter aims also at bringing political economy and applied institutional economics into an area of  
economic inquiry that has systematically prescribed monetary-policy objectives, identified best practices, 
and detailed optimality conditions about money entirely through a dismal, ‘institution free’ sort of  
monetary analysis. Thus the broader objective is to challenge the current way of  thinking in 
macroeconomics and to question its analysis of  optimal monetary policy that proceeds as if  institutions 
don’t matter. Therefore, this chapter seeks to contribute to monetary-policy analysis as if  institutions 
really do matter and thus to illuminate the conditioned monetary and macro consequences of  different 
banking and institutional arrangements that could manage or guide the money supply.  
 
The institutional and political-economic framework delineated in this chapter could be used to evaluate 
and compare alternative monetary regimes such as Friedman’s k-percent rule, the Taylor rule, and 
NGDP-futures targeting (Salter, 2014b, 2017; Sumner, 2012). Indeed, as Ostrom (1990, 22–23) 
recognized, the ‘particular structure of the institution’, meaning both the ‘information provided’ 
(epistemic properties) and the ‘reward and punishment structures’ attributed to different courses of action 
(incentive properties), can deeply affect the patterns of outcomes achieved under different institutions 
(Ostrom, 2000, 2005).  
 
In this Ostromian sense, monetary policy therefore is not any different from institutional structures 
governing the commons or common pool resources since particular monetary frameworks or rules have 
specific epistemic and incentive properties that determine the patterns of the money supply through time, 
thus determining also macroeconomic fluctuations. Hence, similar to Ostrom’s (1990) analysis, probable 
macro outcomes of monetary policy and the patterns of the money supply can be fruitfully analyzed 
through an institutionalist perspective in which the key focus is on the comparative epistemic and 
incentive properties of different monetary institutions (Salter, 2017a).  
 
Much work remains to be done, and is indeed needed, on the factual institutional analysis and the RPE 
properties of NGDP targeting (discussed briefly in chapter 5) and other, lesser-known proposals. 
However, for tractability and simplicity, I here contain the analysis to comparing only two of the most 
well-known, actually implemented, and studied monetary institutions, free banking and central banking.117 
This self-imposed analytical limit aims only at keeping the arguments both succinct and tractable, and it 
does not mean that the RPE framework and the institutional analysis delineated here, and also in chapter 
 
117 A central banking system is a monetary arrangement that entails a national or international centralized institution or bank 
that possesses a legally granted monopoly of  note issuing; the institution possesses either an actual monopoly or a virtual one 
in guiding the supply of  money (Selgin, 1988). After issuance, private banks hold the central bank’s notes as reserves in order 
to expand credit to the rest of  the economy. Under this system, liabilities are generally not redeemable in commodities. A free 
banking system consists of  a decentralized competitive arrangement of  the money supply and a lack of  overarching guidance 
of  it. It is based on the free entry and free competition of  banks in the supply of  banknotes, which can be redeemed by the 
public in an agreed form of  a good, commodity, or bundle of  commodities. Hence ‘banks under free banking [will] be free to 
provide their customers with a range of  products and services driven by market demands, rather than political intervention. 
The most important of  these freedoms would be the ability to supply customers with currency for hand-to-hand use. In the same way 
that commercial banks currently produce money in the form of  deposits, so would free banks offer the alternative of  a bank-
produced currency. Such a currency, along with demand deposits, would require something backing it as a reserve medium’ (Horwitz, 
2000, 210, emphasis added). On these issues see also Sechrest (1993).   
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5, cannot be successfully applied and extended to other monetary institutions and lesser-known rules 
(Salter, 2014b, 2017; Murphy, 2013). 
 
Building on chapter 5, the objective here is to understand how to achieve a more robust and self-
correcting monetary arrangement that also minimizes the likelihood of  severe monetary disorder. As 
suggested in chapter 5, it is normatively ideal to find stable and robust monetary systems that minimize 
systemic macroeconomic disorder and the emergence of  monetary disequilibrium from within the system. 
Accordingly, the ideal of  money neutrality—in the process of  exchange and in the formation of  prices 
(Myrdal, 1965 [1939])—consistent with monetary equilibrium serves here as an ultimate wealth-
enhancing objective and a theoretical benchmark against which we can compare free banking and central 
banking under realistic assumptions of  political pressure, imperfect incentives, and imperfect information 
(Horwitz, 2000).118   
 
This chapter relaxes (challenges) the ideal assumptions of monetary-policy decision-makers’ benevolence 
(complete lack of self-interest and knavery), freedom from political pressure, and omniscience (complete 
knowledge concerning monetary conditions). It replaces them with more realistic assumptions of 
decision-makers’ partisanship, political pressure, narrow self-interest, ignorance, and low degree of 
knowledge and information about the underlying structure of the economy, both in free banking and in 
central banking. Starting with the idea of monetary equilibrium is important for the analysis of banking 
institutions; however, any institution will be expected to achieve monetary equilibrium and thus function 
optimally under ideal incentive and epistemic conditions.  
 
If these ideal conditions are simply assumed, then the entire institutional debate in monetary theory—
concerning which arrangements are better at insulating the economy from monetary shocks—is 
dismissed. Thus the whole ‘need to choose between different political-economic [and monetary] regimes 
arises precisely owing to real-world departures from idealized conditions; these departures create [critical] 
frictions that institutions must be capable of addressing’ (Pennington, 2016, 518–19). Monetary 
institutions and their factual comparisons are therefore relevant precisely because we live in an economic 
world that both depends uniquely upon money (see chapter 2), and is also constantly departing from 
those idealized human and political conditions (Hume, 2008 [1748]).   
 
Section 6.1 reviews in detail the RPE framework and how it could be a tool for institutional analysis to 
evaluate monetary frameworks. Section 6.2 addresses the normative benchmark of monetary equilibrium 
on which to base comparative monetary-institutional analysis. Section 6.3 analyzes the major incentive 
problems and political pressures that might affect and challenge monetary institutions and monetary 
policy. Section 6.4 reevaluates and challenges the assumptions concerning the degree of decision-makers’ 
omniscience (complete knowledge concerning monetary conditions) and their wide-ranging epistemic 
resources (both knowledge and information) within different institutional settings, and reevaluates also 
how their epistemic limitations could be actually circumvented given specific banking-institutional 
contexts and competitive interactions. Section 6.5 concludes. 
 
6.1 Robust Political Economy and Nonideal Theorizing in Monetary Theory  
  
Robustness refers to ‘a political economic arrangement’s ability to produce social welfare-enhancing 
outcomes in the face of deviations from ideal assumptions about individuals’ motivations and 
information’ (Leeson and Subrick, 2006). Notice that such a definition of RPE requires, first, establishing 
 
118 On the concept of  money neutrality, see Lutz (1969). Monetary equilibrium is the normative idea that changes in the 
nominal money supply should promptly adjust to meet changes in the demand to hold money balances. Monetary equilibrium 
‘holds when the supply of  money is equal to the real demand to hold it at the prevailing price level. . . . [W]e are only in 
monetary equilibrium if  such movements in the demand for money are responded to with changes in the real money supply 
through adjustments in the nominal money supply . . . and not the price level . . . [T]he primary task of  a monetary system is 
to avoid money-induced changes in the price level’ (Horwitz, 2000, 70). 
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a specific social-welfare-enhancing outcome that institutions should aim at producing and, second, 
examining how such an objective can be attained in practice whenever the ideal conditions of perfect 
information (omniscience) and benevolence (altruistic motivations) are not present. Put differently: 
 
From an RPE standpoint, departures from ideal theoretic conditions reflect certain ‘non-
reformable’ attributes of human agents that create the frictions ‘real-world’ institutions 
must address. A first set of frictions arises because people are cognitively constrained and 
act under conditions of uncertainty where information is often contradictory and where 
there is a high propensity to err. This problem is not reducible to one of imperfect 
information that can be remedied by searching out additional data. . . . Rather, they often 
arise from ‘radical ignorance’ where agents are incapable of ‘knowing what they do not 
know’. . . . [I]nstitutions must be judged in terms of whether they enable people to adapt 
to and learn from unanticipated mistakes as well as unforeseen opportunities, and against 
their ability to reduce systemic or society-wide error. A second set of frictions that an RPE 
analysis must consider are those arising from opportunistic behavior. . . . Institutions 
should thus be judged on their capacity to address free rider problems, the generation of 
third party costs and to constrain power-seeking agents. (Pennington, 2017, 3–4) 
 
Hence, in what follows, I determine the degree to which social-economic institutions are robust or fragile 
based, first, on the ideal wealth-enhancing (i.e., nondistortive) social goal (here monetary equilibrium) 
that those institutions should aim at and, second, on how well that social goal could still be achieved if 
we put pressure on those institutions under worst-case-scenario assumptions concerning lack of 
knowledge, asymmetric information, frictions, political pressure, and self-interested agents.   
 
The objective is to apply a form of realistic and nonideal theorizing, commonly used in political theory 
(Hume, 2008 [1748]; Ostrom, 1990; Simmons, 2010), to see which institutional arrangement is in practice 
better able to move closer to the normative objective of monetary equilibrium. The task then is to evaluate 
and account for the level of institutional monetary-policy efficiency (the capacity to promptly correct 
monetary imbalances) we actually see in both free banking and central banking under non-ideal 
conditions of the human nature.   
 
The contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, it contributes to monetary theory by bridging monetary 
equilibrium as an ideal goal for policy and an Ostromian form of institutional analysis and nonideal 
theorizing. Accordingly, it uniquely leverages the celebrated idea of monetary equilibrium (Warburton, 
1981) by bringing an approach (RPE) previously unexplored in the macroeconomic literature to the field 
of monetary policy (see also Salter, 2014b). Second, the chapter engages in an applied exercise in 
comparative institutional analysis to assess the epistemic and incentive properties and political-economic 
robustness of both free banking and central banking.  
 
The RPE framework acknowledges that understanding and modeling institutions under the assumptions 
of perfect knowledge and benevolence is an erroneous framework because it is based on false premises 
concerning human nature and its endowments (Hume, 2008 [1748]; Ostrom, 1990). Evaluating 
institutional rules under the wrong assumptions of how individuals act runs the risk of overconfidence 
and designing weak and fragile institutions. Moreover, ‘any institution can be assumed to function well 
under ideal conditions’ (Pennington, 2016, 518). However, when ideal conditions are assumed, the 
institutional framework becomes superfluous (Demsetz, 1969; Ostrom, 1990, 2010).  
 
Instead, political-economic institutions are resilient only if they are able to support the systemic tensions 
and challenges that continuously arise from human imperfections (Ostrom, 2010). In particular, RPE 
focuses on symmetrically relaxing two major assumptions—perfect human rationality (full omniscience) 
and unlimited benevolence (lack of narrow self-interest)—and consequently seeks to understand the 
relative robustness and resilience of different institutions according to how well they promote coordination 
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and money neutrality even under worst-case and non-ideal symmetrical scenarios.  
 
Here what is critical for a novel and applied monetary-institutional analysis is to avoid the ‘nirvana fallacy’ 
(Demsetz, 1969) and hence to maintain analytical equivalence and logical consistency whenever comparing 
and analyzing different institutions (Demsetz, 1969; Pennington, 2011). Thus, the analyst must relax the 
two aforementioned assumptions of omniscience and benevolence for all the institutions being 
considered and compared. In other words:  
 
It will not suffice to show how ignorance, uncertainty, collective action problems, unequal 
power relations, and insufficient generosity lead to ‘failure’ under one regime type while 
assuming away or downplaying the same problems under an alternative. To establish a robust 
case, the analyst must explain how and why his or her favored institutional model will be less 
subject to the [symmetrical] problems concerned given its structural features and how these 
are likely to interact with nonideal [less-than-fully omniscient and benevolent] agents. 
(Pennington, 2017, 4) 
 
Additionally, I do not base the case for either central banking or free banking as a robust institution that 
can maintain monetary equilibrium by assuming that it is actually capable of approaching the ideal of full 
efficiency or perfect monetary neutrality. The idea is rather to discover, in practice, which institutional 
arrangement generates, first, better and more accurate information, dynamic learning, and knowledge 
concerning both existent money imbalances and individuals’ actual demand to hold money balances; and 
second, the correct incentives and reward-and-punishment structures so that policy makers have the 
appropriate set of motivations to both provide an equilibrating nominal money supply (one that meets 
individuals’ demands) and promptly correct monetary imbalances as they are detected.  
 
The objective is not to discern which monetary institutions are capable of achieving perfect monetary 
neutrality, since no institution is ever able to attain it in practice. Instead, the purpose is to judge them 
according to a more modest standard—still guided by the notion of monetary equilibrium—based upon 
the nonideal comparative analysis of which institution is able to generate and communicate relatively more 
information and knowledge and possesses also relatively superior incentives to change the nominal 
money supply in such a manner that it can quickly adjust itself to correct imbalances and consequently 
to move relatively closer to the normative state of monetary equilibrium. Thus, an RPE-based monetary 
analysis attempts to find which system is robust enough to possess relatively superior knowledge, 
information, and incentives in order to self-correct monetary imbalances better and quicker than the 
other monetary alternatives.  
 
Simply put, the concern here resides in ‘antifragility’ (Taleb, 2012), dynamic robustness, and the 
endogenous capacity of institutions to correct mistakes. Institutions are here compared against each other 
based on their relative propensities to cope properly with real-world conditions and thus ultimately on 
their capacities to move closer to the monetary-equilibrium benchmark despite the inexorable presence 
of those symmetrical and nonideal conditions. Thus, the strongest argument in favor of a given monetary 
arrangement is not that it will provide perfect monetary equilibrium, but that such a regime is better able 
to provide a money supply that will correct money imbalances better than the alternatives and thus 
constantly move closer toward the equilibrium benchmark.  
  
Monetary analysis must consider how arrangements are able to address human imperfections and which 
specific institutional mechanisms the arrangements leverage to overcome the imperfections and still 
maintain tendencies toward the optimal monetary policy. RPE suggests that higher degrees of robustness 
are desirable because, first, they leverage and check economic actors’ knavery and reorganize incentive 
structures so that they can still promote wealth-enhancing outcomes in the form of nondistortive and 
epistemic-enhancing monetary policies (Horwitz, 2000). Second, they provide the institutional context in 
which knowledge, knowledge proxies, and relevant information for policy making can be generated and 
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subsequently communicated accurately to policy makers to enact correct wealth-enhancing policies 
(Boettke, 1998b, 2012) despite their information asymmetries and cognitive limitations.  
 
This framework, applied to monetary alternatives, informs us how each system is able to alleviate less-
than-ideal conditions and how likely it is that it can still maintain the goal of monetary neutrality. 
Understanding human fallibility allows us to realize how different monetary frameworks are better or 
worse at promoting economic coordination and maintaining an ‘optimal monetary equilibrium’.119 Both 
the implementation and technical design of monetary policy and monetary rules, then, should be 
analyzed. The institutional RPE evaluation shows us how likely different systems are to meet the ‘right’ 
demand for money with the ‘right’ supply of liquidity, minimizing the systemic risk of market 
discoordination (Horwitz, 2000). A robust framework then should provide feedback and incentives for 
policy makers to provide a better and timelier supply of money.  
  
Robust monetary arrangements, despite the unavoidable existence of imperfections, still guide the 
nominal money supply toward a more optimal quantity of money consistent with maintaining monetary 
equilibrium. In contrast, a fragile monetary system produces a detrimental but politically optimal money 
supply (Mayer, 1993 [1990]), a non-neutral money supply that reflects a lack of robustness with respect 
to information problems and incentives, or worse yet, disequilibrating supplies of money and credit that 
reflect political entanglements or bargains (Calomiris and Haber, 2014). Fragile frameworks therefore 
deviate from monetary neutrality in the presence of departures from ideal epistemic and incentive 
conditions instead of leveraging them to improve and correct monetary policy.   
  
6.2 Monetary Equilibrium as a Monetary-Policy Norm for an RPE Analysis 
 
The concept of monetary equilibrium is understood as ‘the state of affairs that prevails when there is 
neither an excess demand for money nor an excess supply of it at the existing level of prices’ (Selgin, 
1988, 49). Monetary equilibrium describes the ideal condition under which individuals’ actual money 
balances are equal to their desired money balances (Clower, 1984a). Thus, monetary equilibrium is achieved 
only when changes in the nominal money supply—and not changes in the price level—accurately meet 
the changes in economic actors’ real demand to hold money (individuals’ demand for money as real 
balances of purchasing power) at the current price level (Horwitz, 2011, 70).120  
 
One relevant implication of the concept of monetary equilibrium is that the nominal money supply 
should vary with changes in money demand so as to maintain nominal-income stability and avoid price 
distortions (Hendrickson, 2015). According to the monetary theory that follows from the concept of 
monetary equilibrium, divergences between actual and desired money balances have deep and adverse 
consequences on welfare, prices, and degree of coordination (Clower, 1984b; Woolsey, 2012; Yeager, 
1986). Deviations from monetary equilibrium have negative repercussions for the real economy through 
declines in nominal spending, prices, and real output (Hendrickson, 2015; Warburton, 1981).  
 
A monetary regime that is able to consistently correct money imbalances and to stay in or near monetary 
 
119 In the following section, I discuss in more detail what I mean by the ‘optimal monetary policy’. The idea of  monetary 
optimality is one in which monetary policy and the monetary rule aim at stabilizing nominal income by simultaneously 
achieving allocative neutrality and avoiding monetary disequilibrium (Hayek, 1967 [1935]; Horwitz, 2000; Salter, 2014b).  
120 Monetary equilibrium is established only if  money imbalances are promptly equilibrated through correct adjustments in 
the nominal money supply. If  we consider the real money supply as the ratio M/P, then maintaining monetary equilibrium 
requires changing only M (the nominal money supply), not P (the price level), whenever there are changes in the demand for 
real money balances. In terms of  the equation of  exchange, changes in the money supply (M) should move to offset 
movements in velocity (V) in order to stabilize the left side of  the equation (Hayek, 1967 [1935]). Monetary equilibrium is 
used as a foil to understand severe disequilibrium processes that arise from the mismanagement of  the money supply whenever 
a monetary system experiences an excess in the nominal money supply or an excess in the demand for real balances (Horwitz, 
2006; Yeager, 1986). This framework serves as a theoretical instrument to evaluate different monetary-institutional 
arrangements and how they are more robust (or fragile) under realistic assumptions concerning human capabilities and hence 
more (or less) able to achieve a monetary equilibrating environment.  
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equilibrium creates the propitious environment in which individual markets and money prices can work 
as well as possible (Hayek, 1967 [1935]; Mill, 1929 [1848]). The main use of the concept of monetary 
equilibrium here is as a normative benchmark against which we can compare monetary alternatives. On 
its own, recognizing the relevance and desirability of monetary equilibrium does not commit one to any 
particular monetary institution (Hayek, 1967 [1935]; Myrdal, 1965 [1939]).  
 
Accordingly, monetary equilibrium serves here only as the theoretical core and as the wealth-enhancing 
objective from which to start before subsequently engaging in an RPE/comparative-institutional analysis 
in order to see whether free banking or central banking might be more robust at maintaining monetary 
equilibrium or moving closer to it through time. Indeed, only by comparing and exploring the incentive 
properties (section 6.3) and the knowledge-generating functions (section 6.4) of different monetary 
regimes can societies do the same in order to find robust monetary arrangements.   
 
Alternatively stated, ‘the primary task of a monetary system is [monetary equilibrium, meaning] to avoid 
money-induced changes in the price level precisely because they are not costless and they can wreak much 
havoc on economic performance and long-run growth’ (Horwitz, 2000, 70). Following this thinking, I 
will define what constitutes the individual demand for money and then outline how monetary equilibrium 
can be achieved whenever the nominal supply of money meets that established money demand. I later in 
this chapter use monetary equilibrium as the framework in which to reevaluate the incentive and 
epistemic assumptions of RPE in order to understand which monetary arrangement is more robust in 
maintaining (or moving closer to) equilibrium.  
 
Thus the ideal of monetary equilibrium as the normative benchmark against which existing and alternative 
monetary institutions can be judged is here supplemented by nonideal epistemic and incentive assumptions 
concerning human endowments present within those institutions and rules. The central foundation of 
monetary-equilibrium theory is the role of money as the medium of exchange, meaning that ‘goods buy 
money, and money buys goods—but goods do not buy goods in any organized market (Clower, 1984b, 
100; see also chapter 2). Money’s unique role as the general medium of exchange means that individuals 
have to demand money balances in order to hold them so that they can subsequently engage in exchanges. 
This ubiquity of money in all economic activities also implies that changes in the demand for money, if 
unmet, will reverberate throughout all markets (Yeager, 1968, 1986). Since money is the unique medium 
of exchange, it is acquired and held mainly for the purposes of being held and consequently exchanged 
at some point in the future.    
 
6.2.1. The subjectivist and ‘cash balance’ approach to individuals’ demand for money  
 
The demand for money here is understood under the ‘cash balance’ approach (Yeager, 1986, 1996), which 
entails that money demand originally stems from the preferences of individuals within a market economy, 
based on their subjective predilections to hold a certain amount of purchasing power (Horwitz, 2000). 
Economic actors possess a subjective preference to hold money according to their private preferences 
and expectations concerning their needs for purchasing power in the most liquid form, money. Thus if 
individuals accumulate more money balances—either by refraining from spending or by receiving 
circulating notes from issuing banks—it reflects their increased money demand. Ultimately, the demand 
for money is individually based and subjectively held (Horwitz, 1990).  
 
In contrast, whenever individuals spend their money balances, they reduce their money holdings, 
reflecting a reduction of its demand. Indeed, as Horwitz (1990, 465), building upon Yeager (1986), wrote, 
‘One can view the choice to hold money as a decision to “purchase” availability [of purchasing power] 
just as the choice to hold wealth in the form of a book is a decision to purchase book services’. Money 
therefore provides an economic and social service by which individuals can cope with economic 
uncertainty by providing a reservoir of purchasing power that is immediately available to them whenever 
needed (Keynes, 1930). This implies that individuals demand money to hold (rather than spend) balances 
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of real purchasing power (Selgin, 1987; Yeager, 1986).  
 
Consequently, the crucial epistemic challenge for devising a perfectly elastic monetary policy concerns 
how individuals, within a given monetary framework, can accurately communicate their monetary 
preferences and demand to the monetary system and, subsequently, how policy makers can change the 
nominal supply of money accordingly by leveraging the contextualized knowledge, market signals, 
informational proxies, and incentives present within that particular framework. This crucial challenge of, 
first, communicating fragmented and subjective preferences to hold real money balances and, second, 
enacting monetary policy that actually receives correctly such information while also possessing the right 
incentives to enact the correct type of monetary policy will be the core ‘monetary challenge’ analyzed in 
the following sections.         
 
Individuals’ cash balances and desire to hold money are determined according to risk and their liquidity 
preferences (Keynes, 1930; Selgin, 1987), which depend on their expected utility from holding wealth in 
the form of money or ‘purchase availability’. Those actual preferences to hold money balances deeply 
affect the forms and magnitudes of economic transactions. Thus the ‘desired money balances depend, in 
large part, on the economy’s physical volume of transactions contemplated and on the prices at which 
goods and services change hands. Actual money balances add up to the money supply, and if it equals 
the total of desired money balances, the flow of transactions continues without monetary impediment’ 
(Greenfield and Yeager, 1989, 405).  
 
As Greenfield and Yeager (1989) acknowledged above, the key is the relationship between the total 
desired money balances and the actual demand for money. People’s actual money balances do not 
necessarily match their desired demand for money balances. The inconsistency between desired and 
actual money balances is the main source of monetary disequilibrium and subsequent distortion to relative 
prices (Clower, 1984a). The concept of individuals’ demand for money balances allows us to comprehend 
the main sources of monetary disturbances that spring from any monetary system’s lack of capacity in 
dynamically matching individuals’ subjective desire to hold money balances with appropriate changes in 
the nominal money supply.  
 
Whenever the desired demand for money balances exceeds (or lies below) the actual supply of money, 
this mismatch creates widespread disturbances at the micro level because money lacks a single market in 
which it can actually clear (Clower, 1984a, 1984b; Horwitz, 2000). Eventually those monetary 
disturbances (imbalances) can accumulate, and they will be reflected at the macro level in the form of 
changes in the pattern of economic activity and nominal income (Friedman, 1994). Individuals’ unwanted 
and unnecessary changes in spending patterns, exchanges, and investment induced by the effect of 
disequilibrium (imbalances) on their actual money holdings (excesses or deficiencies of money balances) 
reflect actual monetary disequilibrium and are ultimately welfare reducing (Hendrickson, 2015).   
 
6.2.2 The potentially negative consequences of money as the exclusive medium of exchange  
 
As suggested in chapter 2, in a market economy, exchanges are (almost) solely made through money. 
Money is the counterpart of virtually every single transaction in the market process (Clower, 1984a). 
Exchanges of goods and services are therefore performed not through direct barter but only through the 
intermediary of money. As a consequence of this unique role, ‘if the demand for nominal money balances 
at a given price level exceeds the nominal supply of money, agents will try to accumulate money balances 
and do so through a reduction in spending. . . . [E]ffective demand is lower than notional demand. . . . 
The reduction in trade as a result of the deviation between actual and desired money balances could be 
eliminated if the supply of money was greater’ (Hendrickson, 2015, 56). Furthermore, ‘it is the use of 
money in exchanges that activates the epistemic properties of the price system’ (Horwitz, 2003, 311). It 
is given these vital intermediary and epistemic roles that the ‘money veil’ could have the potential to be 
severely damaging or detrimental to the coordination process and welfare.  
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In a nutshell, money imbalances are deeply destabilizing to the entire process of exchange because money 
has no single market of its own and thus has no price of its own through which its imbalances could 
adjust, dissipate, and clear (Woolsey, 2012; Yeager, 1968, 64). Hence money imbalances, meaning 
excesses or deficiencies in the supply of money, make themselves felt throughout (potentially) every single 
market in the economy by affecting both exchanges and prices of all goods and services that are routinely 
exchanged against money (Clower, 1984b; Yeager, 1986).  
 
The important point about money is that, given the non-Walrasian nature of real markets, unwarranted 
money-supply changes have heterogeneous and distortive effects upon exchanges and individual prices. 
This skews the communication of both economic knowledge and underlying real scarcities, curtailing the 
system’s capacity to sustainably allocate resources and activities to their highest-value uses (Horwitz, 
2000; Rabin, 2004).  
 
The potentially negative effect of monetary distortions on the epistemic and coordinative role of prices 
depends ultimately on the degree of robustness by which a banking institutional arrangement supplies 
money commensurate with its changes in demand. Moreover, changes in the demand for money that are 
actually unmet by offsetting changes in its nominal supply result in detrimental changes in both nominal 
and real spending that are welfare reducing (Hendrickson, 2015). Thus, different banking institutional 
arrangements can make money either a market-enhancing institution or a market-curtailing one. More 
importantly, ‘not merely coordination but, more broadly, economic calculation is at stake’ (Yeager, 1983, 
307).  
 
The definite solution to the monetary-disequilibrium problem mentioned above is to have robust 
monetary frameworks that dynamically rely on both strong incentive compatibility and accurate 
epistemologically embedded feedback that together promptly allows the nominal quantity of money to 
adjust as closely as possible to the fluctuations in individuals’ money demand. The objective should be 
to have robust (meaning epistemologically rich and incentive compatible) monetary systems that can 
dynamically and promptly correct monetary disequilibria and money imbalances at the individual level as 
they arise, but only through appropriate adjustments in the nominal money supply rather than by 
systematically distorting the pattern of exchanges, nominal income, and prices.  
 
Following the analytical relationship between transaction costs and the emergence of institutions (Coase, 
1992; North, 1994), both the unavoidable frictions (transaction costs) present in market exchanges and 
the inexorably fragmented and decentralized nature of trade and bargaining (in the absence of ideal, zero–
transaction cost, Walrasian markets) create the real-world imperfect conditions in which the institution 
of money can emerge to sustain and enhance trade in that decentralized and nonideal market reality 
(Horwitz, 1992a; Howitt and Clower, 2000; Ostroy, 1973). Paradoxically, however, it is that same 
existence of non-Walrasian markets and the decentralized, nonideal conditions of trade—facilitated only 
through money as the sole medium of exchange—that subsequently creates also the fragmented and 
fragile conditions in which the potential for systemic coordination failures in money-based markets can 
indeed arise (Clower, 1984a, 1984b; Hendrickson, 2015; Leijonhufvud, 1981).  
 
It is relevant also to recognize that these potentially negative characteristics by which systemic 
coordination failures and price distortions can arise are unique to a decentralized monetary economy that 
is also unable to promptly correct deviations (imbalances) between the supply of and demand for money 
balances (Hayek, 1967 [1935]; Mill, 1929 [1848]; Yeager, 1986). In other words, these negative and fragile 
coordinative conditions of a monetary market economy are not inevitable, and they can indeed be 
drastically ameliorated or eliminated if the nominal supply of money is perfectly elastic—meaning, if 
individuals are capable of accurately conveying and communicating to the monetary system or to banks 
that there are deviations (imbalances) between actual and desired money balances, and subsequently, if 
the banking system is also perfectly capable of responding to those accurate money-demand signals by 
issuing (or withdrawing) money and notes as to correct such imbalances.  
 165 
The arguments provided by the monetary theory briefly delineated above are relevant because if monetary 
disequilibrium and coordination failures are always possible within a monetary market economy, which 
relies on nonideal exchanges and a decentralized market process with subjective and heterogeneous 
preferences for holding money balances (Clower, 1984a), then the key question for monetary theory really 
becomes an institutional one, and hence the key question for real monetary policy becomes also a 
nonideal practical question. The use of money in society, the non-Walrasian nature of markets, and the 
concept of monetary equilibrium have deep nonideal and institutional implications for monetary theory 
not entirely explored by the macroeconomic literature.  
 
In other words, the crucial problem resides in the fact that the non-Walrasian nature of markets leads us 
to rely on money as the only way to overcome the fragmentation, commitment, and bookkeeping 
(memory) challenges of heterogeneous transactions and exchanges (Alchian, 1977; Kocherlakota, 1998; 
Ostroy, 1973); however, at the same time, it is the nonideal combination of both non-Walrasian markets 
and the use of money in society that subsequently opens up the possibility of generating severe monetary 
disequilibrium across all markets that could also deeply affect coordination and exchanges (Hendrickson, 
2015; Leijonhufvud, 1981). Paradoxically then, money seems to arise as a mechanism to overcome (or 
reduce) transaction costs and the fragmented nature of markets (Horwitz, 1990; Menger, 1892); but 
thereafter, its potential disequilibrium across all markets and exchanges could also potentially exacerbate 
transaction costs and coordination failures, whenever money is ‘out of order’ or outside the equilibrium 
between actual and desired money balances.  
 
Thus, as suggested also in chapter 2, the potential coordinative benefits of the use of money in society, 
to enhance exchanges and to increase the epistemic resources of economic systems, need to be always 
analyzed within the institutional and banking context that is actually producing and supplying the medium 
of exchange. For certain monetary and banking institutions could also deeply undermine the epistemic 
benefits of the use of money in society explored in chapter 2, transforming it into a potential ‘double-
edged sword’ type of coordination mechanism and even a potentially dangerous social device.  
 
Consequently, the noteworthy institutional implication that follows from acknowledging both the real-
world, fragmented, and non-Walrasian nature of markets (Clower, 1984b; Jones, 1976) and the unique 
and ubiquitous role of money as the medium of exchange (Yeager, 1968) is that every monetary institution 
should dynamically aim at eliminating monetary disequilibria and thus attempt to provide a ‘perfectly 
elastic’ money supply (Hayek, 1967 [1935]; Myrdal, 1965 [1939]). This means that monetary institutions 
should always aim at avoiding making the price level and the price system the adjustment variables to 
maintain monetary equilibrium in the face of monetary imbalances and changes in money demand. Thus, 
‘changes in relative prices are the problem with excesses or deficiencies in the money supply’ (Horwitz, 
2000, 68).  
 
The importance of maintaining monetary equilibrium resides in the fact that it avoids spillover and 
distortive effects on spending, exchanges, and on the relative prices of goods and services (Yeager, 1983). 
Hence, ‘we do not want the price of money bearing the burden of adjustment in disequilibrium because 
that “price” can only be changed by adjustments in the prices of (all) other goods and services, the effects 
of which dramatically undermine economic order’ (Horwitz, 2000, 70). This leads one to pay attention 
to the institutional question of which banking arrangements are most capable of promptly correcting 
monetary imbalances or both excesses and deficiencies in the demand for money and hence capable of 
sustaining Pareto improvements in the system of exchanges. This importantly means that capitalistic 
orders and the process of rational economic calculation must essentially rest on different monetary 
regimes’ degrees of robustness. How different banking regimes adjust the nominal money supply to deal 
correctly with monetary errors (imbalances) and move closer to monetary equilibrium directly determines 




In conclusion, if market prices are really expressed as money prices, then all the epistemic and 
coordinative functions of prices directly depend on the monetary regime in which prices are being 
expressed and formed. A fragile (nonrobust) monetary arrangement that promotes monetary 
disturbances and money imbalances is pernicious since it ‘overtax[es] the knowledge-mobilizing and 
signaling processes of the market’ (Yeager, 1986, 376). The solution hinted in this subsection is to find 
robust monetary frameworks that leverage (utilize) and cope with our limited and imperfect human nature 
so that from both our self-interested and competitive actions and our fragmented knowledge, we can still 
minimize the severity and extent of monetary disequilibria and ensure dynamically their prompt 
correction.  
 
Consequently, robust monetary frameworks should use and set in motion contextual epistemic signals, 
communicate monetary information promptly throughout the system, rely on feedback, and provide also 
the correct incentives to monetary-policy decision-makers, all of which should generate together the 
institutional banking tendencies (by relying on both accurate knowledge and correct incentives) to 
dynamically learn and correct monetary mistakes and thus to endogenously move individuals’ money 
balances toward equilibrium. Importantly, institutionalizing these self-equilibrating and corrective 
monetary tendencies requires both generating relevant contextual monetary knowledge and establishing 
the correct incentives to promote also the potential for monetary rules to be self-enforcing through 
decision-makers’ own self-interested actions (Salter, 2014b). 
  
6.3 The Incentive Problem in Monetary Policy: Political Pressure and Incentive 
Incompatibility 
 
Thus far I have largely avoided the question of which monetary regime is more robust and more likely 
to be successful by avoiding or quickly correcting monetary disequilibria. This is the task of the following 
two sections, in which I compare the incentive and epistemic properties that both free banking and 
central banking possess and what they imply for their ability to accurately and quickly correct monetary 
imbalances and thus to avoid the negative welfare and epistemic consequences of monetary disequilibria. 
Hence the question I seek to answer, under an RPE-comparative approach, is which regime is more likely 
to promptly correct monetary disequilibria and hence move relatively closer to monetary equilibrium at 
the individual level.  
 
The Federal Reserve System was established by the Federal Reserve Act in 1913, with the specific 
intention to prevent and respond to banking panics (Rockoff, 2015). The Fed and other central banks 
have shifted their roles from what they were originally. The current notion of an active management of 
the money supply came only after the Keynesian revolution and the monetarist counterrevolution 
(Laidler, 1990, 2004). Central banks today are given the power and tools to make monetary policy while 
in theory being isolated from political pressure.121 The modern view is that they should guide the money 
supply with a high degree of ‘political independence’, which would free them to focus solely on 
‘technically based’ and optimal monetary decisions (Goodhart, 2010; Woodford, 2003).  
 
Setting aside the current technicalities of monetary policy, here I am concerned with central banks’ actual 
incentive structures to see how likely they can pursue and enact a given normative policy optimally. For 
the purposes of this section, we can simply assume that the Fed’s decision-makers are perfectly rational 
and omniscient and that they have found a technically optimal monetary policy. The relevant question 
then becomes: how likely is it that policy makers, even if we assume perfect knowledge, will actually 
pursue and enact these technically optimal policies instead of opting for politically optimal ones? 
 
121 The Federal Reserve, or any other modern central bank for that matter, does not control the supply of  money in the full 
meaning of  the term control. What the Fed can do is to promote overarching monetary policies that indirectly impact the 
banking system’s capacity to generate the money supply. Hence the Fed does not directly control the money supply but does 
possess an extremely important role in affecting it indirectly through different tools such as bank reserve ratios, the discount 
rate, and open market operations (Horwitz, 2013).  
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Optimal-policy arguments usually rest on the idealizing assumption of perfect political independence and 
incentive compatibility. These assumptions have been severely challenged since the advent of public 
choice theory (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Mayer 1993 [1990]) and political business cycle theory 
(PBCT) (Nordhaus, 1975; Tufte, 1978). 
 
The aforementioned literature has provided empirical and formal models that have shown that under the 
existent Fed framework, politicians can systematically influence key decisions regarding monetary policy 
and the growth of the money supply. Hence we are likely to discover biases in monetary policy that reflect 
pressure from politicians to steer the money supply for their short-term political and economic interests 
(Nordhaus, 1975; Toma, 2001). Politicians (seeking to promote their self-interest) maximize their own 
probability of reelection. This opportunistic incentive entails higher potential political pressures placed 
on the central banks to align the institutions’ monetary policies with the incumbent politicians’ short-
term goals, thereby inducing an inflation–unemployment cycle (Nordhaus, 1975).122 
 
Independent central banks might also agree to accommodate politically driven fiscal stimuli from the 
executive branch to appear to avoid interference in the electoral process and hence avoid radical policy 
actions during election periods (Drazen, 2001). The PBCT suggests that ‘the management of money is 
always and everywhere political: for every policy choice, there is an alternative that some actors would 
prefer’ (Kirshner, 2003, 645). Political pressure can potentially influence central banking policies to 
conform to their self-interest. Incumbent politicians seek to affect money aggregates through 
unanticipated monetary policies to produce short-term political gain (Nordhaus, 1975; Toma, 2001). 
Empirical evidence (Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen, 1992, 1997) has shown that political pressures have 
been present and have led to postelection increases in inflation and have affected yearly M1 growth rates 
before elections.123  
 
Grier (1989, 1991) provided additional statistical evidence of strong correlations between shifts of 
leadership inside the Senate Banking Committee and the growth of the monetary base. Weintraub found 
through interviews with Fed employees that the ‘monetization of [government] deficits was often cited 
as [a primordial] reason for rapid money growth’ (Weintraub, 1978, 359).124 These findings provide 
further support for the position that politically optimal monetary policies have systematically dominated 
technically optimal and neutral policies because of the structure of appointments, oversight, and 
accountability inherent in the establishment and creation of government-led central banks.   
 
Furthermore, anecdotal historical evidence strongly supports the aforementioned findings. Boettke and 
Smith (2013, 2015) showed, through a review of several historical episodes, that the Fed has systematically 
bowed to political pressure both from presidents and from Congress (see also Meltzer, 2009). Overall, 
the Fed, and most central banks for that matter, is constantly subject to congressional and presidential 
oversight, political partisanship, and soft political pressure, the last of which manifests itself in the form 
of political business cycles or monetary disequilibrium more generally, providing in practice non-neutral 
and non-optimal money supplies.  
  
 
122 Theoretical research on the PBCT has been focused on pre-electoral manipulations with models of  imperfect information 
about incumbents’ competences (Rogoff, 1990) and on partisan postelectoral cycles consistent with rational expectations 
(Alesina, 1987). These models have been tested empirically. For a review of  the major results, see Drazen (2001).  
123 But Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen (1997) rejected the existence of  both a surge in economic activity and postelectoral 
inflation after 1979, which somewhat contradicts the models of  the political business cycle. They also found more evidence 
of  postelectoral inflation prior to 1979. In addition, Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini (1992) found statistical evidence of  
significant political effects on the yearly growth of  monetary aggregates. These results are consistent with anecdotal evidence 
of  changes of  degree of  political pressure in different periods (see Boettke and Smith 2013). The point is not so much how 
constant these relationships of  political pressure are as the recognition that they are latent and inherent in the existent 
institutional framework of  monetary policy (Boettke and Smith, 2015).  
124 For a comprehensive literature review concerning the statistical and empirical evidence on political pressure on the Fed 
and its positive effects and relationships with monetary policy, see Boettke and Smith (2015), Nordhaus, (1975) and the 
collection of  essays in Mayer (1993 [1990]). 
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The cited literature suggests that central banks’ policies are created within a politically influenced context 
since they adjust to the political-fiscal reality in which they are embedded. Monetary policy reflects nested 
political entanglements, pressure dynamics, and political bargains (Calomiris and Haber, 2014). This 
usually entails inflationary biases (Toma and Toma 1986) and easing the federal debt burden (O’Driscoll, 
2011). Misaligned political incentives, congressional oversight, presidential pressure, and politically driven 
bureaucratic appointments can all result in sacrificing social and economic optimality (i.e. the goal of 
monetary neutrality) for personal, party-related, and political optimality, thereby weakening central 
banking’s institutional robustness.  
 
Thus both the statistical evidence of the PBCT and the historical record (see Meltzer, 2009) suggest that 
central banks are embedded in a fragile institutional framework that is not able to cope with both the 
incentive problem (misalignment of incentives between key players) and political pressure. The central 
banking framework generates deep incentive incompatibilities, does not leverage policy makers’ self-
interest in the correct direction, and, ultimately, does not insulate policy makers from recurrent political 
pressure that can severely drive the money supply away from what individuals actually need and demand, 
thus systematically leading toward monetary disequilibrium due to unavoidable political and fiscal 
pressure inherent in the structure and dynamics of appointments, party politics, and congressional 
oversight of central banks.    
 
Centralized monetary frameworks are unable to generate wealth-enhancing incentive compatibility 
between policy makers, bankers, customers, and politicians (Adolph, 2013). Nor do they have strong 
accountability and punishment structures and pressures to hold decision-makers accountable so that the 
policy-makers may quickly learn from their mistakes and promptly correct monetary disequilibria. Indeed, 
the statistical evidence suggests that central banks have deep-rooted biases toward inflation (Toma and 
Toma 1986; Wagner, 1986), a form of distortive monetary disequilibrium (Horwitz, 2000, chap. 4), which 
eventually affects decision-makers’ incentives to not correct their mistakes when they arise. Moreover, 
Beckworth (2012a, 48) pointed out that the ‘Fed’s inability to handle the implications of  the 2002–2004 
productivity boom for the inflation rate, [and] the output gap . . . was one of  the greatest failures of  
monetary policy, [but] it was not unique. Rather, it reflected the Fed’s [systematic] tendency to ease 
monetary policy when responding to productivity surges’.  
 
Hence, on the incentives side of the RPE evaluation or scrutiny, under central banking there are no self-
correcting tendencies to guide monetary policy toward social optimality and neutrality. This suggests that 
attaining monetary disequilibrium—due to political pressure—is an inherent outcome of the 
preconstitutional features (structural bureaucratic and appointment features) of the institutional structure 
of centralized arrangements and their ‘native rules of the game’. Moreover, even if we assume higher 
degrees of central bank independence (isolation from politics), this concomitantly rules out also political, 
social, and democratic accountability and any form of robust monitoring and punishment structure on 
behalf of the monetary policy makers, whenever they deviate from ideal (equilibrating) monetary policies 
(Eijffinger and De Haan, 1996).  
 
Selgin (2010), in contrast, argued that failure to adhere to optimal (neutral) policies may not be the 
manifestation of political pressure and self-interest, but simply the willingness of well-intended expert 
authorities to constantly exercise their expertise through discretionary action. Alas, monocentric 
arrangements, insulated from competitive and economic pressures, do not leverage correctly the self-
interested behavior of all the participants within the monetary rules of the game. Hence in situations of 
less-than-perfect benevolence—and also because of ‘expert’ discretion, bureaucratic and power 
dynamics, inflationary biases, and misinterpretation of productivity surges—optimal monetary policy is 
never actually arrived at. Such a neutral policy is thus constantly replaced by monetary policy that is highly 
discretionary and disequilibrating, and potentially politically (bureaucratically) optimal.  
 
Free banking, instead, seems to weakly dominate centralized arrangements, when it comes to analyzing 
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incentives of all the players involved, under an RPE comparative perspective. In free banking, each 
issuing bank has strong economic incentives to increase or decrease its quantity of money and liabilities 
according to economic actors’ actual demand to hold their notes and their willingness to redeem them 
(Selgin, 1988; Tobin, 1963; White, 1989a). Free banking regimes generate incentive-compatible systems 
in which banking competition, supervising and alert customers, and the wide network for clearing notes 
guide the self-interested behavior of bankers toward generating an equilibrating monetary policy 
consistent with monetary equilibrium and money demand (Hendrickson, 2015).  
 
Unlike central banking—in which policy makers act on their inflationary biases, pursue their own visions 
of the economy, exercise their expertise in a self-interested way, or, worse yet, seek to generate a politically 
optimal money supply—under a free banking system, individual banks’ decisions will always be based on 
customer considerations (Tobin, 1963). By avoiding the need for a bureaucratic organization, the 
institutional structure of a free banking system harmonizes the profit-seeking interest of issuing banks 
and the self-interest of customers, with the socially desirable result of maintaining monetary equilibrium 
(Selgin, 1988).  
 
Moreover, an interbank clearing system and the redemption process (the law of reflux) provide the 
correct incentives and punishments so that issuing banks produce a quantity of money just equal to the 
public’s demand to hold those liabilities (Glasner, 1989), thereby approaching monetary equilibrium 
(Horwitz, 2000). 125  A free banking system nudges money producers and their customers toward 
generating socially beneficial outcomes that neither party intends to achieve. Under free banking, 
economic actors’ and banks issuers’ self-interested behavior leads to a postconstitutional banking 
dynamic and competitive interactions that have strong tendencies toward maintaining monetary 
equilibrium by relying on profit-and-loss signals, competition, clearing systems, and checks and balances.  
 
Individuals and bankers within this decentralized competitive framework, guided through robust and 
aligned incentive structures, lead to dynamic corrections of monetary policy. Under the system of adverse 
clearings and the redemption process, customers actually hold banks accountable for their monetary 
supply decisions and punish (economically) bankers for their monetary-policy mistakes and for the 
issuance of money that does not correspond with customers’ desired money demand (Selgin, 1988; 
Glasner, 1989).  
 
Unlike central banking arrangements, excess supplies of currency in free banking swiftly make their way 
back to the original issuer through the redemption process as a result of direct demand for its reserves, 
which pushes the bank’s reserve ratio below its preferred level. Indeed, ‘only when it has produced a 
quantity of deposits and currency just equal to the public’s willingness to hold them will the bank see no 
net gain or loss in reserves’ (Horwitz, 2000, 211). Furthermore, free banks themselves, in their self-
interested pursuit of both profits and market share, hold each other accountable through the system of 
clearinghouses and the interbank clearing process (Glasner, 1989). Consequently, under an RPE 
evaluation and comparison of the incentive problem, free banking outperforms central banking in 
aligning the incentives of both customers and private banks toward quickly correcting monetary 
imbalances across the banking competitive network.   
 
The incentive structure of free banking assigns personal risks, costs, rewards, and punishments to each 
banking activity and customers such that the incentive-compatible banks attempt to jointly minimize their 
liquidity risks, failures, and interest costs. There is an unintended congruity and close relationship between 
 
125 ‘The law of  reflux’ refers to the principle according to which, in a competitive system with convertibility and redeemable 
notes, issuing banks cannot maintain an excess issue of  banknotes, because any unwanted notes are returned to the issuing 
banks for redemption, netting, and clearing rather than generating additional levels of  spending that would otherwise alter the 
formation of  relative prices and exchanges (Glasner, 1989, 64). Hence ‘a bank could not issue more notes or create more 
deposits than the public wished to hold at the prevailing price level, because doing so would mean accumulating too many 
debits at the clearinghouse at which the mutual claims of  banks were settled. An adverse balance would require the expanding 
bank to settle its balance with other banks in gold or some other acceptable form of  payment’ (ibid., 56).  
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the free banks’ profit-seeking and competitive activities and their collective capacity to produce a 
monetary policy that moves the system closer to monetary equilibrium. In other words, ‘their profit-
maximizing decisions will unintentionally create a quantity of bank liabilities just equal to the public’s 
willingness to hold them at the existing price level, that is, they will maintain monetary equilibrium’ 
(Horwitz, 2000, 212).  
 
Paradoxically, then, despite banks’ knavery and individuals’ self-interest, free banks are still led, as if by 
an invisible hand, to produce a quantity of money just equal to the one the public actually desires. This 
generates the set of aligned incentives, required economic pressure, and competition among banks and 
customers so that monetary equilibrium can be potentially maintained, or at the very least, monetary 
disequilibrium can be quickly corrected.     
 
Finally, free banking arrangements’ lack of both bureaucratic structures and political influence sidesteps 
the negative effects of political business cycles and public choice problems that plague central banks. 
Politicians, governments, and interest groups are unable to influence the decentralized, competitive 
market of note issuance and the resulting aggregate money supply since they lack the institutional and 
legal authority, appointment structures, and congressional accountability to exert political pressure on 
private banks. By radically disassociating the banking system from state and political intervention, free 
banking takes governments and interest groups out of the money-supply process.  
 
In doing so, it takes away also the public choice problems whereby politicians and governments use the 
banking system to monetize their debt and to provide a source of revenue with which to pay interest 
groups and political clientele. Consequently, under an RPE comparison, free banking weakly dominates 
central banking in nonideal situations when there are less-than-ideal levels of benevolence (self-interest 
of both policy makers and politicians) and political pressure (oversight) to manage the money supply.    
 
6.4 The (Monetary) Knowledge Problem: Contextual Knowledge, Adaptability, and Learning  
  
This section evaluates the degree of bounded rationality afflicting decision-makers in different monetary-
institutional settings. The goal is to see how decision-makers can sidestep informational limitations yet 
still contribute to robust outcomes in which their monetary-policy decisions are optimal (equilibrating). 
Unfortunately, ‘more often than not, it is simply assumed that planners can access the necessary 
information’ (Pennington, 2016, 522). In particular, they lack the information about such factors as 
money demand needed to achieve monetary neutrality and expectational stability. Knowledge that is 
crucial to make accurate decisions concerning policy and the correct allocation of resources cannot simply 
be assumed to exist at all times irrespective of context and to be always at the disposal of policy makers 
(Hayek, 1948 [1945]). We must understand under which particular social and institutional conditions such 
monetary knowledge can actually be generated and later communicated to policy makers in the first place.   
 
Emphasis should therefore be placed on questioning the assumptions concerning how easily and 
efficiently society manages, transmits, and encourages the emergence of epistemic resources under 
different contextual monetary arrangements, thereby levering them to achieve its monetary-policy goals. 
Robust institutions are those able to both produce and transmit relevant information from different 
contexts to the specific decision-makers who later utilize it in their ‘optimal’ economic calculations 
(Pennington, 2011). Social orders appear to experience a problem of a societal ‘division of knowledge’ 
(Mises 1981 [1922]; Gigerenzer, 2008). How well different frameworks cope with this problem 
determines how robust they are in the informational-epistemic aspect of the RPE scrutiny or institutional 
evaluation.  
 
Socio-economic institutions that cope with human ignorance and bounded rationality and are still able 
to generate and disseminate more relevant epistemic resources and subsequently promote wealth-
enhancing outcomes are considered robust (Ostrom, 1990; Pennington, 2011). It is the potential absence 
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of local and accurate monetary information about money supply and demand and their imbalances in a 
centralized and numeric form that is the core aspect of the knowledge problem in monetary policy. 
Moreover, if we consider the insights from chapter 2 about the fact that relevant knowledge can only 
arise in certain institutional contexts, then the question becomes in which institutional and competitive 
banking process—free banking or central banking—such monetary local knowledge (concerning 
individuals’ desired money balances) is more likely to arise and later be accurately communicated to policy 
makers in order to reestablish monetary equilibrium at the individual level.   
  
My contention in this section is that much of the local and individual monetary knowledge about 
individuals’ demand to hold real money balances that needs to be communicated to monetary policy 
makers, knowledge actually required to maintain microeconomic-level monetary equilibrium, can only be 
made available and generated through certain process-dependent, social, and competitive processes. In 
other words, the crucial knowledge concerning local changes in the demand for money, individuals’ 
desired money balances, and potential money imbalances (deviations between actual and desired money 
holdings) needs to be revealed and communicated through certain specific social and banking practices 
that can generate such contextual monetary knowledge in the first place. Subsequently, the institutional 
banking process should leverage specific social practices and send accurate and timely epistemic signals 
communicating such knowledge to the relevant monetary policy makers so they can act in an equilibrating 
and neutral manner.  
 
Banking systems that are able to produce and later communicate these epistemic and informational 
resources in an accurate and timely fashion to bankers or policy makers will be considered robust under 
the RPE ‘knowledge-problem’ evaluation. But absent certain banking properties, institutions and 
interactive processes that generate the aforementioned monetary knowledge (e.g. the desired demand for 
money as seen in section 6.2.1), the relevant decision-makers will lack the monetary knowledge and 
information indispensable to attain monetary equilibrium even if they have all the right incentives (even 
if we assume benevolence on the part of all economic actors). The potential absence of this local and 
personal monetary knowledge in any accessible, numeric, and centralized form is the main problem that 
both central banking and free banking must face in order to maintain monetary equilibrium.  
 
As argued in section 6.2, knowledge about individuals’ money demand is highly dependent on the context 
of the postconstitutional market interactions (Horwitz, 1990; Selgin, 1987), and individuals’ demand for 
money itself is ever-changing (Keynes, 1930; Laidler, 1990). Thus, as hinted also in chapter 2, the 
monetary ‘knowledge problem’ is fundamentally an institutionally oriented and ‘contextual argument’ 
(Boettke, 1998b, 145). With the aid of monetary-equilibrium theory and in light of the subjective and tacit 
nature of individuals’ money demand, we are able to understand the challenging epistemological 
conditions for generating the money supply that actually meets society’s money demand.  
 
Knowledge of the local conditions about the demand for money, as seen in section 6.2.1, is individually 
based and thus heterogeneous, contextual, and perhaps even tacitly (nonlinguistically) held (Horwitz, 
1990; Selgin, 1987). After understanding individuals’ complex and subjective formation of preferences 
for holding money balances (Horwitz, 1990), economists then should avoid assuming omniscience (full 
information) on the part of monetary policy makers. A nonideal theory for monetary policy needs therefore 
to evaluate how well a centralized institution can actually deal with both the generation and mobilization 
of local and subjective knowledge concerning money demand and thus the monetary ‘knowledge 
problem’ (Lavoie, 1985; Paniagua, 2018c).  
 
Put differently, the same challenge to the assumption concerning how central planners could possibly 
collect and centralize the relevant facts and individuals’ ‘fragments of knowledge’ necessary to rationally 
plan an economic order (Boettke, 1998b; Lavoie, 1985; Mises, 1981 [1922]) should be posed with respect 
to neutral (equilibrating) monetary policy. Indeed, we need to reevaluate seriously the capacity of 
centralized money-supply guidance and central banks to actually achieve monetary neutrality under 
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nonideal conditions, given those same limitations of knowledge, informational asymmetries, and lack of 
‘knowledge surrogates’ that deeply afflict centrally planned economies (Hayek, 1948 [1945]; Lavoie, 1985; 
Polanyi, 1951). The insights about contextual and tacit knowledge and those severe epistemic problems 
that afflict centralized economies suggest that different monetary institutions possess different 
contextualized epistemic tools and social processes by which individuals could potentially communicate 
their demand for money more accurately and promptly and thus contribute to a better-equilibrating 
money supply.  
 
As suggested in section 6.2, monetary policy aiming actually to achieve the optimal quantity of money to 
maintain monetary equilibrium would have to rely on individuals’ hard-to-extract or hard-to-express 
monetary knowledge since it is burdensome to obtain or decode individuals’ subjectively held knowledge 
and preferences for holding money balances (Hayek, 1948 [1945]). Put differently, if we take Polanyi’s 
(1958) epistemic claim seriously—and recognize that a large portion of human knowledge may actually 
be not only individually held and fragmented, but moreover institutionally contextualized and often tacit 
(hard to express in both numbers and language) (Lavoie, 1985)—then the relevant monetary knowledge, 
concerning individuals’ desires and subjective demand to hold money balances and their dynamic 
adjustments to imbalances, may not even exist outside of certain competitive and socio-interactive banking 
environments in which a myriad of different interpretations and responses about the individuals’ demand 
for money can be tested against each other. Monetary and banking rules, their specific properties, and 
the specific interactions among actors that they actually allow are thus extremely relevant to understand 
how different institutions could in practice ameliorate the monetary knowledge problem.      
 
Additionally, what monetary frameworks can also do, in order to deal with the knowledge problem, is to 
bypass the direct and explicit need for such tacit and personal monetary knowledge and to leverage 
instead circumstantial or structural knowledge surrogates that might allow (ex post) epistemic bypasses, 
signals, and information about money imbalances to emerge. In other words, rather than explicitly relying 
on direct or specific knowledge concerning individuals’ subjective and tacit desires to hold money 
balances and their specific monetary requirements, monetary institutions could use alternative epistemic 
enablers or indirect economic signals—similar to prices—that might instead communicate information 
about monetary imbalances as they arise as if they are actually conveying the personal monetary knowledge 
of time and place. Economic signals that might convey information about actual monetary imbalances 
might be able also to transmit somewhat accurate information concerning the relationship between 
individuals’ desired and actual money balances, thus indirectly signaling also monetary disequilibrium.      
  
Indeed, most of the relevant knowledge generated in society, specifically the economic knowledge that 
individuals hold in their minds, is seldom linguistically and numerically articulated (Hayek, 1948 [1945]; 
Paniagua, 2018a; Polanyi, 1958, 1966). People’s economic knowledge and preferences emerge in specific 
institutional settings and then get ‘transmitted’ solely through specific institutional mechanisms and 
through particular actions or interactions in the form of prices (Hayek, 1973; Polanyi, 1958). Hence, we 
need to scrutinize and compare the different epistemic and informational properties and the information-
conveying mechanisms that different banking institutions possess as they subsequently relate to monetary 
policy’s successes or failures to maintain monetary equilibrium (Horwitz, 2000, chap. 6). The following 
subsections will explore in depth the different epistemic and informational properties of both central 
banking and free banking and how they can potentially cope with informational asymmetries and 
monetary knowledge problems.    
 
6.4.1 Central banking’s fragility with respect to the monetary knowledge problem 
 
Central banks usually enact monetary policy based on tracking individuals’ demand for money or other 
aggregated macroeconomic variables. However, various informational lags, informational noise, and 
knowledge problems prevent them from tracking those variables with great success. Central banking 
arrangements rely heavily on past measured, aggregated, statistically collected data and on critical 
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structural assumptions concerning the macroeconomy to build their models (Sumner, 2012). Central 
banks depend highly upon the centralization, transmission, and interpretation of that data to generate the 
appropriate money supply (Bernanke and Mihov, 1998; Friedman, 1968, 1994; Woodford, 2003).  
 
Nevertheless, the crucial problem, as I have noted, is that individuals’ demands for money (and their 
desires to hold money balances) largely embody a tacit, individually held, and contextual form of personal 
and monetary knowledge, rather than being objective statistical data waiting to be collected (Horwitz, 
1990; Keynes, 1930; Selgin, 1987). Thus, the fundamental monetary knowledge problem is not only about 
search costs, informational asymmetries, and data collection, but also about contextualized formation, 
articulation, and accurate conveyance of such tacit and personal monetary knowledge that cannot be 
simply assumed to exist as data.  
 
Fundamentally then, the epistemic question becomes: how can central banks respond accurately 
(equilibrating) to short-term endogenous changes in the demand for money (Keynes, 1930) without 
suffering the adverse consequences of relying on crude macroeconomic aggregates, second-best 
economic proxies, and statistical information that is always associated with statistical ‘white noise’ and 
severe informational lags (Friedman, 1968, 1994)? Indeed, ‘many of the factors that influence velocity are 
either inaccessible (for example, the tacit knowledge of market actors) or yet-to-be known (for example, 
a future financial innovation that we cannot now even imagine)’ (Horwitz, 2000, 219).  
 
If we recognize that a large portion of economic knowledge does not exist as objective data scattered 
around the system waiting to be collected as if they were tangible goods, then we can comprehend that 
the monetary knowledge problem is not only about search costs, but about generating and conveying 
such tacit and personal knowledge concerning individuals’ preferences for holding money balances. 
Central banks, by relying on structural models of the economy, data gathering, economic surveys, and 
statistical macro aggregates do not seem to be addressing this fundamental point concerning the 
generation and articulation of personal and subjective knowledge.          
 
Furthermore, monocentric structures obliterate and replace decentralized socio-economic interactions 
among agents (e.g., the ones between producers and holders of money), thereby removing the 
institutional context through which decentralized learning and relevant contextual economic knowledge 
can be discovered and communicated (Hayek, 2014 [1968]; Ostrom, 1990, 2005). Doing so presents 
substantial epistemological and informational challenges to monocentric policy makers. In the absence 
of decentralized and socio-interactive processes, central banks have to rely on some other form of 
gathering, depurating, and analyzing statistical data about the demand for money. However, if the changes 
in the demand for money are individually based, and thus fragmented, tacit, subjectively held, and 
contextual (Selgin, 1987), then they are unable to accurately access such information. That personal 
knowledge is either not generated in the first place or, at the very least, cannot be linguistically or 
statistically communicated in a centralized and accessible fashion (Polanyi, 1966).  
 
Simply put, if the monocentric central banking structure largely replaces the cooperative interactions 
between competitive producers (private banks) and holders of money balances (banks’ customers), then 
policy makers face a severe challenge in generating the relevant local monetary knowledge and banking 
signals required to maintain monetary equilibrium. As a consequence, their monetary policies have to 
consist in statistically estimating policy models that forecast how macroeconomic variables such as 
unemployment, output gaps, and inflation will behave when they implement policies through targeting 
short-term interest rates (Bernanke and Mihov, 1998). But this aggregated estimation and structural 
modeling process only exacerbates the informational and epistemic burden on central bankers (Sumner, 
2013). In the absence of scattered knowledge signals generated solely by competition and decentralized 
interactions, how can central banks gain accurate and rapid access to underlying changes in individuals’ 
demand for money? 
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Central banks have to gather quantitative data and statistical information after implementing policy in 
order to refine and update their structural models of the macroeconomy in light of the new measured 
and observed changes in the macroeconomic aggregates. Thus they implement monetary policy affecting 
the future of the macroeconomy, but always by looking backward at the past statistical effects they have 
actually generated in the economy (Friedman, 1968; Sumner, 2013). Hence to implement an optimal 
(equilibrating) monetary policy, policy makers must possess reliable and accurate information concerning 
the exact way macro aggregates will react or behave to changes in the targeted monetary instruments 
(Woodford, 2003). But this kind of forward-looking information is actually absent in the process of ex 
post data gathering and time-consuming economic surveys (Sumner, 2015).126  
 
Consequently, if the contextual personal knowledge concerning people’s subjective preferences and 
desires for holding money balances cannot be fully articulated or expressed linguistically, then it simply 
cannot be part of the measured or observed macroeconomic statistics and surveys (Horwitz, 1990; Selgin, 
1987; Yeager, 1968). Consequently, decision-makers, under central banking arrangements, have to rely 
on second-best data-collection processes, surveys, and other lagged and crude epistemic or statistical 
proxies (Horwitz, 2000). In other words, and echoing Friedman (1968, 1994), under central banking,  
 
monetary policy processes are subject to long and variable lags. . . . [I]t may not be until 
sometime in the future when the results of monetary policy enacted in the present, based on 
information of the past, become effective. The consequence may well be that what would 
have been appropriate monetary policy at the point in time described by the data informing 
the policy shift is now either irrelevant at best, or pro-cyclical at worst. . . . [W]e would like 
to have a monetary regime that could track changes in velocity, but without the [epistemic] 
lags. (Horwitz, 2000, 207, 209) 
 
Therefore, central banks, even if we assume they are populated by benevolent agents (assuming away the 
incentive problem of section 6.3), have to be able to find the perfect macro model of the economy in 
order to implement optimal monetary policy and update it perfectly at all times with accurate forward-
looking data. Central banks therefore seem to rely on too heroic epistemic assumptions concerning a few 
individuals’ capacity to know the one and only ‘true model’ of the economy and rely on their capacity to 
correctly and instantly update that model when the underlying economic circumstances and the demand 
for money change (Sumner, 2013).  
 
Furthermore, since central banks rely on a politically appointed bureaucracy to collect aggregated 
information and statistics in order to subsequently adjust the money supply, they possess severe 
informational and recognition lags, ‘informational’ and ‘statistical noise’ associated with communicating 
information through a bureaucracy, and epistemic and political frictions that impede prompt correction 
of monetary disequilibrium (Friedman, 1968, 1994; Tullock, 1965). These recognition, implementation, 
and feedback lags—inherent in bureaucratic structures—make for severe knowledge and informational 
problems that exacerbate monetary disequilibrium rather than promoting their prompt correction (see 
also footnote 104).  
 
126 Indeed, achieving this degree of  structural knowledge of  the exact numeric way all the macro aggregates will react to 
changes in targeted rates is highly difficult, if  not impossible (Sumner, 2013); especially in complex and nonlinear policy 
environments that are not regulated by predictable and linear rules (Ostrom, 2010; see also chapter 1). Individuals in a changing 
policy framework alter their behavior accordingly, thereby undermining the previous stability of  such statistical relationships 
(Lucas, 1976, 1996). Echoing Friedman (1968), Horwitz (2000, 208) for example argued that central banks face three relevant 
lags in the policy-implementation process. The first is the recognition lag, which acknowledges that it takes time for the monetary 
authority to recognize and observe changes in economic conditions and income velocity. The second is the implementation lag, 
which refers to the extended time frame between recognizing a change in the demand for money and the actual action and 
implementation of  the policy by the authorities. The third lag is the effectiveness lag, or feedback lag, which refers to the actual 
time it takes for any enacted policy to have the subsequent desired effects upon monetary imbalances and for policy makers 
to later receive such information on its effectiveness. These three practical time lags deeply exacerbate the monetary knowledge 
problem that central banks face in trying to achieve or restore an equilibrating money supply.   
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Furthermore, the incentive problem and the inherent structure of a monocentric bureaucracy can 
compound the monetary knowledge problem by severely weakening the direct personal incentives that 
central bankers might possess to seek the correct and necessary information about local monetary 
conditions and money imbalances (Boettke and Smith, 2013, 2015; Tullock, 1965). Under ‘democratic 
centralism’, based upon a bureaucratic structure in which monetary policy making is determined by a 
politically appointed group through democratic voting, monetary-policy outcomes are actually 
disassociated from the central bankers’ personal economic costs and reputational risks of potentially 
generating monetary imbalances and severe disequilibria (Adolph, 2013; Mayer, 1993 [1990]; Wagner, 
1986).  
 
As suggested in section 6.3, central banking monetary policy outcomes are determined by party politics, 
the bureaucratic structure of central banks, congressional influence, and the voting of everyone on the 
central bank’s decision-making board (Adolph, 2013; Drazen, 2001; Grier, 1991). Consequently, 
individual central bankers might become rationally ignorant about local and relevant monetary conditions 
and actual money imbalances since their personal reputation and incentives for seeking the appropriate 
monetary information are much weaker, if not nonexistent, within such a politically appointed 
bureaucracy that engages in group voting (Friedman, 1994; Mayer, 1993 [1990]; Somin, 2011). Indeed, 
central bankers might actually be more concerned with reelection, political struggles, bureaucratic 
dynamics, their future banking careers, and producing niche research for their own peers (Adolph, 2013) 
than actually gathering and detecting the relevant local information about individuals’ desired money 
balances and their real imbalances.  
 
The above strongly suggests that even if we assume that such personal and subjective knowledge about 
individuals’ demand and desire to hold real money balances, their changes, and their money imbalances 
is actually information that is easily accessible to central bankers—and that such information is indeed 
scattered around the system as data waiting to be collected—central bankers still have close to zero 
economic incentives to organize themselves and to incur the time and personal costs of speedily 
gathering, analyzing, and depurating such information since their personal payoffs, careers, and economic 
benefits are linked to other bureaucratic, regulatory, and academic activities rather than associated with 
seriously correcting monetary imbalances (Adolph, 2013; Drazen, 2001; Tullock, 1965).  
 
Thus, the monetary knowledge problem, even in its weakest form (concerning merely search costs, 
information asymmetries, and data gathering), might still be insurmountable under a centralized and 
monocentric bureaucratic structure that does not possess strong economic interactions with the local 
actors that actually possess such relevant knowledge (Ostrom, 1990; Pennington, 2011). These epistemic 
arguments delineated above suggest that central banks are epistemologically unable to attain and maintain 
monetary equilibrium at the individual level—because of the lack of personal and local monetary 
knowledge present in such monocentric systems—and thus unable also to react quickly or accurately to 
constant endogenous changes in the underlying data in the market for money balances, in addition to 
lacking any personal and economic incentives to actually look for and collect such relevant and local 
information if it is available at all (Friedman, 1968; Horwitz, 2000).  
  
Consequently, under monocentric central banking, economic actors and commercial banks cannot 
endogenously correct either an excess supply of money and notes (because they lack the institutional 
mechanisms for its decentralized redemption and for the fast, automatic clearance of competitive notes) 
or an excess demand for money (because the monopoly issuer or central bank does not rely directly upon 
the public’s decentralized demand and adjustment signals and on signals about the issuing banks’ reserve 
ratios that could in another context convey changes in the demand for money). All these informational 
and epistemic problems aforementioned are further compounded by a lack of immediate communication, 
direct interactions, and institutional feedback from individual holders of money balances (the users of 
money balances) that could communicate back to central banks the presence of monetary disequilibrium 
or imbalances at the microeconomic level (Horwitz, 2000, 217).  
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I have suggested that given the lack of certain institutional, decentralized, and competitive processes, the 
relevant local knowledge necessary to conduct optimal (equilibrating) monetary policies simply does not 
emerge or exist in the existent monocentric institutional framework. This epistemic limit and lack of 
informational access to the personal and tacit knowledge concerning individuals’ demand and desired 
money balances forces central bankers to rely instead largely on informational and statistical proxies in 
the form of economic surveys and macroeconomic statistics that are, at the very least, crude, de-
contextualized, aggregated and collected only at discrete intervals, and also backward looking and 
oftentimes even delayed (Horwitz, 2000, 215; see also footnote 104).  
 
Therefore if, as Pennington (2017, 3) stated, the knowledge problem ‘is not reducible to one of imperfect 
information that can be remedied by searching out additional data’, then the epistemic and cognitive 
limitations afflicting centralized monetary policy decision-makers are beyond severe. The crucial 
epistemic signals and information concerning both individuals’ money demand and actual money 
imbalances, just like other economic signals concerning the individuals’ demand for any other goods and 
services, appear to be only available in an accessible form within the framework of decentralized and 
competitive processes (Lavoie, 1985). This institutional-contextual property of knowledge ultimately 
makes it impossible for a centralized authority to solve the monetary knowledge problem so as to correct 
individuals’ monetary imbalances and maintain monetary equilibrium.  
 
6.4.2 Free banking’s ability to cope with the monetary knowledge problem  
 
The main argument in this subsection is that a free banking regime is better able to cope with the 
monetary knowledge problem and can generate more-accurate knowledge surrogates to avoid the 
epistemic challenges that plague central banks. Unlike monocentric central banks, free and competitive 
note-issuing banks, under a free banking regime, do not adjust the money supply according to gathered 
statistical data, structural macro models, or in just any way they see fit. Rather, the decentralized supply 
of money and notes, issued by individual private banks, is based entirely on microeconomic and 
competitive (supply and demand) banking considerations (Glasner, 1989; Tobin, 1969; White, 1989a).  
 
Under free banking, different private money suppliers compete in note issuance within a decentralized 
market process based on note redemption. Additionally, free banks are allowed to produce their own 
brands of currency and notes, and they have also the contractual (legal) obligation to redeem bank money 
(a form of bank liability) in some base money on demand to customers (Glasner, 1989).127 Different 
money suppliers, promptly following the dynamics of competition and contextual market signals of profit 
and loss, want to identify which quantity of money is the most preferable for heterogeneous individuals 
at particular points in time. The context of decentralized competition and redemption presents an 
environment in which those suppliers, following the profit motive, use their entrepreneurial capacities to 
better estimate individuals’ knowledge and preferences for holding money balances even as they fluctuate. 
Thus, unlike central banks, note-issuing banks have the economic incentives and the reward-and-
punishment structures needed to better estimate and learn individuals’ underlying demand and 
preferences for holding money balances.  
 
Free banks, by inhabiting an institutional banking structure of redeemability of notes, decentralization, 
competition, profit-and-loss signals, and dynamic redemption and clearing of notes, leverage the local 
context and the dynamic interactions among competing banks and their customers to generate and 
convey crucial local monetary knowledge and signals that are absent in noncompetitive or monocentric 
 
127 I am not here concerned with the full and specific details and the full institutional properties of  a free banking system, 
since they have already been explored in depth in the free banking literature (Glasner, 1989; Goodspeed, 2016; Selgin, 1988, 
2017; White, 1984, 1989a). For an overview of  the historical cases and historical evidence concerning how free banking 
systems have operated in practice, see also Dowd (1992, 1993, 1994), Schuler (1992), and Smith (1990 [1936]). Readers 
interested in a formal and mathematical model concerning how a free banking system operates in relations to monetary 
equilibrium should also consult Sechrest (1993) and Selgin (1994, 2017).   
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institutional settings. Competing note-issuing banks, through the processes of redeeming and clearing 
notes and other bank liabilities (whether through redeeming them via clearinghouses or through 
accepting them from customers in exchange for specie in vault), are quickly made aware—through both 
the direct redemption and clearing processes—whenever they produce too much or too little money in 
relation to individuals’ desired money balances and effective demand (Tobin, 1963; White, 1989a). They 
thereby overcome a crucial informational component of the monetary knowledge problem concerning 
the lack of information and the variable lags and other time and statistical problems that face central 
banking (see previous subsection).   
 
Thus, just like a capitalist and competitive institutional environment, in which market prices emerge that 
allow for better social coordination and affluence than in a socialist environment (Hayek, 1948 [1945]; 
Lavoie, 1985), a competitive environment for supplying and redeeming notes and money allows enhanced 
epistemic resources and additional knowledge concerning the fragmented, tacit, and subjective demand 
for money and its imbalances to emerge throughout the system. This allows a myriad of actors, such as 
banking entrepreneurs and individuals, to be constantly engaged in the process of discovering the correct 
(equilibrating) quantity of money. In other words, it economically encourages people to adapt to and 
learn from unanticipated monetary mistakes while seeking also to correct them. Hence, and echoing the 
socialist calculation debate (Hayek, 1948 [1937]), under free banking, individuals’ incomplete, fragmented, 
and tacit monetary knowledge can be better generated, enhanced, and later articulated throughout the 
banking system.  
 
Relative to the central banking alternative, the free banking system moves closer toward monetary 
equilibrium by quickly correcting and remedying most forms of monetary disequilibria through rapid 
changes in the nominal supply of money rather than allowing changes in relative prices (Selgin, 1988). 
Particularly, through the symbiotic relationship between the free exercise of issuing short-term liabilities 
and notes in competition and the economic actors’ unconstrained capacity to redeem them throughout 
the banking network, decentralized private money producers provide their money supply as if they actually 
possess the underlying tacit and fragmented knowledge regarding individuals’ personal money 
preferences, demand, and imbalances (Selgin, 1988). Free banks’ information and estimates concerning 
the public’s willingness and desire to hold their notes and money are based on direct and local market 
feedback, signals, and heuristics that get sent through the changes in velocity and rates at which notes 
and checks return to them for redemption, either at clearinghouses or at their counters (Glasner, 1989).  
 
Importantly, competitive note-issuing banks use the entire redemption system and clearing processes, 
meaning: changes in redeemability of their notes and checks in the clearing network, changes in their 
levels of reserves of the redemption medium, adjustments in their deposit balances held at clearinghouses, 
and, finally, changes in their preferred ratio of reserves to outstanding liabilities, as a prompt source of 
knowledge surrogates or epistemic enablers (Selgin, 1988; Horwitz, 2000, 219). These banking signals and 
mechanisms indirectly and nonlinguistically articulate and convey to money producers (banks) underlying 
tacit, subjective, and individual monetary knowledge scattered throughout the system (Polanyi, 1958, 
1966). Free banks then use economic actions (such as spending money, holding money, and redeeming 
money), competitive interactions among banks (interbank note redemption), and clearing procedures 
from clearinghouses as tangible ways by which banking activities can articulate and convey relevant tacit 
knowledge of time and place concerning individuals’ ever-changing preferences and needs for holding 
money balances (Hayek, 1948 [1937]; Polanyi, 1966).  
 
Free banks therefore use the processes of issuing competitive notes and liabilities, redemption of notes 
by customers at the counter, and redemption of liabilities by other banks via clearinghouses as tangible 
ways in which economic actions and interactions can first generate relevant economic knowledge and 
thereafter convey and articulate that hard-to-communicate, or hard-to-extract, personal knowledge 
concerning the demand for money and desire to hold money balances. Thus by providing the institutional 
context in which competition, decentralization, and economic interactions among different money issuers 
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and money holders can exist, free banking also generates additional epistemic resources and physical 
banking mechanisms for conveying personal and tacit monetary knowledge.  
 
Accordingly, free banking also bypasses the aforementioned epistemic and informational limitations of 
actually knowing in detail the individuals’ demand for money and their dynamic personal preferences for 
holding money balances. Through market and banking competitive processes, then, a free banking system 
leverages additional epistemic bypasses (enablers) that allow competitive banks to act as if they actually 
possess the relevant and tacit underlying knowledge necessary to attain monetary equilibrium at the 
individual level.    
 
Importantly, that monetary and tacit knowledge, actually conveyed through banking interactions, clearing, 
and competition, relates (indirectly) with individuals’ underlying demand, imbalances, and inclinations to 
hold issuing banks’ money and liabilities, and it allows the competitive banks to avoid the informational 
search costs and the epistemic burden of relying on aggregated information, macroeconomic surveys, 
and statistics and to avoid suffering also the informational lags and statistical noise that they also entail. 
Put differently, a free banking system, first, avoids (bypasses) the factual need of actually knowing in full 
detail (in an articulated or numeric manner) the personal and tacit monetary knowledge required to attain 
monetary equilibrium; and second, it avoids also the need of relying instead on crude aggregated 
macroeconomic statistics, models, and surveys and consequently avoiding the bureaucratic costs, search 
costs, and statistical noise and information-lag problems they entail.        
 
Thus, a free bank mainly ‘observes movements in its reserve position and interprets those as reflective 
of changes in the demand to hold its liabilities. . . . [T]he key piece of information the bank needs . . . is 
present: the immediate effect of its liability issues on its reserve holdings’ (Horwitz, 2000, 214). In other 
words, the constant, incentive-compatible changes in banks’ reserve holdings work as epistemic enablers 
that allow issuing banks to act as if they actually possess the underlying tacit knowledge concerning 
individuals’ ever-changing demand and desires to hold their liabilities. The free banking system—similar 
to the market system—then provides important and additional monetary knowledge and banking 
surrogates that are entirely absent in monocentric and noncompetitive arrangements.       
 
As hinted in chapter 2 and following Polanyi (1951, 1958), it is only through the use of competition, 
decentralization, and the socio-economic interactions between money holders, clearinghouses, and note-
issuing banks that crucial tacit economic knowledge concerning individuals’ monetary imbalances and 
desired money balances can be both generated and nonlinguistically articulated to banks such that they 
can move the money supply closer to monetary equilibrium. In other words, the competitive and clearing 
processes of free banking allow for a system-wide monetary discovery process (Hayek, 2014 [1968]) by 
which each issuing bank, following the profit motive and correct epistemic signals, constantly discovers 
the supply of money that meets individuals’ desired money balances. Hence, the monetary knowledge 
problem, similar to the economic knowledge problem (Mises, 1981 [1922]), is greatly ameliorated 
(Polanyi, 1951).  
 
By relying on direct market-based forms of knowledge surrogates (e.g., movements in banks’ reserve 
positions and clearing), competitive banks do not have to bear the epistemic, economic, and 
administrative burden of tracking scattered data, enacting surveys, and collecting information concerning 
the demand for money. Moreover, they entirely avoid the time, the economic costs, the collective-action 
problems, and the public choice problems associated with coming together and building an entire 
bureaucratic and state-led technical-expert apparatus.  
 
As suggested earlier in this section, instead of coping with the challenge of achieving monetary neutrality 
and equilibrium through a monocentric institution that gathers data and searches for economic and 
statistical information, free banking approaches the monetary knowledge problem by applying similar 
institutional, socio-interactive, and conveyance principles to what competitive markets apply to solve the 
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economic calculation problem (Lavoie, 1985; Mises, 1981 [1922]; Polanyi, 1951). Furthermore, in contrast 
to the central banking system, in free banking those accurate epistemic signals come along also embedded 
with aligned incentives of profit and loss so that banks can actually enact and make the appropriate and 
corrective monetary-policy decisions based upon that relevant tacit data (Hendrickson, 2015; Sechrest, 
1993).  
 
Put differently, the epistemic signals generated in a free banking environment not only provide relevant 
tacit knowledge and information about individuals’ underlying preferences and demand for money, but 
they also come embedded with the right incentives of profit and loss so that banks can actually respond 
accurately to those signals. Thus a competitive free banking system enables the capacity of private banks 
to acknowledge and discover different forms of monetary-policy failures (money imbalances) concerning 
customers within the banking and clearing network while also incentivizing the capacity of those very 
same banks to correct them and to promote the discovery of novel solutions to remedy such money-
supply imbalances through the rewards of economic profits and market share (Glasner, 1989; Selgin, 
1988, 2017).         
  
Consequently, the radical decentralization of monetary policy under free banking is not only 
epistemologically superior to central banking in the ways detailed above, but also superior to central 
banking in other epistemic aspects and in potentially generating fewer negative banking externalities and 
better forms of risk management. First, free banking, by promoting ‘skin in the game’, minimizes systemic 
and financial risk and banking panics (Goodspeed, 2016; Paniagua, 2018b, 2019b; Salter and Tarko, 2018; 
White, 1984) and allows each individual bank to experiment with monetary policy and different data sets, 
statistical models, heuristics, liability and reserve ratios, and banking procedures so that they can discover 
which macro models and approaches to monetary policy are more suitable to meet individuals’ demand 
for holding money (Selgin, 1988; Goodspeed, 2016).  
 
This increases the banking system’s overall epistemic capacity to constantly learn the banking procedures 
and processes that provide the most equilibrating and neutral money supply. Put differently, a free 
banking system provides an institutional and competitive setting that could be more conducive than 
central banking to the discovery of the previously unknown and most equilibrating monetary policy that 
best satisfies individuals’ tacit preferences for holding money balances and banks’ liabilities.      
 
Additionally, this decentralized ‘monetary policy’ discovery procedure works under the logic of ‘small-
scale experimentation’, or ‘little bets’ (Sims, 2011; Taleb, 2012). That is, it allows for a myriad of 
‘monetary-policy models’ to be tested and implemented while also allowing private banks and commercial 
‘monetary policy makers’ to fully internalize the economic and reputational costs of taking excessive risks 
and of making monetary-policy mistakes generating either inflation or deflation (Goodspeed, 2016). 
Fragmented and small-scale monetary-policy experimentation alongside clearinghouse banking regulation 
and supervision (see chapter 3) allow each private bank to try new procedures, different ways to cope 
with financial risk, alternative models of monetary policy, and different reserve ratios with low social, 
systemic, and personal-failure costs but potentially large social and personal rewards whenever the bank 
gets its monetary procedures and models right (Timberlake, 1984; Yue and Ingram, 2012). Therefore, 
this self-enforcing and polycentric banking structure increases creativity, competition, and 
experimentation in monetary policy while encouraging also banking accountability, financial prudence, 
banking peer pressure, and monitoring. It thus minimizes also systemic risk, banking panics, society-wide 
errors and monetary social costs (Goodspeed, 2016; Paniagua, 2018b, 2019b).  
 
Furthermore, private ‘monetary policy makers’ and bankers are very unlikely to fall prey to the dynamics 
of concentrated benefits and dispersed costs in monetary policy and banking (Calomiris and Kahn, 1996; 
Paniagua, 2018b; White, 2012). Hence, in choosing the competitive supply of money and credit, free 
banks are unable to generate serious banking externalities and disperse monetary costs to every money 
holder in the form of inflation or deflation (Glasner, 1989; Selgin, 2010). Hence free banking lowers also 
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the likelihood that governments, banks, and policy makers will reap personal benefits from banking at 
the expense of the real economy and the public. A competitive banking system therefore allows and 
incentivizes (with economic benefits and concentrated banking costs) the discovery of decentralized 
forms of monetary policy and the supply of money that will eventually meet and adapt to individuals’ 
ever-changing and tacit demand for holding money balances.  
 
The relevant point here is that different monetary institutions vary in how well they will discover the best 
(most neutral) and most equilibrating monetary policy that is yet unknown to policy makers while also 
incentivizing banks to reveal and disseminate what they have discovered about monetary policy and 
individuals’ demand for money. The aforementioned leads to the epistemological and institutional 
question of which are the most suitable banking and institutional arrangements that promote both the 
discovery (emergence) and the use (dissemination) of monetary knowledge concerning individuals’ 
demand and preferences for holding money balances so as to attain monetary equilibrium. I have 
suggested in this chapter that free banking seems to possess a relatively superior epistemological, 
incentive-compatible, and discovery setting in which it can better deal with the knowledge problem.  
 
Banking competition and the clearing network enable feedback, learning, and a heuristic process that 
dynamically minimizes the system-wide damage, non-neutrality, and monetary disequilibrium brought 
about by any individual bank’s money-supply errors or monetary-policy mistakes (Selgin, 1988, 1994). 
Consequently, free banking, from the perspective of nonideal monetary theory and RPE, weakly dominates 
central banking arrangements also in the epistemic-informational aspect of the institutional RPE 
evaluation. Thus this chapter has argued that under real conditions of nonideal fragmented knowledge, 
information asymmetries, and misaligned incentives, free banking weakly dominates central banking in 
moving relatively closer to a self-correcting form of monetary equilibrium (i.e. a system with self-
adjusting, neutral, and equilibrating money supply).   
 
6.5. Brief Digression on Competitive banking and The Unit of Account 
 
Throughout the literature, many proposals for free banking have proposed also maintain the same unit 
of account while encouraging decentralized competition and experimentation in self-governance and self-
regulation (Horwitz; Selgin, 1988). In other words, free banking proposals have sought to maintain the 
same unit of account while encouraging a polycentric form of both money issuance and self-regulation. 
Given the stress earlier on the role of money as the unit of account (see chapter 2 section 2.1) and on its 
epistemic functions more broadly (see chapter 2, section 2.5), then it is worth briefly mentioning in this 
section why having a common unit of account might be relevant for a polycentric banking system. Thus, 
a brief analysis exploring the relationship between the same unit of account and a decentralized 
polycentric system of banking seems warranted.          
 
As seen in chapter 2, and from a Mengerian standpoint, money’s role as the medium of exchange and its 
role as the unit of account have coevolved through time (Salter and Luther, 2014); thus, it’s highly unlikely 
that money’s role as the single and common medium of exchange could ever be divorced from the common 
unit of account and therefore split into different or diverse units of account (White, 1989b). From a 
dynamic and decentralized vision of the market, it is the real process of exchange which simultaneously 
determine prices and the medium of exchange. Consequently, money’s role as the unit of account 
emerges through the process that seeks to establish what the medium of exchange will be, affected also 
by the political and tax system that promotes a certain unit of account (Salter and Luther, 2014).  
 
In consequence, from both an evolutionary and from a fiscal point of view, it is always easier to allow 
the coevolving of a single medium of exchange and thus to allow a single and common unit of account 
to be adopted as well. Also, from a fiscal point of view it much easier for the state to collect taxes and to 
engage in fiscal responsibilities and debt issuance bny relying on a single unit of account. Moreover, from 
an epistemic point of view, we have seen in chapter 2 that a single unit of account allows to generate a 
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coherent and homogenous prices system, in which all the prices and market bargains in society could be 
expressed in a homogenous ‘numeric language’; thus, enabling a wide system of similar-in-kind market 
relations which sustain the whole process of producing economic knowledge. In other words, having a 
common unit of account related with the single medium of exchange is fundamental for any coherent 
monetary order, either a monocentric or a polycentric one.           
 
Now having settled the question concerning why any monetary order –either monocentric or 
polycentric— requires a single and common unit of account, the question now becomes: who can define 
the common unit of account? And, moreover, can we design a common unit of account that can be 
divorced from the single medium of exchange? I will analyze these questions briefly in the following 
paragraphs. Polycentric systems of banking, free banking and central banking do not exhaust all the 
possibilities for establishing a monetary regime. There is the need to recognize that there might be other 
alternatives such as: first, a banking system based on a gold standard and a 100 percent reserve banking 
(Rothbard, 1995 and De Soto, 1995); and second, the so-called BFH system (for Black-Fama-Hall) 
proposed by Greenfield and Yeager (1983) which seeks to create a new unit of account. Given that we 
are here only concerned with the unit of account in a competitive polycentric system, I will only explore 
the BFH system in further details.128                  
 
Greenfield and Yeager (1983) proposed the BFH system in which the main goal is to divorce the medium 
of exchange and the unit of account. The core idea behind this proposal is to eliminate the problem 
caused by the fact that money does not have a unique market of its own in which it can clear (Clower, 
1984a, 1984b). The BFH system seeks to solve the problem of monetary disequilibria by artificially 
creating a separate ‘money market’ and a ‘price’ for money. In fact, the notion of ‘money’ disappears 
from this system, since any financial institution can create any sort of financial media of exchange that 
people find acceptable. The key however is that prices are all defined in a separate unit of account that is 
actually defined outside the market or the process of exchange. According to this proposal then a 
competitive banking system could still rely on a single unit of account, but—unlike a free banking 
system—defined and created ex ante by an external enforcer.  
 
Furthermore, Greenfield and Yeager (1983) argue that the unit of account could be defined as the value 
of a market basket of a few widely traded commodities with substantial non-monetary uses; particularly 
a wide basket or bundle of commodities whose overall price would remain stable over time. The bundle 
‘as a whole, would, by definition, have the fixed price of one unit’ (ibid., 305). It is relevant to acknowledge 
also that, under this proposal, financial and banking institutions do not need to hold stocks of the basket, 
as all media of exchange will not be redeemable into the bundle. The proposed bundle will serve only to 
define or express the common unit of account, ‘much as a “meter” is defined by a specific number of 
wavelengths of the orange-red radiation of krypton 86’ (Horwitz, 2000, 220). Hence payments are 
performed by transferring accepted media of exchange worth however many units of account the good 
being purchased is priced at. Thus, in a way, this is ‘barter [but] not crude barter’ (Greenfield and Yeager, 
1983, 307).  
 
In theory, the BFH system could virtually eliminate monetary disequilibria by giving money a price of its 
own in which it can clear and fluctuate. By separating the medium of exchange from the unit of account, 
the price of the media of exchange can fluctuate in terms of the unit if account, but this will not conduce 
to changes in the unit of account’s general purchasing power, which is ‘practically fixed by definition’ 
(Greenfield and Yeager, 1983, 310). This enables the specific prices of the different financial media of 
 
128 Readers interested in a critical appraisal of  a gold standard system based only on a 100 percent reserve banking rule, should 
consult Horwitz (2000, 222-231) and Selgin and White (1996). The fundamental problem of  such a system is that it is inelastic 
to changes in the demand to hold money balances. In other words, given the current money supply, how will money 
producers—under a 100 percent reserve banking system—react if  customers wish to hold larger balances of  bank liabilities? 
This kind of  system therefore will be unable to maintain monetary equilibrium, since this new demand for bank liabilities will 
not be matched by an increase in the supply of  liabilities, thus producing distortive downward pressure on prices and output.    
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exchange to bear the burden of adjusting out of the changes between the supply and demand for money. 
In other words:  
 
This system manages, in theory, to give money ‘a price of its own’ to react to movements 
in money’s supply and demand so as to avoid the sorts of economy-wide price adjustments 
that have been the central concern (…) For BFH, the adjustment variable is the ‘price’ of 
the medium of exchange in terms of the unit of account. (Horwitz, 2000, 220-221)         
                
As interesting as this theoretical exercise of divorcing the medium of exchange and unit of account is, we 
have to also examine whether the BFH system can actually work in practice. White (1989a) indeed offers 
several convincing reasons to believe that such a system might be actually unworkable: first, demand 
deposits are unlikely to disappear; second, outside money is unlikely to disappear; third and finally, it is 
also unlikely that the medium of exchange could ever be divorced from the unit of account.129 As seen in 
chapter 2, the emergence of the unit of account occurs simultaneously during the process which 
determines what the medium of exchange will be (they coevolve). Hence, it is hard to imagine, “how 
such a separation could ever occur as part of an actual historical process, as opposed to a model in which 
price formation and exchange are treated separately’ (Horwitz, 2000, 222).  
 
Moreover, as seen throughout this work, the production of money is a socially embedded endeavor that is 
contextual and institutionally contingent; in other words, money is a social institution that is sustained in 
certain cultural practices and social processes. Hence money’s widespread use and general acceptability 
are conditioned by the actual preferences, culture and experiences of the citizens who will make actual 
use of it (Salter and Luther, 2014). Thus, ‘simply defining some good or collection of goods as a new unit 
of account, independent of the trading activities of those who will make use of it, will not be sufficient 
to ensure its acceptability. … imposed social institutions will not “stick” because they have no basis in 
actual practice’ (Horwitz, 2000, 222). To conclude, even though a well-designed BFH system might look 
like a good idea in theory, it might be difficult to implement in practice, and to actually promote its 
“institutional stickiness” whenever designed in an institutionless vacuum (Boettke, Coyne, Leeson, 
2008).130 It is not altogether evident that such a system could be put into operation easily, nor that if it 
were to be imposed by the state, that there would be sufficient social and cultural substratum for it to 
generate “institutional stickiness” and thus to be used effectively and widely.    
 
To summarize this brief digression, even though there is a theoretical case for the potential division 
between the medium of exchange and the unit of account, there several practical problems and 
institutional questions that remain unanswered by the literature. Further attention should be given to 
these theoretical debates concerning the unit of account under a competitive banking system. Until 
further clarifications are due, it seems that the most likely scenario is that the very evolutionary process 
that enables prices and barter systems to arise, will also ‘produce a medium of exchange and unit of 
account that are wedded to each other. The emergence of money prices, monetary institutions, and a 
medium of exchange/unit of account are all part of the same Mengerian process of competitive evolution’ 
(Horwitz, 2000, 233). This relationship is also recognized by Selgin (1988) in his proposal for transitioning 
from the present paper-dollar standard under central banking, toward a system of free banking.   
 
129 Due to length constrains I will only and briefly focus here on the alleged feasibility of  divorcing the medium of  exchange 
from the unit of  account; to explore in further details the other interesting points that White (1989a) raises against the BFH 
system consult Horwitz (2000, 221).   
130 Recent research on institutional economics have shown that path dependence and culture do matter greatly in establishing 
and promoting certain types of  institutions. Success or failure in promoting certain institutions—and allowing them to 
“stick”—depends greatly on the history (path dependence) and culture of  the agents who will be found under them. Boettke 
et al., (2008) provide a framework for understanding institutional “stickiness” based on the ‘regression theorem’. According 
to them: ‘The regression theorem maintains that the stickiness, and therefore likely success, of  any proposed institutional 
change is a function of  that institution’s status in relationship to indigenous agents in the previous time period’ (ibid., 331, 
emphasis added). This institutional framework then severely questions the likely “stickiness” of  proposals such as the BFH 
system, which have no prior relationship with the indigenous agents in previous time periods.         
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More specifically, Selgin (1988) argues that the:  
 
existence of a fiat standard is, however, no barrier to the adoption of free banking. As far 
as banks today are concerned, fiat dollars are base money … What is proposed, therefore, 
is that commercial banks be given the right to issue their own notes, redeemable on demand 
for Federal Reserve Dollars … Once the public becomes accustomed to using bank notes 
as currency, the stock of high-powered money can be permanently frozen … This simple 
proposal does not involve any interference whatsoever with the dollar as the national 
monetary unit. … it should be emphasized that, although the above reform is designed so 
that a continuation of the present paper-dollar standard is possible under it, the reform is 
not meant to guarantee the permanence of that standard. Some other asset might replace 
paper dollars as the most saleable asset in the economic system and hence as the ultimate 
means of settling debts. This would drive the value of paper dollars to zero … rendering 
the dollar useless as a unit of account. In this event a new unit of account, linked to the most 
saleable asset in the system, would evolve, thus bringing the dollar standard to an end. 
(Selgin, 1988, 168-171)131       
 
To conclude, and in regard to the possible evolution of a common unit of account, Selgin’s above 
conjecture seems to be the most likely scenario whenever competition, freedom to issue notes, 
and a polycentric system of banking are allowed to take hold of the dynamic processes of both 
money issuance and monetary institutional evolution.    
 
6.6 Concluding Remarks of This Work   
 
As seen throughout part III, recent experiences with centralized institutions that manage the supply of 
money have proved extremely fragile in maintaining monetary or nominal-income stability (Beckworth, 
2012b; Sumner, 2012, 2015). As chapter 5 suggested, the last couple of decades have left us with financial 
panics, nominal-income instability, and recurrent macroeconomic maladies (Taylor, 2009, 2012; White, 
2009, 2012). In part III, I have argued that by reassessing and considering seriously the basic assumptions 
concerning human fallibility, lack of omniscience, and political pressure, central banking institutions 
appear inherently disequilibrating and thus fragile from an RPE and nonideal perspective (Friedman, 
2007). Economists should recognize that to the extent that economic theory suggests it is problematic 
and inefficient to have a government-sponsored monopoly or a centralized government agency supplying 
and producing goods such as cars and shoes (Hayek, 1948 [1945]; Lavoie, 1985), the same skepticism 
should apply also to centralized government-controlled monetary institutions that seek to guide the 
supply of money.  
 
Alas, it is important to recognize that monetary institutional arrangements will never be perfect. We live 
in a social world comprising imperfect human beings and frictions (Coase, 1992; Hume, 2008 [1748]). 
Thus the institutions arising from imperfect individuals and human interactions are also fallible and 
imperfect (Ostrom, 1990, 2005). Accordingly, no monetary institution can ever be perfect in the sense 
that it will always hit a neutral target of monetary equilibrium. Recognizing this unavoidable state of 
affairs is the foundation for a better understanding of how to move toward robust and optimal non-
idealized institutions that constantly promote learning, coordination, expectational stability, and social 
prosperity. The goal is not to find or design perfect institutions, but rather to discern which ones are 
comparatively speaking the most robust or antifragile ones (Pennington, 2011; Taleb, 2012).   
 
This chapter has suggested that under the standards of an institutional comparison and non-ideal 
monetary theory, free banking’s institutional robustness outperforms central banking. Free banking 
 
131 On this issue see also Vaubel (1986), which emphasizes that a successful free banking reform should also entail the 
elimination of  any possible barriers standing in the way of  the emergence of  new monetary standards and a new common 
unit of  account.    
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seems to weakly dominate centralist and monocentric systems in both aspects of political-economic 
robustness (epistemic and incentive properties) addressed throughout this chapter. I have also argued 
that if monetary equilibrium and monetary neutrality are considered the ideal, optimal, and normative 
goals for monetary policy (Hendrickson, 2015; Lutz, 1969; Myrdal, 1965 [1939]), then regardless of the 
institutional or banking system, all monetary institutions therefore face two fundamental and 
insurmountable challenges.  
 
First, there is the public choice challenge of insulating monetary policy makers from regulatory banking 
capture, short-term private interests, and political pressure and also the challenge of possessing the 
correct set of incentives (aligned incentive structures) to nudge policy makers to follow monetary policies 
that can uphold the principles of monetary equilibrium while avoiding also the risks that self-interest and 
politics will severely distort them. This challenge is what I have broadly defined as the ‘incentive problem’ 
in monetary policy.   
 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, there is the epistemological or informational challenge of 
knowing exactly what is the appropriate and neutral quantity of money desired and demanded by 
individuals (at any given time) in order to attain monetary equilibrium between actual money balances 
held and desired money balances (Clower, 1984a; Friedman, 1975). The ‘monetary knowledge problem’ 
then refers to the informational challenges of knowing exactly, and hopefully at all times, what individuals’ 
personal and desired demand for holding money and bank liabilities is and hence what nominal money 
supply actually meets such changing demand. Put differently, how can monetary policy makers be sure 
they have indeed attained microeconomic-level monetary equilibrium between actual and desired money 
balances (or something very close to it)?  
 
Following Polanyi (1958), I have argued that this epistemological and informational monetary challenge 
is difficult to meet since the monetary knowledge concerning the appropriate (equilibrating) quantity of 
money that needs to be produced by banks is not known a priori or before the competitive and 
cooperative interactions between banks and money holders. Thus such knowledge cannot be dissociated 
from the competitive-interactive banking processes unfolding between banks, clearinghouses, and 
customers. Hence the optimal and neutral quantity of money—like the appropriate and optimal supply 
of any other good or service—must be discovered through decentralized socio-interactive processes 
(Hayek, 2014 [1968]). Absent certain institutional and banking features and socio-interactive processes 
between banks and customers, crucial social and monetary knowledge required to guide rational 
economic behavior will never exist in the first place (see chapter 2 and Paniagua, 2018c).  
 
Given the two challenges aforementioned, this last chapter has argued that the advantage of free banking 
is precisely the fact that it leverages institutional features, incentives, the competitive forces of banks, and 
banking signals to cope with both the public choice challenge and the epistemological challenge in order 
to produce a ‘perfectly’ elastic supply of money that actually meets individuals’ demand. Thus it ‘allows 
changes in the demand for bank liabilities to “announce” themselves through changes in bank reserve 
flows and, therefore, bank profitability’ (Horwitz, 2000, 233). In contrast, the two other monetary 
constitutions that I have examined (NGDP targeting and central banking) in one way or another are 
unable to cope correctly with either challenge when nonideal conditions of human nature hold. This work 
has found that such systems are less robust than the free banking alternative in attaining the wealth-
enhancing goals of expectational stability and monetary equilibrium.   
 
Overall, the comparative assessment of alternative monetary regimes suggests that among the systems 
analyzed in this work, only free banking seems to utilize self-interest, align incentives, secure self-
enforceability, and transmit diverse epistemic and banking signals as required to achieve expectational 
stability, constitutional robustness, and monetary equilibrium whenever the epistemic and incentive 
conditions of the economic actors and politics present within the systems are less than ideal. If monetary 
equilibrium and monetary neutrality are the normative goals of monetary policy, then in order to obtain 
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a stable and orderly system of exchanges (Lutz, 1969; Myrdal, 1965 [1939]) monetary theorists should 
also encourage those monetary and banking institutions that, under nonideal conditions, best allow 
society to discover the optimal and equilibrating, yet unknown, forms of monetary policy that are actually 
capable of matching individuals’ actual money balances with their desired money balances or self-
correcting them when the two do not match (Clower, 1984a, 1984b).  
 
I have argued throughout parts II and III that free banking regimes, or polycentric frameworks of banking 
more broadly, are best at generating competition and cooperation among issuing banks. They also 
generate interactions among issuing banks, clearinghouses, and customers that best allow for different 
banking jurisdictions (such as private banks and clearinghouses as suggested in chapter 3) to dynamically 
resolve the monetary knowledge problem of attaining monetary equilibrium through the use of 
competition, decentralized monetary experimentation, and learning (Paniagua, 2019b). 132  All of the 
issuing banks and clearinghouses are imbued also with the correct incentives of profit and loss.         
 
Indeed, as Aligica (2014) acknowledged throughout his broader work on polycentricity, that resonates 
also with the epistemic and institutional properties of free banking explored in this chapter (see also 
chapter 3): 
 
If experimentalism is a central issue . . . then one can hardly think of a better arena of 
experimentation than polycentricity. It is a system of reciprocal monitoring and assessment 
in dynamic interdependence. The various units and decision-making centers depend on 
each other or compete with each other or both. They must stay informed about (and be 
prepared to adjust to) the evolutions of other units. (Aligica, 2014, 66)   
 
Considering the major findings of this work regarding both the lack of a strong and intrinsic institutional 
rationale for central banking (see part II) and free banking’s higher degree of political-economic 
robustness (see part III), it seems reasonable to finally ask: why do we not see more free banking reforms? 
One plausible answer lies in the fact that political dynamics, private corporate incentives, and interest 
groups are usually in strong opposition to reforms toward freer, more decentralized, and more 
competitive structures (Becker, 1983; Stigler, 1971; Zingales, 2012). Indeed, as part II suggested, banking 
systems and monetary frameworks in general are the emergent institutional embodiment of the broad 
political system and the dynamic political bargains and entanglements among interest groups, rent 
seekers, and politicians through time (see also chapter 4 in this thesis). 
 
Consequently, governments, political coalitions, and interest groups ‘shape laws, policies, and regulations 
in their favor—often at the expense of everyone else. . . . [A] country does not ‘choose’ its banking 
system: rather it gets a banking system that is consistent with the institutions that govern its distribution 
of political power’ (Calomiris and Haber, 2014, 4). Hence future monetary research should focus also on: 
the political and constitutional context within which money is produced, particularly the relative 
robustness of monetary frameworks in the face of political recapture; institutional switching costs; 
monetary arrangements’ comparative robustness with respect to political structures for distributing 
power; and ultimately, how we can adjust existent monocentric structures of regulatory financial power 
and the incentive structures of politicians, bankers, and interest groups alike so that sound reforms toward 
polycentric and competitive forms of banking could be enacted. It is my hope that this entire work, 
through its emphasis on complexity, knowledge, and the political economy and institutional analysis of 










132 Readers interested in the institutional and analytical relationships between a polycentric system of  banking and the notion 
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